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The literature on security sector actors in transitional societies emerging from war 
and/or authoritarianism has evolved by critiquing local perspectives recently. 
While the existing literature has extensively analysed transitional societies in 
Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe, the thesis adds a new geographical 
perspective by providing a case study of security sector change processes in the 
Republic of Georgia, 1985 - 2008. More specifically, the thesis examines the local 
processes and drivers of security sector change in Georgia, and their inter-
relationships with donor supported programmes including SSR. The thesis 
employs a political economy analysis to examine indigenous security sector 
actors and their characteristics. Based on the approach, the thesis particularly 
examines processes of change and reform of policing institutions. The 
paramilitary is identified and examined as a key focus for analysis. 
 
The research shows that political dynamics among a few political elites 
determined the course of security sector change in Georgia. Despite ample 
external assistance, domestic political dynamics remained the main driving factor 
in the SSR agenda-setting process. In the politically-driven security sector 
change efforts, the restoration and maintenance of regime security remained a 
priority under both the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes. Overall, the 
security sector actors played significant role in the political developments. 
Consequently, the process of changing these actors was a largely domestically 
driven political process. The role of paramilitaries in relation to regime security 
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and the security sector change agenda-setting process in Georgia requires the 
security sector research to treat paramilitary as a distinguished unit for 
consideration. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction: security sector change and political transition in Georgia 
 
The thesis is an investigative research to provide a better understanding of the 
political transition in Georgia between 1985 and 2008. During the transition, 
security sector actors played a pivotal role in Georgian politics and power struggle 
in society. The thesis thus discusses security sector change in Georgia in the 
wider political transition. Placing its analytical centrality on the political nature of 
security sector change, the thesis focuses on security sector actors with policing 
function, in particular paramilitaries, which have had closely interacted with the 
overall political transition in Georgia.  
 
Since the Republic of Georgia emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991, it has 
experienced a socio-political transition from a Soviet republic to an independent 
and democratic state. It also underwent a number of violent conflicts in the 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as proper Georgia in 
the aftermath of the independence. In the transition process, a wide variety of 
social, economic and political changes took place. Georgia underwent a radical 
shift from a centralised and controlled economy to market economy. It also 
needed to depart from the Soviet legacy and develop its own sovereign state 
institutions.  
 
The transition from a Soviet to a newly independent state meant a need for a 
drastic change in the security sector, too. In the Soviet Union countries including 
Georgia, the security sector actors, especially with policing function, played a 
crucial role in ensuring the security and stability for the regime. In the 
democratisation process in post-independent Georgia required the security 
sector to undertake a significant normative transition from an authoritarian to a 
democratic apparatus. In other words, security sector change in the 
democratisation reform meant a deprivation of the monopoly over the use of 
violence for those in power. 
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Since the mid-1990s, democratic reform efforts such as so-called security sector 
reform (SSR) began to take place in Georgia under the president Eduard 
Shevardnadze and then continued under his predecessor, Mikheil Saakashvili. 
The Western alliance supported the democratisation process by providing 
external assistance, too. However, the nature of the security sector actors did not 
alter significantly since the Soviet times. Security sector change in Georgia did 
not accompany significant normative transformation. Rather, most of them 
restored the authoritarian nature.  
 
This thesis posits that security sector change in transitional Georgia closely 
interlinked with multiple of domestic socioeconomic and political factors and 
dynamics among them rather than norm-based democratic reform and SSR 
discourses and interventions. If it was not the norm-based reform efforts, then, 
what determined the course of security sector change in Georgia, and how? To 
address the question, this thesis investigates the recent history of security sector 
change in Georgia between 1985 and 2008. The study demonstrates an explicit 
example of how the social change including institutional change in the security 
sector that took place in a state-building and peacebuilding context.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
This thesis provides a case study of security sector change process in Georgia, 
and their relationships with SSR as a more normative agenda associated with 
external donor support and cooperation. The thesis examines a transitional 
society emerging from an authoritarian regime and violent conflicts, Georgia. 
 
1.2.1 Main research questions 
 
The thesis investigates the first primary research question: ‘What factors 
determined and/or influenced the course of security sector change in Georgia 
during the period of political transition between 1985 and 2008?’ The thesis 
focuses on the political nature of security sector change, and how varying political 
and socioeconomic factors interact with security sector change in transitional 
Georgia. The security sector includes a wide range of actors such as military, 
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police, border control and so forth, as discussed in the subsequent section. As 
Georgia’s example demonstrates, paramilitaries and other security sector actors 
with policing function are prominent actors in politicised security sector change 
as well as in an overall political transition, because they are particularly close to 
the power. The thesis therefore focuses on paramilitaries and examines the 
following questions: ‘What factors have determined or influenced changes in 
paramilitary groups and activities in Georgia between 1985 and 2008, and how 
do these changes relate to SSR programmes?’ 
 
The second primary question lies on the interplay between SSR and security 
sector change. In particular, the thesis analyses the following second primary 
research question: ‘What have been the interrelations between normatively-
informed SSR agendas and programmes and security sector change in Georgia 
between 1985 and 2008?’ In the analysis, a distinction needs to be made between 
the two terms: SSR and security sector change. SSR is a normative policy 
discourse based on liberal democracy norms. Security sector change does not 
imply any normative issues but just refer to actual changes made in security 
sector actors. The thesis examines security sector change in the democratisation 
context in Georgia. The thesis pays due attention to domestic actors that pursued 
norm-based SSR agenda based on liberal democratic values. The thesis also 
examines external actors providing assistance leading to certain security sector 
change not necessarily in line with the normative SSR discourse. By doing so, 
the thesis explores the interplay between the security sector change process and 
SSR agendas.  
 
The following sub-questions on more precise issues are addressed in the thesis:  
 
 What roles did key security sector actors played during the key historical 
phases in Georgia? 
 What were the actual driving factors for security sector change and its 
agenda-setting process?  
 How the security sector actors interacted with the political dynamics in the 
key transitional periods in Georgia?  
 What was the interplay between international donors’ SSR assistance and 
actual change in the security sector like?  
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 Which security priorities were reflected in the security sector change 
process? 
 
1.2.2 Understanding terms 
 
How to understand terms such as security sector, SSR and paramilitary itself is 
a contesting issue and directly related to the central discussion of the thesis. 
Some of the subsequent chapters devote to discuss different views on those 
terms contributing to varying concepts of SSR and paramilitaries. Before we 
move on to the discussion, however, it is useful to provide working definitions of 
security sector, SSR and paramilitaries in this research. 
 
1.2.2.1 Security sector 
 
Security sector actors include a wide range of actors. Although components of a 
security sector vary among the scholars and literature, they basically agree on 
including security institutions which are responsible for securing state’s and 
citizen’s security. This thesis adopts the OECD DAC’s definition of the security 
sector which refers to a) official security sector apparatus including military, police, 
border and custom services, intelligence services, civilian management and 
oversight bodies, paramilitary, judiciary, and penal system; and b) non-official 
security sector apparatus including non-statutory security forces and non-
statutory civil society groups (OECD/DAC, 2005). Some organisations and 
scholars prefer the term security system to security sector. More specifically, the 
security sector includes: 
 
 Core security actors: armed forces (including international and regional 
forces), police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, 
intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs 
authorities, and reserve and local security units; 
 Security management and oversight bodies: parliament/legislature and its 
relevant legislative committees, government/the executive, including 
ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs, national security 
advisory boards; customary and traditional authorities; financial 
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management bodies; and civil society actors, including the media, 
academia and non-governmental organisations; 
 Justice and rule of law institutions: justice ministries, prisons, criminal 
investigation and prosecution services, the judiciary (courts and tribunals), 
implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and 
traditional justice systems, human rights commissions and ombudsmen; 
 Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private 
body-guard units, private security companies, private military companies 
and political party militia; and 
 Non-statutory civil society groups: professional groups, the media, 
research organisations, advocacy organisations, religious organisations, 
non-governmental organisations and community groups.1  
 
Some earlier SSR policy documents limit the scope of the word security sector 
only to state security actors.2 However, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, 
in conflict-affected transitional environments, non-state actors including of 
warlords and their irregular non-state armed forces demonstrates significant if not 
most influential players in societies. Recognising their socio-political dynamics 
and roles, this thesis not only includes non-state actors in a security sector and 
uses the wide definition of a security sector but also treats them as one of the 
main research subjects. 
 
In transitional societies emerging from an authoritarian regime and/or armed 
conflict, security sector actors are often perpetrators of violence and coerce 
regime control. In transitional society like Georgia, the security sector is often 
highly politicised, and so is the process of changing it. Identifying driving factors 
                                                          
1 Adopted from Kristin Valasek, Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit (Bastick and Valasek, 2008, 
p. 2) and OECD/DAC, Security System Reform and Governance (OECD/DAC, 2005, pp. 20–21). 
2 For instance, OECD’s DAC states that the security sector encompasses:  
 
 “[…] a) state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the  state  and its 
 citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police, the intelligence 
 services and similar bodies); and b) the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible 
 for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g. Parliament and the Executive).”  
 
DAC 2000, Security-sector Reform and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for 
Enhancing Police Coherence (preliminary paper), OECD, Paris, p.9, cited in Security-sector Reform in 
Developing Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate and Potentials for Implementing Reform 
with Recommendations for Technical Cooperation  (GTZ, 2000). 
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and analysing dynamics of security sector change is the key to understanding 
political transition in transitional societies where security sector actors play 
significant role in power struggle.  
 
1.2.2.2 Security sector reform (SSR) 
 
Transforming security sector actors into democratic actors ensuring security is an 
acute yet most challenging issue. There have been a variety of topics/issues to 
discussing security sector change, such as democratic control of armed forces 
and institutional development of law enforcement institutions. Since the 2000’s, 
the SSR discourse began to emerge and encapsulate the various topics related 
to security sector change. Liberal democratic values are embedded in the SSR 
discourse.  
 
Based on definitions used in the existing SSR literature (Ball, 1998, 1988; 
Chalmers, 2000; DFID, 2000a; GTZ, 2000; Hendrickson, 1999; OECD/DAC, 
2008, 2005, 2000), the thesis understands SSR as a norm-based policy 
discourse aiming to address ill governance in the above-mentioned security 
actors, and in case of some conflict-affected transitional societies, non-state 
security actors which are either dismantled or integrated into a formal state 
security sector.  
 
The objects of SSR usually include strengthening civilian control of security 
forces; enhancing accountability and transparency in a security sector; and 
professionalising security forces and civilians in a security sector. Based on these 
objects, SSR assistance programmes are translated into various components of 
activities. These components usually include activities such as: strengthening 
civilian control and oversight of the security sector (reforming ministries of 
defence and internal affairs; enhancing the oversight capacity of legislators 
through training. Establishing independence ombudspersons’ offices; initiating 
public sector reviews of military expenditures; and building the capacity of civil 
society organisations to oversee the security sector); professoinalisation of the 
security forces (programmes designed to train soldiers, police and other security 
sector personnel on democratic accountability, gender issues, human rights, 
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international humanitarian law and ethnic sensitivity; technical skills training; 
promoting community policing; upgrading of military or police equipment; and 
drawing up professional codes of conduct);  demilitarisation and peace-building 
(programmes to reduce the availability and misuse of small arms and light 
weapons; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; and 
strengthening regional security measures); and strengthening the rule of law 
(establishing a strong, independent legal framework that provides critical civil-
democratic oversight and a better functioning penal system, capacity building for 
the judiciary; and establishing an independent judiciary)  (Bastick and Valasek, 
2008, p. 2). 
 
1.2.2.3 Paramilitary 
 
The definition of paramilitary is rather blurred and ambiguous. Recognising the 
elusive boundary of paramilitaries, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics states that: 
 
“Paramilitary forces are those uniformed, armed and disciplined bodies 
that exist in most countries to carry out internal security and policing 
functions which are beyond the capacity of ordinary police forces. 
Frequently the boundaries between what would be considered an ordinary 
police force and a paramilitary force are very blurred” (Robertson, 1993, p. 
363). 
 
The word paramilitary is often used to refer to non-state, anti-government armed 
forces rather than state forces, too. Anti-governmental armed groups such as 
FARC and the IRA are the two most examples referred as paramilitary examples.  
 
Paramilitary is not clearly defined and requires a scrutiny. The blurred definition 
stems from the phenomena that paramilitary often takes a variety of different 
types of equipment and composition, institutional affiliation, as well as function 
and mandate. In order to better understand paramilitary, their interplay with the 
SSR process and for a refined SSR concept, the varying types and uses of 
paramilitary need to be unpacked and analysed properly. The subsequent 
chapters provide more detailed discussions on the issue. In the meanwhile, the 
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thesis adopts a working definition of paramilitary which refers to non-military 
armed forces which are equipped with military weapons. 
 
1.2.3 Research focus on Georgia and paramilitary 
 
The case study sets its focus on Georgia. The thesis provides a historical analysis 
on Georgia’s domestic political dynamics and how it affects the security sector 
change process. Political scientists, including those of security studies, have 
examined Georgia extensively after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. However, 
most of these studies merely looked at Georgia along with other former-Soviet 
Union republics and examined their democratisation processes in comparison 
with Ukraine and the Baltic States or the ethnic conflicts with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia but have not sufficiently focused on the Georgian domestic political 
dynamics. This led to some weaknesses and gaps in the understanding of 
political and social developments within Georgia, particularly less studied ethnic 
minority issues in the territory of so-called proper Georgia.  
 
Against the background, the thesis is based in part on extensive field research 
as well as and a historical analysis on Georgia as the main case study, bringing 
deeper understanding of complex security issues in different ethnic groups in 
communities, as well as the interplay between Georgian politics and the security 
sector change process. The thesis analyses and examines what domestic and 
external socio-political factors influenced the agenda-setting processes in 
Georgia in three key transitional periods: a) between the late 1980 and early 
1991: the transition from Soviet to independent Georgia; b) between 1992 and 
2003: the stabilization process under President Eduard Shevardnadze; and c) 
between 2004 and 2008: the “democratisation” reform under President Mikheil 
Saakashvili. The close look at those key transitional periods offers the readers a 
set of various socio-political transition samples: from a Soviet to an independent 
state; from a conflict-affected to post-conflict country; and from a new 
independent democracy to country with relatively more consolidated democracy. 
 
This way, the thesis is to provide a detailed examination and a political analysis 
of the security sector change process in Georgia. In particular, the thesis 
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examines what domestic security, political, political economy, and societal factors 
influenced the agenda-setting of security sector change during the three 
transitional phases in the post-independent Georgian history in which Georgia 
experienced state-building, peacebuilding and social change from an 
authoritarian state to a democratic state. The thesis presents Georgia’s case as 
an example of challenges, obstacles and resistance in the security sector change 
process. Although the nature of the security sector and insecurity are country-
specific, these challenges are highly relevant to contexts in each society 
experiencing similar transition such as state-building, peacebuilding and social 
change. It is therefore feasible to say that many of them are commonly found in 
other transitional societies. 
 
Another focus in this thesis is paramilitaries. The reason is twofold. First, in post-
conflict transitional societies, paramilitaries are politically influential. At the same 
time, politics influences paramilitaries and their reform process significantly. The 
intensive analysis on paramilitaries in Georgia provides an example to articulate 
roles of paramilitaries and their political economy dynamics within the security 
sector change process in transitional society. Through discussing the example of 
Georgia, the thesis provides insights to other countries experiencing security 
building in post-conflict settings, in order to open up a discussion on paramilitary 
reform.  
 
Second, paramilitary is a less studied subject in the SSR literature. The existing 
SSR literature have extensively documented on reform efforts on the police and 
militaries. However, in transitional and post-conflict societies, it is often hard to 
find clear-cut demarcation between the police, military and other security sector 
actors in transitional and post-conflict societies. Actual roles and functions of 
these forces are quite different from what the institutional labels suggest. 
Furthermore, paramilitaries are often the most powerful security sector actors 
closely associated with influential political elites and individuals in conflict-
affected societies. In such societies, paramilitary forces could be either state or 
non-state armed forces under prominent political figure and warlords. Such 
paramilitary forces are sometimes most capable and powerful security sector 
actors than the military and police. Yet, few SSR studies have been conducted to 
study actual roles, function and nature of paramilitaries in a post-conflict 
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transitional context. Similarly, the reform process of paramilitaries has been less 
documented than the ones for the military and police. Despite their socio-political 
influence in conflict-affected societies, the dynamics of the paramilitary reform 
have not been sufficiently addressed in the existing SSR literature. 
 
While argument in the thesis mainly draws its empirical support from Georgia, the 
issues involved have a salience beyond that context for other instances of 
protracted post-reconstruction in general. The understanding of the paramilitary 
dynamics and their interplay with political developments is crucial to understand 
which factors support and resist SSR in transitional and post-conflict societies. 
The thesis therefore aims to contribute to knowledge on SSR not only by 
providing an detailed analysis of security sector change and SSR processes in 
Georgia between the late 1980s and 2008, but also by focusing on paramilitaries 
and examining how paramilitary dynamics interplay with socio-political 
developments in post-conflict transitional societies. This way, the thesis aims at 
contributing to filling in the gap in the SSR knowledge.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
1.3.1 Research strategy 
 
This research sets its primal objective in investigating security sector change in 
the state-building and peacebuilding context and what factors brought the change. 
To investigate the query, the research takes a historical overview of the political 
transition and security sector change. The period between 1985 and 2008 is 
chosen to be the timeframe for the examination. In particular, the thesis focuses 
on the three key transitional periods: a) 1985 - 1991 during the transition from 
Soviet to independent Georgia; b) 1992 - 2003 under President Eduard 
Shevardnadze; and c) 2004 - 2008 under President Mikheil Saakashvili. These 
phases were chosen because Georgia experienced substantial socio-political 
transitions, i.e., independence movement, state-building and peacebuilding and 
attempted social change from an authoritarian state to a democratic state. 
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1.3.1.1 Differentiating SSR and security sector change 
 
It should be noted that in this thesis the terms SSR and ‘security sector change’ 
are treated as two different concepts. SSR, a set of reform efforts, either 
conducted by a country itself and/or the international donor communities, refers 
to the policy discourse informed by the liberal democratic norms. The word SSR 
in this thesis is understood as a concept that encompasses a wide range of 
reform policy agendas and activities based on liberal democratic norms as 
elaborated in the previous section. 
 
On the other hand, the term ‘security sector change’ in this thesis refers to mere 
changes, not norm-based reform efforts, in the security sector. When the thesis 
employs the term ‘security sector change’, it looks at the overall security sector 
transformation and associated socioeconomic and political change process, not 
limited to the normative reform agenda, i.e., SSR. The investigation in this thesis 
places its central focus on analysing the overall process of security sector change, 
in which SSR efforts were included. 
 
1.3.1.2 Single case study and process tracing 
 
To achieve the goal, the thesis applies single case study and process tracing as 
overall research methods. Rather than applying the process tracing methods in 
multiple case studies, this research applies a single case study method. This is 
because the aim of this case study is the objective of this research is to scrutinise 
a historical process of security sector change; and identify and examine factors 
that influenced and/or determined the change process, and not to present an 
archetypal example. ‘A goal of a case study is to expand and generalise theories 
and not to enumerate frequencies’ (Yin, 1984), and this goal applies to the 
research in this thesis. The research thus carries out an extensive examination 
of Georgia’s case rather than listing a wide array of examples from various 
countries. 
 
The thesis applies process tracing methods to the single case study on Georgia. 
Process tracing is a qualitative analysis tool often applied to within-case analysis 
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based on qualitative data (Collier, p. 823). Alexander George and Timothy 
McKeown explain that the process-tracing method is an analytical tool to 
“investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial are 
translated into outcomes” (George and McKeown, 1985, p. 35). The ‘process 
tracing’ method is effective in the thesis’ historical investigation of institutional 
changes in the security sector and enables to identify factors that brought these 
changes. The reason is twofold. First, in-depth studies on security sector change 
in Georgia over a chronological timeframe are less available in comparison with 
other countries with similar experiences. By providing intensive research on 
Georgia offers a case study upon which future research can be built upon. 
Second, the chrono historical scrutiny on Georgia provides ample data to conduct 
process tracing over the chronological change process in the security sector.  
 
1.3.2 Research methods 
 
In analysing causation in the trajectories of security sector change (dependent 
variables), the process tracing approach in this research employs a political 
economy analysis framework. The political economy analysis examines the 
following factors: a) structural features in what security sector change took place 
(independent variables); b) key institutions and individuals, their incentives and 
motivations for certain (or no) changes in the security sector and decision logics 
during the SSR agenda-setting process (independent variables); and c) dynamics 
between key institutions and individuals (intervening variables).  
 
1.3.2.1 Data collection and analysis 
 
The single case study approach in this thesis employs mixed research methods. 
In the research, different data and methods of data collection and analysis are 
triangulated. The thesis reviews primary and secondary documents, open and 
semi-structured interviews relevant stakeholders including Georgian 
parliamentarians, local and international researchers, officials from local and 
international organisations, as well as governmental agencies. At community 
level, focus group discussions were conducted with local community members. 
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The research employed and triangulated various methods of data collection. Data 
collection was carried out through a) primary and secondary data collection, b) 
semi- and un-structured interviews, and c) focus group discussions.  
 
Primary and secondary data were collected from relevant organisations. 
Quantitative data such as crime rates were triangulated with qualitative data in 
this study. Secondary data sources were draw from both official and unofficial 
materials including documentation (such as project progress reports, former 
studies of the same areas under study, newspaper clippings and other articles 
appearing in the media) and archival records (such as organisational records 
such as organisational charts and budgets).  
 
Semi-and un-structured interviews were conducted with Georgian officials from 
the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, State Security and Defence. 
Relevant personnel from local and international researchers, non-governmental 
organisations and international organisations were also interviewed. There are 
few written documents on paramilitaries as well as records on reform efforts and 
changes concerning the security sector institutions in the 1990s. Thus, those 
interviews were conducted precisely to fill in the gap in the literature and to 
reconstruct institutional memories among relevant personnel. Because of this 
reason, this research chose interviewees from political figures including 
parliamentarians and civil society leaders, who had direct involvement in the 
reform process, rather than governmental officials. 
 
For a closer examination on how socio-political dynamics affected people’s 
security at the community level, the research conducted focus group discussions 
with selected local community members in three different geographical locations. 
Sample data were collected from three communities of Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and 
Zugdidi, considering geographical and social variables. Those communities were 
extensively studied because, in addition to the national level SSR policy 
interventions, these communities experienced policy interventions such as border 
guard training, weapons collection programmes and community policing 
initiatives. 
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The other major criterion for the selection of the locations was the demographic 
composition of community members. Akhaltsikhe was chosen because of the 
Armenian community. Marneuli was chosen for its Azeri communities. Zugdidi 
was selected for its internally displaced persons (IDP) communities. The majority 
of the population in the region is Mingrelians. Therefore, Zugdidi also provided 
diverse perspectives among Georgians. The participatory methods allowed the 
research to obtain highly qualitative data including nuanced perceptions on 
security and security sector actors. 
 
Individual interviews were conducted in English. Focus group interviews were 
carried out either in Georgian or Russian, facilitated by local facilitators. The 
reason is primarily my limited abilities of conducting interviews in either of the 
languages. 
 
The choice of languages used in the individual and focus group interviews pose 
some research implications and limitations. The choice of the languages for the 
interviews is reflected in the number and variety of interview samples. Conducting 
interviews in English resulted in fewer interviews with officials at the Ministries of 
Internal Affairs and State Security who preferred using in either Georgian or 
Russian rather than English at interviews. In comparison, most of the 
respondents from the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministries, NGOs and 
academic institutions responded to my interview requests positively as they 
tended to prefer using English to using Russian at interviews.  
 
Table 1 Distribution of focus group interview participants 
 
Location Gender Number of participants 
Akhaltsikhe Male 8 
Female 8 
Marneuli Male 8 
Female 8 
Zugdidi Male 10 
Female 9 
Total  51 
 
15 
 
1.3.2.2 Issues of ethics and security 
 
Given the sensitive research topic, an issue of security for the informants and the 
researcher was well considered. Privacy of the focus group discussion 
workshops was protected. Upon requests of some key informants, quotations 
from certain participants and interviewees appeared in anonymous form in any 
written outcomes of the research. Materials produced during the workshops were 
removed from the communities, in order to avoid unnecessary suspicion from 
local authorities. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis comprises with three parts. Part I provides an introduction and a 
literature review. It consists of chapter 1 and chapter 2. Part II consists of five 
core analytical chapters: chapters 3 to 7. This part of the thesis offers an in-depth, 
detailed analysis of the security sector change process in Georgia between 1985 
and 2008, and examines what factors interacted and/or influenced the agenda 
and course of security sector change. Part III (chapter 8) examines how the 
domestic agenda-setting process for security sector change is driven by certain 
dynamics and factors in Georgia and other transitional societies by placing an 
analytical focus on paramilitaries. 
 
In the first part of this thesis, chapter 1 aims to establish the base upon which the 
thesis is built. The objective of chapter 1 is to explain the research background 
and introduce research questions and methodology employed in this research.  
 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 aims at providing a critical review 
of the existing literature related to the research questions. The chapter reviews 
the literature exploring issues related to the relation between security sector 
actors and political developments, by focusing on key debates and critiques in 
the civil-military relations, the security sector in transitional societies, as well as 
peacebuilding. By doing so, the chapter engages with the debates in the three 
literature areas for which the thesis contributes the knowledge to. chapter 2 
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concludes by justifying the overall research strategy used in this research and 
introduces a political economy analysis framework applied in the research. 
 
The objective of the chapters in Part II (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) is to investigate 
the two primary research questions of this thesis. First, it aims to provide an 
analysis for the first primary research question: ‘What factors determined and/or 
influenced the course of security sector change in Georgia during the period of 
political transition between 1985 and 2008?’ To address the question, it examines 
the politics and process of agenda-setting of the reform of the security sector 
actors by applying a political economy analysis framework. By critically examining 
the relationships between domestic and international reform efforts and the actual 
changes in the security sector, Part II aims to answer the second primary 
research question on the interrelation between normatively-informed SSR 
agendas and security sector change in Georgia. 
 
More specifically, chapters 3, 4 and 6 aim to provide an understanding of security 
sector change in the three transitional periods: a) 1985 - 1991: the transition from 
Soviet to independent Georgia (chapter 3); b) 1992 - 2003: the Shevardnadze 
regime (chapter 4) and c) 2003 - 2008: the Saakashvili regime (chapter 6). 
Chapters 3, 4 and 6 provide detailed systematic mapping and analysis of security 
sector change, including domestic reform efforts and international SSR 
assistance initiatives and identify factors that determined and/or influenced the 
course of security sector change. Chapters 3, 4 and 6 focuses on exploring what 
factors influence the course of security sector change in the respective time 
frameworks in Georgia. These chapters aim at scrutinising actual roles played by 
the security sector actors and how these actors interacted with the political 
dynamics during the transitional periods in the three transitional periods. Based 
on the political economy analysis of the interaction between the security sector 
actors and the political dynamics, the three chapters examine what factors drove 
the agenda-setting process of security sector change.  
 
Chapters 5 and 7 aim to analyse interrelations between the domestic dynamics 
in security sector change and international SSR assistance efforts and interrogate 
which security priorities were reflected in the security sector change process. 
External assistance for the security sector began to arrive in key areas in the 
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Georgian security sector since the Shevardnadze period onwards. Both the 
chapters aim at examining how the external assistance was actually received and 
perceived on the ground by focusing on the Shevardnadze period: 1992 – 2003 
(chapter 5) and the Saakashvili period: 2004 – 2008 (chapter 7).  
 
Part III consists of chapter 8. Chapter 8 seeks to provide a better understanding 
on paramilitary in transitional societies. Based on the analysis in the preceding 
chapters in Part II and the further scrutiny on paramilitaries, chapter 8 analyses 
what factors contributed to shaping the course of the paramilitary change and 
how. While the chapter develops its argument by being based on the Georgia 
case study, it also refers to other countries’ examples. For doing so, chapter 8 
explores the Georgia example further to demonstrate paramilitaries’ roles and its 
interplay with political dynamics. 
 
The thesis ends with chapter 9 which discusses findings and conclusions in 
relation to the overall research questions. It presents contributions of the thesis 
to the respective bodies of knowledge and closes with suggested directions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 The relation between security sector actors and political 
developments 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter provides a review of approaches to understanding the relation 
between security sector actors and political developments. Studies on 
understanding the relation between security sector change and political 
developments is nothing new in the field of social science. The main research 
interest of the thesis, i.e., “What factors determine and/or influence security sector 
change during a political transition?” is built on the key debates and critiques 
emerged in the relevant literature. By doing so, this chapter places this 
investigation on the research question in the wider scholarly context. This chapter 
begins by focusing on existing research on the relation between security sector 
actors in societies, in particular, societies emerging from violent conflict and/or 
authoritarian regime. This chapter then proceeds to introduce the political 
economy analysis framework applied in the case study on Georgia in the 
subsequent analytical chapters. 
 
2.2 Review of literature exploring the relation between security sector actors 
and political developments 
 
This section examines the literature related to the overall research question. In 
particular, the section examines the two bodies of literature i.e. one concerning 
security sector actors in political developments and another on peacebuilding and 
identifies gaps in key arguments and analytical approaches. 
 
2.2.1 Security sector actors and political developments 
 
2.2.1.1 Civil-military relations in liberal democracies 
 
The study on the relation between security sector actors and political 
developments could be traced back as early as the 1950’s. One of the pivotal and 
19 
 
influential studies is Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State: the Theory 
and Politics of Civil-military Relations (Huntington, 1957). Placing the security 
sector actors, especially the military, as the main actor in political developments, 
Huntington argues that that civilian control can be achieved through “the 
maximizing of military professionalism” (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). Huntington 
claimed: “The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in 
politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involves 
in institutional, class, and constitutional politics” (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). 
 
Following Huntington’s work, the study on the civil-military relationship with 
special attention the military’s role in political developments developed during the 
1960’s. Some critiques against Huntington’s argument that the recognition of 
autonomous military professionalism leads to the achievement of objective 
civilian control (Finer, 1962; Janowitz, 1964, 1960). For instance, while 
Huntington argued for the strict separation between the military and politics, other 
scholars such as Janowitz employed less rigorous lenses to view the military. 
Janowitz pointed out the possibility that the military may change its existence, for 
instance; “the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is 
continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks 
viable international relations, rather than victory” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418).  
 
When discussing issues raised in civil-military relations, many of the civil-military 
relations studies place its focus on the military in liberal democracies (Dunlap, 
1992; Foster, 1997; Holsti, 2001; Kohn, 2002, 1994; Luttwak, 1994; Weigley, 
1993). These studies discussed the relation between the military and politics with 
the assumption that the military as a relatively centralised and homogeneous 
national institution (Clapham, 1996; Huntington, 1957; Im, 1987; Kolkowicz and 
Korbonski, 1982; Maniruzzaman, 1987). 
 
2.2.1.2 The security sector and democratic transition in authoritarian 
societies 
 
Since the 1980s, the security sector actors have increasingly regarded as active 
players in state formation in transitional societies, especially in authoritarian 
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societies. Studies on the security sector in the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy emerged since 1980 as the Cold War structure began to dissolve 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnel et al., 1986; Stepan, 1988). In contrast with 
the studies on the civil-military relations in liberal democratic countries, these 
studies on the security sector in authoritarian countries examined the resilience 
of authoritarian regime (Bellin, 2004; Posusney and Angrist, 2005; Schlumberger, 
2007). Unlike the studies on civil-military relations, armed forces are least studied 
factor when it comes to democratisation process in post-totalitarianism (Stepan, 
1988, p. 22). 
 
The close examination of the authoritarian regime maintenance in the studies 
expanded their analytical scope and included the police and paramilitaries, given 
their roles in the regime maintenance (Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 1982; Quinlivan, 
1999). Furthermore, study on the security sector in authoritarian societies 
focused on the role of these armed forces as an economic actor (Nassif, 2013) 
and their interest lied in the maintenance of the regime which secures their 
economic benefits (Cook, 2007). 
 
These studies examined the regime maintenance functions of the wider range of 
security sector actors other than the military as well as their multi-faceted and 
more nuanced roles and critiqued the way the rigid assumption on the nature and 
role of the military assumed in the classic studies on civil-military relations such 
as those by Huntington.  
 
Scholars such as Davis and Pereira argue for expanding a research scope to 
examine:  
 
 “the wide variety of diverse social and political and even economic 
 institutions in which military personnel or other armed forces play a part. 
 These include intelligence agencies, militia, paramilitary forces, police 
 and even veteran associations” (Davis and Pereira, 2003, p. 13). 
 
Emphasising the importance of “unpacking” the military as an institution (Davis 
and Pereira, 2003, p. 14), Davis and Pereira argue to “reintroduce studies on 
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irregular or nonconventional armed forces to the literature on politics and state 
formation” (Davis and Pereira, 2003, p. 8). 
 
2.2.1.3 Paramilitaries in conflict-affected societies 
 
More recently, there are an increasing number of examples that the emergence 
of paramilitaries, either of state, quasi-state and non-state natures in the former 
communist countries and Middle East. 
 
The first example is the recent trend in Central and Eastern European countries 
that have undergone the geopolitical uncertainties triggered by the de facto 
annexation of Crimea by Russia and the influx of refugees escaping from the 
chronic insecurities in Middle East. A large number of non-state paramilitary 
forces have fought both on the pro-Kiev and pro-Moscow sides in the violent 
conflict that broke out in eastern Ukraine in 2014. (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 
2016) Over the last two years, the Baltic States have increased their state-
paramilitary units (“The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe,” 
2016). Poland also plans to recruit and train civilian volunteers in military skills 
(“Poland plans paramilitary force of 35,000 to counter Russia,” 2016). The aim of 
this paramilitary recruitment and training is to counter warfare of the kind that was 
fought by non-state Ukrainian paramilitaries loyal to Russia (“Poland plans 
paramilitary force of 35,000 to counter Russia,” 2016). In the Balkans, a 
numerous non-state paramilitary have been organised and consisted of “far-right 
elements” in amidst of the influx of refugees arriving from the neighbouring 
conflict-affected countries.3 In Middle East countries, paramilitaries are the major 
actor in the recent conflict against the Islamic States as well as the one in Syria. 
In Iraq, civilians reportedly volunteer to form their own defence forces to counter 
Islamic States fighters (“The Christian militia taking on Islamic State in Iraq,” 
2015). Syria has a number of influential paramilitaries, including National Defence 
Force (NDF) with a reportedly number of more than 100,000 fighters (“No peace 
in sight in Syria,” 2016). 
                                                          
3 Those groups include the Slovenskí Branci (Slovak Recruits) and Vzdor Kysuce (Kysuce Defiance) in 
Slovakia; the Českoslovenštívojáci v záloz (CVZ, Czechoslovak Reservist Soldiers) in the Czech 
Republic; the Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (Hungarian National Front) and Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom 
(Hungarian Self Defence Movement) in Hungary (“The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” 2016). 
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The recent warfare fought by other irregular forces such as the case in Ukraine 
and other countries in the region has attracted scholarly attention to paramilitaries. 
(Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016) The publication of a special issue of The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution4) entirely dedicated to research on militias is one 
of the examples of the increasing interest among academia in the issue of 
paramilitaries. More recently, Aliyev provides a comprehensive overview of the 
definition of paramilitaries, (Aliyev, 2016, pp. 499–501) along with a reference to 
various paramilitary groups in the world. (Aliyev, 2016, pp. 502–503)  
 
Research on paramilitaries needs to be further developed. For instance, the term 
paramilitary has still been used elusively. No common definition of paramilitary 
exists yet. Without providing conceptual clarity, “the term “paramilitary” has been 
used colloquially as a sort of “catch-all’ rather than with any sort of precision or 
analytic conceptualization.” (Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) The term ‘paramilitary’ has been 
often used interchangeably with militia, and/or refer to specific anti-government 
armed forces, namely, the IRA and Colombia’s FARC. Built on the anti-
governmental paramilitary forces in Colombia, Mazzei defines that: 
 
 “Paramilitary groups are political, armed organizations that are by 
 definition extramilitary, extra-State, noninstitutional entities, but which 
 mobilize and  operate within the assistance of important allies, including 
 factions within the State.” (Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) 
 
Yet, as Mazzei herself admits, this definition of does not suffice. Mazzei describes 
the lack of any definitive meaning “an obvious obstacle to both theory building 
and policy making.” (Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) While the recognition of the need for 
defining paramilitary has increased, the definition of the term has remained 
centered on its political and institutional status in relation to a State.  
 
Paramilitaries have still received relatively less attention as a main analytical unit 
by the academic research. 5  There has been literature on paramilitaries in 
                                                          
4 Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 59, Issue 5, published in August 2015.  
5 One of the few exceptions was Hills whose research looked at paramilitary forces in Africa in the 
context of post-colonial policing (Hills, 2000). 
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Colombia and Northern Ireland that extensively studies the paramilitaries’ 
involvement in the violent conflicts in those two countries. Paramilitary forces in 
Latin America were examined by Latin Americanist scholars. Mazzei’s study on 
paramilitaries focuses on the emergence of paramilitaries. Its geographical focus 
is on Latin America. 
 
In order to reach better understanding of paramilitaries, the breadth and variety 
of paramilitary research is yet to be expanded. On one hand, the geographical 
scope of paramilitary research is on a gradual rise mainly due to the recent 
publications on the Ukrainian paramilitary forces, although the number of 
literatures still remain small.6 On the other hand, the analytical framework of the 
current paramilitary research has been largely centred on and limited to 
paramilitaries’ relations with a state. The recent discussions on paramilitaries pay 
its main focus on their affiliation with state. A group of scholars examine 
paramilitaries from the perspectives of whether they are associated with states 
or not (Aliyev, 2016; Mazzei, 2009). For instance, on the difference between 
paramilitary and other armed forces like militias and elite military factions, Mazzei 
points out the leverage that paramilitary groups gain from their relation with a 
state. According to Mazzei, “It is the relationship between the PMG and significant 
factions within the State itself that both distinguishes PMGs from other violent 
actors and highlights one of the analytical weak spots in the literature on political 
violence” (Mazzei, 2009, p. 5). 
 
This relation-focused analysis has been further developed by Aliyev (Aliyev, 
2016). Aliyev shows two different types of paramilitaries: a) ` state-parallel` militias 
and b) `state-manipulated` militias. Pointing out that studies on the former type of 
paramilitaries, or militia, as he uses the two terms interchangeably, Aliyev offers 
another theoretical approach to think about paramilitaries by terming `state-
parallel paramilitaries’. While this observation shows the varying types of 
paramilitaries, Aliyev’s focus remains on the issue of paramilitaries’ association 
with a state (Aliyev, 2016). 
                                                          
6 For instance, Kuzio T (2000): The non-military security forces in Ukraine. The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 13(4): 29-56 (Kuzio, 2000) and Malyarenko T and Galbreath D J (2016) “Paramilitary 
motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolitions. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16 
(1), pp. 113-138 (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016) and Carey et al (2013) lists paramilitary case study 
literature on death squads in Latin America, political party organisations in Indonesia (Carey et al., 2013). 
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While those paramilitary studies’ analysis on the viewpoint of the paramilitary-
state relationship is important, there are a few analytical gaps. First of all, it needs 
to be pointed out that the studies are mainly drawn from the paramilitaries active 
in Colombia and other Latin American countries, where the states have a long 
history of sponsoring armed groups that are not formally affiliated to state 
structures yet executing violence by targeting anti-government actors. 
Paramilitaries are often active in societies where no strong state apparatus exists. 
In such societies, this paramilitary-state relationship based analysis may not have 
sufficient explanatory leverage.  
 
Another issue of the paramilitary-state relationship based analysis is its 
assumption that paramilitaries are non-governmental actors. By focusing on anti-
government armed groups in Colombia and elsewhere, the research by Mazzei 
and Aliyev focuses on non-governmental paramilitaries, either the state-
manipulated and state-parallel paramilitaries. This approach consequently 
excludes state paramilitary forces. 
 
The paramilitary-state relationship based analysis reveals another assumption 
that the paramilitary scholars seem to hold, i.e., a government is a static entity. 
Carey et al introduces a database on pro-government militias. (Carey et al., 2013) 
The introduction of the dataset stemmed from a question “why governments with 
regular forces delegate to informal groups.” However, governments in conflict-
affected societies are often subjected to constant power struggle and 
governments. Their work on producing the dataset refers to a difficulty in 
identifying governments in some countries heavily affected by violent conflicts 
such as Lebanon and Somalia. 
 
2.2.2 Liberal peacebuilding and SSR 
 
Since the mid-1990s, a body of literature discussing the security sector 
institutions as subject for being reformed or developed has emerged in fields of 
peacebuilding, state-building and nation-building. 
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Since the end of the Cold War structure, the international community began to 
engage in efforts to reconstruct conflict-affected societies. UN- and/or US-led 
nation building interventions took place in various war-affected societies such as 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Bosnia, El Salvador, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, Mozambique, 
Somalia, and Timor Leste. The emergence of the concept of ‘state-building’ in 
peacebuilding context emerged as early as 1992 when the UN’s An Agenda for 
Peace proposed “reforming or strengthening government institutions”. (Boutrous-
Ghali, 1992) 
 
The concept of ‘failed states’ (and ‘fragile states’) was often employed in 
developing policy discourses for such international interventions and studies on 
such interventions. (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Helman and Ratner, 1992; 
OECD/DCD, 2005) In the state-building and peacebuilding literature, state 
security sector actors became to be treated as subjects to be reformed and 
developed. As discussed more in detail later in the section, the SSR concept is 
an example of policy discourses which regarded the security sector actors as 
institution rather than political entity which can influence and interact with local 
politics significantly. 
 
The concept of SSR emerged in the late 1980s in the development assistance 
context. Initially, in response to the wave of democratisation in Africa, scholars 
such as Ball discussed the issue of re-organising the security sector from a public 
spending point of view, in a wider context of structural adjustment. (Ball, 1988) 
Since then, the body of SSR literature has grown significantly both in terms of its 
volume and variety. Since the end of the 1990s, the international assistance 
community in Europe started to apply the SSR discourse in  post-conflict 
reconstruction and democratisation contexts by international assistance agencies 
and think tanks including Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), the 
UK Government and its Department for International Development (DFID), the 
Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). (Ball, 1998; 
Chalmers, 2000; Chanaa, 2002; Hendrickson, 1999; Wulf, 2000a, 2000b) 
 
During the early 2000’s, SSR discourses were further developed by international 
development assistance agencies. The main drivers of the SSR discourse 
development included the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
26 
 
Development (OECD), the British Department for International Development 
(DFID) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische (GTZ). These development 
assistance bodies started to link the issues of development and security, and 
significantly contributed to the development of SSR discourses by regarding SSR 
as a possible tool for establishing good governance and security in assistance 
recipient countries SSR. (DFID, 2000a; GTZ, 2000; OECD/DAC, 2000) In 2004, 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), chaired by the UK at that 
time, stated endorsed the policy statement and paper on security system reform. 
(OECD/DAC, 2005) Subsequently, OECD/DAC developed standard policy 
guidance and operational handbook that provide a comprehensive and systemic 
policy overview of SSR as an international assistance policy option. (OECD/DAC, 
2008) The European donor community spearheaded the SSR policy 
development process, followed by other international community members such 
as the United Nations and the United States.  
 
The conceptualisation of SSR had been refined further and contextualized by 
being applied to varying settings not only in development but also in post-
authoritarian and post-conflict contexts. (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004) For instance, 
in post-authoritarian context, SSR policies have been adopted by the EU and 
NATO in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. (Ebnöther et al., 
2007; Ebnöther and Gustenau, 2004) Those SSR efforts were often implemented 
along the other EU and/or NATO partnership frameworks under the overall 
eastern expansion of those regional organisations. SSR assistance was 
implemented in the spheres of defence, police and justice.  
 
Since the late 2000’s, SSR has increasingly become a policy discourse in 
peacebuilding context. In particular, the United Nations developed its own SSR 
policy framework by placing it as a key component within their peacebuilding 
policies and activities. (United Nations, 2014, 2013a, 2013b, 2012a, 2012b) 
Reflecting policy frameworks set out by the OECD/DAC, the UN’s SSR efforts in 
the peacebuilding context focuses on justice and capacity development of justice 
institutions. While the European countries and donor communities spearheaded 
in the formation of SSR discourses, the United States has developed their SSR 
approach by building on the US government’s foreign assistance experiences in 
security, peace and governance fields. In 2009, their policy framework and 
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guiding principles were jointly published by the Department of State, Department 
of Defence and US Agency for International Development (USAID). (USAID et al., 
2009) 
 
While the diverse assistance providers and policy makers have involved in the 
SSR policy discourse development, the SSR discourses within the assistance 
community can be divided into three approaches. 
 
2.2.2.1 Military-focused SSR approach 
 
The military-focused SSR thinking takes a static, institutional approach to the 
reform of security sector agencies, particularly the defence system. Their 
emphasis in reference to this type of SSR is on civil-military relations and 
development of military capacity of a country in concern. The establishment of 
democratic control of armed forces, in particular, military forces, is the aim of 
military-focused SSR discourse. In short, the building of military institutions is the 
central agenda of this category of SSR discourse.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War structure, SSR has been increasingly implemented 
in the former Communist bloc, particularly in the eastern European states. Such 
SSR often takes a form of modernisation of the defence system.7 By enhancing 
the civil-military relations in the NATO standard, the chain of command and 
operation will be smoothened once Partner country joins in co-operation. As 
prioritising and focusing on ‘professionalisation’ of armed forces,8 merely military, 
in a country of concern, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched in 
January 1994, with a purpose to integrate Central and Eastern European 
countries into NATO, aiming at increasing transparency in national defence 
                                                          
7 Since the late 1980s, NATO has engaged in military reform in the eastern European countries. The end 
of the Cold War brought more opportunities for the Western allies to deal with Central Eastern European 
countries. NATO focuses on military issues, under the auspices of the PfP (NATO, 1994). The PfP has 
developed with a strategic aim to support democratisation of the Central Eastern European countries, 
supporting for “reforms to establish democratic systems of government based on the rules of law and the 
respect for human rights” (NATO, 1991). NATO assists the former socialist counties establish democratic 
civil-military relationship and enhancing the military capacities of the partner countries in those countries.  
8 The professionalism, however, often does not include comprehensive education and training on 
international humanitarian law, which are significant to differentiate irregular bandit-type of armed forces 
and legitimate military forces. 
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planning and military budgeting; ensuring democratic control of national armed 
forces; and developing, over the longer term, Partner country forces that are 
better able to operate with those of NATO members (NATO, 1994). 
 
Outside Europe, bilateral donors are the main military assistance providers 
through technical assistance. They are often narrowly focused on transfer military 
equipment and skills. Such military assistance often targets less developed 
countries in Asia and Africa. For instance, the USA provides military assistance 
to foreign countries through the International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) programmes in strategically crucial countries including Georgia and the 
Philippines. The UK’s British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) has 
provided support to several Southern Africa countries such as Namibia and 
Zimbabwe in the transformation of various armed forces into a united national 
force. (Bennett, 1990) In Namibia, BMATT personnel developed training curricula 
for military officers and trained the trainers. The UK also helped to set up the 
Zimbabwe Staff College when the unified Zimbabwean force was created. In 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, BMATT personnel assisted in integration of official 
armed forces and guerrilla and other unofficial forces into a single entity. In South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, BMATT personnel assisted in integration of official armed 
forces and guerrilla and other unofficial forces into a single entity. 
 
Apart from technical assistance, donors also provide assistance addressing 
institutional reform of the militaries in the transitional state. The main focus in the 
area is on civil-military relations, in which both civilian and military institutions 
engage in assistance (USAID, 1998). The British Ministry of Defence (MoD), for 
example, has provided technical assistance for education of democratic control 
of the armed forces in the Eastern European countries (DFID, 2000a, p. 67). 
Through its Outreach Programme, the British MoD has provided technical 
assistance for studies of democratic control of the armed forces, defence 
management practices, and planning and budgetary processes (DFID, 2000a). 
The UK also provides similar technical assistance to African countries through 
BMATTs and the secondment of military and civilian personnel from MoD to 
ministries of defence in Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
US Department of Defense finances the Africa Center for Strategic Studies which 
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is aimed to promote transparency, accountability of resource allocation of the 
defence sector and civil oversight of the armed forces (DFID, 2000a). 
 
The main aim of this military-oriented SSR assistance is thus to enhance 
professionalism and capacity of military personnel. Technical assistance strictly 
focuses on the defence system and national security concerns, not community-
based insecurity and individuals. Compared with previous military assistance as 
seen in the Cold War period, this military-oriented SSR assistance has not 
changed its focus and contents. The security concerns in this military-oriented 
SSR thinking is military threats to state, rather than non-military threats to states 
and individuals. In fact, there is a strong sense of rejection of people-oriented 
security thinking among some defence officials. For example, a British military 
officer said he was against integrated SSR discourses involving police and other 
non-military security agencies and claimed that SSR should concern only military 
organs.9 A security sector is defined narrowly and the justice and penal systems 
are often looked over in the military-focused SSR discourse. 
 
2.2.2.2 Development- and governance-focused SSR approach 
 
The second group of the SSR thinking takes a development and governance 
approach. This category of SSR discourse evolved from the fields of development 
and governance assistance. Compared with the military-oriented SSR thinking, 
scholars of the development SSR camp such as Ball and Hendrickson regard 
SSR not as mere military matters, but more of a governance agenda (Ball, 1998; 
Hendrickson, 1999). Ball regards SSR as a critical component of sustainable 
economic and social development, good governance, conflict management 
between and within states, and arms limitation (Ball, 1998). Focusing on the 
economic, social and governance aspects of SSR, the main target of this school 
of SSR is developing countries. 
 
Having its conceptual genesis in the development studies, this school of SSR 
encompasses human security perspectives in its principles. For the interests of 
particular donor agencies, there are several prominent literatures concerning the 
                                                          
9 Private communication, January 2002, Brussels. 
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development/governance SSR thinking. A few policy recommendation papers 
have been published recent years as to more extent development assistance 
agencies commit human security-related issues in developing countries and the 
demand of conceptualisation and guidance of practical implementation are 
increasing. 
 
Hendrickson deepens the argument on empirical framework of SSR programme 
on security- and military-related issues, expanding the scope of SSR from state 
security to human security. Hendrickson sets the goal of SSR as not simply the 
establishment of civilian control over the military. Hendrickson claims that SSR 
will ultimately entail changes in bureaucratic cultures that are less dependent on 
the acquisition of new skills those on changes in attitude and patterns of 
interaction between civilian and military actors (Hendrickson, 1999). Thus, 
according to Hendrickson, it requires development agencies to simulate local 
initiative and to build consensus among relevant actors on the rationale for 
change. The governance approach that is narrowly and short-term focused on 
only strengthening the rule of law and civilians in managing and monitoring 
security sector is, therefore, regarded as counter-productive. 
 
Ball claims that SSR involves fundamental issues of human security, including 
respect for human rights and international law. Ball has its significance in bridging 
between the commitment of development agency and SSR as the first and most 
comprehensive security sector-related survey (Ball, 1998). It also covers the 
experience of security sector-related issues in various countries, and the recent 
trends within the international community and among donor agencies both of 
development and of humanitarian. Linking security and poverty agendas, Ball 
claims that poverty reduction cannot succeed without SSR. Putting an emphasis 
on implementing good governance, Ball includes a broad range of organizations 
in a security sector, including judicial, legal and penal systems, and claims that 
there is a need of the attention to civilian institutions related to SSR, not only to 
armed forces (Ball, 1998). 
 
In this wide range of SSR agenda, objectives of development- and governance-
focused SSR are more than the modernisation of defence system, but more of 
governance agendas. Those objectives include the establishment of good 
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governance in security sector with transparency and civil control. The focus is put 
on more management and administration matters such as budgetary 
accountability of those institutions, the enhancement of professionalism and 
transparency of security sector agencies. Reflecting the variety in the areas of 
SSR assistance, SSR actors also include a wide range of institutions. For 
instance, the UK’s SSR assistance shows one of the most comprehensive 
approaches to SSR in transitional societies. The UK’s inclusive SSR policies 
include a wide range of actors such as the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), and the Home Office. The labour distribution is the following: the 
FCO sets the political framework, the MoD can provide direct help to the military, 
and the Home Office is to help with police reform. Sierra Leone serves as a pilot 
case of the joined-up SSR programme.  
 
This development- and governance-oriented SSR approach has enabled 
development agencies to participate in security sector-related issues including 
political, social and economic matters, rather than solely focusing on security- 
and military-related issues. Consequently, the development/governance SSR 
discourse has rapidly developed in the recent years by development actors such 
as OECD/DAC, UNDP and DFID, reflecting the human security concept in the 
process. For instance, governance and poverty issues in Sierra Leone justify the 
DFID’s SSR intervention, which were formerly military-led agendas. 
 
At a policy level, awareness of the implications of SSR policies to post-conflict 
societies has been growing among some donors. OECD/DAC, for instance, 
acknowledges the link between efforts to “support participation, democratisation 
and peacebuilding, through strengthened institutions of governance” in post-
conflict societies (OECD/DAC, 1997, p. 37). In its new approach to SSR, 
OECD/DAC has increasingly integrated a human security concept into working 
principles of SSR policies. Adopting the human security concept, the OECD/DAC 
emphasises the nexus between security and development issues. Unlike other 
SSR policy guidelines, OECD/DAC clearly regards SSR as a key component of 
the human security agenda (OECD/DAC, 2005). The narrow scope of human 
security, i.e. the ‘Freedom from Fear’ approach, is adopted in these policies with 
focus on direct physical insecurities. Within its policy report, Security System 
Reform and Governance, OECD donors provide several working principles for 
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this human security oriented SSR (OECD/DAC, 2005). Reflecting human security 
in policy principles, the OECD/DAC report Security System Reform and 
Governance states that SSR should be: 
 
 people-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and 
human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom 
from fear;  
 seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse 
security challenges facing states and their populations through more 
integrated development and security policies and through greater civilian 
involvement and oversights; 
 founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies, based upon a broad 
assessment of the range of security needs of the people and the state; 
 developed adhering to basic principles underlying public sector reform 
such as transparency and accountability; and 
 implemented through clear processes and policies that aim to enhance 
the institutional and human capacity needed for security policy to function 
effectively (OECD/DAC, 2005, p. 12). 
 
The OECD/DAC principles have been increasingly adopted by policy makers and 
practitioners in the international community both multilateral and bilateral donors.  
 
Whilst focusing on the human security approach, SSR policies include a wide 
range of works interlinking social, economic, and military agendas. Those works 
include conversion of military resources to civilian use, gender-analysis of SSR 
policies, DDR, and the issues of child soldiers and war economies (OECD/DAC, 
2005, pp. 42–44). There is also an increasing claim in this governance SSR camp 
that more attention and sustainable efforts should be paid to reform judicial and 
penal system reforms such as the promotion of the rule of law, which requires 
long-term commitment and effort (Popkin, 2000). Development aid agencies such 
as the World Bank and UNDP have increasingly involved in the judicial system 
reform. The World Bank implements programmes in the area of administration of 
justice, primarily as regards legal reform. UNDP operates police reform 
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programmes in various post-crisis societies.10 UNDP/BCPR provides the police 
in conflict-prone countries with technical assistance to develop “an accountable, 
equitable, effective, and rights respecting public service” (UNDP, 2002, p. 5). 
 
2.2.2.3 Conflict management based SSR approach 
 
The third group of SSR thinking regards SSR as a set of policy instruments that 
can contribute to conflict management. This was against the background that a 
number of conflict-affected countries such as Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had undergone the building of new national 
army and the police under the policy slogan of SSR. Compared with the 
development/governance SSR discourse, what can be labelled as a conflict 
management SSR thinking by Chalmers offers a set of concrete SSR policies 
related to physical security of individuals unlike the military-oriented SSR. 
Chalmers has linked peacebuilding and SSR discourses, bringing physical 
security issues in the SSR discussions. 
 
Chalmers employs a wider concept of SSR which includes socio-economic, 
governance and security dimensions. But, in comparison with the development 
and governance oriented SSR scholars such as Ball and Hendrickson (Ball, 1998; 
Hendrickson, 1999), Chalmers puts more focus on physical security aspects 
within a framework of SSR, such as DDR and community-based weapons 
collection programmes. (Chalmers, 2000) Chalmers regards security-related 
issues such as small arms control programmes as part of a holistic SSR approach, 
with more focus on individuals rather than institutions and institution-building as 
in the cases of the military- and development-oriented SSR discourses. 
(Chalmers, 2000) 
 
While Chalmers’ focus is on direct physical insecurity, his scope of SSR and 
security sector actors are wider than the two approaches described earlier. By 
regarding security widely, Chalmers’ argument extends the range of activities of 
external actors much wider than the conventional militaristic, institution-centred 
                                                          
10 The countries include: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan 
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approach. Chalmers defines security sector more widely than the military-
oriented SSR thoughts. They include all those organizations which have authority 
to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its 
citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their 
management and oversight. It includes a) military and paramilitary forces; b) 
intelligence services; c) police forces, border guards and custom services; d) 
judicial and penal systems; e) civil structures that are responsible for the 
management and oversight of above (Chalmers, 2000). 
 
This view also provides concrete and practical implications for policies in the 
security dimension of SSR. Chalmers places SSR in a conflict management 
context, rather than reform merely confined to security sector institutions. 
Chalmers claims that SSR is to be a mechanism of conflict management, putting 
an emphasis on conflict related issues such as small arms proliferation, regional 
security regime building with confidence building through SSR, regarding those 
measures as pre-emptive actions addressing roots of conflict with less focus on 
institutions. Chalmers refers to norm-setting initiatives rather than institution-
building activities as plausible SSR efforts. For example, Chalmers discusses the 
recent activities of the EU in those fields, and points out some initiatives by the 
EU as significant steps including: the adoption of the 1997 EU Programme for 
Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms; the 1998 EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; the EU Joint Action on Small Arms agreed in 
December 1998; the Development Council’s resolution on combating the 
excessive and uncontrolled accumulation and spread of small arms and light 
weapons which was adopted in May 1999. The implementation of these 
statements has been implemented by the agreement at the October 1998 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) small arms moratorium 
with support of the EU member states. According to Chalmers, this initiative is 
part of a series of capacity-building programmes to support ECOWAS countries 
by implementing their moratorium and enhancing border controls and SSR as an 
integral part of their peacebuilding programmes. (Chalmers, 2000) 
 
2.2.2.4 SSR as peacebuilding and statebuilding programme 
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As the international community’s efforts in SSR implementation have amounted, 
SSR the numerous SSR studies have examined these practices. These studies 
have placed the SSR debate in the peacebuilding context, as the increasing 
number of SSR programmes were implemented in conflict-affected countries 
such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and 
so forth (Godwin and Haenlein, 2013; Justaert, 2012; Murray, 2011; Sedra, 2006). 
The trend was particularly enounced since the United Nations recognised SSR 
as a key pillar of peace support activities in 2008. The body of the SSR literature 
produced since 2010’s has analysed the SSR practices from programming 
perspective. Evaluating and monitoring ‘impacts’ of SSR projects and 
programmes, budgetary efficiency and effective coordination among relevant 
assistance providers and donors was the central to their discussion.  
 
The programming-focused research often led to the SSR research to overlook 
nuanced political and social implications and interactions with and among the 
actors on the receiving end of the SSR assistance. One of the recent critics, Paul 
Jackson, for instance, argues that academic studies of SSR have not been linked 
to the broader debate on liberal peacebuilding as “they have been driven by policy 
perspectives”. (Jackson, 2018, p. 2) Rather, the policy-driven studies have led to 
what Peake, Scheye, and Hills (Peake et al., 2013, p. 32) refer to a ‘benign 
analytical neglect’” in the SSR studies (Jackson, 2018, p. 2). 
 
Built on the critique, there is a growing trend in the recent SSR studies to distance 
from the programming- and policy-focused approach. The critical studies by 
scholars such as Fairlie Chappuis, Timothy Donais and Jackson have been more 
informed by liberal peacebuilding critiques. These studies stress the resistance 
from the local actors and their actual roles and dynamics (Donais, 2018; Jackson, 
2018; Jackson and Bakrania, 2018) More scholarly attention has been paid on 
local agencies and domestic politics that provide the context to the SSR 
interventions. (Sahin, 2017; Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014) 
 
2.2.3 Critiquing norm-informed liberal peacebuilding efforts: perspectives from 
local ownership, actors and dynamics 
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In the wider discussion on peacebuilding, a number of scholars have critiqued 
post-conflict peacebuilding endeavours led by the international community. Oliver 
Richmond, for instance, termed peacebuilding efforts that accompanies with 
liberal democratic values ‘liberal peacebuilding’. Richmond argues that liberal 
peacebuilding efforts are accompanied with a set of activities based on liberal 
democratic values and include “promotion of free markets, democratization and 
elections promotion, and other reforms, including promotion of the rule of law, 
access to justice, and human rights” (Richmond, 2010, p. 44). Casting doubt on 
effectiveness of such liberal peacebuilding based on liberal democratic norms, 
Roland Paris claimed for ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ by arguing that 
building institutions need to take before liberalisation (Paris, 2004; Richmond and 
Mac Ginty, 2015). 
 
David Chandler argues even further by claiming that “Building a liberal democratic 
state itself prevents peace from being realised” (Chandler, 2017). Chandler 
criticises the development aid agencies’ technical approach to nation-building 
and argued that the technical approach overlooked political development process 
and dynamics in societies emerging from war (Chandler, 2009, p. 85). The stream 
of the critiques on liberal peacebuilding efforts highlighted the importance of 
peacebuilding efforts to be based on indigenous actors and had a ‘local turn’ 
towards indigenous institutions and their roles in peacebuilding process 
(Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015). 
 
Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty argue for ‘hybrid peace’ instead of liberal peace. 
Acknowledging the local actors’ structures and network, as well as their abilities 
to resist liberal peacebuilding efforts, and they argue that efforts to build peace 
need to be drawn on traditional and indigenous institutions and take a ‘bottom-
up’ approach rather than intervening with liberal democratic values in a ‘top-down’ 
approach (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). 
 
Built on the critiques on liberal peacebuilding debates, the emphasis on the issue 
of local ownership, local actors and their dynamics have become a research focus 
in the recent literature critiquing security sector institution development including 
SSR as briefly mentioned in the previous section. 
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2.2.3.1 Local ownership 
 
Some critical reviews of SSR practice on the ground have discussed the issue of 
local ownership (Benedix and Stanley, 2008; Donais, 2008; Gordon, 2014; 
Nethan, 2007; Panarelli, 2010). Those studies examine SSR from the 
international assistance perspectives and consider how to operationalise SSR 
practice in order to ensure local counterparts’ ownership, and their subsequent 
commitment to reform efforts.  While they have advanced the SSR studies by 
extending its scope to include local perspectives, a few analytical gaps still remain 
to be explored.  
 
The international community has increasingly provided SSR related assistance 
in post-conflict peacebuilding context. For example, the European Unions have 
supported various SSR initiatives in fragile and/or post-authoritarian societies in 
Africa and Eastern Europe. Since the 2010’s, the United Nations has engaged in 
SSR programmes and initiatives in some conflict-affected countries through its 
peacekeeping missions, namely in sub-Sahara Africa. As SSR policies became 
implemented on the ground, the literature critiquing the SSR concept, discourses 
and operations have grew (Born and Schnabel, 2009; Peake et al., 2007; 
Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005; Schnabel and Farr, 2011; Sedra, 2010). As those 
studies point out, internationally-supported SSR efforts have often met with 
difficulties on the ground. In particular, difficulties in garnering fostering local 
ownership are among the challenges observed by practitioners (Born and 
Schnabel, 2009; Donais, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.2 Local actors 
 
The argument for the importance of scrutinising local actors’ actual roles in the 
domestic political process has been made in recent literature on SSR as well as 
the security sector and democratic transition in former authoritarian societies. For 
instance, some critical SSR studies points out that an analytical gap lies in the 
understanding of what consists of ‘local”. As Donais and Manniz point out, it is 
not clear how the critical SSR studies conceptualise ‘local’ (Donais, 2008; 
Mannitz, 2014). A wide range of domestic actors could include various actors 
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ranging from political elites, state technocrats to the wider population and 
marginalised social groups. Currently, the critical SSR studies have not 
developed the clear understanding of what consists of ‘local’ and domestic actors. 
 
The existing SSR discourses tend to focus on security sector actors in 
accordance with the Western countries’ ministerial and institutional demarcation. 
The main spheres of the security sector are the military, the police and the 
judiciary, along with corresponding civilian oversight mechanisms. A blueprint of 
SSR programme typically has four pillars of the reform. Those pillars usually 
include 1) military reform, 2) police reform, 3) judicial system reform and 4) 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of regular armed group soldiers 
(DDR). The armed forces in post-conflict societies are linearly divided between 
military and police, although such a demarcation does not reflect actual situation 
on the ground. Paramilitaries, which often represent the major categories of 
armed forces in those societies, do not fall into any of the reform categories and 
left excluded from SSR planning and implementation. This clear demarcation 
between the security sector actors does not necessarily exist in other countries, 
especially those emerging from violent conflict and/or authoritarian regime. In his 
research on post-authoritarian countries, Pereira argues that the neat division 
between the military and the police that characterised in northwest European 
countries is by no means representative in other parts of the world (Davis and 
Pereira, 2003, p. 388). 
 
Instead of following the existing templates of the security sector actors, scholars 
such as Hills have focused on actual functioning of the security sector actors. In 
her studies on police reform in transitional societies in Africa, for instance, Hills 
examines the interface between the police and the military, and also the relations 
among domestic factors, i.e., political background, internal insecurity, public order 
and security sector institutions (Hills, 2000). The strong point of her argument is 
that it is relatively free from convention approach to examine security sector 
actors such as the police nominally, but rather focusing on actual functioning. For 
starting the research, Hills clarifies that it is not the police as organisations but 
the policing functioning to focus on. Her function-focused approach is useful 
because, as the definitions of policing in most developing countries are less 
clearly defined than in Western countries (Hills, 2000, p. 6), and also depending 
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on the political environment of the country in concern. Focusing on the functioning, 
this function-based approach makes a distinct difference from other researchers 
in the SSR studies, who often do not question the natures of the security sector 
actors and particular characteristics of the indigenous police institutions in each 
country. Furthermore, by focusing on actual functions by the security sector 
actors, Hills reviews the relations between armed forces and political 
environments in the case studies’ countries, and finds that regimes’ perception 
on internal security and public order are most significant elements to influence 
the relations. (Hills, 2000) A function-focused approach is thus a significant step 
forwards in the SSR studies to deepen its understanding of actual nature and 
dynamics of local actors. 
 
The function-based approach points out another gap in the current critical SSR 
studies that lines in the analytical unit: paramilitaries. Not only in conflict-affected 
countries and authoritarian societies but also in most of contexts, paramilitaries 
play significant roles in societies. Paramilitaries are often personalised and used 
to pursuit individual interests than the military and police forces. It is particularly 
so in post-conflict societies, in which paramilitary is the major political tool to fill 
in a power vacuum. In this sense, paramilitaries are not a minor actor to substitute 
military and police forces. Furthermore, paramilitaries are often more functional 
security forces to provide political elites with efficient force and fight for power 
than those of the military and police. Reform of paramilitaries therefore needs to 
be an SSR agenda. However, the SSR studies have not fully placed its focus on 
analysing paramilitaries yet. As demonstrated by Hills’ studies above, a close 
observation of actual activities, participating individuals and genesis of the 
organisation helps one to have a clearer idea what nature, activities and roles 
contemporary paramilitaries convey. Therefore, defining paramilitaries by their 
actual function, as well as by their official titles and affiliation gives clearer ideas 
of paramilitaries in conflict-affected and settings. 
 
2.2.3.3 Local dynamics 
 
Reflecting the operational challenges on the ground, some recent SSR studies 
have started filling the gap by providing critiques by focusing on local agency and 
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domestic power dynamics. For instance, a special issue of International 
Peacekeeping 21:2 was entirely dedicated to discussing SSR from this 
perspective. Schroeder and Chappuis note the limited scope of the existing SSR 
literature that tends to assess SSR against “externally defined mission objectives 
and interests” (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, pp. 133–134). The special issue 
recognises that existing SSR research have neglected “to consider the agency 
and power of domestic actors” in the SSR and peacebuilding processes 
(Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014, p. 136) and proposes an analysis on “interaction 
dynamics between external and domestic stakeholders” (Schroeder and 
Chappuis, 2014, p. 134). 
 
For understanding a SSR process in the domestic political process the concept 
of regime security would be useful to examine the local dynamics surrounding 
SSR efforts. SSR efforts often take place in weak states, where political elites 
need to seek for ways ensure their security (Jackson, 2016). Strengthening 
armed forces loyal to the regime could be one of the strategies to ensure regime 
security. In such a context, SSR may be adopted to promote regime security 
whilst security concerns of the wider population may be left unattended. Some 
recent critical SSR literature indeed looks at this regime-survival issue (Marten, 
2014). The phenomena of the security sector in transitional societies being highly 
political remains under-researched, however, and so does the process of 
reforming the security sector. The issue of regime security concerns in the SSR 
context has room for further elaboration. 
 
2.3 Political economy analysis of security sector change process: elements of 
analysis 
 
As discussed above, the literature on the relation between the security sector 
actors and political developments both note the need to scrutinise and better 
understand the indigenous actors and their impacts on the wider socio-political 
process, i.e., state formation and peacebuilding. The study on the security sector 
actors and its relationship with the state formation has not fully developed an 
analytical framework to study the security sector actors. On the other hand, the 
aid community has developed a political economy analysis to examine external 
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intervention efforts. This research applies the political economy analysis to the 
study on security sector change and security sector actors involved in the change 
process. This way, the research provides a closer look at the local security sector 
actors and their political roles in the overall socio-political process. 
 
The examination of the relation between the security sector and political 
developments in Georgia in the following chapters takes the following analytical 
approaches. First, the research applies a wider scope of security sector actors. 
In the analysis of the security sector actors, the research employs examines not 
only the military as in the case of the civil-military relations studies, but also 
policing institutions and irregular armed forces, especially, paramilitaries, in 
addition to corresponding civilian oversights bodies. Second, for understanding 
local actor and their dynamics, the research locates the security sector change 
process in a wider political development process as in the studies on the security 
sector in authoritarian societies. In doing so, the focus is placed on political 
economic dynamics of the security sector actors and relevant actors involved in 
security sector change. This way, the research in this thesis examines security 
sector change as part of a wider political development process, such as transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace, rather than as a 
separate set of peacebuilding and/or SSR policies. In other words, the focus of 
the research is placed on the relation between the domestic political 
developments and the security sector actors, rather than the reform itself. 
 
Based on these analytical approaches, this research conducts political economy 
analysis of security sector change in Georgia. Political economy analysis has 
been used in social science research. More recently, an increasing number of 
development assistance agencies have examined effectiveness of their 
interventions. Methods of political economy analysis have been developed, 
tailored and applied by a number of researchers and practitioners engaged in the 
development assistance field and beyond (Adam and Dercon, 2009; Rocha 
Menocal, 2014; Williams et al., 2007). While those materials provide varying 
perspectives in details and no conceptual framework exists, the OECD-DAC, 
cited in DFID’s Political economy analysis: how to note, provides a definition that 
shows a main feature of political economy analysis: 
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 “Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of 
 political and  economic processes in a society: the distribution of 
 power and wealth  between different groups and individuals, and  the 
 processes that create, sustain and  transform  these relations 
 over time” (DFID, 2009, p. 4). 
 
Being highly pragmatic, the method aims at understanding political and economic 
processes in society such as “the incentives, relationships, distribution and 
contestation of power between different groups and individuals” that impact on 
development outcomes (Mcloughlin, 2014, p. 2). Political economy analysis has 
an advantage in analysing local actors, as it focuses not only on formal but also 
informal institutions and cultural and social practices. This way, political economy 
analysis can delve into local dynamics and explain “why formal institutions do not 
work as intended” (Mcloughlin, 2014, p. 2), so that it cautions “against relying on 
technical fixes, and assuming that formal institutions can be made to work 
through the transfer of ‘international best practice’” (Williams et al., 2007). Political 
economy analysis allows the in-depth understanding of the political context in 
which the international donors provide assistance (Williams et al., 2007). 
 
The method has not been systematically applied in the studies of the relation 
between security sector actors and political developments yet, but this research 
employs political economy analysis methods because of the usefulness in 
analysing and understanding local dynamics in the SSR context. The analytical 
framework in this research is largely based on the models used in other practical 
and academic research, but specifically developed and tailored for this research. 
This research adopts a framework of political economy analysis developed in the 
development assistance field, in particular, by the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) (Harris, 2013). 
 
The subsequent chapters examine the local dynamics of security sector change 
in Georgia (chapters 3, 4 and 6). In these chapters, political economy analyses 
the following elements: a) structural features in which security sector change took 
place; b) key institutions and individuals, their incentives and motivations for 
certain (or no) changes in the security sector and decision logics during the 
agenda-setting process; and c) dynamics between key institutions and individuals. 
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In structural diagnosis, key structural features of the socio-political context in 
which the security sector change process takes place are closely examined from 
various dimensions. In particular, features relevant to the security sector change 
process including political dimension, socio-economic dimension, institutional 
dimension (i.e., the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and security forces 
including non- and quasi-state armed forces) are key units of analysis in structural 
diagnosis. In agency (actor) diagnosis, key security sector actors and prominent 
individuals including the Presidents, paramilitary leaders, security sector 
institutions, civil societies and external actors are examined. Their incentives for 
and/or reasons for resistance against security sector change efforts are analysed 
so that their logic of decision making in the security sector change process can 
be distilled. Finally, dynamics between key actors, both institutions and 
individuals, are analysed and the types of relationships and power balance 
between those actors are identified. 
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Chapter 3 Security sector change in the transition from the Soviet to 
independent Georgia between 1985 and 1991 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapters take a close look at the three key phases of the transition. 
The first sets its timeframe between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when 
various independence movements started to gain momentum. More precisely, 
this chapter examines the socio-political transition in Georgia between 1985 and 
1991 and how security sector actors interacted with the socio-political dynamics 
during the period.  
 
This chapter seeks to understand what factors play influential roles in shaping the 
course of security sector change in the socio-political transition in which Georgia 
became independent from the Soviet Union. The example of Georgia between 
1985 and 1991 shows that a certain set of political and socio-economic factors 
allow paramilitary leaders to become not only influential security sector actors but 
also dominant political actors. Upon the independence, Georgia began its efforts 
to create its own security sector apparatus. This chapter examines how in the 
absence of a clear strategy and functional state institutions the course of the 
security sector creation was influenced by power dynamics among a few of those 
political elites, in particular, paramilitary leaders. 
 
The analysis of security sector change takes three parts. The first part provides 
the background to the transitional period between 1985 and 1991. It reviews the 
emergence of Georgian nationalism and the independence movement, Georgia’s 
independence from the Soviet Union and the subsequent civil wars in separatist 
regions and within Georgia. It provides an overview of Georgia’s transformation 
from a Soviet republic to an independent state in its embryo. The second part 
examines security sector change that took place in Georgia immediately after the 
independence. The third part applies the political economy analysis introduced in 
chapter 2 and analyses the security sector change process and examines driving 
and resisting factors for reform efforts, as well as dynamics within the process of 
security sector change.  
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3.2 The examination of the political developments between 1985 and 1991 
 
This section provides an overview of major socio-political changes during the 
transition period in which Georgia transferred from a Soviet republic to an 
independent state, the Republic of Georgia, in order to provide essential context 
for the analyses in the subsequent sections. The chapter covers a seven-year 
period between the early stage of perestroika when Shevardnadze, then the First 
Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, left Tbilisi to Moscow to hold a 
position as the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry in 1985, until he returned to Georgia 
to fill in a power vacuum left after the ousting of the first President of independent 
Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in January 1992. 
 
3.2.1 Re-emergence of Georgian nationalism and independence movement 
 
The first half of the seven year period coincides with perestroika, the sociopolitical 
reform movement introduced by Mikhail Gorvachev between 1985 and 1989. 
Georgia was independent for a brief period of time between 1918 and 1921. 
During the Soviet times and especially since 1956 when a pro-Georgian rally in 
Tbilisi was violently oppressed by the Soviet troops, Georgian nationalism had 
not been on the political surface. Under perestroika, the Georgian nationalism 
started to re-emerge and gather momentum. The re-kindled Georgian 
nationalism led to the independence movement. Nationalistic Georgian 
intellectuals such as Giorgi Chanturia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava and 
Erekle Shengelaia emerged as independence movement leaders.   
 
Jumbar Patiashvili, who replaced Shevardnadze as the Georgian Communist 
Party in 1985, maintained severe repression of any dissident movements. During 
the late 1980s, the police broke up pro-independence demonstrations and 
meetings more frequently, as the Georgian nationalist movement was 
increasingly gathering popular support. On May 26 1988, the police intervened in 
various demonstrations and meetings to commemorate the anniversary of the 
first Georgian independence. This incident was followed by a more violent 
intervention on April 9 1989. The Soviet troops cracked down on a pro-
46 
 
independence demonstration in Tbilisi, killed 19 people and injured hundreds. 
(Keller, 1989) 
 
The violent oppression by the Soviet troops, however, contributed to the popular 
support for the Georgian nationalist movement leaders. By late 1989, 
Gamsakhurdia became the most prominent political figure. 11  In 1991, the 
Georgian parliament declared secession from the Soviet Union. The Georgians 
voted for a restoration of the independence of Georgia at a referendum in which 
almost 90 percent of the voters supported the “restoration of the state 
independence of Georgia”. (Suny, 1994, p. 326) Gamsakhurdia was elected with 
an overwhelming majority (more than 85 percent), as the first President of 
independent Georgia. (Suny, 1994, p. 326) 
 
3.2.2 Independence and civil wars 
 
The declaration of independence did not, however, bring political stability in 
Georgia. On the contrary, Georgia became an extremely fragile state and affected 
by violent clashes in various parts of the countries including its capital, Tbilisi.  
 
Instead of consolidating his power, Gamsakhurdia increasingly become hostile 
towards his political opponents. Gamsakhurdia drew further hostilities towards 
him by his ambivalent response to the coup attempt in Moscow in August in 1991. 
(Jones, 2015, pp. 62–63; Suny, 1994, p. 327) On 22 December, Gamsakhurdia’s 
opponents attacked the parliament building. In January 1992, the first elected 
President of Georgia was deposed after fighting with his opponents, causing 
dozens of deaths in central Tbilisi. Gamsakhurdia escaped to Armenia and later 
to Chechnya, where he remained until his death in December 1993. (Civil Georgia, 
2009) 
 
The territorial integrity of independent Georgia was jeopardized. As the 
independence movement gathered pace, tensions grew between ethnic 
Georgian and other ethnic groups within the new Georgian state, in particular the 
                                                          
11 Merab Kostava, the other most popular nationalist movement leader, was killed in a car accident in 
October 1991.  
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Abkhaz and Ossetians. The more momentum the nationalistic independence 
movement gained among the ethnic Georgians, the more distant the non-
Georgian peoples became from the Georgian-centric movement. The ethnic 
tensions led to territorial conflicts, particularly over two regions, i.e., Abkhazia (the 
former Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) and South Ossetia (the 
former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast). There was another territorial issue 
with Adjara (the former Adjaran Autonomous Soviet Social Republic) which was 
predominantly habituated by the Muslim population. Adjara had been largely 
controlled by its leader, Aslan Abashidze12 and his clans for a long period of time. 
Unlike the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the relation with Tbilisi remained 
relatively calm and the territorial issue did not escalate into a violence conflict. 
 
Since the late 1980s, the Abkhaz had started to demand separation from the 
Soviet Georgia. The tension between the Georgians and the Abkhaz escalated, 
especially after a mass Abkhaz meeting in March 1989, demanded for separation. 
During the same period, violent confrontations were frequent between the 
Georgians and the Ossetians in South Ossetia, too. In 1989, demands for more 
autonomy in South Ossetia led to violent clashes between the Georgian and 
Ossetian militias. Russian peacekeepers were deployed in South Ossetia in 1980. 
In 1992, South Ossetians voted for independence, although Georgia did not 
recognise the referendum. 
 
In addition to the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a civil war 
erupted in a western Georgian region of Samegrelo. Tbilisi also became a battle 
field, as inter-militia violence became intensified. In Samegrelo, the Zviadistss 
fought to take over the power in the capital against Gamsakhurdia’s opponents. 
Street violence in Tbilisi exchanged fires mainly between different youth gangs 
for their private revenge. State control became virtually non-existent in the 
western Georgia. By that time, Georgia lost its control over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. With Adjara having its own paramilitary forces under a personal fiefdom 
of Abashidze, Georgia’s territorial integrity was eroded, leaving Georgia on the 
verge of turning into a failed state by 1992. 
 
                                                          
12 When Georgia became independent of the Soviet Union, Abashidze was appointed as the Chairman of 
the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. 
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By the time when Georgia became an independent state, its society had become 
highly volatile and militant. The state apparatus of newly independent Georgia 
was not functional. A Military Council replaced the ousted president, 
Gamsakhurdia. Having ousted Gamsakhurdia, his opponents and paramilitary 
heads, Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani invited Shevardnadze, who had 
resigned as the Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister by then, to return to Georgia. 
Shevardnadze returned to Tbilisi. The Military Council was transferred to the 
State Council, and Shevardnadze was appointed the head of the newly formed 
State Council in March 1992, with the two paramilitary leaders among the four 
voting members (Jones, 2015, p. 82), then the chairperson of the parliament in 
October.  
 
In sum, Georgia in the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed massive socio-
political changes. Georgia transformed from a Soviet republic to an independent 
state. However, its territorial borders became contested and the inter-ethnic 
tension escalated and led to the armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
As the Soviet Union dissolved, its state apparatus ceased to function. The 
militarised power struggle among political elites, the armed conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as well as the absence of functional state apparatus created 
a political and institutional vacuum in Georgian society. It was in this context that 
security sector change in the late 1980s and 1990s took place. 
 
3.3 Examining security sector change between 1985 and 1991 
 
Security sector change in Georgia during this period were can be divided into two 
stages. The first is the period between 1985 and 1991, when numerous 
paramilitary forces emerged out of the Georgian independence process. The 
second phase runs briefly between 1990 and 1991, during which independence 
Georgia started to create new regular armed forces while the Soviet armed forces 
ceased to exist.   
 
3.3.1 The evolution of paramilitaries affiliated with independence movement 
leaders 
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The first phase in this period is marked by the emergence and flourish of various 
non-state paramilitary forces and their leaders. Since the late 1980s, numerous 
political associations were created among the Georgian intelligentsia. Several 
dissident nationalist leaders formed small paramilitary groups since the 1980s. 
For instance, supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a nationalist movement leader 
and the first president of independent Georgia, formed a paramilitary group called 
‘Zviadists’. Those paramilitary forces initially were small in size in 1989–91 and 
acted “as the private bodyguards or thugs for political personalities and their 
entourage” (Demetriou, 2002, p. 23). Those militia groups include the Zviadists, 
a group of supporters of Gamsakhurdia. The Merab Kostava Society also had an 
armed wing, led by Vaja Adamia, a Gamsakhurdia loyalist. Several other 
paramilitary forces such as the White Legion and the Forest Brothers were 
organised by ethnic Georgians, mainly consisting of volunteer civilians who were 
enthusiastic supporters of Gamsakhurdia.  
 
The Mkhedrioni was not affiliated to any political leader, yet it was one of the most 
notable and influential paramilitary forces of the post-independent period. 
Established in 1989 by Ioseliani, the Mkhedrioni had approximately 5,000 
members. The Mkhedrioni emerged in 1988 as an illegal armed formation with 
some links to the Communist nomenclature. Gaining influence in the political 
scene and criminal activities, the Mkhedrioni and its leader Ioseliani became 
significant actors in Georgian politics and society in independent Georgia. Those 
militias consisted of dozens of units of varying size, from a few hundred to several 
thousands of people (Darchiashvili, 2003a). By the time of the independence, 
Georgian political elites were mostly heading their own paramilitary forces. By 
early 1990, one estimates the total number of 60,000 volunteers in such 
paramilitary groups (Woff, 1993, p. 309). 
 
3.3.2 The creation of Georgian security sector institutions 
 
During the Soviet times, Georgia did not have a national army as all the Soviet 
republics were prohibited from creating their own military forces.13 However, as 
                                                          
13 Georgia had had a national army until 1956, when Khrushchev banned all national units in the Soviet 
Army.  
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the independence movement started to gain momentum in the late 1980s, some 
Georgian independence movement leaders gathered armed supporters and 
formed paramilitary forces (Darchiashvili, 2005, pp. 5–6). 
 
Following the independence, some security sector institutions started to emerge. 
One such institution is the National Guards. In November 1990, a law was 
adopted to ban drafting of Georgian youth to the Soviet Army. In December, the 
Law on Internal Troops - National Guards was adopted.  The Supreme Council 
of Georgia established the National Guard on 20 December 1990 as the interior 
troops (Darchiashvili, 2003a, p. 32). The intention was to transform the National 
Guard to a regular army at a later stage. The National Guard absorbed some  
paramilitary forces and armed wings of the Georgian nationalist movement14 
(Woff, 1993, p. 71). Kitovani, an independence movement leader and an elected 
member of the Supreme Council, led the National Guard as a commander. 
Although some former Soviet officers of Georgian origin joined the guard, most 
of them volunteered. 
 
The draft into the National Guard began in February 1991. By next spring, the 
National Guard had some 12,000 officers and enlisted soldiers (Darchiashvili, 
1997a). The National Guards at this time was more of paramilitary forces rather 
than a regular military. Besides the National Guard, there were also a number of 
other state paramilitary forces in Georgia during this period. In September 1990, 
for instance, the Mkhedrioni gained legal status and registered as a rescue 
service. There were also about half legal or illegal paramilitaries with a few 
thousands of poorly armed and trained recruits (Darchiashvili, 1997a). 
 
During this period, security sector institutions other than the armed forces were 
also created. The Ministry of Defense was created in 1991. The Information-
Intelligence Service was created in the same year. Gamsakhurdia’s government 
merged the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) with the Committee of State Security 
of Georgia. The creation of those new security sector institutions was 
accompanied by the President’s various reform efforts targeted at the 
disbandment of the two most influential paramilitary forces: the Mkhedrioni and 
                                                          
14 One of such paramilitary groups is While Eagle, which had parted from the Mkhedrioni and headed by 
Ghia Kharkharashvili.  
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the National Guard. In 1991, Gamsakhurdia ordered the Mkhedrioni to disband 
and arrested its leader, Ioseliani. In the same year, Gamsakhurdia dismissed the 
National Guard leader, Kitovani. Neither of the paramilitary forces obeyed the 
orders, and they remained under the de facto control of their leaders.  
 
Table 2 Major security agencies during the Gamsakhurdia period, 1990 - 
1991 
 
Non-state Quasi-state State 
 Forest Brothers 
 Merab Kostava Society 
 White Legion 
 Zhviadists 
 Ajara paramilitary forces 
 Mkhedrioni 
 National Guards 
 Committee of State 
Security (merged with 
the MIA) 
 Ministry of Defence 
 Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 
 Internal Troops (affiliated 
to the MIA) 
 
3.4 Examining driving factors for security sector change 
 
This section examines in detail why certain security sector actors emerged so 
prominently and held power during the transitional period. The discussion follows 
the political economy analysis frameworks introduced in chapter 2. Key structural 
features (structural diagnosis), power relations between key individuals and 
agencies and their incentives for security sector change (agency diagnosis) 
during the pre- and post-independent Georgian society are analysed.  
 
3.4.1 Structural diagnosis 
 
3.4.1.1 Political dimension 
 
During the transition between 1985 and 1991, Georgia went through a radical 
socio-political change from being a Soviet republic to an independent state. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union brought power and institutional vacuums in the 
Georgian society. The weakening political control of Moscow allowed Georgian 
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nationalist movement leaders and other prominent figures to emerge as political 
leaders. To protect themselves, they mobilised armed groups, which eventually 
became paramilitary forces. Those informal and irregular paramilitary forces 
gained influence in the political chaos in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. On 
the other hand, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, so did its state apparatus. The 
absence of functional state institutions meant that building security sector 
institutions of its own became one of the major issues for independent Georgia 
to equip with full-fledged state institutions.  
 
The weakened state capacity and frantic nationalist leadership of Gamsakhurdia 
led to growing separatist sentiment which jeopardised Georgia’s territorial 
integrity. The examples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are most intense and 
violent. In the two autonomous regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separatist 
sentiments gained momentum at the end of the Soviet times, and especially since 
the nationalistic Georgian President, Gamsakhurdia, took power. South Ossetia 
declared its intention to secede from Georgia in 1990, then its independence in 
1992. A growing demand for more autonomy in the South Ossetia led to violent 
clashes between Georgian and Ossetian paramilitaries in 1989. In South Ossetia, 
a ceasefire was signed in June 1992 and a peacekeeping force consisting of 
Georgian, Ossetian and Russian troops were deployed.  
 
In the early 1990s, Georgia and its surrounding regions were heavily affected by 
armed conflicts. In Abkhazia, fighting broke out in Abkhazia between the 
Georgian troops and Abkhazian forces in August. As both the territorial disputes 
over Abkhazia and South Ossetia escalated into violent conflicts, paramilitary 
forces were heavily involved in on all the sides. Those armed conflicts in the 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions involved a large number of volunteered 
citizens. The conflicts reinforced the popular support for Georgian paramilitaries 
and their leaders.  
 
Even within the territory of proper Georgia itself, various factions among Georgian 
independent movement leaders resulted in political disputes, often in armed 
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clashes in Tbilisi and other parts inside proper Georgia, especially the Mingleria 
region.15 
 
3.4.1.2 Socio-economic dimension 
 
Since the late 1980s, a number of paramilitary groups started to emerge as 
influential actors in society. They were mainly affiliated with independence 
movement leaders. New independent Georgia started to develop state security 
institutions in 1991. However, they were far from being professional and capable 
security sector actors.  The development of a number of unprofessional and 
personalised paramilitary forces can be attributed to several socio-economic 
factors in Georgia.  
 
Georgian-centric nationalism and inter-ethnic tension 
 
The independence movement leaders cultivated popular support by appealing to 
Georgian centric nationalism, but this resulted in escalating inter-ethnic tension 
among various ethnic groups in Georgia. Georgia is an ethnically diverse country. 
The 1989 census conducted by the Soviet Union shows that ethnic Georgians 
consist of 70.7% of its population. The other ethnic groups in Georgia include the 
Azeris (5.7%), Armenians (8.1%), Russians (6.3%), Ossetians (3.0%) and 
Abkhazians (1.8%). In the multi-ethnic environment, most of the independence 
movement leaders used Georgian-centric nationalistic discourses in order to 
consolidate popular support. The most prominent example of such leaders is 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia. He employed an fanatic Georgian centric nationalism to 
generate popular support amongst ethnic Georgians. His chauvinistic sentiment 
fed the independence movement. At the same time, it alienated other ethnic 
groups in the country. According to one study, many felt that the nationalistic 
policies of the Gamsakhurdia government oppressed ethnic minorities and 
increased tension between Georgians and non-Georgians. (Koyama, 2005)  
 
                                                          
15 Miglerian belongs to the Kartoveli language group, as is Georgian, but they are not mutually 
comprehensive.  
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The limiting, confining concept of Georgian nationalism partially led to, or 
contributed to escalating inter-ethnic tensions in Georgia as well as the separatist 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where paramilitary forces were organised 
to fight in the inter-ethnic conflicts.  In the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, several paramilitary forces were organised by Georgians to fight 
against separatists in the region. The White Legion and the Forest Brothers 
reportedly consisted of volunteers from the Georgian internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) from the Samegrelo region, and both are active in hostilities against 
Abkhaz armed forces. Many of the volunteers were the Zviadists - supporters of 
Gamsakhurdia. 
 
The control of the central government was significantly challenged in other 
regions, too. State’s control was only formal, and real power was “exercised by 
local fiefs” (DFID, Analysis of Incentives and Capacity for Poverty Reduction and 
Good Governance in Georgia, p.9). Although not experiencing the full-scale 
violent conflicts as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the autonomous region of 
Adjara distanced itself from Tbilisi and its leadership, so did Armenian-populated 
Javaxeti and Azeri-populated Kvemo Kartli, since the ethnic Georgian centric 
nationalism leader Gamsakhurdia took power. 
 
Clientelism and informal economy  
 
Headed by prominent social and political figures, Georgian paramilitaries were 
highly personalised. The personalised organisation of paramilitaries can be 
attributed to the expanded informal network and strong patron-client connections 
that had been prominent in Georgia. Centred-around prominent political and 
social figures, the Georgian elite society connoted clientelism, which formed a 
dual social structure parallel to the formal Soviet state institutions. 
 
This tendency can be found as early as the Stalinist period between 1924 and 
1953, in which a patron-client relationship among the Georgian elites gradually 
grew outside the governmental structure. The patron-client tie grew into ‘fiefdoms’, 
modelled on family and clan, religion, corruption and crime (Fairbanks, 1996). 
During the Soviet period, being far from Moscow, many Georgians managed to 
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maintain their ‘private’ informal economy, by growing own crops and running 
cottage businesses during the Soviet times (Fairbanks, 1996). 
 
The Soviet Georgia was known for its active informal economy. According to one 
report, 33% of Georgia’s GDP was produced by the illicit sector (Alexeev and 
Pyle, 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union increased the patronage power of 
pseudo-clans and regional bosses even further, undermining the state apparatus 
and embryonic civil society institutions, by tapping into informal economic 
activities. The prime example is the Mkhedrioni. The Mkhedrioni emerged as an 
armed group of members with criminal backgrounds. As the political turmoil 
escalated in December 1991, many of the Mkhedrioni members were released 
from prisons and mobilised to fight in the civil war in Georgia against the 
Gamsakhurdia side and in Abkhazia. The Mkhedrioni members supported 
themselves by demanding ‘tax’ from the local population for the war effort and 
providing ‘protection’. They also financed themselves through the control over the 
distribution of lucrative commodities. Their influence reportedly exceeded the 
formal governmental institutions those days.16  
 
The informal networks thus extended not only in Georgian politics, but also in 
social and economic life of the Georgians, since it became a crucial survival tool 
to replace the collapsed planned economy since the beginning of the 1990s.17 In 
the absence of functional state institutions, the client-patron nature of the 
relationship further increased the paramilitary leaders’ influence. 
 
Organised crimes and corruption 
 
Organised crimes and corruption are the other key socio-economic factors to 
understand the emergence of paramilitaries and their leaders during this period. 
Organised crimes and criminal gangs had existed since the Soviet period. So-
called ‘thieves-in-law’ (vory-v-zakone in Russian) originated in the Gulag in the 
1930s (Slade, p.12). The Gulag at that time provided an environment in which 
                                                          
16 Demetriou (2003) and Slider (1997). 
17 One UNDP reports that the informal economy constituted up to 70 -80% of the real GNP in Georgia 
(UNDP Georgia, 1996). 
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actors could build network among themselves. Thieves-in-laws consisted of “a 
criminal fraternity that topped prisoner hierarchies” (Slade, p.12).  
 
Thieves-in-law began to play significant roles both in illicit and non-illicit spheres 
in society. For instance, these organised criminal groups engaged in various 
criminal activities such as robberies and theft. Kidnapping, bride-kidnapping, 
trafficking and drugs were among other criminal activities that sourced these 
organised criminals (Slade, p.52). 
 
After the independence, thieves-in-law also began to gain benefits from 
arbitration and dispute dissolution. It is noted that the thieves-in-law had engaged 
in dispute settlements in the illicit economy that could not have been settled by 
the police during the Soviet time (Slade, p.46). Their role in dispute settlements 
increased in the early stage of the independence. In the absence of functioning 
police and justice systems, thieves-in-law further consolidated their influence in 
society by offering a certain type of protection and settling disputes for emerging 
business owners. As confidence in the police was low, victims of kidnapping and 
bride-kidnapping often turned to thieves-in-law for settling a case. As a result, 
thieves-in-law often engaged in negotiations between criminals and victims 
(Slade, p.45).  
 
Georgia at that time was still an embryonic capital economy without functional 
economic governance institutions nor regulations. As a result, thieves-in-law 
established their influential profile in emerging business activities of both illicit and 
non-illicit natures. Slade notes space racketeering and providing protection to 
enterprises by selling guarantees or cutting profits as thieves-in-law’s profit-
making examples during this period (Slade, p.49). 
 
The thieves-in-law were also active in legitimate economy. They engaged in a 
wide range of economic activities such as offering ‘protection’ to minibus drivers, 
controlling the supply of goods to marketplaces, and gambling and debt collection 
(Slade, pp. 54-60). 
 
Arms proliferation  
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The power of paramilitary forces increased as they increased the level of 
militarisation by accessing to small arms and light weapons which became widely 
available especially after 1991. Initially, the availability of small arms was limited 
in the early part of the period and Georgian paramilitaries were poorly armed. For 
instance, even for major paramilitary forces such as the National Guard and 
White Eagle, only 60% of their manpower was armed with small arms and light 
weapons.  Prior to the end of the Soviet Union, the source of weaponry varied. 
According to Demetriou, there were three major sources of weapon supply. The 
first was the Soviet police stations which were occasionally raided, and their 
weapons were stolen. The Voluntary Supporters for the Air Force and Navy 
(DOSAAF), under the direct supervision of the Soviet MoD, had over 50 local 
installations in Georgia, and became another source, as their weapons could be 
purchased or lost. The other source of weapons consisted of WWII-era rifles that 
had been distributed to protect against a German invasion (Demetriou, 2002, pp. 
8–9). 
 
Since 1991, however, this level of weapons proliferation raised drastically. This 
was due not only to the informal market as well as the lack of strict control of arms 
leaking from the former Soviet army base, but also to the intentional leakage by 
the Russian forces. Following the military coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, 
Russian commanders and officers began to distribute or sell a large amount of 
weapons to armed groups in Georgia, which resulted in a drastic increase in the 
scale and the types of weapons circulating in Georgia. (Demetriou, 2002, p. 8) In 
post-1991 Georgia, it is estimated that about 40,000 weapons were in the 
possession of armed groups (Demetriou, 2002, p. 20). For instance, the National 
Guards owned 18,000 weapons for its 12,000 troops. The Mkhedrioni was even 
more over-equipped: its 1,500 troops possessed approximately 6,250 weapons 
(Demetriou, 2002, p. 21). The excessive availability of weapons thus contributed 
to increasing the influence of the paramilitaries and militarising Georgian politics 
subsequently, especially since 1991.  
 
Public perceptions on security and security institutions 
 
Security concerns among Georgian populations during this period varied, 
depending on their physical location, ethnic identify and gender. Outside the 
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conflict-affected areas such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Tbilisi, people 
perceived that their physical security was significantly affected by economically 
motivated crimes and violence in their own communities. Money-driven crimes 
such as abductions of rich business people ran rampant, posing acute security 
threats in Georgia.18  
 
In the regions where non-Georgian ethnic groups were the majority, many felt that 
the differences in ethnicity among community members had added grievance in 
communities, fuelling communal tension and violence between the ethnic 
Georgians and non-Georgians. This was especially the case under the 
Gamsakhurdia period, due to his extreme, ethnic-Georgian centric nationalism. 
Responding in a focus group interview conducted in 2005 in ethnic Armenian-
dominated Akhaltsikhe, for instance, ethnic Armenian interviewees recalled the 
Gamsakhurdia period as quite insecure due to Georgian nationalism inflamed by 
the political leader: 
 
 “The Gamsakhurdia period was really dangerous. There were many 
 discrete armed groups in our region. There are also many 
 demonstrations and meetings against  Armenians population.”19 
 
In Akhaltsikhe, another ethnic Armenian interviewee remembers that during this 
period many anti-Armenian demonstrations and meetings were organised. The 
other ethnic Armenian woman remembers that non-Georgians, especially the 
youth, were often beaten by ordinary Georgians for no particular reason:20  
 
 “(During the Gamsakhurdia time) the non-Georgian populations were 
 beaten by Georgians for nothing. There were numerous robberies, 
 abductions, and shootings.”21 
 
                                                          
18 Precise crime data during this period is not available. According to participants at a focus group 
interview conducted in Marneuli, a district in the Azeri-populated Kvemo Kartli, in 2005, 50 to 60 Azeris 
were abducted for ransom during this period (Koyama, 2005, p. 6). 
19 A middle-aged Georgian woman, NGO worker, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe. A preliminary analysis was 
published in Evaluating human security impacts of the security sector transformation in Georgia 
(Koyama, 2005, p. 5) 
20 Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe. 
21 Ibid.  
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The Azeri communities in Marneuli shared a similar fear of tension between 
different ethnicities with the ethnic Armenian communities.22 
 
The state security sector institutions including the police and justice institutions 
were dysfunctional and did not attend those security threats. Having low 
confidence in those institutions, people rather preferred to rely on criminal groups, 
paramilitaries and/or informal networks such as family and community ties for 
justice and protection, because “[t]he police take years to investigate a case if 
they do it at all, while the criminal groups would settle the problem within a matter 
of hours.”23 Besides de jure legitimacy, people in Zugdidi find the criminal gangs 
more reliable than the police for protection in the daily lives.24  
 
In sum, people had little trust in the state security institutions. People perceived 
that the institutional capacities of state security apparatus declined since the 
Soviet time. Their lack of confidence in state security institutions drove them to 
rely on their own private networks, paramilitaries and even criminal gangs, for 
protection. Unofficial networks based on patron-client relationships, wide spread 
informal economy and the lack of functional state security institutions paved the 
way to consolidate popular support for paramilitaries and their leaders during the 
chaotic period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
 
3.4.1.3 Institutional dimension 
 
Substantial development of state institutions in independent Georgia did not start 
to be established until after 1995, when the new Constitution was signed. Until 
then, the government apparatus, i.e., the executive judicial and legislative 
branches lacked the mutual independence, accountability and capacities. 
 
                                                          
22 In Marneuli, an Azeri man recalls how a dispute between different ethnic groups engulfed the whole 
community: “First it was a quarrel between a Svan and an Azeri guy. Then the dispute broke out between 
their relatives, then between their streets, then spread to the whole community. Finally, it turned into 
chaos.” Focused group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. On the other hand, the Georgian interviewees 
did not recall ethnic tension as a serious cause of insecurity. For example, the interviewees in Zugdidi 
where most of the population is Georgian (to be more precise, Minglerians, as was Gamsakhurdia) shared 
contrasting views on the security condition during the Gamsakhurdia period. People in Zugdidi recall that 
this period was the calmest in the last 15 years. Zugdidi, March 2005. 
23 Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
24 Ibid. 
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 During the transitional period between 1990 and 1992, Georgia had four 
legislative bodies consecutively. First, in October 1990, the Supreme Council was 
established as the highest legislative body, when Georgia was still part of the 
Soviet Union. The Supreme Council was soon replaced by the Military Council 
upon a coup d’état in 1991, then the State Council in 1993. Both of the Councils 
were led by paramilitary heads, Kitovani and Ioseliani. Finally, in October 1992, 
the Parliament of Georgia was elected and became the legislature body. 
Throughout the early 1990s, the legislature hardly exercised independently of the 
executive and suffered from political struggle among different political leaders. 
The President Gamsakhurdia was both the head of the state and the Chairperson 
of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council itself became divided among 
numerous political functions soon after its establishment, and later became totally 
dysfunctional when the President himself was ousted by the 1991 coup d’état. 
 
Independent Georgia adopted the Presidency as its executive mechanism and 
the President’s post was introduced in April 1991 (UNDP Georgia, 1997, p. 39). 
The Supreme Council had elected Gamsakhurdia as its chairperson in November 
1990, and he became the first President of Georgia in 1991. As mentioned above, 
the demarcation between the executive and legislature was blurred. An 
institutional arrangement of the executive branch was yet to be developed. In the 
immediate aftermath of the independence, the executive bodies such as the 
ministries kept the Soviet structure. When the Soviet Union dissolved, those 
Soviet security institutions ceased to function and were later replaced by newly 
emerging security institutions. The Prime Minister presided over the Cabinet of 
19 Ministries supported by five Deputies (UNDP Georgia, 1997, p. 40). 
 
As for the judiciary, in 1990, the Law on the Judiciary System was adopted. 
According to the 1990 Law, the judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Courts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Tbilisi Municipal Court and 
other Regional and Municipal Courts (UNDP Georgia, 1997, pp. 40–41). The 
judiciary was reportedly de jure but not necessarily de facto independent of the 
executive (UNDP Georgia, 1997). Those judicial institutions remained attached 
to the executive rather than becoming independent of them. The judiciary still 
carried a negative reputation among the general population which it inherited from 
the Soviet period (UNDP Georgia, 1997, p. 41). 
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In the early stage of the post-independent period, Georgia had two sets of state 
security institutions. The first is the Soviet security forces including the Soviet 
military and MVD troops. Their primary role was the protection of the Soviet 
regime rather than its citizens, as violent suppressions of demonstrations by the 
Soviet security forces in 1956 and 1989 in Tbilisi illustrate.25 The second set of 
security institutions is a group of various paramilitary forces, both of non-state 
and state. The institutional vacuum left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the embryotic security institutions of independent Georgia provided space for 
informal and irregular security forces to flourish during the socio-political chaos in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Armed groups such as the Mkhedrioni, Imedi, 
and Merab Kostava Society are among the examples. A newly established 
security force, the National Guard is another prime example of paramilitary forces 
during this period. Prior to independence, Georgia did not have its own national 
army since the Soviet leader Khurshchev had banned not only Georgian but all 
national units in the Soviet Army back in 1956. When Georgia became 
independent, the National Guard was established with the intention to transform 
it into a national military. Its mission was to protect public order and state integrity 
(Darchiashvili, 1997a). As for institutional capacities, those paramilitaries were far 
from being able to replace the Soviet security forces as a state security 
apparatus: their personnel ranged in low hundreds, and none of them was as 
structured and professional as a regular military. According to Darchiashvili, 
armed men were acting according to their own desire or at the order of certain 
charismatic military leaders, and there was little organised framework in those 
armed forces during the political turmoil in this period (Darchiashvili, 1997b). In 
some cases, individual soldiers or officers acted voluntarily and they could join 
and leave the unit whenever they wanted and join in the other (Darchiashvili, 
1997b). 
 
                                                          
25 In 1956, having succeeded his predecessor Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev made a famous ‘secret 
speech’ and denounced Stalin and his “cult of personality” at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which also commemorated the third anniversary of Stalin’s death. 
Khrushchev’s speech, especially his remarks on Georgians, hurt national pride of young Georgians. 
Following the speech, a demonstration took place in Tbilisi. Initially, groups of students gathered to 
commemorate the third anniversary of the death of Stalin. As time passed on, an anti-Soviet sentiment 
grew among the group and leaflets calling for a secession of Georgia from the Soviet Union were 
distributed. On March 9, the police and military fired at peaceful demonstrators. 106 persons are said to 
have killed and hundreds were wounded. 
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3.4.2 Agency diagnosis 
 
During this early stage of the post-independence period, the former Soviet 
nomenklaturas in Georgia and Moscow continued having close ties. While most 
of the newly emerged Georgian nationalists had little experience in the state 
administration, this group of the former Soviet nomenklaturas had a certain level 
of professional experience. Having been trained in the Soviet system, this group 
took a less confrontational attitude towards Russia in comparison with the 
paramilitary leaders and Gamsakhurdia. This group also pursued the creation of 
a Georgian military. During the early 1990s, those former Soviet nomenklaturas 
played a key role in the formulation of the National Guard. However, their 
approach was moderate as they were afraid that forming a national army might 
cause a sharp reaction from Moscow (Darchiashvili, 2005, p. 6). In parallel, a 
number of actors emerged as influential figures in the security sector change 
process during this period.  
 
3.4.2.1 The paramilitary leaders 
 
The first group of such actors consists of paramilitary leaders including Georgian 
national movement activists and prominent figures in the informal network.  
Kitovani and Ioseliani are the primary examples. They pursued the establishment 
of a Georgian state independent of influence from Moscow and territorial integrity 
with the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 
The nationalist movement leaders appealed for popular support by using their 
paramilitary forces to enhance the sense of Georgian identify and nationalism. 
Some paramilitary leaders gathered popular support as a symbol of defiance 
against the Soviet rule. Java Ioseliani of the Mkhedrioni is one of such icons, 
because of his record of criminal acts during the Soviet times. Independent 
movement leaders used paramilitaries among other security forces to reinforce 
Georgian identity. Paramilitaries and the other security sector actors played a role 
as an identity symbol for Georgian nationalism and independence sentiment. The 
sentiment of defiance and pro-independence grew popular in the post-
independent Georgia and contributed to mobilising young men to join paramilitary 
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groups, resulted in increasing the influence of the paramilitary forces and their 
leaders.  
 
However, establishing professional armed forces was not their primary goal at 
that time. Instead of disbanding their own forces or building professional military, 
the paramilitary leaders retained their own paramilitary forces which were mostly 
young men who had received little or no professional military training. These 
forces were not under anyone’s strict control and did not have particular political 
motivations to participate in paramilitary activities. Most of them switched their 
affiliations regardless of the political stances of the groups (Darchiashvili, 2005, 
p. 6). Irregular armed forces in the post-independence period were therefore quite 
informal, loose associations of armed volunteers, without proper military training 
and a strong command and control structure within. In other words, they were not 
military forces, but rather political and social associations with arms and armed 
members.  
 
In addition, some of the paramilitary leaders extended their influence. As 
discussed earlier, so-called ‘thieves-in-law’ expanded their influence by 
penetrating their influence both in informal and legitimate economic activities. The 
Mkhedrioni, “based on the thieves’ traditions” (Kupatadze, p. 118), is the most 
significant paramilitaries that emerged as an influential player in such an 
environment. In the absence of functioning authority, Georgia was “divided into 
fiefdoms presided over by warlords and their private armies…gangs and 
paramilitary thugs roamed the streets and territories towns and villages; 
corruption and violence were rife” (Ekedahl and Goodman, 2001, p. 263, cited in 
Slade, p. 127). This way, the paramilitary leaders enabled to retain their own, 
personalised armed forces rather than giving up their political and economic 
leverage. 
 
Thus, for the paramilitary leaders, establishing professional regular armed forces 
was not the main priority but consolidating their own power was. In order to 
generate and restore support and power, their paramilitary forces needed to 
remain informal, irregular armed groups. Fragmented, personalised paramilitary 
forces were necessary to restore the paramilitary heads’ political leverage and 
economic interest in the fragile statehood of Georgia during this period. As a 
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result, paramilitary forces remained highly personalised along with the individual 
leaders and they could be used to consolidate their power and occasionally purge 
political rivals.  
 
3.4.2.2 Zviad Gamsakhurdia: The President  
 
Gamsakhurdia is one of the most prominent figures among independence 
movement leaders. He is a distinct actor as his position as the President and his 
relation to other political leaders significantly influenced the course of the security 
sector formation.  
 
Gamsakhurdia’s style in mobilising political support was based on his Georgian 
ethnocentrism, claiming Georgian culture’s superiority over other cultures. 
Gamsakhurdia regarded that ethnic sentiment was “at a level suitable for helping 
him to achieve popularity” (Nodia, 1996, p. 77). Born to a famous Georgian 
novelist, Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a literature 
lecturer at Tbilisi State University in the middle 1970s, when Georgian 
intellectuals began the nationalist protest against Moscow. Among the nationalist 
intellectuals, Gamsakhurdia had the most radical attitude towards other ethnic 
groups in Georgia. Together with Merab Kostava, Giorgi Chanturia and other 
intellectuals, Gamsakhurdia protested various Soviet policies on Georgia and the 
Georgian language. After the death of Kostava in October 1989,26 Gamsakhurdia 
became the most popular Georgian politician for his romanticised nationalism, 
especially among ethnic Georgians, in particular, the Western Georgians or the 
Mingrelians. As he further pursued for more political influence and support, 
Gamsakhurdia’s nationalistic style became increasingly radical. He refused to 
stop hostilities by the Georgians against other ethnic groups and pronounced 
threats against minorities who ‘would not behave in a proper manner’ (Nodia, 
1996, pp. 77–78). His Georgian-centric policies spread dismay among non-
Georgian ethnic groups, and incurred conflicts between Georgians and the other 
ethnic groups.   
 
                                                          
26 Kostava was killed in an automobile accident (Suny, 1994, p. 324). 
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Another characteristic feature of Gamsakhurdia is his populist and (some-said) 
paranoid personality. Gamsakhurida appealed for popular support by employing 
extreme nationalist rhetoric resembled to those used by Stalin in the 1930’s, such 
as ‘Enemy of the Nation’ (Stalin’s version: ‘Enemy of the People’) (Nodia, 1996, 
p. 80). Such extreme populist rhetoric garnered popular support for 
Gamsakhurdia on one hand, on the other, it generated an image of 
Gamsakhurdia as a dictator and other Georgian democrats increasingly 
distanced from him. 
 
The more he gained popular support, the more his attitude towards political rivals 
became radical, sometimes even violent. He grew a sense of paranoia, believing 
other political leaders and ‘Tbilisians’ were betraying him. Gamsakhurdia’s failure 
to condemn an attempted coup in Moscow in August 1990 increased opposition 
against him. As one critic states, Gamsakhurdia was “obsessed with the problem 
of personal loyalty and failed to develop rational political behaviour”.27   The 
political chaos in the early 1990s in the aftermath of the independence was 
shaped by the personal rivalry between Gamsakhurdia and his political 
opponents and escalated to armed struggles.  
 
In 1990 and 1991, Gamsakhurdia’s priority was to establish dominance over 
prominent political rivals, especially Kitovani and Ioseliani. Instead of introducing 
economic policies to stabilize the economic and other social disturbance in the 
aftermath of the Soviet dissolution, Gamsakhurdia introduced a number of 
security sector change that aimed to curtail their influence during the short period 
of his time in power, until he was ousted by the coup in early 1992. For example, 
in early 1991, Gamsakhurdia ordered to create the Special Purpose Police Unit 
(OMON) with an intention to counter the influence of Kitovani who controlled the 
National Guard. The National Guard was ordered to become a subunit of OMON, 
but Kitovani refused to follow the order. 
 
3.4.3 Dynamics 
 
                                                          
27 Author’s interview, October 2000, Tbilisi. 
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Between 1985 and 1991, security sector change in Georgia occurred in the 
context of the emergence of the Georgian nationalist movement in the late 1980s 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The emergence and dominance of 
paramilitary forces were the two most prominent outcomes of security sector 
change during this period. The multi-faceted structural dimensions mentioned 
above interacted with the various agencies to produce complex dynamics in the 
course of security sector change. Which factors shaped the course of security 
sector change? What incentives drove those agencies to transform the way they 
did?  
 
3.4.3.1 The emergence of the paramilitary forces in the power and 
institutional vacuums 
 
The emergence of the paramilitary forces derived from the combination of a 
number of political, socio- economic factors. As this chapter discussed earlier, the 
Georgian nationalist movement in the late 1980s centred on a few prominent 
leaders such as Gamsakhurdia. Their political groups were often accompanied 
with private armed groups loyal to their leaders. In the absence of a regular 
military of Georgia itself, the fragmented statehood of Georgia due to the two 
territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia contributed to justifying the 
emergency of Georgian paramilitary forces, even though they were no more than 
private militias of the political elites. Those independence movement leaders 
often appealed to the general public by using Georgian centric nationalism and 
garnered popular support. 
 
The vacuum in power and institutions in post-Soviet Georgia could be attributed 
to the emergence of the paramilitary leaders as the most significant political 
figures. In terms of economy, Georgia had been known for its flourishing informal 
economy based on patron-client relations even during the Soviet times 
(Fairbanks, 1996). In post-independent Georgia, the high degree of informality in 
the Georgian economy allowed some of the paramilitary forces to generate 
economic benefits from an informal network based on a client relationship and 
became an influential actor not only in politics but also in an economic sense. The 
institutional vacuum could be found in the governance domain, too. Upon the 
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dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Soviet institutions ceased to function and left 
the power and institutional vacuum which the paramilitary leaders eventually filled 
in. The collapse of the Soviet Union induced the leak of small arms and light 
weapons from the Soviet military depos, resulting in the further militarisation of 
the paramilitary forces and the power struggle among their leaders.  
 
3.4.3.2 Power struggle among political elites and the evolution and 
disbandment of the paramilitary forces 
 
Georgia in the early independence period between 1990 and 1991 in post-
independence Georgia saw some efforts to build its own state institutions under 
the newly elected president, Gamsakhurdia. As discussed in the previous section, 
the executive and the legislature at this time were far from being functional to 
political influence of the President or the paramilitary leaders who headed the 
Supreme Council.28 The weak state institutions in the early independence period 
allowed political dynamics to direct the course of the change of the security sector, 
in particular, paramilitaries. The process was thus heavily influenced by political 
dynamics and power struggle between the President and his political opponents 
and paramilitary leaders: Kitovani and Ioseliani. 
 
Initially, Gamsakhurdia accommodated the other political and paramilitary leaders 
holding crucial positions in the government. For instance, Tengiz Kitovani was 
appointed as the commander of the National Guard. He also held high-ranking 
positions such as the Parliamentary Deputy and the head of the Government 
Commission of Defense.29 Similarly, Vaja Adamia was close to Gamsakhurdia in 
the early stage of the post-independence period. Adamia was the head of the 
Merab Kostava Society and its armed wing. Under the Gamsakhurdia 
government, Adamia, like Kitovani, held various key positions such as the 
chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Defense, Security, Law and Order. 
 
                                                          
28 The Supreme Council was established in 1990, then replaced by the Military Council in 1991, then the 
State Council in 1993.  
29 Similarly, Vaja Adamia was close to Gamsakhurdia in the early stage of the post-independence period. 
Adamia was the head of the Merab Kostava Society and its armed wing. Under the Gamsakhurdia 
government, Adamia, like Kitovani, held various key positions such as the chairman of the Parliamentary 
Commission for Defense, Security, Law and Order. 
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Eventually, Gamsakhurdia increasingly became anxious about his political 
dominance and his relationship with the prominent paramilitary leaders grew sour. 
The relationship between Gamsakhurdia and the Mkhedrioni became the most 
adversarial one. According to one critique, the Mkhedrioni hated Gamsakhurdia 
for his populist nationalism as well as “heavy reliance on people from the 
provinces and Tbilisi’s outlying areas” that the Mkhedrioni regarded as “socially 
and culturally alien” (Darchiashvili, 2005, p. 6). A series of the reform attempts 
targeting the paramilitary forces took place in 1991. Those attempted paramilitary 
reform efforts illustrate the power struggle between the President and the 
paramilitary heads.  
 
In February, Gamsakhurdia ordered the Mkhedrioni to disband. Having met a 
refusal from its head, Ioseliani, Gamsakhurdia arrested the Mkhedrioni 
members30 with the help of the Soviet army, and imprisoned its leader, Ioseliani, 
without a trial. In August, Gamsakhurida dismissed Kitovani and Adamia. In the 
same month, Gamsakhurdia ordered a presidential decree to abolish the position 
of the commander and turn it into a unit called Rapid Reaction Corps, 
subordinated under the MIA. Gamsakhurdia created another internal troop, 
OMON (Jones, 2015, p. 68). In September, Gamsakhurdia created the MoD and 
restored the National Guard’s previous status and had it subordinated directly to 
the president himself. In September, Gamsakhurdia created the National Security 
Council consisting of law enforcement bodies (Jones, 2015, p. 69).  
 
Despite his official dismissal as the commander, Kitovani continued to lead most 
of the National Guard. The confrontation between Gamsakhurdia and the 
paramilitary leaders escalated towards the end of 1991 and led to a violent clash 
which ousted Gamsakhurdia from power. By the end of 1991, the National Guards 
and the Mkhedrioni, the two major paramilitaries, thus became not merely armed 
forces but a dominant player in Georgian politics. Having grown powerful enough 
to organise a coup and oust the President, they became the most influential 
political player in the Georgian politics by the end of 1992 (Aves, 1996; 
Darchiashvili, 1997a; Jones, 2015). 
 
                                                          
30 Later in the year, however, the arrested Mhkedrioni members were released to fight in the civil war.  
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The relation between Gamsakhurdia and other paramilitary leaders further 
deteriorated after the failed attempt of the disbandment of paramilitaries and the 
dismissals of their commanders. After having been dismissed, Kitovani and 
Adamia joined the Mkhedrioni and its leader, Ioseliani, and formed the anti-
Gamsakhurdia coalition. The formation of the anti-Gamsakhurdia coalition 
changed the power balance between Gamsakhurdia and his rivals. At the end of 
1991, the latter organized the coup and ousted Gamsakhurdia as the President. 
The ousting of Gamsakhurdia left the various attempts of security sector change, 
i.e., the disbandment of the paramilitary forces and the development of national 
military and other state security institutions incomplete. The coup was an 
illustrative event to demonstrate the dominance of the paramilitary forces over 
the democratically elected president. Security sector change during this period 
suggests that the paramilitary forces became dominant actors not only in the 
security sector but also in politics and society in Georgia by the end of 1991, 
rather than being subordinated under the civilian control.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
During the political transition between 1985 and 1991, the security sector in 
Georgia experienced two major changes. The first change was the evolution of 
the prominent paramilitaries. In pre-independence Georgia in the late 1980s, a 
number of paramilitary forces started to emergence and affiliated to prominent 
individuals such as independence movement leaders. Those paramilitaries were 
not of a large scale in manpower and weaponry, and their affiliation was rather 
informal and based on personal loyalty to leaders. The second change is the 
creation of new state security sector institutions. Towards the end of the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet state security apparatus started to become fragmented: their 
last intervention in Georgia was on in 1989, when the Soviet internal troops 
intervened and violently clashed an anti-Soviet rally. When the Soviet Union 
ended, the Soviet security apparatus ceased to function, leaving a vacuum in 
state governance. A number of the paramilitaries emerged to fill in the vacuum 
and thrived in the early stage of post-independence Georgia. In the absence of 
professional security sector institutions and civilian control mechanism, the 
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paramilitaries continued being disobedient against the President and became 
influential enough to oust him by the end of 1991. 
 
The scrutiny on the local security sector actors and the process of security sector 
change indicates that the domestic power struggle among a handful of political 
elites was the key driver for determining the course of security sector change. 
The appointments of the paramilitary leaders as heads of the state institutions 
and the frequent dismissals of paramilitary leaders suggest the absence of a 
systemic SSR strategy. 
 
Moreover, this chapter attributes the emergence and dominance of the 
paramilitaries to political, socio-economic and institutional factors. As discussed 
earlier, these factors include a wide range of factors including the emerging 
Georgian nationalism, widespread client networks embedded with the informal 
economy, the high accessibility to circulating small arms and low confidence in 
the existing state security institutions. It is noteworthy that most of these factors 
are not confined to a narrow definition of security but encompass a wide range of 
human security concerns.  
 
Based on the analysis of the interplay between those factors, the chapter 
provides the following observations that seek to further refine the understanding 
of the relationship between domestic socio-political factors and the process of 
agenda setting for security sector change.  
 
First, the nature of the security sector process in Georgia during this period 
appears to be politically driven. The process of agenda setting for security sector 
change, for instance, the disbandment of the Mkhedrioni and the downgrade of 
the National Guard, aimed at curtailing political influence of the paramilitary 
leaders. The SSR agenda was heavily influenced by power dynamics between 
the president and his political rivals, i.e., the paramilitary leaders.  
 
Second, the executive needed to have enough capacity and political support to 
carry out SSR agendas. The actual executive power of the President during this 
period was extremely weak. Although the president initiated some SSR efforts, 
they were met with severe resistance from the reform targets: the paramilitary 
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forces. As the latter eventually became prevailing actors, those reform efforts 
were not realized.  
 
Third, the paramilitaries were not merely security forces but also played various 
political and socio-economic roles. During the course of the pre-independence 
period, the paramilitary forces became as a symbol for the Georgian nationalism. 
Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the independence, they provided a 
socio-economic network through which economic benefits were distributed to its 
supporting members. On the other hand, the paramilitary forces did not function 
as state security institutions to protect and promote security of the general public. 
Instead, they remained de fact private militia and only loyal to their own leaders. 
In other words, their role was not so much of security issues but more of political 
and socio-economic nature. 
 
This analysis on the Georgia during this period thus highlighted the importance 
of understating the political dynamics as well as political, socio-economic and 
institutional dimensions that surround security sector actors. The next chapter 
further applies the political economy analysis and examines what factors drive 
the course of security sector change in a different political period under the 
President Shevardnadze. 
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Chapter 4 Security sector change under the Shevardnadze regime 
between 1992 and 2003 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on examining the security sector change process during the 
socio-political transition in Georgia during the period between 1992 and 2003. 
The analysis in this chapter examines key factors in the agenda-setting process 
of SSR and how they determined the course of security sector change during the 
Shevardnadze times. During the first half of the phase, Georgia started 
consolidating its statehood, while territorial conflicts remained violent and 
contentious. Under Shevardnadze’s administration, the security sector 
development started receiving external assistance from the Western allies. In the 
second half of the phase, an anti-Shevardnadze government movement began 
to increase and eventually led to the ousting of Shevardnadze. What roles did the 
security sector actors play and how did they interact with political dynamics in the 
transitional period? What were the key factors that affected the course of security 
sector change? 
 
The chapter consists of three parts. The first part examines political 
developments relevant to security sector change in Georgia between 1992 and 
2003. The chapter proceeds with a detailed examination of the changes in the 
security sector. The third part of this chapter provides a political economy analysis 
to examine these changes in the security sector, identifying key determining 
factors and dynamics among them in the SSR agenda-setting under the 
Shevardnadze regime. 
 
4.2 The examination of the political developments between 1992 and 2003 
 
As the previous chapter described, post-independence Georgian was at the 
verge of collapse as a state in 1992. The Georgian state authority in Tbilisi could 
not control paramilitaries, and the paramilitaries instead filled in the power 
vacuum, by taking over the crucial security sector institutions. Between 1992 and 
1993, Georgia was deep in violent chaos, too, with the two separatist conflicts in 
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as a civil strife in Georgia itself. This was at 
the peak of Georgia’s being on the edge of sliding into a failed state by the early 
1990s.  
 
The return of the former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze, to Tbilisi in March 1993 was a 
political watershed. Since the mid-1990s, Georgia began restoring its statehood 
and building state institutions, including security sector ones. Under the 
Shevardnadze times between 1992 and 2003, Georgia gained a certain degree 
of stability. This section outlines the main political developments between 1992 
and 2003 as a context in which security sector change took place.  
 
4.2.1 Building an independent Georgian state  
 
After having been at the verge of collapse in the early 1990s, Georgia started 
building its statehood. Shevardnadze, the head of the State Council, was elected 
the president in 1995. In the same year a new constitution was adopted. A new 
currency, the lari, was introduced. Narrowly escaping two assassination attempts, 
Shevardnadze won the election and became the president with  stronger 
executive power, in November 1995. Non-political civic movement grew. By this 
time, Georgia had avoided the risk of state collapse. 
 
After Shevardnadze became the president in 1995, Georgia started to see a 
democratic political system evolve. Basic principles of democracy were 
implemented, and a multi-party system was consolidated, with Shevardnadze’s 
Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG) as the leading party. Civil society grew, so did 
an independent media both in print and electric formats. By the end of the 1990s, 
the state-building process in Georgia had significantly progressed.   
 
When it comes to territorial integrity, Georgia barely controlled its own territory in 
1993. The violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were monitored by 
international mechanisms of the UN in Abkhazia and OSCE in South Ossetia, but 
became stuck in the political deadlock. The conflicts’ situation reached a point  
that was often called ‘no war, no peace’. In 1993, Georgia lost a battle in Sukhumi, 
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Abkhazia. During the Shevardnadze period, Georgia also lost control over South 
Ossetia as a result of the violent conflicts not only militarily and politically but also 
economically. In addition to the two breakaway regions, Adjara remained 
independent of Tbilisi. Its leader, Abashidze, implemented authoritarian, one-
person politics. Abashidze consolidated the control of the armed forces in the 
region and made them into his personal guard to maintain the independence of 
the region. Though Georgia escaped from a state collapse in the early 1990s, the 
question of its territorial integration remained resolved during the Shevardnadze 
period. 
 
Figure 1 Map of Georgia 
4.2.2 International recognition and diplomatic shift towards the Western allies 
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By the beginning of the 1990s, Georgia had become isolated in the international 
community. However, since Shevardnadze became a state head in 1992, Georgia 
had gradually gained international recognition as an independent state. Georgia 
joined a number of multinational organisations and partnerships. Within 1992, for 
instance, Georgia became a member of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) 31  the International Monetary Fund, the United 
Nations and the World Bank. Shevardnadze built a close strategic relation with 
the Western allies, in particular the United States, whilst keeping ‘balance 
diplomacy’ between the newly emerged Western allies and Russia.  
 
As described above, Georgia between 1992 and 2003 transformed from a 
collapsing state, to a fragile state with significant functioning state institutions and 
basic democratic frameworks and mechanisms. Although the territorial disputes 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unsolved, a certain level of security 
was restored. It became recognised as a state internationally, too, which brought 
an amount of external assistance to the country, to build its state institutions and 
systems further.  It was in this context that the SSR efforts took place.  
 
Strategic interests in Georgia increased, as Georgia was to become a transit 
country of the oil pipeline between Baku, Tbilisi and Ceyhan. This enhanced the 
strategic importance of Georgia for the Western countries. The strategic interest 
among the Euro-Atlantic allies in Georgia helped Georgia maintained its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
4.2.3 The declining Shevardnadze block and the emerging anti-Shevardnadze 
alliance  
 
Shevardnadze won the 1995 presidential election with an overwhelming majority. 
However, popular support for his presidency started declining since the late 
1990s, too, as Georgia’s economy contributed struggling. Although Georgia 
recovered from the economic decline in the early 1990s, the economic situation 
deteriorated again after the economic crisis in Russia in 1998 (The Foundation 
“Liberal Academy - Tbilisi", 2012, p. 4). 
                                                          
31 The CSCE became the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the OSCE, in 1995 
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Basic daily life for the general population remained hard to maintain. Even in 
Tbilisi, electricity and gas supply were not stable except in privileged districts. 
Prevailing on the informal economy as seen in the previous chapter, the issue of 
corruption became even more rampant and became a political issue, especially 
in the second half of the Shevardnadze regime. 
 
Shevardnadze nevertheless continued to enjoy wide support from the general 
population as well as external actors, both of the West and Russia. Shevardnadze 
won the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections with an overwhelming majority. 
However, the stagnated economic condition, along with the widespread 
corruption, contributed to accumulating frustration among the general public 
against the Shevardnadze regime. Frustration among the general public reached 
its peak in the latter half of the Shevardnadze presidency. In late 2000, for 
instance, people often lit bonfires on the street, and sometimes demonstrated to 
demand the President to resign even in winter at night.32 
 
It was in this context that so-called ‘reformists’, politicians of a younger generation, 
led by Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili started formulating an anti-
Shevardnadze alliance.33 Shevardnadze’s political protégé and the former justice 
minister, Saakashvili, had distanced himself from Shevardnadze by leaving the 
Shevardnadze’s government and party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, in 
2001.34 Saakashvili founded a new political party, the United National movement, 
and criticised Shevardnadze for corruption, which was notoriously high among 
the security sector institutions then. The anti-Shevardnadze group became to be 
called ‘reformist`, as they advocated the reform of the Shevardnadze regime and 
its power basis, the security sector institutions. The security sector institutions 
had thus become a target for the anti-Shevardnadze coalition’s political campaign. 
                                                          
32 Author’s observation, September – December 2000, Tbilisi.  
33 Both Zhvania and Saakshvili were Shevardnadze’s protégé until the early 2000’s. Zhvania was general 
secretary of Shevardnadze’s party, the CUG, until 2001 when he pulled off in a protest against corruption 
scandal involving high MSS officials. Saakashvili joined the CUG and was elected the MP. In 2000, 
Saakashvili became the Minister of Justice under the Shevardnadze government, then resigned next year 
in the protest against the corruption scandal.   
34 Saakashvili joined Shevardnadze’s party and rose as one of the most prominent politicians of the next 
generation, along with Zhvania and held the position of the justice minister under Shevardnadze’s 
government. Saakashvili had gradually distanced from Shevardnadze, however, as Shevardnadze started 
losing popular support in the mid-2000s. 
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By 2003, the opposition had organised mass protests for the last few years. Some 
civil society institutions, in particular, the Liberty Institute, had been the pivotal in 
the democratisation process. After a few failed demonstrations, in the year 2003, 
they managed to become more organised and better financed than the previous 
years. Popular protests against the Shevardnadze regime started as early as April. 
Since the election on 2 November, the popular protest became more active. 
Under the leadership of Kmara! (‘Enough!’) activists, closely worked with the 
Liberty Institute, people from other regions than Tbilisi participated in the protest. 
Protests grew bigger as the movement gained popular support. Ordinary citizens 
joined the rallies, and the opposition leaders: Saakasivili, Zhvania and Nino 
Burjanadze put strong pressures on Shevardnadze to resign. In the meanwhile, 
Shevardnadze sought support from Russia’s Putin and Abashidze of Adjara, 
which the opposition regarded as a symbolic gesture of the authoritative 
dictatorship of Shevardnadze. This resulted to inflame further disgust against the 
Shevardnadze regime among the population. Shevardnadze also lost a strong 
ally, the head of State TV Channel, by criticising him for the channel’s media 
strategy on the protests. On 19 November, Shevardnadze agreed to resign. 
Burjanadze became an interim president until the presidential election on 4 
January 2004.35 
 
Thus, the ‘reformist’ took over from Shevardnadze after his decade-long regime. 
During the 10 years, Georgia had achieved a certain degree of state building. The 
territorial disputes over the two separatist regions remained unsolved and the 
Shevardnadze government’s popularity had gradually become waned in the early 
2000’s. However, in comparison with the time immediately after the 
independence, Georgia restored a greater degree of stability. In this context, a 
number of state institutions, including the security sector actors, were built.  
 
4.3 Examining security sector change between 1992 and 2003 
 
                                                          
35 Prior to the ‘Rose Revolution’, Zhvania had resigned as the Speaker of Parliament and split from 
Shevardnadze’s CUG and formed an opposition. Nino Bujranadze had replaced Zhvania as the Speaker of 
Parliament.  
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The following section explores two phases of security sector change in the period 
between 1992 and 2003. It examines how each element of the security sector 
took different trajectories and degrees of reform implementation. The first phase 
runs between 1992 and 1998. During this period, a basic legal framework for 
developing and defining security sector institutions was established. As the major 
quasi-state paramilitaries became mostly disbanded, the state armed forces, 
including paramilitaries, became defined by the 1997 Law On Defence (“The Law 
of Georgia On the Defence of Georgia,” 1997). Under the Law on the Defence of 
Georgia, the security forces in Georgia are divided into two categories: the 
Military Forces and the Armed Forces. According to the Law, the Military Forces 
consists of Armed Forces of Georgia, Border Guards of the State Department of 
Protection, Internal Troops of the MIA and other armed formations created by the 
legislation order. The Armed Forces consisted of ground forces, air forces and 
armies of antiaircraft defence.36  
 
The paramilitary heads and their followers were replaced with professional 
security personnel in the process. In the second phase of security sector change 
1998 and 2003, the defence and justice sectors made a clear shift towards the 
Western standards and received external assistance from the Western allies, 
whilst the reform of the police and paramilitary forces met with stagnation.   
 
4.3.1. Security sector change between 1992 and 1998 
 
In the first half of the Shevardnadze times, a basic legal framework was prepared 
and the professionalization of the security sector institutions started. During this 
period, Georgia saw three major changes in the security sector: a) disbandment 
of paramilitary forces, disarmament of armed civilians, b) state institutions and 
legal framework started to be developed and/or formalised and c) 
professionalisation of the security sector personnel and institutions.  
 
4.3.1.1 Disbanding paramilitaries 
 
                                                          
36 The Law was amended in 2001 and naval forces were added as armed forces. 
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The SSR efforts under the Shevardnadze regime began with the disbandment of 
the quasi-state paramilitaries and the ousting of their leaders. During 1993, the 
cooperation between Shevardnadze and Kitovani was dissolved and the later 
was dismissed from the Minister of Defence. Shevardnadze commenced military 
building process to professionalize armed forces and reduce the individual 
influence of the paramilitary leaders. The National Guards, which was renamed 
as the Rapid Reaction Force at the time, was abolished as a separate unit.  
 
However, the annihilation of unaffiliated armed forces was not a smooth process 
and met with resistance from the paramilitary leaders. In January 1995, Kitovani 
departed with his 1,000-armed supporters and invaded Abkhazia. After clashes 
with forces of the Georgian Ministry of State Security (MSS), he was arrested, 
and his men were disarmed. The National Guard was subordinated to MoD in 
1994 as a department. Restricting the quasi-state paramilitaries by the 
Constitution in 1995, the process of disbanding the National Guards and the 
Mkhedrioni became complete. However, the politically driven disbandment and 
lack of systemic DDR process left some negative consequences to the overall 
SSR efforts, as elaborated in chapter 8. 
 
4.3.1.2 Building civilian control mechanisms 
 
The security sector governance dominated by the semi-paramilitary headers was 
gradually replaced by a more systemic, civilian control mechanism. In 1994, 
Shevardnadze created the National Security and Defence Council within the 
Parliament, along with the Military Consultants Group. These platforms appointed 
and shuffle high level state security personnel. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, a legal framework defining the relations between and roles 
of security sector actors started to be built, too. The most significant one is the 
Constitution that was approved in 1995. According to the Constitution, the 
President was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, as well as the 
chairman of the Security Council. State budget including defence and security 
expenditures was discussed and adopted by the Parliament. The President could 
not deploy armed forces in emergency situations without obtaining consent from 
80 
 
the Parliament. Furthermore, the then chairperson of the parliamentary defence 
committee, Revas Adamia, is quoted saying: ‘To say that our committee controls 
the law-enforcement structures would be grossly exaggerated’ (Darchiashvili, 
1997a). This way, the Constitution set out a foundation of the armed forces based 
on Western standards based on democratic, civil military relations. 
 
The Constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, too. Subsequently, 
the penal system was transferred from the MIA to the Ministry of Justice in 2000. 
This transfer of the judicial power to the Ministry of Justice meant that the law 
enforcement body would no longer control the justice system, which was the case 
in the Soviet times.  
 
Besides the Constitution, a series of laws and legislations were developed. They 
include the Law on Police (adopted in 1993), Law of State Border (1998), State 
Material Reserve (1998), the Status of the Servicemen (1998), Operative-
Investigative Activity (1999) and Defence (2001). These laws contributed to 
clarifying the role of security sector personnel. For instance, the Law on the 
Status of the Servicemen restricted the political activity of the military, police and 
special agency employees. It also prohibits the political activity of the military 
creation of political party cells within their units. (Darchiashvili, 2004, p. 90) 
Similarly, any commercial activity was prohibited for the employees of the security 
sector agencies. The introduction of the new security sector related legislations 
thus separated the security sector sphere from the political and economic ones.  
 
In the defence sphere, a further effort for civilian control took place. The National 
Security Council (NSC) was established in 1996. According to The Law of 
Georgia On the National Security Council, the NSC was:  
 
“an advisory body of the President for decision-making on strategic 
questions of the organisation of military construction and defence, 
international and foreign policy related to the security of the country, 
maintenance of stability, law and order.”37 
 
                                                          
37 The Law of Georgia On the National Security Council, Article 2, 24 January 1996.  
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The NSC was in charge of dealing with both defence and domestic security 
issues. The NSC consisted of the President, the Secretary of the NSC and the 
Ministers of State, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, State Security and 
Finance.  
 
4.3.1.3 Professionalising security and justice sector agencies 
 
The reshuffle of the ministers in 1993 initiated the reform of the defence sector. 
Shevardnadze replaced key management positions in the security sector 
institutions by appointing professional staff who were trained military experts 
either at the Soviet (or Russian) or US institutions. This way, the influential yet 
non-military professionals such as Kitovani were removed from the state security 
institutions. 
 
Georgia adopted its new security concept with a clear indication that Georgia 
would form a closer strategic tie with the Euro-Atlantic allies and distance from 
Russia. In April 1997, the Georgian parliament adopted new foreign-policy 
guidelines aimed at expediting the country’s integration into European structures. 
The Parliamentary Speaker Zhravia said that the new concept reflected the 
current state of Georgia’s relation with Russia which he termed “the main threat 
to Georgian security.”38 With an intention to be integrated into the NATO system, 
Georgia started strengthening its military partnership with the USA and the other 
NATO ally countries. In 1996, Georgia started the NATO Programme for 
Partnership in 1996. In order to assist with the organisational reform of the 
security system, the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) was founded 
under the provision of the National Security Council in 1998, in order to assist 
with the organisational reform of the security system. In 1999, the ISAB produced 
a number of recommendations to modernise the Georgian military. Those 
recommendations included the elimination of parallel structure in the security 
sector institutions, the need for a formal national security concept and a White 
Paper on defence, the reduction of the armed forces and the appointment of a 
civilian minister of defence. 
 
                                                          
38 RFE/RL (1997) “Georgian adopts new security concept”, RFE/RL, 4 April 1997.  
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4.3.2 Security sector change between 1999 and 2003 
 
The second phase runs between 1999 and 2003. The Western allies increased 
their assistance for the Georgian SSR, in a context where the specific SSR 
agendas for international assistance were being first developed. It was in this 
period that different security sector institutions showed different degrees of reform 
progress.  
 
4.3.2.1 Increased external assistance for the defence and justice 
spheres 
 
The pro-Western foreign policy of the Shevardnadze regime required the 
Georgian security sector system to be aligned with the Western standards. 
Consequently, external assistance from the NATO allies started to increase, 
particularly in the defence and justice sectors.  
 
Among the NATO allies, the USA was the biggest assistance provider. The USA 
provided technical assistance to the Border Guards and the Custom Service to 
enhance their capacity to address border control. The Border Security and Law 
Enforcement (BSLW) Assistance Program was administrated by the US Custom 
Service in order to establish the government’s control on borders, providing 
equipment and training (Hoye and Davis, 2000, p. 8). As for developing export 
control regimes to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile material, 
the US Department of State and Defence assists the Georgian State Department 
of the State Border Guards under the Co-operative Threat Reduction Program. 
 
The US assistance became even bigger after the 9.11 attacks in the USA in 2001. 
The USA started providing bilateral military assistance to enhance anti-terrorist 
operation capacities and combat capacities of the Georgian security agencies. 
These programmes included the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement 
Assistance Program; Military/Ammunition Relocation Program; Foreign Military 
Financing Program; and International Military Education and Training Program. 
Among these programmes, the biggest programme was the Georgia Train-and-
Equip Program (GTEP). The 64 million USD programme involved training of 
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Georgian troops to enhance counter-terrorism capacities (Darchiashvili, 2004, p. 
96). 
 
Turkey, a then close NATO ally, also provided military assistance. For instance, 
Turkey provided Georgian officers with military training at Turkish military 
academies and the participation of Georgian servicemen in peacekeeping 
operations in which Turkey was involved. Turkey also signed an agreement to 
train a Georgian commando unit and provide Georgia with non-combat 
materials.39 With the affluent financial and technical support, Georgia managed 
built its own national military and modernised the defence system in the latter half 
of the Shevardnadze times. 
 
The most significant progress in the justice reform was the transfer of the penal 
system from the MIA to the Ministry of Justice. The penal system was transferred 
to the Ministry of Justice in 2000, after a number of years of pressure from the 
Council of Europe and within Georgia itself.40 This transfer of the judicial power 
to the Ministry of Justice meant that the law enforcement body would no longer 
control the justice system, which was the case in the Soviet times. American and 
European donors actively supported the judicial reform. Training of judges and 
assistance in the court system was assisted by the European Commission, the 
United States Agency for International Development, and the World Bank. The 
transfer provided more constitutional independence of the law enforcement 
bodies with the justice system. 
 
4.3.2.2 The Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security 
 
In comparison with the defence and justice spheres, the MIA and the MSS 
underwent few reform efforts. The biggest hindrance to SSR in Georgia was the 
weak domestic will or support for the reform process, especially from within the 
security forces and policing organisations, i.e. the MIA and the MSS. In the early 
period of the Shevardnadze administration, the government did not show much 
strong will to address problems in those organisations. 
                                                          
39 RFE/RL (1997): “Georgia, Turkey discuss Military Cooperation”, RFE/RL, 22 May 1997. 
40 The Ministry of Justice was headed by an emerging young politician, Saakashvili, appointed as the 
minister in 2000. 
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The reform process in the MIA and the MSS makes a sharp contrast with the one 
in the defence and justice sectors. As discussed above, the Ministries of Defence 
and Justice saw a certain degree of westernisation with external assistance. On 
the other hand, the Internal Affairs and State Security ministries remained its 
Soviet style governance. The MIA, for instance, restored the Soviet style staffing. 
Instead of appointing a civilian as the Minister, the President appointed police 
professionals who were either a Police Major-General or Police-Lieutenant-
General, throughout his times between 1995 and 2003.  
 
As the criticism against the corruption increased in the general public, in 
November 2001, the Shevardnadze administration dismissed a number of 
Internal Affairs and State Security officials (Jones, 2015, p. 165). Besides this, 
hardly any institutional reform efforts were made in those internal security organs. 
External assistance towards the MIA and the MSS was quite limited, too. 
 
4.3.2.3 Paramilitary groups 
 
By the late 1990s, all the major paramilitary forces came to under the state 
structure, mainly the internal security agencies. Around this period, Georgia had 
a number of paramilitary forces the controls of the MIA, the MSS, the MoD and 
the State Department of the State Border Defence (SDBD) respectively.  
 
As seen above, the biggest paramilitary forces, the National Guards, were 
already subordinated to the MoD in 1994 as a department. Those non-defence 
sector paramilitary forces also had troops and their manpower numbered in 
thousands. For instance, the MIA had several armed forces under its control, i.e., 
Interior Troops, Assault Brigade and OMON. The MIA and the Special Service of 
State Protection include 3,000 to 3,500 officers and soldiers. The SDBD 
consisted of 5,500 personnel. State Safeguard Service had approximately 6,000 
personnel in the Service. The MSS also had armed units. However, the size and 
mandate of their paramilitary forces were unclear as such information was almost 
inaccessible form the MSS at that time. 
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The mandates of some of the paramilitaries duplicated and/or sometimes 
conflicted. The Special Service of State Protection’s mandates mainly concerned 
of the protection of boarders and strategic state assets such as the President’s 
office and oil industry infrastructure. The MIA’s paramilitary forces had the tasks 
of maintaining law and order, fighting terrorism and other forms of organised 
crime, defending state installations, protecting special cargo transportation, and 
supporting the military in wartime. The SDBD were to defend the country’s long 
borders and had the task of apprehending smugglers, drug traffickers, poachers, 
and illegal immigrants amongst other things. The Coast Guard was in charge of 
coastal border control. State Safeguard Service had the role of protecting all key 
strategic state assets such as the President’s office, the Parliament and the 
component parts of the oil industry infrastructure. While to the paramilitary forces 
in the early 1990s were mostly serving for their individual leaders and networks, 
the paramilitaries in this period became mandated to protect state assets 
(Koyama, 2002, p. 7). As discussed in depth in chapter 8, reflecting the lack of 
reform at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Securities, the reform of the 
affiliated paramilitaries had unsolved issues, i.e., overlapping mandates and 
ambiguity over the concept of ‘public order’. 
 
In sum, the SSR during in the late 1990s made a significant progress but left 
unsolved issues. The quasi-state paramilitaries were disbanded and their leaders 
were replaced with professional security personnel. The defence system had 
been created from scratch and opened to foreign assistance for institution 
building. The transfer of the justice system was a significant step to establish the 
justice sector’s independence of the police. On the other hand, few reform efforts 
succeeded in so-called ‘power ministries’, i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs 
and State Security. Although the paramilitary forces became under the state 
control, their mandates were left ambiguous and sometimes conflicting among 
themselves.  
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Table 3 Major security agencies during the Shevardnadze period, 1992 - 
2003 
 
Non-state Quasi-state State 
(Mostly 
disbanded/dissolved) 
 Ajara paramilitary forces  Internal Troops 
 Ministry of Defence 
 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 Ministry of State Security 
 National Guards (subordinated 
to the MoD as a department in 
1994) 
 National Security Council 
(established in 1996) 
 Special Service of State 
Protection 
 State Department of Border 
Defence 
 
4.4 Examining driving factors for security sector change between 1992 and 
2003 
 
The security sector institutions and governance system evolved significantly 
during the Shevardnadze period between 1992 and 2003. Yet, the degrees of 
reform progress varied among the defence, justice, internal affairs and 
paramilitaries actors. This section discusses how the divergence in the course of 
the reform efforts emerged. As in the previous chapter, the discussion follows the 
political economy analysis framework and examines key structural features, 
power relations between prominent individuals and agencies, as well as their 
incentives for security sector change during the Shevardnadze times.   
 
4.4.1 Structural diagnosis  
 
The security sector institutions and governance system evolved significantly 
during this period. This section applies the same analytical framework applied in 
the previous chapter and identifies driving factors for security sector change. 
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Political, socio-economic and institutional perspectives surrounding this period 
are examined.  
 
4.4.1.1 Political dimension 
 
The domestic political context remained volatile and involved a high-level power 
struggle among the top leadership figures, Shevardnadze and his political rivals. 
Having succeeded Gamsakhurdia and been elected the President, 
Shevardnadze struggle to consolidate his power in a political rivalry at the 
Georgian leadership. During the first half of the Shevardnadze times, a power 
struggle involving Shevardnadze, as well as high-ranking officials of his power 
platform, the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defence and State Security, took place. 
The competition over power among political elites sometimes took a violent form 
during this period. For instance, a number of prominent figures, including 
Shevardnadze’s close allies, Giorgi Chanturia and Soliko Khadeishvili, were 
assassinated between 1994 and 1995. 41  The assassination target not only 
included politicians but also other prominent figures of the security sector 
ministries. In April 1994, the deputy minister of internal affairs, Giorgi Gulua was 
killed. An attempted assassination against the former minister of defence, Giorgi 
Karkarashvili, took place in the same month and killed his deputy. This shows 
how closely the state security sector was involved in the political disputes during 
this period. 
 
The territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia were far from reaching 
the settlement. The central government in Tbilisi had had no control over 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the vacuum of functioning state apparatus, 
armed criminality set in, allegedly engaged in trafficking of tobacco, drugs, 
weapons and humans. The residents in the two regions increased their economic 
activities with bordering Russia. In Abkhazia, the majority of the Abkhazians 
possessed Russian passport. The local currency was replaced by ruble. 
Residents in South Ossetia, both Georgians and Ossetians, engaged in trading 
                                                          
41 In December the same year, Chanturia, who by then became the leader of the National Democratic 
Party, was shot and killed in Tbilisi (Jones, 2015, p. 89). In June 1995, Khabeishvili, the head of the 
Democratic and Revival Fund, was also shot and killed (“Mkhedrioni member confesses to involvement 
in political assassinations,” 1997). Assassinations were attempted on Shevardnadze himself in 1995 and 
1998 (Chicago Tribune, 1998; The Guardian, 1995). 
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with Russia through Roki Tunnel which connects Russia and North and South 
Ossetias. 
 
As to its external relations, Georgia established and maintained relatively stable 
relations with all the major strategic players in the region. During the first half of 
his presidency, Georgia adopted pro-Euro-Atlantic policy and increased its 
strategic partnership with the Euro-Atlantic allies, namely, the USA. Turkey, the 
immediate neighbour and a NATO member state, increased military and 
economic cooperation, too. In 1996, NATO’s Programme for Partnership between 
Georgia and NATO began and a political and strategic regional grouping of 
GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was launched. 
In 1999, Georgia left the security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), and reached an agreement with Russia to withdraw four Russian 
military bases from Georgia at the OSCE Istanbul Summit. 
 
The Georgia-Russia relation deteriorated as Georgia became involved a closer 
relation with the USA and other Western allies. The Georgia-Russia relation 
soared in 2002 when Russia bombed the Georgian villages near Pankisi Gorge 
in 2002. Under the pro-West strategic shift, Shevardnadze’s Georgia managed 
to manoeuvre a delicate diplomatic relation with Russia. Shevardnadze sought 
Russian support to curtail nationalist upheavals in the western region and 
Abkhazia. In return, Georgia agreed to join the CIS at the end of 1993. Also, 
Georgia accepted the presence of Russian military bases and border guards in 
the country, as well as Russia’s leading role in peacekeeping operations in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Shevardnadze’s government maintained the 
balance diplomacy between Russia and the West. 
 
4.4.1.2 Socio-economic dimension 
 
Organised crimes and corruption 
 
The most prominent socio-economic phenomena related to the course of security 
sector change during this period are corruption and organised crimes. Corruption 
among political and economic elites still very much remained in post-revolution 
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Georgia. State budgets were constantly tight and salaries for law enforcement 
personnel were not only low but also often delayed or underpaid. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, rampant corruption and organised crimes 
had not been a new phenomenon in Georgia. Since around 1995, the link 
between organised criminals, corruption and the state increasingly become even 
closer. A number of observers point out that state organs’ and/or high-ranking 
governmental officials’ involvement in corruption. The MIA reportedly controlled 
the retake and the wholesales in the cigarette and oil businesses (Darchiashvili, 
2003, pp.8-12, cited in Kuparatdze, 2012, p.123). Kakha Targamadze, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs (1995-2001), reportedly opposed the transfer of pre -
trial detention centres to the Ministry of Justice because “he would lose 
opportunities for bribes from the prisons” (Stefes, 2006, p.109). During his term 
as the minister, Targamadze involved in various organised criminal activities, 
namely in the tobacco and illicit fuel businesses as well as the kidnapping 
business (Kupatadze, 2012, p.125).  
 
An example of Tariel Oniani, a prominent thief-in-law, illustrates how close and 
tight the tie between the government and organised criminal spheres had become 
under the Shevardnadze regime. Oniani had developed a close tie with the 
government structure and business figures, including Shevardnadze’s relatives. 
Utilising his extensive networks both in the state and the world of thieves-in-law 
in and outside Georgia, Oniani played a pivotal role in settling disputes between 
large businesses (Kupatadze, 2012, p.125). The extent and degree of his 
influence was vividly demonstrated when he facilitated the release of three UN 
observes who had been taken hostage in the Kodori Gorge in western Georgia 
in 2003. (Slade, pp.5-6). Shevardnadze’s plenipotentiary did not hide but rather 
proudly announced his connections with Oniani and his ‘rescue methods’ to the 
press (Slade, p.6). 
 
As the earlier section of this chapter discussed, the issue of corruption ignited a 
political dispute within the Shevardnadze block and eventually led to the split 
between Shevardnadze and anti-Shevardnadze politicians. Corruption was 
widespread in the security sector institutions, too. Wide spread corruption 
involved high-ranking officials at the Ministries of Internal Affairs, State Security 
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and Defence. A number of corruption scandals involved high-ranking officials of 
those ministries, despite the introduction of Laws banning state officials from 
engaging in economic activities. 
 
The Autonomous Republic of Adjara was a primal example of economic and 
political activities determined by nepotism. Adjara’s leader, Abashidze had strictly 
controlled the law enforcement bodies in the republic, especially the customs 
point on the Georgian-Turkish border.42 Security and law enforcement officials 
owned a graphic design company called Basri Limited. Directed by Soso 
Gogitidze, the brother-in-law of Abashidze and the Minister of State Security of 
Adjara, the company was involved in drug trafficking and car smuggling from 
Chechnya into Adjara.43 Gogitidze was one of a few examples of Abashidze’s 
family clan members. In fact, 57 percent of the executive and 54 percent of the 
legislature in Adjara were close relatives of Abashidze and his wife at that time.44 
 
Smuggling was another phenomenon that involved corrupt security sector actors. 
For instance, local community members in Zugdidi, a region bordering with 
Abkhazia, expressed a strong discontent against the governmental officials’ 
involvement in smuggling.45 Paata Zakalaishvili, a civil society expert on the 
conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, told that the local authorities in the border 
regions were involved in illicit trading of commercial goods and weapons. 
According to Zakalaishvili, Shevardnadze promised unofficially to the local 
authorities that Tbilisi would not prosecute them for trafficking in exchange for 
remaining within the Georgian territory. 
 
People’s confidence in the executive body, in particular the police, was low 
(Koyama, 2005). They did recognise the role of the police and their armed forces 
under the Shevardnadze period for stabilising the country. However, their 
confidence in the law enforcement body declined immensely soon after the 
country restored relative stability in the mid-1990s. The major reason was an 
                                                          
42 Kupatadze, A. (2010): ‘Transition after transition’: coloured revolutions and organized crime in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, a thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St. 
Andrews, http://hdl.ahndle.net/10023/1320, p.122. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Kikadidze, K. and Losaberidze, D. (2000) “Institutionalism and clientalism in Georgia”, Series of 
discussion materials, UNDP, pp.40-41 
45 Author’s interview, October 2000, Tbilisi. 
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increasing rate of corruption in the form of bribery. Bribe-taking by the traffic police 
on street became rampant, and people stopped consulting the police as they 
were allegedly prone to bribe. Rather than turning to the police, people 
increasingly relied on their own informal network when they needed to solve 
community crimes. Interviewed on people’s perception in the police at that time, 
one local community member put, “People had to defend for themselves against 
the police” (Darchiashvili, 1997a). 
 
Civil society 
 
Civil society in Georgia had emerged as a distinct player by the end of the 
Shevardnadze times. In the process of SSR, some civil society organisations and 
think-tanks contributed to SSR-related discussions. For instance, experts at 
organisations such as the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and 
Development (CIPDD) produced a number of detailed analyses on issues 
concerning security sector governance and reform efforts. Human rights 
organisations such as the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) had 
been actively involved in critiquing the governance and performance of the justice 
and penal system institutions over years (Hiscock, 2005). 
 
Some non-governmental organisations such as the Liberty Institute became 
prominent organisations in the field of political movement in the early 2000’s. In 
particular, one of the leading members of the Liberty Institute, such as Gia 
Bokeria, was a close ally to Saakashvili and played a pivotal role in organising 
anti-Shevardnadze movement by the youth, Kmara! ("Enough!"). 46  The anti-
Shevardnadze driven by civil society eventually led to the change in the power. 
 
4.4.1.3 Institutional dimension 
 
The development of legal framework as well as the state institutions in the 
security sector proceeded significantly, especially by the adaptation of the 1995 
Constitution. However, the level of confidence in the state institution among the 
general public stayed low.   
                                                          
46 Personal communication, November 2000, Tbilisi.  
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Under the new Constitution adopted in 1995, Georgia’s legislative system 
adopted a semi-presidential system and unicameral parliament. Under the 
arrangement, the Parliament became the supreme representative body which 
exercises legislative authority. The Parliament is chaired by its Speaker. The 
Georgian Parliament is the country’s Supreme representative body which effects 
legislative authority, determines the main directions of the country’s home and 
foreign policy, controls the activity of the Government within limits defined by the 
Constitution and exercises other rights. The parliament had several committees 
which were supposed to control the security sector actors. The Parliamentary 
Committee on Legal Affairs was responsible for the Internal Affairs, and the 
Committee on Defence and Security responsible for paramilitary forces including 
Border Guards and Internal Troops. (The Georgian Parliament, n.d.) Although the 
Parliamentary Committees existed, in reality, the executive bodies did not always 
respect their guidance.  
 
The executive institution development saw some progress. The 1995 Constitution 
established a strong Presidency similar to the American style which accumulates 
the executive power under the President. According to the 1995 Constitution, the 
President decides foreign and domestic policy, issues presidential decrees, and 
presents budgets to the Parliament. The President is elected by universal 
suffrage and serves a five-year term, for a maximum of two terms. In relation with 
the other executive actors, the 1995 Constitution provided a more influential role 
to the President. Prior to 1995, Georgia had a cabinet of ministers with a Prime 
Minister as a head. This system was then replaced with a new arrangement under 
which a Minister of State, subordinated under the President, serves as a State 
Chancellery and heading line ministries, including the Power Ministries, Ministries 
of Internal Affairs, State Security and Defence (The Georgian Parliament, 1997).  
 
The 1995 Constitution laid out the judicial institutional framework, too. According 
to the 1995 Constitution, the Georgian judiciary consists of the Constitutional 
Court, the general courts and the General Prosecutor’s Office. The Constitutional 
Court is the main body responsible for ensuring constitutionality. There are nine 
judges in the Constitutional Court: three selected by the President, three by the 
Parliament and the other three by the Supreme Court. The General Persecutor 
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was to be nominated by the President and approved by the Parliament. The 
judiciary’s independence of the executive power during this period was rather 
weak. There was a lack of qualified judges yet, and the executive power often 
intervened in judicial proceedings. Corruption was widespread within the justice 
system and most judges were believed to be prone to bribes. As within the 
executive, confidence in the judiciary among the general public was low. 
 
The state armed forces were further institutionalised and affiliated under the 
Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and State Ministries. Efforts to establishing 
the democratic control of those forces started to be introduced. For instance, in 
1997, the Law on the Defence of Georgia was adopted and laid out the civilian 
control structure for the defence armed forces. According to the Law, the 
President was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, whilst the Parliament was 
responsible for defining the state policy in the sphere of defence, approving the 
military doctrine and the construction of the military forces, and passing laws in 
the defence sphere. The Parliament was also tasked to approve the defence 
budget and the numerical strength of the Military Forces. The President could 
hold dominant power under a newly introduced semi-presidential system. The 
armed forces affiliated to the MoD were therefore under the strong influence of 
the President. This was also the case for the other armed forces affiliated to the 
other Ministries, since the ministries the security forces were affiliated with were 
directly under the President.  
 
4.4.2 Agency diagnosis 
 
4.4.2.1 Eduard Shevardnadze: The President 
 
Given the concentration of executive power under the president, as well as his 
position in the Soviet times, Shevardnadze was one of the most influential actors 
that shaped the course of the security sector change between 1992 and 2003. 
Unlike his predecessor, Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze had a long track record of 
serving as a Soviet bureaucrat and communist party leader since the time of 
Soviet Georgian. Shevardnadze was appointed the Minister of Internal Affairs of 
Soviet Georgia in 1965 and became the First Secretary of the Georgian 
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Communist Party in 1972, before he served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1991.  
 
The close tie with the Soviet state institutions, in particular of the MIA, enabled 
him to generate political influence without relying on fanatic nationalism like his 
predecessor Gamsakhurdia did. Instead, Shevardnadze kept a moderate stance 
in relation to the Georgian nationalism. His moderate nationalism, combined with 
his Soviet nomenklatura background, contributed to reducing the tension in the 
Georgia-Russian relation that had become volatile under the Gamsakhurdia 
government, too.  
 
His background as the Minister of Internal Affairs during the Soviet times provided 
Shevardnadze with a close tie with the MIA. Because of the network, 
Shevardnadze did not need to seek his authority and power from quasi-state 
paramilitaries. The close tie with the MIA also enabled him to counterbalance the 
power relation with the MSS, the MIA’s rival agency. In return, the Shevardnadze 
government’s reform efforts in the MIA and its paramilitary forces were 
significantly compromised, and the Ministry remained almost immune to 
substantial changes.  
 
4.4.2.2 The ‘power ministries’: the MIA and the MSS 
 
The Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security played significant roles in 
Georgian politics. These two institutions played the central role to control internal 
security in the Soviet Georgia, by having been directly supervised by their 
headquarters in Moscow. Those ministries were called ‘power ministries’, due to 
a legacy from the Soviet times in which both of them had military characteristics. 
 
Although they were both called ‘power ministries’, they have sometimes found in 
a rivalry relation. In post independent Georgia, the MSS, the former KGB, 
intervened the domestic politics and maintained its Soviet-style governance after 
the independence. Some critiques argue that pro-Moscow dissidents of 
Shevardnadze used some of the former KGB officers to try to turn over his 
government and install a pro-Moscow government.  
95 
 
 
The relation between Shevardnadze and the MSS had never been a smooth one. 
According to one observer, Shevardnadze distrusted the MSS.47 Shevardnadze 
tried to weaken the political influence of the MSS and some individuals officially 
and unofficially affiliated to the organisation and counterbalance the influence by 
replacing officers with his supporters at the MSS. (Aves, 1996) The tension 
between the Shevardnadze and the MIA versus the MSS persisted in 
independent Georgia. Many critics regarded the two assassination attempts in 
1995 and 1998 were examples of attempts to remove Shevardnadze from the 
President’s position.48  
 
4.4.2.3 The paramilitary leaders 
 
The paramilitary leaders play significant roles in Georgia. As discussed in more 
detail in chapter 8, their influence became significant both in political and social 
spheres. The two paramilitary heads, Kitovani and Ioseliani, remained influential 
figures in the early 1990. They played a pivotal role in ousting of the first president 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the return of Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Upon and right after Shevardnadze’s return to Georgia in 1992, 
Shevardnadze needed the paramilitary heads’ political support to re-establish 
himself as a political leader. This way, the paramilitary leaders were not merely 
armed group commanders but more importantly key political actor influencing the 
course of the security sector change trajectory.  
 
The paramilitary leaders increased their political influence through personal links. 
For instance, Ioseliani, the leader of the Mkhedrioni, was reported to have a close 
tie with a formerly Soviet Communist Party elite, Guram Mgeladze, who was 
widely viewed as a leading ‘party-economic mafia’ and considered as a close ally 
with Shevardnadze (Kupatadze, 2012, p.118). After the ousting of Gamsakhurdia, 
Shevardnadze relied on them for providing security and used “them as 
parliamentary security guards” (Kupatadze, 2012, p.119).  
 
                                                          
47 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
48 Author’s interviews, October 2000, Tbilisi. 
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To keep paramilitary leaders and their forces on his side, Shevardnadze 
appointed the paramilitary leaders and their subordinates to high-ranking 
government positions. Shevardnadze appointed Kitovania was the Defence 
Minister, and Temur Khachishvili, a close ally of Ioseliani as the Deputy Internal 
Affairs Minister in 1992. One observer notes that, through this arrangement, 
spheres of “control of illicit profits were divided by giving the Mkhedrioni a 
monopoly over the distribution of fuel and making the National Guard the 
exclusive arms trader” (Baev, 2003, p.133). Thus, by the mid-1990s the 
paramilitary leaders and their allies had become significant players in not only the 
economic but also political arenas. 
 
4.4.2.4 External actors 
 
There are some key external actors that can be considered as key agencies 
influencing security sector change. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
USA had had been a major strategic player in the Caucasus and Georgia. The 
Georgia-US relationship became even more crucial than before for the two 
countries since the 9.11 attacks in the USA in 2001. Following the event, Georgia 
became one of the strategic partners for the USA’s ‘War on Terror’ policy, and 
US’s military and economic assistance increased. 
 
Russia began to add a political pressure on Georgia as it started regaining a 
certain degree of political stability following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
For Russia, Georgia located in the strategic position by neighbouring with the 
North Caucasus and Chechnya heavily affected by the violent conflicts with 
Russia. Russia’s strategic interest in involving in the bordering region between 
Georgia and North Caucasus, Russia deployed its troops to the Russia-led CIS 
peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the UN Observer 
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in Abkhazia.  
 
During the Shevardnadze period, the bilateral relationship saw both deteriorating 
and constructive developments. In 2002, Russian fighter jets bombed Georgian 
villages near the Pankisi Gorge, killing civilians. This made Georgia’s external 
relation swing back to Russia. In 2003, waiting for the presidential election in 
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November, Georgia signed on a strategic relation with a Russian energy company, 
Gazprom, over an energy strategy in 2003, which was a major diplomatic 
concession for Georgia.  
 
The EU began to appear as a key regional player for Georgia’s external 
relationship. As the relation between Georgia and the Western allies became 
closer, various international actors, especially of the Western countries, started 
directly involving in Georgia. During the first half of the 1990, the USA and 
European countries provided assistance. The European Commission launched 
the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) 
in 1991. Through TACIS, Europe had assisted institutional, legal and 
administrative reforms in Georgian.  
 
Another regional actor, Turkey, began to develop a close relationship with Georgia 
since the early 1990s. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the strategic 
importance of Georgia increased significantly for Turkey and it became an 
immediate neighbouring country sharing a border with Georgia. In particular, 
developing a close tie with Tbilisi became indispensable for the actualisation of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that would run between the Caspian Sea 
to the Mediterranean Sea and avoid passing through Armenia. Unlike the other 
external actors, although it provided Georgia with military assistance, Turkey 
remained low-profile in the geopolitics in the region unlike other external actor 
such as the USA, EU and Russia. Lynch attributes Turley’s interest in “supporting 
stability in Georgia – no matter the government in power” rather than playing a 
role in the overall geopolitics in the region to its interest in securing the BTC 
pipeline plan as energy supplies to Europe (Lynch, 2006, p. 56). 
 
4.4.3 Dynamics 
 
How did the structural factors and agencies interact in the course of security 
sector change under the Shevardnadze period? Which factors interact with the 
agenda-setting of security sector change and how? Between 1992 and 2003, the 
process of security sector change was dominantly shaped by the political 
dynamics and power struggle between Shevardnadze and other political figures. 
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It appears that political and economic interests among the key actors/agencies 
dominated the SSR priorities. 
 
4.4.3.1 Professionalising the armed forces as part of power 
consolidation under Shevardnadze 
 
Domestic politics had its own dynamics to influence the course of security sector 
change between 1992 and 2003. During the first half of the Shevardnadze time, 
security sector change, namely the disbandment of the quasi-state paramilitaries 
and the defence system development, happened in the context of power struggle 
between the paramilitary heads and Shevardnadze. 
 
Having been appointed the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament in 1992 then 
elected the President in 1995, Shevardnadze gradually managed to reinstall 
himself as a dominant political figure in Georgian society. Simultaneously, the 
relation between him and the paramilitary leaders started to change around 1993 
and became confrontational by the mid-1990s.  
 
The decline of the paramilitary leaders could be attributed to two factors. The first 
factor is the decreased popular support among the general Georgian population 
for the paramilitary forces. The turning point was Georgia’s defeat in the war with 
Abkhazia in 1993. In September 1993, the Georgian troops were defeated in 
Sukhumi by the Abkhaz forces and driven out of Abkhazia. The defeat affected 
Georgian psychology towards the paramilitary forces, too. Since the fighters 
could not win and get back Abkhazia, “these soldiers do not deserve respect in 
society.”49 The defeat in Sukhumi and the loss of Abkhazia led to the decline of 
people’s support towards the paramilitaries.  
 
The second factor is the increasing concentration of executive power under 
Shevardnadze. Since 1992, Georgia began its process of developing its own 
national security sector. In this process over the time period between 1993 and 
1998, Shevardnadze gradually curtailed paramilitary forces’ influence in society. 
It took the form of institutionalising security sector governance system and 
                                                          
49 Personal communication in Tbilisi, 2000. 
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appointing professional security personnel to replace the paramilitary heads. The 
process began when Shevardnadze created the National Security and Defence 
Council (NSDC) in 1993. The paramilitary leaders, Kitovani and Ioseliani, were 
appointed deputy chairs of the council.  However, their position had no veto power. 
This indicated that it was actually a downgrading their position from the de facto 
decision makers to the ones subordinate to Shevardnadze. Furthermore, 
Shevardnadze established a Military Consultants’ Group to supervise the 
ministries concerning military matters. The Military Consultants Group became 
directly reporting to the President, supervised military departments and 
implemented the NSDC decisions. Shevardnadze appointed professional military 
officers independent of their influence, to governmental positions. This way, 
Shevardnadze further cut down cliental networks of Kitovani and Ioseliani in 
security forces.50  
 
Another purpose of Shevardnadze’s reshuffling the personnel at the security 
ministries was to counter-balance the re-emerging nationalist movements by 
appointing pro-Moscow personnel at those “Power Ministries”. After the defeat in 
Sukhumi in 1993, the Zviadists started to use the defeat to generate grievance 
against Tbilisi. Shevardnadze needed Russia’s support to curtail the Zviadists, 
which had used the defeat in Sukhumi to re-gain support in western Georgia. 
Shevardnadze appointed Shota Kviraia as the new Minister of Internal Affairs, 
and Igor Giorgadze as the new Minister of State Security.51 Both Kviraia and 
Giorgadze were former KGB agents. Heavily involved in the fight in Abkhazia, 
Kitovani was forced to resign in May 1993. A former Soviet military captain, Giorgi 
Kharkharashvili, replaced Kitovani. Shevardnadze ordered the complete re-
establishment of the National Guard in October 1993.52 By replacing the key 
ministers with these pro-Moscow, non-nationalist personnel, Shevardnadze 
consolidated his dominance over Kitovani, and his position to counter both the 
nationalist movement led by the supporters of the former president. 
 
                                                          
50 Colonel Vladimir Cikovani, who was appointed as a military advisor to Shevardnadze, is one of such 
examples (Jones, 2015, p. 98). 
51 Giorgadze was later accused of masterminding and carrying out the 1995 assassination attempt against 
Shevardnadze and removed from the post.  
52 Karkarashvili resigned to protest against the remaining of the Russian military bases in Georgia in 
1994. 
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The dismantlement of the Mhkedrioni became complete by the late 1990, after 
the two assassination attempts against Shevardnadze in 1995 and 1998. Back in 
1994, the Mkhedrioni had declared a voluntary disarmament, but in reality the 
process was not clear and they allegedly restored armaments. After the 1998 
assassination attempt, Ioseliani was accused of masterminding and carrying out 
the attempt. Subsequently, key members of the Mkhedrioni, including Ioseliani, 
were arrested. The government disbanded the Mkhedrioni.53 
 
By the late 1990, Shevardnadze rooted out the political influence of the 
paramilitary leaders. Security sector change in Georgia in the first half of the 
Shevardnadze regime was more of a political process to dismantle the 
paramilitary leaders’ influence in politics, rather than institution building of the 
security apparatus.  
 
4.4.3.2 Maintaining the power base by keeping the “Power Ministries” 
free of reform 
 
Unlike the MoD that had seen a process of modernisation, the other two security 
sector ministries, i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security had 
hardly undergone any organisational reform efforts during the Shevardnadze 
period. The absence of reform in the internal security organs could be attributed 
to the political leadership’s need to secure its regime security. 
 
The return of Shevardnadze as the president in 1992 reinstalled his old-style 
governance by utilizing the core Soviet apparatus, i.e. the MSS and the MIA, and 
keeping balance of power between them. Having ousted the paramilitary leaders, 
Shevardnadze needed a new power base. This time, Shevardnadze sought for 
support from the MIA which he used to head during the Soviet period. Despite 
pressure from Europe, Shevardnadze did not advance the process of reforming 
the police system to transform it from the Soviet to Western styles. All the 
Ministers of Internal Affairs appointed between 1992 and 2003 were Police Major 
                                                          
53 Ioseliani was, however, later given amnesty and became a head of a political party. The political party 
was also named “the Mkhedrioni”. 
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or Lieutenant General, as in the Soviet times. The power consolidation overrode 
the reform of the police as a priority. 
 
Shevardnadze needed to provide the MSS with an incentive strong enough for 
them to stay under his control. For establishing such a condition to ensure his 
regime’s stability, Shevardnadze provided the two ‘power ministries’ with 
economic incentives. The economic incentives were generated from the 
corruption and informal economy in which those state security actors were heavily 
involved.  
 
Corruption among high ranking security sector officials was often reported by the 
media. For instance, a high ranking official in the MIA who owned a local football 
team received a grant from the state budget used to balance the books of his 
private company. The phrase “thieves in law” well describes the people’s 
perception on the phenomena of the wide spread corruption at the security sector 
institutions, in particular, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. Given 
the wide-spread corruption within the ‘power ministries’, any substantial reform 
involving institutional downsizing and restructuring would jeopardize the corrupt 
system and the power base for Shevardnadze. According to one observer, 
“corruption was his rule of law”.54 
 
Shevardnadze took advantage of the situation for ensuring his stability in power. 
In order to tame the powerful ministries’ and their elite officers, Shevardnadze 
bargained them by providing them with exemption to reform. Shevardnadze 
provided the internal security elites with immunity to their corruption in exchange 
with their support for his regime. As seen in the previous section, by the late 1990, 
corruption in the Georgian society had become rampant, especially through the 
patron-client network in the security sector ministries. Against the background, 
several state commissions concerning the security sector were established 
between 2000 and 2003. These commissions included a commission for drafting 
an Anti-Corruption Programme, a coordination council for Anti-Corruption Policy, 
a commission to study military legislation, and a commission to suggest reforms 
of security sector agencies. However, these commissions’ work remained on 
                                                          
54 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
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paper only, and their recommendations were hardly translated into practice. No 
actual efforts to curtail corruption took place in the Ministries of Internal Affairs 
and State Security. The legislature at that time was still too weak to counter the 
disproportionally powerful executive, including the President. 
 
Due to the economic benefits and political immunity to reform, Shevardnadze 
succeeded to restore a certain degree of support, or at least lack of strong 
dissidents against him, within the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. 
For the Shevardnadze regime, the political benefit to secure the regime security 
prevailed benefits of developing transparent and accountable the security sector. 
Likewise, serving officers at those ministries also found economic benefits of the 
absence of reform. State budgets were constantly tight and salaries for law 
enforcement personnel were not only low but also often delayed or underpaid. 
Therefore, the incentive for serving officers to back the reform of the current 
structure remained low. Moving towards transparency and accountability of the 
system was often perceived as a direct threat to those personnel who gained 
benefits from the existing corrupt network. The lack of substantial reform efforts 
at the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Ministries was therefore a product of 
a mutually beneficial condition between the top leadership and the serving 
officers. 
 
4.4.3.3 Shifted benefits from the absence of reform to the advancement 
of reform 
 
The stagnated reform efforts in the ‘power ministries’ suddenly came to end in 
2003. What drove the change was not SSR agenda, but the domestic political 
movement.  
 
The lack of the reform efforts in the internal security institutions brought a 
significant political impact on the Georgian politics and led to the emergence of 
the anti-Shevardnadze block. The lack of the reform efforts in the “Power 
Ministries” and paramilitary forces had a political consequence which later directly 
affected the Shevardnadze government itself and jeopardized its regime. In 
October 2001, dozens of officers from the MSS went to Rustavi2, an independent 
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TV station and a vocal critique of the corruption and the Shevardnadze regime. 
The media reported this event as a raid by the security officers loyal to the regime, 
and the situation became tense. This event became a political watershed: 
students organised several rallies to protest against the security ministries. As a 
result, the Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs, and the Persecutor 
General resigned. The anti-Shevardnadze block further gained popular support 
and eventually replaced the Shevardnadze regime, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. It is an irony that the lack of reform and the overlooked corruption later 
became the very reason for the forthcoming anti-Shevardnadze movement led by 
Saakashvili in the mid-2000s. 
 
In post-2003 Georgia, Georgia advanced its SSR efforts under the new 
administration led by one of the so-called ‘reformists’, Saakashvili. Chapter 6 
details driving factor to make the shift from the absence or reform to the 
advancement of reform was the political motivation. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Between 1992 and 2003, Georgia achieved a lot in terms of state building. The 
first half of the Shevardnadze times saw various progresses such as the 
adaptation of the 1995 Constitution, the affiliation with international organisations 
and partnerships such as the UN as an independent state. Building its own state 
institutions also took place during this period. As for the territorial integrity, 
Georgia had a major setback: the defeat in Abkhazia meant a territorial loss to 
Georgia. By the mid-1990s, Georgia under the Shevardnadze regime become 
relatively stable compared to the Gamsakhurdia time. Since 1995, however, the 
Shevardnadze regime faced a number of political challenges such as the two 
assassination attempts against Shevardnadze and the growing anti-government 
movements, until it was replaced by the so-called ‘reformists’ in 2003.  
 
Various changes in the security sector during the period between 1992 and 2003 
took place in this context. The political economy analysis in this chapter 
demonstrated the interaction between political dynamics in the key political 
developments and the change of the security sector. One major change in the 
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security sector was the development of the modern defence and justice sectors. 
As Georgia established its presence in the international community, it began to 
receive external assistance in the security sector. The defence and justice sectors 
went through various reform efforts, mainly to transform them to align with the 
Euro-Atlantic standards. The defeat in Abkhazia resulted in the decline of the 
influence of and popular support for the quasi-state paramilitaries, which helped 
Shevardnadze to curtail the quasi-state paramilitary heads and paved the way for 
professionalising paramilitary forces. 
 
On the other hand, some of the security apparatus, namely the MIA and the MSS, 
escaped significant reform efforts. Little effort had been made to develop the 
institutional capacity of these institutions. The analysis reveals the main reason 
for the absence of reform efforts in these security sector actors is the 
Shevardnadze regime’s need for consolidating power. The analysis attributes the 
enabling factors for the power consolidation in the security sector actors, in 
particular, the two ‘power ministries’, to the ‘power ministries’ roles in the 
persisting corruption and to their power relations with Shevardnadze. This way, 
the analysis in this chapter shows that various political, social and economic 
factors influenced the course of the agenda-setting process, in which the 
unbalanced SSR progress took place.  
 
Based on the analysis of security sector change under the Shevardnadze regime 
between 1992 and 2003, the chapter provides the following observations on the 
relationship between domestic factors and the process of agenda setting for 
security sector change. 
 
First, the nature of the security sector process continued to be politically driven. 
The executive power concentrated at the President led to the selective reform 
efforts. On the contrary to the Gamsakhurdia period, the president’s executive 
power was strong and dominant over other executive bodies. The agenda for  
security sector change was set (or not set) in accordance with the political 
purposes of the President as described above. The strong executive, i.e., the 
President under which the executive power was concentrated enabled to 
implement the SSR agenda accordingly. The SSR efforts were very much driven 
by the domestic political dynamics, especially at the top elite level. 
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Second, the politically-driven SSR efforts led to the lack of reform efforts in the 
internal security institutions and paramilitaries, with political and security 
consequences in the Georgian society. Compared with the lawless situation with 
the quasi-state paramilitaries in the early 1990s, the control of those armed forces 
was achieved to a certain degree. However, the persisting ambiguity and 
confusion over roles of the various armed forces under the rival security sector 
institutions still remained and the paramilitaries were left without thorough reform 
efforts. This was a result of a political compromise among the political elites, i.e., 
the President and the ‘power ministries’. The compromise appears to have 
achieved a purpose of establishing and maintaining political stability in Georgia. 
However, at the same time, the compromise appears to have allowed the security 
sector actors remain an influential political actor in Georgian politics rather than 
a mere security apparatus.  
 
It was in this context that external SSR assistance began to arrive in Georgia. 
How did external SSR assistance efforts were received, consumed and digested 
by the Georgian side which involved those varying factors, dynamics and political 
context? The next chapter explores this query. 
 
  
106 
 
Chapter 5 Dynamics in the provision and reception of the SSR 
assistance in Georgia between 1992 and 2003 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Since Shevardnadze came to power and Georgia gained the international 
recognition of Georgia as an independent state in 1992,55 an increasing number 
of SSR assistance programmes and projects started to flow into Georgia. Some 
of the assistance efforts brought intended progress in SSR. However, other SSR 
assistance did not necessarily lead to outcomes intended by the SSR assistance 
providers. What was the interplay between external donors’ SSR assistance and 
actual security sector change like? What were the local dynamics between the 
providing and receiving ends of SSR assistance in the interplay like? 
 
The first part of this chapter examines the external assistance for SSR in Georgia 
between 1992 and 2003. It examines political contexts in which SSR assistance 
agendas were formulated in the assistance providing countries. The chapter then 
examines the SSR assistance at the technical level and to which extent the SSR 
assistance provider’s objectives were met in the process of security sector 
change. In doing so, the section discusses how the Georgian counterparts 
responded to the SSR assistance. The last part of the chapter explores which 
security priorities were reflected in the course of security sector change between 
1992 and 2003, and what security issues remained to be attended as a result.  
 
5.2 External actors’ SSR assistance in Georgia between 1992 and 2003 
 
As chapter 2 discussed, the concept of SSR had emerged in the late 1990s within 
the policy development circle in the West, particularly among scholars and policy 
makers in the western European countries.56 No comprehensive and concrete 
                                                          
55 Georgia was recognized as an independent state by the UN and the EU in 1992.  
56 The early SSR literature include: Nicole Ball (1998): Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector 
Reform: Policy Options for the British Government (Ball, 1998), Herbert Wulf (ed.) (2000): Security 
Sector Reform, Brief 15 (Wulf, 2000b), Herbert Wulf (2000): Security Sector Reform in Developing 
Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate and Potentials for Implementing Reforms with 
Recommendations for Technical Cooperation (Wulf, 2000a), Michael Chalmers (1999): Security-sector 
reform in developing countries: an EU perspective (Chalmers, 2000), DAC/OECD (2000): Security-
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country-specific SSR strategy was available during the Shevardnadze times yet. 
The SSR assistance in Georgia was not necessarily labelled as SSR explicitly 
during the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze periods. 57  In the case of 
Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, where the international community provided a set 
of assistance under an SSR package either through multilateral or bilateral 
schemes, there was no comprehensive SSR assistance package existed Few 
materials on SSR activities in Georgia during this period are available. The 
scarcity of the SSR literature on Georgia reflects the underdeveloped SSR 
thinking on Georgia during this time. Nonetheless, a number of organisations and 
donor countries started providing assistance in various spheres in the security 
sector during the Shevardnadze times. The flow of assistance accelerated since 
1999, after Georgia had established a certain level of stability and sovereignty as 
an independent state. The assistance were not labelled as SSR, yet the 
assistance providers, mostly the Euro-Atlantic allies, including NATO, the OSCE 
and the EU and their member states started offering assistance to Georgia’s 
security sector institutions.  
 
5.2.1 Objectives of the external SSR assistance 
 
For the Western governments, in the power vacuum followed by the Soviet Union 
dissolution, the Southern Caucasus region became a major strategic interest for 
the Euro-Atlantic allies. MacFarlane clusters the objectives of the West in the 
former Soviet Caucasian countries including Georgia into two groups: norm-
based objective and interest-based objectives. (MacFarlane, 1999)  
                                                          
sector reform and development co-operation: a conceptual framework for enhancing policy coherence 
(OECD/DAC, 2000), DFID (1999), Poverty and the security sector (DFID, 2000b), DFID (2000a): 
Security-sector reform and the management of defence expenditure, a conceptual framework (DFID, 
2000a), DFID (2000b): Security-sector reform: Review of the role of external actors (DFID, 2000c), 
Hendrickson (1999): Key issues in security-sector reform (D Hendrickson, 1999), NUPI Working Group 
on Security-Sector Reform (1999): Security-sector reform as a development issue (NUPI. Working Group 
on Security Sector Reform, 1999), DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-
operation, OECD, Paris, Clare Short (1999): Security-sector reform and military expenditure symposium 
(Short, 2000),World Bank (1999): Security, poverty reduction & sustainable development: challenges for 
the new millennium (World Bank, 1999). 
57 It was 2004 when USAID endorsed the OECD/Development Assistance Committee’s publication, 
Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice on behalf of the US Department 
(OECD/DAC, 2005). US Agency for International Development, US Department of Defense and US 
Department of State (2009): Security Sector Reform, (USAID et al., 2009), p.2. The EU Concept for 
ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) Support to SSR was developed in 2005  (Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: a concept for European Community 
support for security sector reform, 2005). 
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The first group of objectives, an identify-driven, norm-based objective, aimed to 
transform the former Soviet countries in the region to become “more like us” 
(MacFarlane, 1999, pp. 9–10) based on liberal democratic norms such as 
“sovereignty, stability, democracy and liberalism”. (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 60) In 
SSR assistance to Georgia, the norm-based objective was most explicit in the 
defence and justice spheres. Since the end of the Cold War structure and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, establishing professional defence institutions with 
effective civilian control was of a primary interest for the Western countries. As 
described below, the West sent a group of senior military experts as early as in 
the mid-1990s to provide the Georgian government with overall policy advice to 
reform the Georgian security sector along with NATO standards.  
 
NATO compatibilities also required the Georgian defence institutions to adopt 
democratic norms, such as democratic control of armed forces. Western notions 
of civil-military relation and ‘democratic oversight’ were a new concept for this 
former Soviet republic. The external assistance in the defence sphere during this 
period thus involved the development of scholarly and professional discussions 
on norms and principles such as democratic control of armed forces, civil-military 
relations and professionalism in the defence sector. The norm-based approach 
was well represented by the justice sector, too. The West, especially the EU and 
OSCE, set their assistance objectives in promoting the rule of law, human rights 
and democracy. Taking the norm-based approach was reasonable and needed 
in Georgia at that time. Georgia was in the process of shifting from the Soviet 
judiciary system whose independence was not ensured due to frequent 
interference by the Communist Party. 
 
The second group of objectives, an interest-based objective, was driven by 
political and economic self-interests of the West (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 10) such 
as “containing radical Islam, containing Iran, reducing the influence of Russia, 
securing access to energy resources” (MacFarlane, 1999, p. 60). This approach 
was eminent in the defence sphere, in which SSR assistance was most concrete 
and made available fast and abundant in quantity. In particular, enhancing border 
control capacities was a primal priority for the West. The border control issue 
during the Shevardnadze period posed a practical challenge for both the West 
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and Georgia. For Georgia, the violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
had been jeopardizing its territorial integrity. For the West, the unsettled violent 
conflicts were risk for destabilizing the South Caucasus region including Georgia. 
Inadequate and porous border control was considered to pose significant security 
threat for the West as they would raise the risk of trafficking of various items 
including small arms and light weapons as well as nuclear missile materials. Thus, 
the border control assistance had an interest-based objective, which was 
mutually met between Georgia and the West. 
 
Similarly, building the Georgian military force was of an interest for the NATO 
allies. This became particularly the case after the 2011 9/11 attacks in the USA 
which shifted the USA and its allies’ strategic efforts to counter-terrorism. 
Consequently, as described below, NATO needed to increase its combat 
manpower to engage in counter-terrorism operations in Iraq, and later in 
Afghanistan. Raising the combat capacities of Georgian troops to meet the NATO 
standards became a strategic interest for the USA and the other NATO members. 
SSR assistance of the Euro-Atlantic ally countries and partnership organisations 
were provided in this context.  
 
5.2.2 Varying SSR strategies within external assistance providers 
 
The evolution of the SSR assistance provided by the West can be grouped into 
three phases. The first phase runs between 1992 and 1996 in which two major 
frameworks for cooperation were developed. In the defence sphere, Georgia 
signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO in 1994, which provided a 
platform for having a political dialogue to discuss cooperation between Georgia 
and NATO. In 1995, the first NATO-Georgia Individual Partnership Program (IPP) 
containing activities in different areas of co-operation was developed. In 1996, 
the first Georgian Unit participated in the PfP Field Training and the EU and 
Georgia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA, 
entered into force in 1999, covers an array of areas of cooperation aiming at the 
harmonisation of Georgian legislation with EU standards. 
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The second phase of the SSR assistance covers between 1997 and 2000. During 
this period, the SSR assistance contained more concrete activities. For instance, 
the ISAB, consisted of high-ranking experts58 was established in 1998. The ISAB 
assessed the situation surrounding the Georgian security sector and provided the 
National Security Council with a comprehensive set of recommendations on SSR. 
The recommendations provided guidance on developing and reforming the 
Georgian security sector in line with the Western standards. The ISAB 
recommendations accompanied with an implementation plan which specified 
timeline and lead agencies for implementing recommended activities (The Centre 
for Peace and International Relations Studies, 2000, p. 104). In parallel, the USA 
started providing border control assistance. The USA provided technical 
assistance specifically targeted at enhancing border control capacities through 
the provision of financial assistance, equipment and training.  
 
The beginning of the third phase coincides with the 2001 9/11 attacks in the USA 
followed by the 2002 Prague Summit. The Summit adopted measures aimed at 
strengthening the Alliance's capabilities for fighting terrorism (NATO, 2002). It was 
in this context that the USA started providing bilateral assistance titled the 
Georgian Train and Equipment Program (GTEP) (Global Security, n.d.). 
Subsequently, reform assistance in the Georgian defence sphere via NATO 
started to increase, with the objective to enhance its counter terrorism capabilities. 
In the new security environment, SSR assistance became centred on the defence 
sphere, especially in the area of direct provision of combat capacity training. 
 
The main providers of the SSR-related efforts were those of the Euro-Atlantic ally 
countries, partnerships and frameworks including the EU, NATO and the OSCE. 
In the 1990 and early 2000s, SSR policies were yet to be developed. As seen 
above, SSR discourses had been increasingly developed among the Euro-
Atlantic countries, especially within the European countries. On the other hand, 
the key assistance provider for Georgia, the USA during this period hardly used 
the term SSR, assistance for the security sector actors in Georgia was provided 
nonetheless, without being labels as SSR assistance, in both multilateral and 
bilateral frameworks. 
                                                          
58 The advisory board consisted of general Sir Garry Johnson (Chairperson, UK), David Ochmanek 
(USA) and General Henning von Ondarza (Germany) (ISAB, 1999).  
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The external assistance providers’ SSR approach to Georgia was sporadic and 
focusing on specific issues in an independent manner, rather than regarding the 
SSR issue as a whole. Their approaches towards the assistance varied: NATO 
and US assistance focused on the defence and security issues. The European 
countries under the OSCE framework were also heavily involved in the security 
issues faced by Georgia. But their attention was at that time more on the conflict 
resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU provided assistance for 
Georgia to become part of the market economy. Their assistance had a strong 
focus on the economy aspect, in order to harmonise Georgia’s regulations and 
institutions with the EU ones, along with other activities including democratisation 
assistance such as and civil society support and political reform processes 
 
5.2.2.1 Defence- and security-oriented assistance: NATO and the USA 
 
The collapse of the Cold War structure led to the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic 
strategic partnership towards the east. A number of agreements and frameworks 
for cooperation between Georgia and NATO were signed since Shevardnadze 
came to power.  
 
In 1992, Georgia joined the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council.59 
In 1994 Georgia joined the PfP, a programme aiming to increase security and 
defence cooperation between NATO and individual partner countries. Those 
milestones provided a framework for further partnership and assistance in the 
defence sphere, with a certain level of coherency.60 The PfP Planning and Review 
Process (PARP) is a significant step development as it provided a concrete 
process for enhancing capacities for defence planning. In 1999, Georgia joined 
the PARP to help its forces develop the ability to work with NATO to improve 
defence planning.61 The PARP was set up in order to help Georgia’s troops 
                                                          
59 The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 
1997. 
60 In 1995, Georgia signed the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and its partner 
countries. SOFA addresses the status of foreign forces while present on the territory of another state in the 
context of cooperation and exercise under the PfP programme.  
61 PARP is a practical tool aimed at enhancing the interoperability of partner countries’ military units and 
command structures with NATO forces (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 
n.d.). 
112 
 
develop the ability to work with NATO and provides planning targets that are key 
to SSR objectives by facilitating improved financial management in the MoD, 
assisting in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed forces and ensuring 
that a credible Strategic Defence Review was conducted. 
 
For the NATO’s engagement in the SSR in Georgia, the Prague Summit in 2002 
was a prominent step. The Prague Summit adopted the Military Concept for 
Defence Against Terrorism which aimed at enhancing counter-terrorism 
capacities in NATO member countries. At the Prague Summit, Georgia officially 
declared its aspirations to NATO membership and its intention to develop an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO to sharpen the focus of 
cooperation on reform efforts. Reflecting the NATO’s strategic priority to enhance 
counter-terrorism capacities, their assistance was geared to enhance Georgia’s 
capacities relevant to the counter-terrorism operations. However, the 
development of detailed for IPAP had to wait until 2004, after Saakashvili replaced 
Shevardnadze.  
 
Actually, cooperation in the field of combat capacities had already started since 
the late 1990. Having received voluminous assistance from the USA as the 
leading NATO member state, Georgia started contributing peacekeepers to the 
NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999. Consequently, Georgia hosted 
multinational PfP military training exercise in 2001 and 2002.62 Georgia extended 
its contribution to the NATO troops by participating in the ISAF in Afghanistan in 
2003 (NATO, 2015). 
 
The USA was the most prominent donor providing defence- and security-oriented 
assistance. Two objectives were particularly important for the USA’s strategic 
interest in preventing the region from being penetrated by terrorism. One was the 
USA’s increasing engagement in counter-terrorism operations worldwide. The 
USA needed Georgia’s troops to increase combat capacities to for their 
operations in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan. Since 9/11 attack in 2001, the USA 
enhanced its assistance either bilaterally and/or through NATO in the field of 
counter-terrorism. The second objective was to curtail the trafficking of 
                                                          
62 In 2001, Georgia hosted a multinational PfP military training exercise “Cooperative Partner”, and 
“Cooperative Best Effort” in 2002. 
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radioactive materials from the Northern Caucasus region to other regions via 
Georgia. Their assistance thus focused on the development of combat capacities 
and border control. Having focused on the bilateral partnership with Georgia 
rather than waiting for the NATO frameworks to be developed, the USA started 
providing direct assistance in a wide range of security sector spheres, namely the 
defence, police and border control. 
 
5.2.2.2 Conflict prevention and resolution approach: OSCE 
 
Since the end of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Cold War structure, 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), formerly titled 
as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),63 became 
engaged in a wide range of conflict prevention and resolution activities in the 
former socialist and communist counties, including Georgia.  The OSCE involved 
in Georgia by placing the centrality of its involvement in conflict resolution over 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Upon a request from Georgia, the OSCE Mission 
to Georgia was established in 1992. The Mission’s objective was to support a 
peaceful and political settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, and 
later included support for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia (OSCE, n.d.). In 1994, 
the mission’s mandate was expanded to include helping Georgia to establish a 
democratic state under the rule of law and promoting the observance of human 
rights (Stöber, 2010, pp. 203–220). 
 
Although not being mandated to conduct SSR per se, in practice the OSCE 
Mission engaged in a variety of SSR-related activities,64 especially in the field of 
policing and community security. Following the war in the North Caucasus 
republic of Chechnya in 1999, the OSCE Mission engaged in policing through a 
joint-initiative with the Georgian police, the South Ossetian militia and the JPKF 
(OSCE, 1997). Since 2000, the OSCE supported the JPKF programme on the 
voluntary handover of small arms and ammunition (OSCE, 2002). The OSCE 
                                                          
63 The CSCE changed its name to the OSCE at the Budapest Summit in January 1995. The change of the 
names, according to the Budapest Summit document, “has no effect on the character of its commitments 
nor the status of the CSCE and its institutions" (OSCE, 1995). 
64 The OSCE engaged in promoting confidence-building measures among parties to the territorial 
conflicts at grass-roots level, supporting the return of IDPs, facilitating economic activities and 
reconstruction in conflict-affected areas (Sagramoso, 2003, p. 78). 
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assisted the Georgian government in ridding the environment of surplus weapons 
(OSCE, 2002). 
 
5.2.2.3 Democratisation-focused approach: the EU 
 
Cooperation between Georgia and the EU started after the EU recognised 
Georgia’s independence in 1992. The European Commission launched the 
Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in 
1991. Through TACIS, European countries assisted institutional, legal and 
administrative reforms in Georgia, to support its transition to market-oriented 
economy.65 Georgia under Shevardnadze expressed its interest in joining the EU. 
Following the policy orientation, the EU and Georgia agreed on a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1996.66 The EU approach to the SSR assistance in 
Georgia mainly took place in the legal framework. The aspiration for the EU 
membership required Georgia to harmoniseA its legislation with the EU law,67 the 
EU’s acquis communautaire, the set of rules and regulations for all member 
states.68 The preparation process for the adaptation of the National Program of 
Harmonisation of Georgian Legislation with EU law started in 2001-2003. It was 
only after 2004 that concrete action plans were developed. 
 
5.3 External SSR assistance programmes and projects between 1992 and 2003 
 
SSR assistance between 1992 and 2003 began by adopting two major 
partnership agreements, PfP and PCA, with major SSR providers, NATO and the 
EU. These two partnership agreements laid out frameworks for further 
cooperation. Those frameworks, however, were not substantiated with detailed 
action plans that could provide clear milestones and feasible work plans during 
the Shevardnadze’s period. The exception was the US assistance in the defence 
                                                          
65 Since 2007, TACIS was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
67 The EU membership requires prospect members to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, a set of basic 
principles including “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities” (European Union, 1993). 
68 Those rules and regulations include including in rules on public procurement, indirect taxation and 
nuclear regulations and transport (Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration, n.d.). 
115 
 
sphere, in the areas of border control and combat capacities. Detailed action 
plans for the overall SSR did not become materialised during the Shevardnadze 
period. As the subsequent sections demonstrate, the lack of substantiated action 
plans other than border control and combat capacities development left most of 
SSR issues unattended during the Shevardnadze period. At the policy level, the 
SSR consisted of a set of various technical cooperation programmes and projects 
rather than a comprehensive strategic framework. When it comes to the actual 
implementation, the partnership objectives tended to be translated into sporadic 
and ad hoc projects.  
 
On the receiving end, Georgia under Shevardnadze did not provide a leadership 
to consolidate the varying assistance efforts for establishing a security sector in 
accordance with the recommendations offered by external advisers. Furthermore, 
as the two previous chapters discussed, the security sector actors were heavily 
involved in the domestic power politics among a handful of political elites. 
Assisting the reform of the security sector meant to interact with the power politics, 
whether assistant providers had such an intention or not.  
 
The following section focuses on some key SSR assistance initiatives in the 
defence, police, justice and border control spheres, and examines the converging 
and/or diverting incentives and interests between the providers and the receiver 
of the external SSR assistance.  
 
Table 4 SSR assistance initiatives in Georgia during the Shevardnadze 
time: 1992 – 2003 
 
Imitative Objective, Content, Activity Who When 
Defence 
NATO 
Partnership 
for Peace 
(PfP) 
PfP is the main framework under which political dialogue is 
conducted and different programs and activities are developed.  
Under the PfP framework, Georgia has contributed peacekeeping 
contingent to a NATO-led military operation in Iraq. 
NATO 1994 - 
Georgia-
Turkey 
bilateral 
military 
cooperation 
agreement 
Under the military cooperation agreement, Turkey provided 
military equipment, training for officers and troops and support for 
the Georgian National Defence Academy reform, as well as the 
modernisation of an airbase. 
Turkey 1997 -  
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International 
Security 
Advisory 
Board (ISAB) 
A group of western senior experts providing recommendations on 
the overall SSR strategy.  
UK, 
USA 
 
1998 - 
2006 
NATO 
Planning and 
Review 
Process 
(PARP) 
PARP has helped its forces develop the ability to work with NATO 
and provides planning targets that are key to security reform 
objectives by facilitating improved financial management in the 
MoD, assisting in reforming the intelligence structure of the armed 
forces and ensuring that a credible Strategic Defence Review was 
conducted. 
NATO 1999 - 
Foreign 
Military 
Financing 
Programme 
The Foreign Military Financing Program provides the Georgian 
military with defense articles, services and training. FMF also 
promotes Georgian's participation in NATO's PfP. 
USA 2001 
International 
Military 
Education 
and Training 
Program 
The International Military Education and Training program helps 
Georgian soldiers to develop the English-language and 
professional military skills necessary to augment Georgia’s PfP 
participation and its interoperability with NATO and other 
international peacekeeping missions. 
USA 2001 
Georgian 
Train and 
Equipment 
Program 
(GTEP) 
GTEP assisted Georgia in enhancing its counter-terrorism 
capacities. The 18-month programme started in 2002. US 
allocated USD 64 million to provide staff and tactical training to 
approximately 2,600 troops including a headquarter staff 
elements and five tactical units. 
A trained infantry battalion was deployed in Iraq in 2005. Georgian 
troops also supported operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo.  
USA 2002 - 
2004 
NATO 
Integrated 
Partnership 
Action Plan 
(IPAP) 
Georgia declared its intention to develop an IPAP at the 2002 
Prague Summit and signed in 2004. 
IPAP is a partnership tool for NATO to provide focused country-
specific advice on defence and security-related domestic reform 
and on larger policy and institutional reform. IPAP sets up strategy 
and operational action plans for defence institution building and 
armed forces development.  
NATO 2002 -  
CUBIC 
program 
Assisting in the development of strategic documents, defence 
planning, professional military education, logistics and resource 
planning.  
Assisting the National Defence Academy in establishment of 
Command and Staff College. 
USA 2003 -  
Police 
Law 
Enforcement 
Program 
Focusing on police reform and the improvement in law 
enforcement capabilities and supporting for strong money 
laundering and other anti-crime legislation. Supporting the 
development of modern forensics techniques and establishment 
of a modern forensics laboratory through the provision of training 
and equipment.   
USA Exact 
date 
not 
availab
le 
Justice 
Technical 
assistance 
projects in 
the judiciary 
Assisting the reform effort and supporting the government and 
parliamentary efforts to combat corruption. Advising on criminal 
law reform. Assisting in drafting money-laundering legislation. 
Anti-trafficking programs, including assistance in prevention and 
prosecution, in order to help to raise the profile of this issue and 
reduce the occurrence of trafficking in persons. 
USA Exact 
date 
not 
availab
le 
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Financial 
assistance in 
the justice 
sector 
Providing credits to finance court infrastructure rehabilitation, 
improved court administration, training for judges and staff, and a 
public campaign to increase awareness of and trust in the legal 
system. 
World 
Bank 
1999 -
2002 
Technical 
advice on 
human rights 
issues  
Providing technical advice and disseminated human rights norms. 
Advising on law concerning the status of judges and the police, 
development of the penal system and the organization of 
ministries of justice, as well as training of lawyers, prosecutors, 
police and prison officials both on general issues. 
Counci
l of 
Europ
e 
Exact 
date 
not 
availab
le 
Border control 
The Georgia 
Border 
Security and 
Law 
Enforcement 
(GBSLW) 
Assistance 
Program 
The Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance 
Program assisted the Border Guards and the Custom Service. 
The GBSLW Assistance Program provided equipment, logistical 
and infrastructure support, and training to help Georgia’s Border 
Guards maintain an active border presence, particularly along the 
Georgian-Russian border.  
USA 1997 - 
2005 
 
5.3.1 Defence sphere: enhancing NATO compatibilities in counter-terrorism 
operations 
 
Reform efforts in the defence sphere during the Shevardnadze aimed at the 
modernisation of the defence system and its institutions. The Western advisory 
group for SSR, The ISAB, recommended that Georgia “should undertake a 
comprehensive modernization and reform process in the security and defence 
areas” (ISAB, 2000). The ISAB recommendations in 2000 set out what needed 
to be done for SSR. Those recommendations were submitted to the National 
Security Council of Georgia in the same year. The two major recommendations 
were a) the demilitarisation of the security concept and b) the de-militarisation of 
the security sector governance (Johnson, 2005, pp. 8–9).  
 
Technical assistance to the defence sphere began to arrive. They could be 
categorised into four main thematic areas: a) security concept and strategy 
development; b) overall defence institutions building; c) parliamentary oversight; 
and b) capacity development. Having ousted the paramilitary heads from the 
state security institutions, the Shevardnadze government stated an intention to 
formalise and professionalise the defence sphere. The both sides of the SSR 
assistance providers and receivers seemed to agree on the objectives. However, 
their understanding on what the word ‘modernisation’ suggests a divergence 
when reform efforts started to be implemented on the ground. 
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5.3.1.1 Security concept and strategy development 
 
The SSR assistance providers and Georgia found the first and most significant 
chasm of interest and understanding in the issue of defining a national security 
concept and a strategy. For Shevardnadze’s Georgia, explicitly defining a national 
security concept itself meant a strategic challenge. 
 
For the Euro-Atlantic actors, defining a clear security strategy was regarded key 
prerequisite for SSR assistance. The Western assistance partners had pressed 
the Shevardnadze government to define its national security concept explicitly: 
the ISAB stressed the need to being the SSR process by defining “the basic 
security concept and strategy by which Georgia intends to secure and advance 
its national objectives in light of the international situation” in its report submitted 
to the Georgian government in 1999 (ISAB, 1999). The 1999 ISAB report 
recommended that such a security concept to be supported by an endorsement 
within Parliament and widely accepted by the general public (ISAB, 1999). 
 
The development of an articulated security concept and a strategy was a dilemma 
for the Shevardnadze government. The reason is twofold. The first factor 
concerns external relations with Russia. In the late 1990s, Russia still had its 
military bases in the Georgian territory. The situation in the two disputed territories, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, remained volatile, with Russia-led peacekeepers 
deployed. Under the circumstances, Russia was an obvious security threat for 
security and stability in Georgia and the Southern Caucasia (Georgian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2000).  
 
The Shevardnadze government did not explicitly adopt a security concept that 
clearly indicated Georgia’s orientation towards the West. Some critiques claim 
that this was because Shevardnadze was afraid of upsetting Russia.69  One 
observer commented: “Shevardnadze knew Russia well and knew what it means 
to have an army against Russia.”70  
                                                          
69 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
70 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
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The fear of angering Russia directly impacted the development of a national 
security concept. A group of Georgian and international expert drafted Georgia 
and the World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future in 2001 (Georgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2000)s The document, submitted to Shevardnadze, explicitly 
states an intention to integrate into Europe as foreign policy objective. The 
document, however, remained “under Shevardnadze” (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 18). 
Darchiashvili reports that the fear against Russia was “essentially believed to be 
the reason why a national security concept was never adopted under 
Shevardnadze” (Darchiashvili, 2008). The lack of firm commitment by the highest 
level of the Georgian authority was clearly noted by the ISAB. General Sir Garry 
Johnson, the ISAB chairperson recognises that “the proximity of Russia, the 
complexities of the region and the greater distance from the heart of Europe” 
made it difficult for Georgia to declare an explicit foreign policy orientation to 
become a member of NATO and the EU (Johnson, 2005, p. 51). 
 
5.3.1.2 The separation of the law enforcement and defence forces 
 
One of the pre-requisites for the SSR assistance providers was the separation 
between the law enforcement and defence forces. However, for Georgia, the 
blurred demarcation between the law enforcement and defence forces was rather 
a deliberate choice. In most of the SSR assistance providing countries, the MIA 
is usually a civil ministry. On the other hand, in Georgia with a Soviet legacy in its 
state apparatus, the MIA still possessed the largest armed forces, Internal Troops, 
in post-independence Georgia.71 For the Western advisors, the main issue for 
building defence institutions was the blurred demarcation between military and 
law enforcement institutions in the security sector. In other words, establishing 
defence institutions in Georgia required demilitarisation of the non-military 
institutions. In the late 1990, Georgia had a few major state paramilitary forces 
under the Ministries of Defence (the National Guards), Internal Affairs (Internal 
Troops, State Department of Border Guards), State Security (Special State Guard 
Service and Presidential Guards). As chapter 4 discusses, some of those forces 
                                                          
71 Internal Troops were reported to possess around 6,300 troops in 2002. (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 73) Larsson suggests that an actual number of troops was much less and that 
the Internal Troops only fulfilled its manpower by 56% (Larsson, 2003, p. 15).  
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had unclarified roles and mandates, and some of which overlapped and/or 
duplicated. Recognising this issue, the 1999 ISAB Report pointed out the 
“possession of armed forces by a civil Ministry does not conform with normal 
practice in a modern democracy” (ISAB, 1999) and recommended to separate 
between armed forces with military and law enforcement functions. (ISAB, 1999) 
In the same report, the ISAB specifically recommended that: 
 
“all units with a military function (i.e. the Armed Forces, the National Guard, 
and the Independent Brigade 72 ), be subordinated to the MoD, and 
reformed on NATO-compatible lines by 2004” (ISAB, 1999); and 
 
“all units with a police or civil function (i.e. Interior Troops, Border Guards, 
and Police Special Duties Unit), be subordinated to the Ministry of Interior 
and that these organisations be reformed on lines which are compatible 
with general practices and standards of member nations of the Council of 
Europe by 2004” (ISAB, 1999). 
 
The 1999 ISAB report also recommended that “plans for those actions should be 
submitted to the National Security Council by spring 2004” (ISAB, 1999). Thus, 
the ISAB advisory members had explicitly recommended the separation of law 
enforcement security forces from the defence forces from an outset of the SSR 
assistance. Yet, the implementation of this recommendation did not take place 
throughout the Shevardnadze period. Rather, there was a strong resistance 
within the Shevardnadze regime to undertaking such a substantial institutional 
reform involving the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security. The major 
reason for the lack of will for reform is the power dynamics among Shevardnadze 
and the two ‘power ministries’ as discussed in detail in the previous chapter.  
 
Another reason was related to the security dilemma over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Georgia, along with the majority of the international community, regarded 
those two regions as part of Georgia. For Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
were of internal rather than external issues. In the meanwhile, the unsettled 
disputes over the two regions required Georgia to equip with armed forces 
                                                          
72 At that time, the Independent Brigade was affiliated to the MIA.  
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capable of low-intensive combats. Thus, the Georgian internal affairs troops 
required to be militant. The security need and the territorial and security 
complexity concerning Georgia and its two separatist regions therefore prevented 
Georgia from advancing the West’s recommendation to make a clear 
demarcation between the law enforcement and defence forces. 
 
Despite the lack of willingness to advance the separation between the defence 
and law enforcement bodies, the West’s assistance in the defence sphere started 
to flow into Georgia before the institutional demarcation between defence and 
law enforcement borides had been complete. The Euro-Atlantic allies started 
providing assistance, such as the USA’s GTEP, to build the defence institutions. 
The primal example of the contradiction in the defence assistance can be found 
in the area of border control. The ISAB report itself gave a temporary waiver on 
the institutional restructuring for the border control actors, as securing national 
borders is the vital necessity so that “any change in the status of the Border 
Guards as an independent Department of State (rather than as their status as the 
State Department for Border Defence, added by the author) should wait until the 
border situation has been sufficiently stabilised” (ISAB, 1999). Having given the 
waiver, the Euro-Atlantic allies provided an intensive assistance for building 
border control institutions. Through the Georgia Border Security and Law 
Enforcement (GBSLW) Assistance Program, the USA helped Georgia’s Border 
Guards build its capacities by providing equipment, logistical and infrastructure 
support, as well as training the Border Guards troops. This way, the Western 
assistance in the defence sphere began without waiting for the institutional 
restructuring within the Georgian security sector. 
 
5.3.1.3 Parliamentary oversight and democratic control 
 
In the relation between Georgia and the international community, the issue of 
democratic control of armed forces and parliamentary oversight was recognised 
as crucial element in the reform of the security sector institutions since 1994. At 
the Budapest Summit of the OSCE,73 the Code of Conduct on Political-Military 
                                                          
73 At the Budapesht Summit, CSCE was renamed OSCE.  
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Aspects of Security was adopted.74 The Code highlighted the centrality of the 
democratic control of not only military but also, paramilitary, internal security 
forces, intelligence services and the police as an indispensable element of 
stability and security (“Budapest summit declaration,” 1994). The Code provided 
the CSCE participating states with a political roadmap for international 
cooperation in enhancing democratic control of armed forces. Similarly, the 1999 
ISAB Report stressed the importance of democratic control of armed forces and 
the central role of Parliament in democratic control of the military (ISAB, 1999). 
 
Despite Georgia joining the early political statement on the need for democratic 
control by the international community, no significant progress to establish 
parliamentary oversight and democratic control was made in Georgia during this 
period.  
 
Without explicitly pointing at the budgetary mismanagement and high level of 
corruption within the Shevardnadze government, the ISAB Report highlighted the 
need for Parliament to ensure financial accountability by not only to approving but 
also reviewing an overall expenditure budget (ISAB, 1999). The Report 
recommended the Georgian government and Parliament to continue to seek for 
advice on the establishment of effective budgetary management systems. 
 
The Georgian side showed signs of improving the budgetary management. An 
Administrative Code was adopted to establish democratic accountability and 
principles in the overall public sector. For the defence sphere, the Georgian 
government did pass a set of legislations related to the budgetary management. 
Those legislations included The Law on Budgetary System and Responsibilities 
and The Law on Security Services were adopted. The ‘Group of Trust’ was 
established at Parliament for the oversight of some special and classified military 
and security programmes (Darchiashvili, 2004, pp. 90–91).  
 
However, the level of the implementation of those legislations remained quite low 
during the Shevardnadze times. As discussed in the previous chapter, the corrupt 
network within the security sector was a platform to generate power for the 
                                                          
74 CSCE adopted the Code on the 3rd of December, 1994.  
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Shevardnadze regime. A parliamentarian reported a massive scale of corruption 
and misuse of the state budget within the MoD. 75  For Shevardnadze’s 
government, establishing effective budgetary management systems meant a 
means to erode the power generating mechanism. A substantial reform progress 
thus had to wait until Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze and his government in 
2003. 
 
5.3.1.4 Development of combat capacities and human resources 
 
External assistance included various institutional capacity development and 
combat capacity development. For instance, the neighbouring country, Turkey, 
signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement as early as in 1997 and 
provided a number of supports to modernise the Georgian military. Their 
assistance included the provision of military equipment, training for officers and 
troops, support for the reform of the National Defence Academy and upgrading 
the Vaziani airbase to NATO standards (Lynch, 2006, p. 56). 
 
The major assistance provider was the USA, whose strategic interest in 
stabilising the Caucasus region had significantly increased since the 9/11 attacks 
in 2001. Through the Georgian Train and Equipment Program (GTEP), the USA 
assisted Georgia in enhancing its counter-terrorism capacities and developed its 
operational capacities in multi-national environment. The GTEP was one of the 
few SSR assistance with concrete and substantial activities involved during the 
Shevardnadze times. Since April 2002, the USA provided an 18-month long 
bilateral defence assistance and allocated USD 64 million to provide staff and 
tactical training, as well as military equipment including uniform items, small arms 
and ammunition, communications and training gears and construction materials. 
Between 2002 and 2004, the GTEP trained approximately 2,600 soldiers, 
including a headquarters staff element and five tactical units. (Global Security, 
n.d.) The defence assistance provided through the GTEP remained at the 
operational and technical level and did not involve normative and substantial 
reform assistance. Nonetheless, the USA benefitted from the GTEP by receiving 
                                                          
75 Authors interviews, March 2005, Tbilisi 
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troops contribution from Georgia for military operations led by the USA in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. 
 
From Georgia’s perspectives, however, the GTEP left mixed results. Initially, 
Shevardnadze requested the USA to provide a firm political backing on the issue 
of the Pankisi Gorge in Abkhazia, where Georgia claimed that Al Qaida elements 
were operating (Civil Georgia, 2002). The USA, on the other hand, responded 
with the provision of the GTEP rather than bringing up the Abkhazia issue as a 
political agenda between Russia and the USA.  
 
The fact that the USA’s engagement limited to the provision of training and 
equipment, however, contributed to creating deterrence between Georgia and 
Russia over the bordering territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, at least for 
the time being. By keeping the reform effort at a somewhat superficial level, the 
Shevardnadze government avoided having Russia regard the assistance as an 
immediate and direct threat to the Georgian territory. This way, Shevardnadze 
achieved to maintain Georgia’s statehood, although the success was made in 
exchange for the status quo over the territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
 
5.3.2 Police sphere: immunity to police reform as a means of regime 
stabilisation 
 
The police sphere hardly saw any substantial reform initiatives under the 
Shevardnadze government, due to socioeconomic and political dynamics among 
the domestic actors in Georgia as discussed in chapter 4. The absence of any 
reform plan developed by the Shevardnadze government provided no systemic 
assessment of the law enforcement institutions. This left external assistance 
providers with no choice but providing specific technical assistance in certain 
areas rather than offering support in a holistic manner.  
 
In Georgia, a former Soviet republic country, a handful of institutions, namely the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, covered the police sphere. Those 
institutions inherited the structure and human resources from the Soviet system. 
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Those institutions, including their paramilitaries, remained immune to any 
substantial reform efforts during the Shevardnadze period. The external 
assistance in the police sphere was limited at this time, with some exceptions of 
some ad hoc technical and human rights related assistance, 76  as well as 
providing policing service in the conflict-affected regions bordering with Chechnya, 
Dagestan and Ingushetia (Kakachia, 2005). The OSCE had its focus on the 
policing issues from the early stage of their involvement in Georgia. The OSCE 
expanded its assistance to train the Georgian police, but this had to be waited 
until 2004, after Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze as the president. 
 
The US assistance programmes for law enforcement bodies, for instance, 
focused on building capacities of money-laundering and anti-crime legislation. 
The USA also provided training and equipment to build forensic examination 
capacities.77 
 
Both the SSR assistance providers of the West and the Shevardnadze 
government were cautious in the interests of the stability of the Shevardnadze 
regime. For the Shevardnadze government, the absence of reform in the police 
structure contributed to consolidating and maintaining his political platform in the 
MIA. The lack of reform efforts in the police sphere thus contributed to 
Shevardnadze’s remaining in power. 
 
Either norm-based or interest-based, external assistance to the reform of defence 
and justice spheres were provided. When it comes to the police sphere, however, 
no substantial reform efforts took place during the Shevardnadze period. Both the 
West and Georgia found a common interest in resisting to reform in the police. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the police were Shevardnadze’s power 
platform. Reforming the police may have risked jeopardising the power platform, 
and potentially destabilize the Shevardnadze regime. This was not the interest of 
the West or of the Shevardnadze government. The police sphere thus escaped 
from any substantial, normative reform efforts, as long as the Shevardnadze’s 
regime managed to restore a certain level of political stability. 
                                                          
76 OSCE, for instance, provided police officers with training on combating domestic violence (OSCE, 
2003).  
77 The US provided a significant amount of assistance for the border control institutions. See Sub-section 
5.6 Border Control in this chapter for further discussion on the US assistance on border control. 
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5.3.3 Justice sphere: compromised reform impacts 
 
Prospects for the justice sphere reform initially seemed high when the 
Shevardnadze government executed the lay-off of a large number of judges and 
replaced them with newly appointed ones in 1998. The reform efforts were carried 
out by the Georgian authorities, conducted under Saakashvili, then Parliament’s 
Legal Committee and subsequently the Minister of Justice, who had been 
regarded as an emerging political leader with strong orientation towards western 
values. Subsequently, an expectation for progressive reform efforts in the justice 
sphere became high among the general public as well as the international 
community, followed by the arrival of external assistance in the justice sphere.  
 
The international assistance placed its focus in the transformation of the Georgian 
judiciary from the Soviet style system to a modern, western-style system that is 
independent of the executive power. What entailed in the external assistance for 
the justice sphere ranged from direct assistance on infrastructure and human 
resources such as rehabilitation of court infrastructure and development of 
human resources including judges and court staff, to the provision of legal advice 
to develop a range of codes and legislations concerning the justice sphere. 
Between 1999 and 2002, the World Bank financed the rehabilitation of courts 
infrastructure and the training of judges. The assistance’s objective was to 
modernise the judiciary, and enhance its level of the independence and efficiency 
(World Bank, 2009, p. 25). Following an initial assessment in 1998, the World 
Bank financed a variety of judicial reform activities including “court infrastructure 
rehabilitation, improved court administration, training for judges and staff, and a 
public campaign to increase awareness of and trust in the legal system” (World 
Bank, 2009, p. 25). The Council of Europe vigorously pursued “its central 
functions in the area of dissemination of human rights norms.” The reform 
concept of the Georgian prosecuting agency was drafted by EU experts 
(Darchiashvili, 2003b, p. 125). The Council of Europe provided “advice on law 
concerning the status pf judges and the police, development of the penal system 
and the organization of ministries of justice” (Darchiashvili, 2003b, p. 125). The 
Council of Europe also provided human resources capacity development through 
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“the training of layers, prosecutors, police and prison officials both on general 
issues and on such special topics as the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities” (Darchiashvili, 2003b, p. 125). 
 
Despite the initial reform efforts by the Shevardnadze government and external 
assistance, the justice sphere did not see much improvement in public perception 
on the judiciary. The World Bank itself considered outcomes of their assistance 
moderately unsatisfactory, noting that those assistance efforts did not lead to 
improved public trust in the judiciary and judicial independence (World Bank, 
2009). Like in the other security sector spheres, corruption was endemic in the 
justice system and general public had very low confidence in judges and the 
overall court system (Human Rights Watch, 2000). As the previous chapter 
discussed, corruption had become so imbedded in the security sector even to the 
extent that corruption became a means of livelihoods. In the environment, 
Georgia lacked a strong enough incentive to reform the judicial system, while the 
external assistance in the justice sphere largely focused on developing judicial 
infrastructure and human resources. 
 
5.3.4 Border control: large scale technical assistance with limited impacts on 
border control effectiveness 
 
During the Soviet times, Georgia shared a national border only with Turkey. As 
the Soviet Union was disappearing along with its borders, the CIS Summit 
meeting reached Agreement on Armed Forces and Border Troops which confirms 
“member-states legitimate right to set up their own armed forces” in December 
1991 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 246). As Georgia 
became an independent state, it came to share the new national borders with 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the border with Russia became 
contentious as the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
demanded for independence from Georgia. The border control between Georgia 
and its neighbouring countries was quite porous, due to weak institutional 
capacities and corruption among border guards and custom officials. During the 
Shevardnadze period, building functional border control between Georgian and 
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its neighbouring countries became an acute issue for Georgia and the 
international community. 
 
External assistance in the border control area began as early as in the late 1990. 
During Shevardnadze’s time, the Border Guards was regarded as military 
institutions. As part of the overall SSR advisory, the ISAB recommended 
transferring the Border Guards to be removed from the State Department for 
Border Defence and to be subordinated under the MIA in its 1999 report (ISAB, 
1999). At the same time, the same ISAB report gave a de facto waiver for the 
affiliation issue, and specifically mentioned the Border Guards by stating that: 
 
“ISAB understands that special priority must be given to the vital necessity 
of securing national borders and, there, that any change in the status of 
the Border Guards as an independent Department of State should wait 
until the border situation has been sufficiently stabilised” (ISAB, 1999). 
 
The main assistance providers for the border control issues were the USA and 
OSCE. The USA provided technical assistance to the border control institutions 
since 1998 through the Georgian Border Security and Related Law Enforcement 
(GBSLE) programme (Welt, 2005). Since 1999 the OSCE Mission in Georgia 
provided the border monitoring function along the border between Georgia and 
Russia (OSCE, n.d.). 
 
The early and direct commitment of the West in the border control issues were 
driven by two urgent security concerns for the West. The first is the unsettled 
territorial conflicts on the border between Georgia and Russia, over Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Following the war in Chechnya, since 1999 the OSCE’s mandate 
was expanded to provide border patrol along with the areas bordering first with 
Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia (Kakachia, 2005). The other security 
concern for the West was the weak border control risking the trafficking of 
radioactive materials from Russia. According to a report by a non-proliferation 
specialist, Cory Welt, Georgian officials have apprehended traffickers in 
radioactive materials at least seven times between 1999 and 2005. In addition, 
three earlier cases of trafficking of radioactive materials in 1993, 1996 and 1997 
were reported. Those cases allegedly involved Georgian citizens in trafficking 
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radioactive materials from Georgia (Welt, 2005, p. 528). For the USA, Georgia’s 
border control capacity development was their strategic interest to prevent those 
materials from proliferating in the region and beyond. 
 
In this context, the USA launched the GBSLE program. The GBSLE program 
targeted a varying border control actors, both of defence and law enforcement 
spheres including the “Border Guard, Customs, Ministry of Defense, and other 
border security and law enforcement agencies” and provided assistance ranging 
from the provision of communications equipment, vehicles and helicopters with 
spares/repair parts for transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment, 
computers for automation of applications, licensing and regulatory systems, and 
forensics laboratory assistance” (Global Security, n.d.). Through the GBSLE 
program, between 1998 and 2005 the USA allocated approximately 135 million 
USD to Georgia in border security assistance. 
 
From the viewpoint of the Shevardnadze government, the external assistance in 
the border control sphere benefitted Georgia by building a modern border control 
apparatus. During the Shevardnadze period, the border control capacities were 
close to nil. The border control along with the borders with its southern neighbours, 
i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, for instance, was largely porous at that time. 
The border guards had neither enough uniforms nor food and lacked proper 
facilities such as radio equipment to monitor the borders. 78  During the 
Shevardnadze period effectiveness of the Georgian border control was 
questionable.  
 
The provision of the US assistance in the area of border control capacity 
development was welcomed in the void of financial and material resources. In 
2005, the GBSLE program stood 15 million USD, more than the annual budget 
of the Georgian border protection department. The GBSLE program helped 
Georgia to create the Coast Guard, and provided training, supplies, equipment, 
uniforms, infrastructure, helicopters, ships, aircraft and vehicles to the border 
protection department, and trained and supplied the customs department and 
other relevant agencies, as well as provided forensic laboratory assistance (Welt, 
                                                          
78 Author’s interview, March 2005, Marneuli.  
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2005). The US Department of Homeland Security also focused on the radioactive 
material issues and provided technical assistance, training and equipment to 
enhance Georgia's capability to deter, detect, interdict, and prevent the spread of 
dual-use equipment and technology, such as radioactive materials. 
 
In sum, the border control assistance significantly advanced the modernisation of 
the border control institutions in terms of the equipment and training. On the other 
hand, as in the case of the defence sphere, the capacity development of the 
border control stopped at the technical level without involving substantial reform 
efforts in a normative sense (Welt, 2005). The Shevardnadze government did 
accept the technical capacity building of the border control institutions but did not 
proceed with an institutional reform substantial enough to eradicate corruption 
within the institutions.  
 
5.4 Security consequences of the SSR efforts between 1992 and 2003 
 
The external SSR assistance efforts during the Shevardnadze period lacked a 
comprehensive approach. External SSR assistance providers such as NATO, the 
OSCE, the EU and bilateral donors signed a number of partnership agreements. 
However, most of the partnerships remained at a policy discourse and did not 
translate into actual action points and activity plans. 
 
As chapter 4 and the previous sections in this chapter discuss, in the absence of 
a comprehensive SSR assistance strategy, external assistance activities were 
provided in limited fields, namely, the provision of training and equipment for 
enhancing counter-terrorism combat and border control abilities. Georgia’s SSR 
efforts during the Shevardnadze period remained technical and sporadic, and did 
not bring substantial SSR that would have required substantial political 
commitment to the Georgian security sector actors. The disproportional 
assistance in the security sector resulted had Georgia face multifaceted security 
consequences. The following part of the chapter analyses those consequences 
to regime security, state security and human security. At the same time, the 
section examines what security issues remained unattended in the SSR process, 
131 
 
in spite of and/or because of the way the SSR assistance was provided in Georgia 
between 1992 and 2003.  
 
5.4.1 Regime security: frustration over corruption leading to the end of the 
Shevardnadze regime 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the lack of reform efforts in the ‘power ministries’ 
contributed for Shevardnadze’s regime to restoring its power base. External 
assistance in the security sector did not change the dynamics which restored 
Shevardnadze’s regime security. Incentives for restoring the regime security 
needs appeared to be more powerful than establishing a functional security 
sector apparatus. 
 
An illustrative example of the western SSR assistance did not surpass the 
domestic political dynamics can be found in the field of border control. One of the 
most significant external SSR assistance activities, the border control institutions 
development mentioned above, contributed to building and developing the 
Georgian border guards’ capacities. Despite the large amount of the assistance 
from the USA, the effectiveness of border control remained low. Smuggling 
remained rampant over the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Marneuli, a 
town close to the two southern neighbouring countries, a local resident described 
the extent of smuggling and lack of effective border control by saying: “A real 
frontier we have is only with Turkey”.79  In Zugdidi, a town close to Abkhazia, 
people also pointed out weak capacities of the border guards. One local 
interviewee told: 
 
“Nobody is satisfied with the frontier military work. Kidnapping of 
neighbours in the bordering area by Abkhazia criminals is very common. 
The neighbours are constantly under fear. People are unprotected 
because the frontier military works badly.”80  
 
                                                          
79 Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. 
80 Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
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In the bordering regions, people were particularly discontent with the 
government’s official’s involvement in smuggling. One source told that the local 
authorities in the border regions were involved in illicit trading of commercial 
goods and weapons. 81  According to the source, Shevardnadze promised 
unofficially to the local authorities that Tbilisi would not prosecute for trafficking in 
exchange for their being allowed to remain in the Georgian territory.82 The level 
of corruption among border control officials remained high throughout the 
Shevardnadze period and even after Saakashvili came to power in 2003. Local 
residents in Marneuli reported that the cost of bribery increased from 
approximately 30GEL to 100GEL between 2004 and 2005. 
 
Rampant corruption and the frustration over the Shevardnadze government’s 
lack of efforts for curtailing corruption eventually led to mass demonstrations 
against his government. During the demonstrations in November 2003, the 
security ministries including the MIA, who had been Shevardnadze’s power 
platform, did not stand on the Shevardnadze side. An official from the MIA 
explained the reason that rank-and-file officers at his Ministry and the MSS did 
not benefit from corruption as “most of the money went to people at the very top 
level (in the ministries)”.83 This way, the lack of the reform in the police and law 
enforcement failed to garner enough institutional support from the security 
ministries, and failed regime security for Shevardnadze. 
 
5.4.2 State security: maintaining the territorial status quo over Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia 
 
The biggest threat to state security during the Shevardnadze period was posed 
by the unsolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without having 
received full-fledged assistance to upgrade its defence system and articulating 
its strategic direction, the Shevardnadze government maintained moderate 
relations with Russia, and restored the status quo situation over the separatist 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a way, the lack of a comprehensive 
                                                          
81 Author’s interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
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SSR strategy, especially in the defence sphere, contributed to ensuring a certain 
level of state security for Georgia. 
 
The Georgian perspective needs to be understood in the political context 
surrounding Georgia during this period. In the political context in which the SSR 
assistance was provided, Georgia was at the edge of a collapsed state when 
Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia. The first few years under his administration 
focused on restoring a certain level of order, gaining international recognition of 
Georgia as an independent state and developing basic state institutions. Its 
relation with Russia was not always a smooth one and it soured under the 
Shevardnadze government. Georgia did not join the CIS upon its foundation, but 
later chose to join it in 1993, hoping its CIS membership may lead to resolving 
the conflicts over Abkhazia.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Georgia under the Shevardnadze 
government was yet to firmly decide Russia as an existential threat, unlike the 
Saakashvili government. During the Shevardnadze period, Georgia was still very 
much under strong and direct influence of Russia. This was largely due to the 
unsettled violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the presence 
of the Russia-led peacekeeping forces in those territories. Russia still kept its 
military bases in proper Georgia. The two assassination attempts against 
Shevardnadze in 1995 and 1998 were suspected to be masterminded by Russia. 
Under the circumstances, SSR from the Euro-Atlantic countries was regarded as 
antidote against Russia’s influence and political and social elites with strong ties 
with Russia. In this context, a full-fledged, substantial SSR implementation had a 
risk to invite a coercive reaction from Russia. In the political environment, 
Shevardnadze placed a priority on maintaining a relation with Russia than 
developing an explicit security concept enlisting Russia as a threat. 
 
5.4.3 Human security: relying on private networks 
 
The absence of reform efforts in the police spheres not only fostered the culture 
of corruption in the police and other security sector institutions. It also left a 
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number of human security challenges at community level little attended and left 
non-state actors remained as a major security provider on the ground.  
 
Although some external SSR assistance providers attempted to attend human 
security needs on the ground. For instance, as chapter 3 discussed, the 
proliferation of small arms in society had been an issue since the Gamsakhurdia 
period. One report estimates that approximately 40,000 weapons were in the 
possession of armed groups during the period. (Demetriou, 2002, p. 20) Under 
the Shevardnadze regime, small arms still remained circulating in society. While 
the capacity of the Georgian government was yet to be established, the 
international community provided assistance in order to control the irregular 
proliferation of small arms. In South Ossetia, for instance, the OSCE Mission to 
Georgia provided weapons collection assistance (OECD, 2002). Nonetheless, 
human security needs at community level were far from being met by the external 
assistance. 
 
People had little trust in the capacity of the state security institutions in the 
Georgian society. Field studies conducted in 2005 shows that people shared 
testimonials on the state security apparatus on its weak capabilities and lack of 
willingness to attend people’s needs (Koyama, 2005). Moreover, people felt that 
the institutional capacities of state security apparatus declined since the Soviet 
time. The lack of confidence in state security institutions drove them to rely on 
their own private networks for protection Georgia was known for its unofficial 
networks since the Soviet time as economic corruption and political nepotism 
flourished through such private webs (Koyama, 2005). In Georgia during the 
Shevardnadze period, the private networks took over the state security sector’s 
role to provide security to people in communities. Human security needs were 
attended by non-state, alternative actors such as community members 
themselves who were often armed with small arms, traditional and ethnic 
community networkers, family and relatives and even criminal groups. 
 
Having very low confidence in the state security institutions, local community 
members chose to rely on their own network for protection. One such network 
found typically in the ethnic Azeris communities, was the traditional community 
network called brethren, and community elders called akhsakhals to resolve 
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conflicts. Even during the Soviet time, they tended to seek for their traditional 
chiefs’ ruling. In the lacuna of law and order, the roles of the brethren and 
akhsakhals as the justice provider became more critical. Azeri participants 
explained a type of community-based conflict resolution: 
 
“When there is a conflict between people, the parties start getting to know 
the other side: what kind of family they are, who their friends are and to 
which brethren they belong. Then, they will find a person among this circle 
of people with whom they could negotiate. This is a way of conflict 
settlement. It is a better way than to appeal to the government structure.” 
84  
 
In Marneuli, the Georgian communities went to akhsakhals rather than to the 
police in case of disputes with Azeri neighbours. From the Georgian side, another 
ethnic group, the Svans, were often selected as a negotiator as they were 
regarded neutral. 
 
People sometimes tried to work out issues without the police and state security 
agencies particularly on issues related to domestic violence and abduction of 
women and girls for marriage. Cases involving sexual issues were particularly 
under-reported. 85  People tended to receive punishment by themselves. The 
Armenian female group reported two examples of murders. One participant said:  
 
“In my district, a father found his daughter in incest with her brother. He 
killed both of them. Now the father is in a psychiatric hospital.”86  
 
Another ethnic Armenian participant reported a case of summary execution of a 
suspect by community people. According to her:   
                                                          
84 Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. 
85 In most cases of domestic violence, victims, who were mostly women, were persuaded to “endure” 
violence at home by family members.  If the victims decided to resolve these issues at all, they preferred 
to resolve it within their circle of friends or relatives. Women believed it was rather pointless to bring a 
case to court since they did not have enough money to bribe judges, unlike her male family members. 
Thus, women tended to rely on her family network to settle disputes. In case in which families of 
kidnapped women and girls were against the marriage, they did not report the incident to the police but 
organised their own ‘rescue’ teams. Through networks of family, relatives and friends, they collected 
information, identify the abductor, and negotiate the release of the kidnapped. 
86 Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe. 
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“Six or seven years ago, a young man raped a little girl. The people in the 
village caught the man and burned him.”87  
 
Another such private networks include criminal groups. Since the breakdown of 
the Soviet system, criminal groups had engaged in extortion. During the civil war, 
these groups set up their own rules, which locals had to obey and largely rely on 
these criminal groups for their protection. In some cases, community members 
also relied on the criminal networks to resolve crimes. They preferred to go to 
criminal groups than to the police, because “the police take years to investigate 
a case if they do it at all, while the criminal groups would settle the problem within 
a matter of hours.”88  Another interviewee told:  
 
“The criminal groups are still the major source of security and protection. 
You pay one criminal group, and they would protect you from other criminal 
gangs.”89  
 
Needless to say, the private networks were unable and incapable of responding 
to all the security needs of the people.90 At the same time, people acknowledge 
that money was often a key in mobilizing the police, the courts, and the criminal 
groups. This implies that the rich, legally or illegally, had better access to the 
security and justice systems, at the expense of the poor who could not afford 
access. In other words, access to security and justice for people had become 
disproportionate between the rich and the poor. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Having gained independence in 1991, Georgia in the 1990s was still on its early 
stage of state-building. Security sector change took place in the state-building 
context, in which security sector institutions and the sector’s governance 
mechanism were to be transformed from Soviet- to Western- style apparatus. In 
                                                          
87 Ibid. 
88 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Such shortfalls were especially prominent in cases of gendered violence. 
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this context, a number of major strategic partnerships such as NATO’s PfP and 
EU’s Partnership for Cooperation Agreement were signed between Georgia and 
the Euro-Atlantic block. Following the adaptation of the key partnership 
frameworks, external assistance for the security sector started to arrive since the 
late 1990. 
 
The ample externa assistance in the security sector sphere did not lead to a 
normatively informed reform. Neither the external assistance providers nor 
Georgia developed a comprehensive policy or action plan for the overall SSR, 
although the need for clarifying the political and security framework within which 
SSR was to take place at the onset was pointed out.91 In Georgia, external 
assistance in the security sector arrived in the absence of an overall SSR policy 
framework. 
 
The provision of SSR assistance between 1992 and 2003 appears to be driven 
by strategic interests and political incentives among the external assistance 
providers and the Georgian counterpart for reforming and not reforming the 
security sector. For instance, in the early 1990, the Western assistance providers 
had an interest in the stability in the Southern Caucasian region and in Georgia. 
The West also had an aspiration for the eastward expansion of democracy based 
on liberal democratic norms. Regime stability was the priority for their counterpart, 
the Shevardnadze government, too. The absence of substantial reforms in the 
police sphere was an illustrative example of the outcome of the mutually met 
political incentive between Georgian and its SSR assistance providers. For the 
domestic stability in Georgia, the Shevardnadze regime at that time appeared to 
be a condition for stabilising Georgia. No reform efforts which may jeopardize the 
regime’s power such as the MIA took place. The external assistance providers’ 
incentives for the reform in the police sphere did not surpass the strategic interest 
in establishing a stable regime in Georgia. This way, the aim to expand 
democracy based on liberal democratic norms was significantly compromised. 
 
The external assistance providers and Georgia did not always share the common 
goal in the implementation of SSR, however. The case of the defence sphere is 
                                                          
91 Johnson, 2005, p.55 
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a suggestive example. The dissolution of the Soviet Union created a strategic 
space for the Western allies for the eastward enlargement of their influence 
towards the region to promote and embed the post-Cold War political transitions 
and also to replace Russia as a major geopolitical power. Georgia’s SSR efforts 
took place in the strategic context. The Euro-Atlantic allies, especially the USA, 
provided a significant amount of SSR assistance to help Georgia’s defence 
system, especially, to build capacities of the combat battalions under the MoD 
and border controls. The Georgian counterpart expressed their intention to 
modernise their security sector. But the intention was largely driven by a political 
motivation: modernising the country and its security sector institutions as an 
antidote against Russia. However, even this political agenda had to be 
compromised in order to prevent the relations with Russia from being deteriorated. 
An absence of a national security concept despite of the explicit recommendation 
by the Western advisers illustrates the specific security and political challenges 
that Shevardnadze’s Georgia faced at that time. 
 
These observations on the SSR assistance and how they were treated by the 
Georgian counterparts provide the following conclusions on the interplay between 
the SSR assistance and the actual changes in the security sector. 
 
First, the SSR assistance aimed at attending strategic concerns for the SSR 
assistance providers, and not necessarily Georgia’s security concerns. The SSR 
assistance initiatives provided by the Euro-Atlantic allies during the 
Shevardnadze period mainly focused on the development of border control and 
combat capacities. The main objective was to enhance Georgia’s capacities to 
counter terrorism as part of the USA and its allies’ efforts against terrorism. The 
SSR assistance thus concentrated on those issues which aimed for ensuring 
security outside, not inside Georgia.  
 
Second, in the interest-driven SSR agenda-setting process, state and regime 
security concerns appeared to be a dominant factor determining the course and 
extent of SSR. Consequently, despite the increased external assistance in SSR, 
Georgia remained affected by a number of security concerns. The lack of 
substantial reform in the police and law enforcement spheres, combined with the 
external security oriented SSR efforts on counter-terrorism, left a wide range of 
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other security issues within Georgia little attended. The issue of human security 
at community level in the chapter provided an illuminating example of the 
consequence of the compromised SSR implementation. 
 
Third, little efforts in security sector governance issues contributed to sustain the 
regime security, but eventually led to jeopardise the regime security. The SSR 
assistance during the Shevardnadze time remained at a technical level, and did 
not involve substantive, normative reform in the field of security sector 
governance, including budgetary management and parliamentary oversight. The 
lack of the governance reform helped the security sector institutions restore its 
corrupt system at first. However, the ousting of the Shevardnadze regime by 
popular demonstrations against corruption suggests that the lack of substantial 
reform in the power base of the Shevardnadze regime turned out to be a trigger 
for destabilising the regime security.  
 
The SSR assistance efforts between 1992 and 2003 left a number of challenges, 
both in terms of the security sector development and security concerns in Georgia. 
The external assistance remained only supplementary without leading to 
normative reform. What took place in the security sector between 1992 and 2003 
could be better described as security sector change rather than SSR, given the 
lack of substantial normative reform.  
 
The next chapter discusses a drastic change in the course of Georgian politics 
and external relations under a new government led by Saakashvili that replaced 
the Shevardnadze government, and analyses the interaction between these 
political chances and security sector change between 2004 and 2008. 
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Chapter 6 Security sector change under the Saakashvili regime between 
2004 and 2008 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
A number of changes in the security sector in Georgia between 2004 and 2008 
took place in a politically eventful period, both domestically and internationally. 
The Rose Revolution in 2004 began this next period, from 2004 to 2008. The new 
Saakashvili government during this time enhanced the democratization process 
further, while removing his political rivals consisting of the former Soviet 
nomenklatura and Shevardnadze appointees. At the same time, the Saakashvili 
government explicitly expressed the ambition to join NATO and the EU, which 
intensified tensions in the relation with Russia. The Georgia-Russian relation 
increasingly deteriorated, and ultimately resulted in a war over the South Ossetia 
territory in summer 2008.  
 
This chapter seeks to understand how the political developments affected the 
course of security sector change processes, including SSR in the transitional 
context in which the centre of power shifted from pro-Russia to pro-West elites. 
By examining how the security sector evolves and changes in detail, this chapter 
analyses what socio-political factors influence the course of security sector 
change and how. The example of Georgia during this period illustrates that the 
political dynamics continued to play a major role in determining the course of 
security sector change, even though the country had an advantage of receiving 
international expertise on SSR, the provision of equipment and training, as well 
as financial support. 
 
The analysis of security sector change under the Saakashvili government is 
organised in three components. The first part of this chapter provides a brief 
analysis on the major political developments the period between 2004 and 2008 
in which Georgia experienced a revolution domestically and a war internationally. 
The chapter then proceeds with a detailed examination on security sector change 
that took place in the transitional context. As in chapters 3 and 4, the third 
component comprises a political economy analysis of security sector change and 
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of the set of factors that influenced the course of the security sector change 
process and vice versa.  
 
6.2 The examination of political developments between 2004 and 2008 
 
This chapter covers the period between 2004 and 2008. During this period, 
Georgia experienced major political and social developments, both domestically 
and internationally. The Rose Revolution introduced a new political leader, 
Saakashvili and his allies, replacing Shevardnadze and his supporters. The new 
administration took an expansive approach towards the contested territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which led to a deteriorated relation with Russia. The 
relation with Russia became further intensified and finally resulted in a war in the 
summer of 2008. (Gahrton, 2010; Jones, 2015) This section provides a detailed 
discussion of those key social and political developments that influenced the 
course and agenda-setting process of security sector change under the 
Saakashvili government between 2004 and 2008.  
 
6.2.1 Domestic political developments: power struggles under the Saakashvili 
government 
 
The so-called Rose Revolution ushered in Saakashvili and a few other young and 
liberal political elites into power. Following the Rose Revolution, the Saakashvili 
won the presidential election with an overwhelming majority with 96 per cent of 
the vote in January 2004 (OSCE/ODIHR, 2004). Saakashvili formed the 
government consisting of young, pro-reform politicians and civil society leaders.92 
This made a sharp contrast with his predecessor’s government which was 
dominated by the former Soviet nomenklatura.  
 
Saakashvili and his administration put their priority in reforming and modernising 
the state administration to remove corruption from the state institutions. To initiate 
                                                          
92 Upon elected the president, Saakashvili appointed another reformist leader, Zhvania, the Prime 
Minister. Zhvania’s time as the Prime Minister, however, ended with his sudden death in February 2005. 
Zhvania’s death left Saakashvili to become the most prominent leader in the reformist block. 
Saakashvili’s political dominance lasted until other political leaders, namely Irakri Okruashvili, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs and then the Minister of Defence, emerged as a prominent figure in late 2005. 
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the reform, Saakashvili established a Civil Service Council and an office of the 
State Minister for Reform Coordination in 2004 (Jones, 2015, p. 166). A large 
number of civil servants were accused of corruption and removed from their 
positions. The MIA, once the power base of Shevardnadze and notorious for its 
corruption, was particularly affected: the MIA investigators and 211 policemen 
were charged of corruption (Jones, 2015, p. 166). 
 
There were only two years that Georgia enjoyed political stability during this 
period. In 2006, Georgia experienced had another political crisis and mass 
demonstrations. The Saakashvili government implemented an anti-corruption 
campaign, including the massive lay-off of allegedly corrupt officials, especially of 
the Traffic Police, and the abolishment of the MSS, that were the stronghold of 
the former Soviet nomenklatura and notorious for corruption. Popular support for 
the Saakashvili government started to wane, as the general public, which held a 
high if not unrealistic expectation had become increasingly frustrated by the pace 
of the reform efforts. Their resentment against the Saakashvili government 
escalated further when Irakli Okruashvili, the former Ministers of Internal Affairs 
and Defence and Saakashvili’s close ally, was arrested after he openly criticised 
Saakashvili by accusing him and his government of corruption.93 
 
The anti-Saakashvili movement started to accumulate a momentum and eventual 
grew to become a political crisis. Large-scale anti-Saakashvili demonstrations 
started to take place on 1 November 2006. A large number of demonstrators, 
estimated between 50,000 and 70,000, gathered in central Tbilisi (International 
Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 3). After having failed to reach an agreement with the 
opposition, the Saakashvili government had the police disperse the protestors on 
7 November. Later the day, Riot police were deployed, followed by a military unit, 
to disperse the crowd. Through the operation, the number of violent acts by the 
police and other law enforcement bodies were witnessed and reported 
(International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 4). In that evening, the government 
declared the state of emergency and the public broadcasts were suspended. 
Saakashvili called for a presidential election in January 2008, which Saakashvili 
                                                          
93 Okruashvili had resigned from the Saakashvili government in late 2006. Having parted from 
Saakashvili, Okruashvili had become a popular political leader rivaling Saakashvili. Okruashvili also 
claimed that Saakashvili ordered an assassination of a prominent business figure, Badri Patakatsishvili 
(International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 2). 
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won. Saakashvili was re-elected the president on 5 January 2008 (International 
Crisis Group, 2007a, pp. 7–8). 
 
6.2.2 Deteriorating relations with Russia 
 
Since Saakashvili became the president for the first time in 2004, the bilateral 
relationship between Georgia and Russia became intense. Although the relations 
between the two countries had never been an amicable one since Georgia’s 
independence, the bilateral relations sharply deteriorated since the arrival of 
Saakashvili as the president. In May 2004, Georgia launched an anti-smuggling 
operation in the conflict-affected South Ossetia. It was believed that Okruashvili, 
the then Minister of Internal Affairs led the campaign. In addition, Saakashvili and 
his allies also employed antagonistic discourses against Russia, which was 
believed to damage the relations with Vladimir Putin even at a personal level 
beyond repair (International Crisis Group, 2007a, pp. 7–8).  
 
Throughout 2006 and 2007, Georgia and Russia had a series of offensive 
retaliations. Since the end of 2005, Russia had put pressure on Georgia 
economically. In late 2005, Russia’s state owned gas company, Gazprom, raised 
the gas price from $62.5 to $110 per 1,000 cubic meters (International Crisis 
Group, 2007a, p. 8). In January 2006, two gas pipelines were destroyed by 
explosion in Russia’s North Ossetian Republic, which resulted in a suspension of 
gas supply to Georgia (Civil Georgia, 2006a). Around the same time, Russia 
prohibited the import of wine, brandy and mineral water, all of which are important 
export products for Georgia.94 Furthermore, Russia closed the only transportation 
channel in July 2006. Following the ‘economic embargo’ (Civil Georgia, 2006b), 
Georgia arrested four Russian officers for a spy charge and expelled them from 
Georgia in September 2006. In return, Russia recalled its ambassador and more 
than 2,300 Georgians were expelled from Russia (Human Rights Watch, 
2007b).95 Russia blocked the only transportation channel between Georgia and 
Russia on October 2006.  
 
                                                          
94 Prior to the bans, Russia banned agricultural imports from Georgia in December 2005.  
95 In Russia, ethnic Georgians and Georgian nationals were harassed. Russia stopped issuing visas to 
Georgians, too.  
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In 2007, the confrontation between the country countries transformed to more 
direct and violent, especially over the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
In summer 2008, a war finally broke out between Georgian and Russia over 
South Ossetia. 
 
6.2.3 Disputes over territories: Adjara, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
 
For the Saakashvili government, the restoration of territorial integrity of the 
Georgian state was his first priority (German, 2006, p. 8). This aspiration was met 
with a mixed result, i.e., a success in Adjara and de facto loss of territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
 
In the Autonomous Region of Adjara, Abashidze had had immunity under the 
Shevardnadze government and controlled in both political and economic senses. 
When Shevardnadze was ousted by the Rose Revolution, Abashidze refused to 
recognise the new authority of Tbilisi and Saakashvili as the President of Georgia. 
Declaring a state of emergency, Abashidze and his forces96 took a defiant stance 
and burned down bridges between Adjara and the rest of Georgia, to which Tbilisi 
reacted firmly.97 Having met large scale demonstrations calling for the resignation 
of Abashidze in Batumi, the capital of Adjara, Abashidze finally resigned in May 
2004 and fled to Russia. His post was abolished by Saakashvili. Having ousted 
Abashidze, a new legislation that have the President of Georgia appoint the head 
of the Adjaran government was passed. Subsequently, a Saakashvili ally, Levan 
Varshalomidze, was appointed chairperson of the regional council of ministers. 
Adjara had become under the control of Tbilisi within the first year of the 
Saakashvili regime.98  
 
The success of Adjara was not replicated in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Following the successful integration of Adjara, the Saakashvili government 
offered autonomy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In South Ossetia, the offer was 
                                                          
96 Georgia’s 25th Moto-Rifle Brigade based in Batumi mutinied and pledged support to Abashidze. In 
addition, Abashidze had Adjara’s internal minister’s battalion (356 men) and a special force, well trained 
by a retired Russian general, directly under his control (International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 7).    
97 Saakashivili ordered Abashidze to disarm his forces or face removal (BBC, n.d.). 
98 Abashidze was later sentenced to prison for a charge of misuse of office and embezzlement of GEL 
98.2 million state funds (Civil Georgia, 2007). 
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met with a rejection by a referendum in 2006. Since then, the relation between 
Tbilisi and Tskhinvali further deteriorated. In parallel, the situation in Abkhazia 
intensified. In March 2007, the Upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, the only territory 
under the control of Georgia, was shelled. In July, Georgia launched an operation 
in the Kodori Gorge to arrest an Abkhazian militia leader Emzar Kvitsiani 
(International Crisis Group, 2007b). In August, a military aircraft launched a 
missile onto Georgian territory near South Ossetia(International Crisis Group, 
2007a, p. 9). Georgia claimed Russia’s involvement in the incident, which Russia 
dismissed (RFE/RL, 2007a). The tension between Georgia and Russia further 
amounted, when a Georgian drone was shot down over the Abkhazia territory in 
April 2008. Following the incident, Georgia sent its troops to Abkhazia.  
 
The tension between Georgia and Russia over the two separatist regions reached 
its peak in August 2008. In early summer in 2008, sporadic violent clashes had 
taken a place between the Georgian and South Ossetian armed groups. After a 
series of violent clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces, Georgia 
launched a bombardment and ground attack on 7 August 2008. Russia countered 
the attack by sending thousands of troops into South Ossetia.99 The five-day 
Russo-Georgian War left a few hundred deaths on both the sides. (International 
Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3) According to a report, 30,000 ethnic Ossetians fled 
from South to North Ossetia.100  85,000 ethnic Georgians were displaced: 15,000 
from South Ossetia and 30,000 from Abkhazia (International Crisis Group, 2008a, 
p. 3). During the war in South Ossetia, Russian armed forces moved through the 
Abkhazian territory.101 The Abkhazian armed forces took a control of the Kodori 
Gorge that had been under the control of Georgia. After the war ended, Russia 
formally recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. After the 
Russo-Georgian War, the two separatist territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
became under the de facto control of Russia, and deepened their dependence 
on Russia, militarily, politically and economically. 
 
                                                          
99 More than 20,000 troops were reportedly crossed the border from Russia into South Ossetia, as well as 
to Abkhazia (International Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3).  
100 The displaced figures were provided by a UNHCR official to International Crisis Group (International 
Crisis Group, 2008a, p. 3).  
101 Moscow moved its troops, amounted up to 400, into Abkhazia. The justification was to rehabilitate 
between Sukhumi and Ochamchira (International Crisis Group, 2008b, p. 3).  
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As this section illustrates, post Rose Revolution Georgia did not enjoy political 
stability for too long. Domestically, the young, ambitious liberal democrat 
politicians were met with a large scale of demonstrations, which required the 
president declare a state of emergency. The bilateral relation with Russia became 
damaged through a number of antagonistic incidents involving both de facto 
economic sanction and violent clashes, and finally the 2008 War. The reform of 
the security sector institutions took place in this volatile political environment. The 
next section examines in detail on the developments in the security sector change 
during this period.  
 
6.3 Security sector change in Georgia between 2004 and 2008 
 
Georgia under Saakashvili saw a significant progress in the development and 
reform of its security sector actors. The result of the SSR between 2003 and 2008 
is a mixed one. The Saakashvili government implemented various SSR efforts. 
The main approach to the reform efforts can be characterised as 
‘Europeanisation’ of its security sector apparatus, by bringing their compatibilities 
with NATO and the EU. Through the reform efforts, the so-called ‘power 
ministries’, i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security underwent 
drastic changes. This led to the eradication of the post-Soviet nomenklatura in 
those ministries, which was one of the political agendas of the new government 
under Saakashvili. On the other hand, they were occasionally mobilised to 
supress some political movements whilst the security sector actors were 
“democratised” and fully “modernised”. The degree of civilian control remained 
questionable, as some civilian state figures overran it and participated in a violent 
confrontation with South Ossetian forces. This section provides a detailed 
analysis on the SSR efforts that took place under the Saakashvili government in 
each of the following security sector spheres: defence, internal affairs and justice. 
In particular, the section examines the process of the re-shuffling of paramilitary 
forces among defence and law enforcement institutions. The section then 
scrutinises the degree and nature of civil control of those armed forces under the 
Saakashvili government.  
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6.3.1 Defence reform: aligning with NATO standards 
 
Georgia saw a significant progress in the defence reform under the Saakashvili 
government. His predecessor, the president Shevardnadze declared the intention 
to join NATO in 2002. Efforts to upgrade the defence sphere in terms of defence 
institutions, equipment and capacities accelerated under the Saakashvili 
government and more detailed, concrete action plans were lied out. This includes 
the agreement of an IPAP between Georgia and NATO in 2004.102  Subsequently, 
defence reform activities were carried out in accordance with the strategy and 
operational action plan set up by the IPAP.  
 
As the previous chapter discuss, the process of professionalising the defence 
institutions had already begun during the Shevardnadze period, and Georgia had 
received external advice from a group of experts from NATO ally countries. Under 
the Saakashvili government, the progress was further made in professionalising 
and modernising the defence institutions, both at conceptual and operational 
levels. These efforts were implemented in accordance with NATO standards. 
 
The concept of security and defence was re-examined and revised under the 
Saakashvili government by consulting a wide circle of experts, academia and civil 
society actors. A new National Security Concept was developed and adopted in 
2005. The National Security Concept specifies its national strategic interests such 
as restoration of territorial integrity (Darchiashvili, 2008). The content reflected 
recommendations provided by the international experts such as the ISAB since 
the late 1990. Additionally, the process of the document development involved a 
consultation with civil society representatives and academia to incorporate their 
perspectives. The National Security Concept employed a wider and inclusive 
security concept which includes non-direct security threats such as organised 
crimes and corruption. Given a consideration to the multi-ethnic nature of the 
society, the document adopted the word ‘people of Georgia’ instead of ‘Georgian 
people’. The Saakashvili government thus clarified security concept and strategic 
priorities in both domestic and foreign policies. 
                                                          
102 Georgia signed the IPAP on 29 October 2004. Georgia is the first country that signed the IPAP (NATO, 
n.d.).  
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The people-centred security concept was, however, slightly shifted as the 
territorial tensions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased. In 2006, the 
National Security Concept was amended in 2006. The amended National 
Security Concept placed an emphasis on the need for preparing for unconditional 
and total defence. The amendment tasked the National Guard with training 
reservists to become able to engage in defence operations (Darchiashvili, 2008, 
p. 27). The amendment of the National Security Concept departed from its initial, 
inclusive scope and narrowed its focus on traditional, defence-centred security 
approach. 
 
The civilian control mechanism for armed forces in Georgia saw a certain degree 
of advancement under the Saakashvili government, making the civilian control 
system more aligned with the US counterpart. Yet, the degree of the actual 
implementation of the civilian control was questionable. The main issue is the 
provision of more power to the President in terms of the approval for deploying 
armed forces. The 2004 Constitutional amendment made it possible for the 
President to dispatch armed forces without seeking for a parliamentary approval 
prior to dispatching armed forces. Instead, the 2004 amendment allowed the 
President to obtain an approval from the Parliament within 48 hours ex post, 
instead of prior to the dispatch.103 The question over the actual civilian control 
could be found at the operational level, too. The weak control of oversight over 
the paramilitary forces was particularly pressing when Okruashvili was the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence. Okruashvili, the then Minister of Internal 
Affairs, led an aggressive police operation in South Ossetia in 2004.104 In the 
following year, Okruashvili who by then had become the head of the defence 
ministry entered into conflict-affected areas in Abkhazia. Okruashvili, the then 
MoD, made a public statement that he went to Abkhazia with several soldiers.105 
Those two incidents illustrate that the principle of civilian control was violated by 
a civilian head of the security sector ministries himself. The fact that Okruashvili 
                                                          
103 The 2004 Constitutional amendment contradicts with the Law on Defence, which still requires a 
parliamentary approval prior to the dispatch of armed forces.  
104 In summer 2004, Okruashvili led an aggressive police operation against South Ossetia (International 
Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 2). 
105 The website of the Ministry of Defence confirmed his statement, and added that the Minister was 
accompanied only by his security guard (Anjaparidze, 2005). 
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remained in the defence minister’s office 106  suggests that the Saakashvili 
government did not take the violation of the civilian control principle as too serious 
an issue. Furthermore, the oversight of reservists was even more ambiguous, as 
there is no written specification as to whether the parliament should be informed 
of their deployment during a state of emergency (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 61). 
 
Georgia under Saakashvili continued to receive large scale foreign aid, 
particularly from NATO ally countries, for its defence system. Along with the 
NATO-aligned action plans, a number of efforts upgrading the defence system 
were implemented in the areas of organisational management including human 
resources107 and budget, along with the provision of training and equipment. 
Following the adaptation of the IPAP in 2004, Georgia received a range of 
assistance in defence sector management from the NATO ally countries. The 
Netherlands, for instance, supported Georgia in the defence-related planning and 
management through the “Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System/Financial Management System (PPBS/FMS)” (Transparency 
International Georgia, 2007, p. 3). The USA continued providing defence 
management training to the MoD personnel (Transparency International Georgia, 
2007, p. 3). 
 
The adaptation of the IPAP included an obligation to earmark no less than two 
percent of a national GDP (Transparency International Georgia, 2007, p. 1). As a 
result, the defence budget drastically increased. Between 2004 and 2005, 
Georgia’s defence budget increased by more than three times (Transparency 
International Georgia, 2007, p. 1). In 2007, allocating 3.2 percent of the total GDP, 
the defence budget amounted about 1.5 billion GEL (about 640 billion USD), 
whilst the 2006 defence budget was 6.5 billion GEL (about 2.8 million USD).  
 
One account states that the national defence spending rose from a few dozen 
million GEL in 2003 to over a billion laris in 2007. The large margin of the increase 
is partly due to the insignificant budget allocation to the defence sector during the 
Shevardnadze period. Nonetheless, the sharp increase in the defence budget in 
                                                          
106 Okruashvili remained as the defence minister until November 2006, when he became the Minister of 
Economy and Sustainable Development.  
107 The 2007 Law on Military Duty and Military Service refers to the Ministry of Defence forces of 
32,000 servicemen (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 30). 
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the short-period of time was quite a noticeable indication of the Saakashvili 
government’s commitment to the integration with NATO.  
 
NATO member countries, namely US, provided combat training for Georgian 
troops along with the defence management training. In 2005, training was 
conducted through the 18-month long Georgia Sustainment and Stability 
Operations Program (GSSOP) of 60.5 million USD.108 GSSOP’s objective was to 
train and equip more than 1,200 soldiers for the USA’s war on terror in Iraq 
through their Operation Iraqi Freedom stability missions. (“Georgia Sustainment 
and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP),” n.d.) GSSOP was designed to 
consolidate the progress made at its preceding programme, the Georgina Train 
and Equip Program (GTEP) of 2002-2004. Building on the GTEP, the 2005-2006 
GSSOP involved training and equipping the 11th Brigade, equipping two other 
infantry battalions, two logistics battalions and training some other separate 
companies of the 11th Brigade (“Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations 
Program (GSSOP),” n.d.).  
 
Thus, the Georgia’s defence system had received foreign assistance in 
modernising its management system, building the defence management and 
combat capacity training under the Saakashvili government. Along with the 
government’s strategy to integrate into NATO, those assistance was provided to 
raise the NATO compatibility of the Georgian defence system. On the other hand, 
the Georgian troops were challenged to defend their own country. When the 
Russo-Georgia broke out in summer 2008, for instance, around 2,000 Georgian 
troops including the GSSOP trained personnel had been deployed in Iraq as part 
of the USA-led operation in Iraq (France24, 2008), leaving the home country less 
prepared for Russia’s attack. 
 
6.3.2 Reforming the MIA and abolishing the MSS 
 
The Saakashvili government set up the reform of the Ministries of Internal Affairs 
and State Security as the major political agenda under the campaign: “War 
                                                          
108 GSSOP was a two-phased programme: GSSOP-I took place between 2005 and 2006, followed by 
GSSOP-II carried out between 2006 and 2007.  
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against Corruption”. Under the strong political direction, the Georgian law 
enforcement organs underwent massive structural and organisational changes 
for the first time since the independence. As a result, the MIA was hugely 
downsized and the MSS was abolished in 2004, leaving some departments 
integrated into the MIA and the Presidential unit. The Justice Ministry was 
separated from the MIA, making the justice became independent of the executive 
power.  
 
Reform initiatives began as soon as Saakashvili held the power in the office. In 
January 2004, the Saakashvili government outlined goals for the reform of the 
MIA. Those goals were: 
 
 reorganisation of the Ministry into the body responsible for the internal 
policy of the country, with duties including the execution and coordination 
of police activities;  
 professionalisation of the police force to make it completely non-political, 
including the bolstering of public confidence in the police by increasing 
its effectiveness in fighting crime, ensuring civilian security, and 
combating the system’s existing corruption;  
 creation of appropriate work conditions, suitable remuneration, and job 
stability for the employees of the Ministry system and protection against 
the hiring of unqualified persons; and 
 gradual execution of the reform process, ensuring that the necessary 
material, technical, and human resources are determined and their 
sources defined before components of the reform are implemented 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2004). 
 
These goals clearly indicated the new government’s intention to remove the 
Soviet legacy in the security sector and to eliminate the political influence of the 
two ministries. 
 
Subsequently, in the relatively short period of time between January and 
December 2004, the ministries underwent an organisational change. One of the 
major efforts was made in downsizing the size of the MIA. In July 2004, several 
departments such as the Transport Police Department, the Main Administrative 
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Board of Traffic Police, the Main Administrative Board of Protection of Public 
Order, and the Main Administrative Board of Ecology Police were abolished.109 
Some organs were transferred to other ministries.110 For instance, the Internal 
Troops were transferred to the MoD, and the National Bureau of Passport-Visa 
and Citizens Registration was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Consequently, 
the number of the employees of the Ministry was reduced from 53,691 to 
22,229.111 Before the restructuring of the MIA, there was one police officer per 89 
citizens. In 2005, the ratio became one police officer per 214 citizens. The large 
scale lay-off contributed to the increase of the average wage for the MIA 
personnel raised from 80-90 GEL (around 45-51 USD) to 350-500 GEL (around 
200-286 USD). (Krunic and Siradze, 2005, p. 55) The salary increase was 
expected to curtail corruption with the MIA as it may motivate the police officers 
that were notorious for bribe-taking largely because of the low salaries during the 
Shevardnadze period.  
 
The second effort was to replace the Traffic Police, most notorious and unpopular 
among the general public for their corruption, with a new Patrol Police. The laying-
off of the police officers, in particular of traffic police officers and the establishment 
of the new Patrol Police were regarded as the best policies carried out by the new 
Government. (International Herald Tribune, 2004) The Main Administrative Board 
of the Highway Patrol Police was established in August 2004 to replace the Traffic 
Police. Since October 2004, a new Police 022 telephone central dispatch system 
(24/7) were installed in Tbilisi. A media campaign was conducted in order to raise 
the positive image of the police. For instance, a TV programme broadcasted their 
activities on a daily basis, campaigning to eradicate the negative image of the old 
traffic police and the police in general. 
 
The most significant reform in the law and enforcement sphere during this period 
is the abolishment of the MSS, the most influential ‘power ministries’ during the 
Soviet period. In December 2004, the Minister of State Security, the former 
                                                          
109 These organs include: the Transport Police Department; the Main Administrative Board of Traffic 
Police; the Main Administrative Board of Protection of Public Order; and the Main Administrative Board 
of Ecology Police. 
110 In November, the Internal Troops were transferred to the Ministry of Defence. The National Bureau of 
Passport-Visa and Citizens Registration was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. 
111 There are approximately 12,000 Protection Police employees. But they are not covered by the State 
budget (Krunic and Siradze, 2005, p. 55). 
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Georgian KGB, was integrated into the MIA. Many of the functions of the MSS, 
including Security Service, were abolished and the border guards department 
became integrated into the MIA. The Department of Intelligence in charge of 
foreign intelligence gathering came directly under the control of the President. 
The biggest stronghold of the legacy of the Soviet nomenklatura was thus washed 
out the slate by the Saakashvili government, at least in terms of a state institution.  
 
6.3.3 Reforming the justice sector 
 
Saakashvili had been an active driver of the judicial reform since he was the 
Minister for Justice under the Shevardnadze administration. In 2000, the Ministry 
of Justice became independent of the MIA. The reform efforts in the justice sphere 
continued after Saakashvili became the President. Salaries for court officials were 
raised and detainees’ rights were strengthened (Jones, 2015, p. 170).  
 
The justice reform received support from the EU. In 2004, the EU set out a 
strategy for the criminal justice legislation. The EU Rule of Law mission, so-called 
EUJUST THEMIS, operative between 2004 and 2005, assisted Georgia in 
developing a strategy for criminal legislation reform in the context of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Union, 2005). A high-level 
working group was set up and developed a strategy for reforming Georgian 
criminal legislation and submitted to the Government of Georgia in 2005. As an 
outcome, the National Strategy for Criminal Justice Reform was drafted after a 
consultation with various stakeholders. In 2005, the President Saakashvili 
adopted the National Strategy by decree and noted that the National Strategy 
would be part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan and that 
the implementation of it would be his government’s top priorities. 
 
The actual commitment from the Georgian during the drafting process side was 
rather bleak, however. A high-level working group was established and headed 
by the Minister of Justice: its members included a number of respective actors 
such as the Secretary of National Security Council, the Secretary of the High 
Council of Justice, the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Supreme Court, 
the General Prosecutor, the Public Defender and a representative of the Liberty 
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Institute, an influential civil society organisation close to Saakashvili himself 
(European Union, 2005). The working group failed to meet frequent enough and 
provide inputs to finalise the draft strategy. At the end, EUJUST THEMIS drafted 
the strategy then incorporated a contribution from the Georgian side (Kurowska, 
2009, p. 206). 
 
Besides the lack of actual commitment from the Georgian counterpart, EUJUST 
THEMIS had hurdles for implementation at strategic and operational levels. 
Some critiques note such as ambitious strategic goals, inter-personal conflicts 
among high-level EU officials and complex bureaucratic administrative 
procedures which led to the delay in disbursement of financial resources. (Helly, 
2009; Kurowska, 2009) One report refers to financial and procurement delays 
resulted in a lack of basic equipment such as computers for the first three months 
(Kurowska, 2009, p. 205).  
 
Another reason that can be attributed to the poorly managed implementation 
process is its pilot nature. In the early 2000‘s, the EU was yet to develop a 
assistance approach to the issue of rule of law. In the context, the EU regarded 
the EUJUST THEMIS as “an opportunity to test civilian crisis management 
capabilities in the field of rule of law, in a relatively stable area with a small-scale 
mission” (Helly, 2009, p. 91). The EUJUST THEMIS was “a first ever ESDP 
operation in the Former Soviet Union, therefore, “it was also a test for EU relations 
with Russia” (Helly, 2009, p. 91). In other words, Georgia’s judicial system 
received external assistance that was more of an experiment. 
 
6.3.4 Reforming paramilitaries: from defence to law enforcement, and back 
 
A major achievement of the Saakashvili government in the field of paramilitary 
reform is the abolishment of the defiant, quasi-state paramilitary forces under a 
local tycoon in Adjara, Abashidze. The rest of the paramilitaries were targeted for 
the restructuring along with the ISAB recommendations. Paramilitary reform 
during the Saakashvili period thus saw a significant progress in a sense that they 
became a reform target unlike during the Shevardnadze period. On the other 
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hand, the issue of their affiliation, unclear demarcation of roles remained 
unsolved.  
 
During the Shevardnadze period, most of the paramilitary forces except a few in 
the separatist regions came under state subordination (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2004). According to Military Balance 2004/2005, there were 
overall 11,700 paramilitaries, out of which 6,300 paramilitaries were the Interior 
Troops, 5,400 were border guards (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2004). The Saakashvili government abolished quasi-state paramilitary forces in 
Adjara. In May 2004, Tbilisi sent special troops to Adjara, a Turkish dominant 
territory under the long-term control of Abashidze, to bring the de facto semi-
autonomous region under Tbilisi’s control. During the event, the Adjara’s 
paramilitary forces became dissolved and disarmed.  
 
One of the recommendations that the Western security and defence experts such 
as the ISAB had insisted since the late 1990 was the separation of the defence 
forces from other security forces. Following the recommendation, some of the 
MIA’ troops including Internal Troops and all their heavy weaponry were 
transferred to the MoD since Saakashvili came to power in 2004.  
 
Despite the major transfer of the Internal Troops from the MIA to the MoD, a 
number of other paramilitary forces remained under the MIA and other non-
defence ministries and state agencies. For instance, the Law on Weapons lists 
state agencies with units carrying military weapons. According to the Law, those 
agencies include the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and Justice; the 
Foreign Intelligence Service; the Ministry of Finance’s social sub-agencies and 
the Special Service of State Guard (SSSG) (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 36).  
 
The departure of the Internal Troops to the MoD still left the MIA with several 
paramilitary units. Two paramilitary units affiliated to the MSS were transferred to 
the MIA when the MSS was abolished in 2004. Those paramilitary units were the 
special purpose unit named after General G. Gulua and the State Department of 
the State Border Defence (SDBD).112  The special purpose unit was directly 
                                                          
112 The MIA also had a contingent to protect its building, and the contingent consisted of conscripts.  
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subordinated under the MIA. The Unit was responsible for anti-terrorist operations 
and arresting dangerous criminals and had 155 troops. The Unit had four combat 
groups: Alfa, Bravo, Charlie, and Omega. Delta group was a supporting unit with 
sharp-shooters, communications and medical unit. There was also a new unit 
called Legion which was under creation. The new unit was reported to be a 
gendarmerie unit.113 The SBPD came under the control of the MIA in February 
2004, in order to harmonise with EU standards.114 The SDBD consisted of 6,700 
personnel, 40% of which was conscripts and 3% contractors, mostly from the 
Rapid Reaction Unit.115 In 2006, the SDBD was reorganised from a paramilitary 
unit into a law-enforcement body: the Border Police. (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
2014) In 2006, amendments to The Law On Defence gave a mandate to function 
as a military force to the Border Police, which was initially established as a law 
enforcement body. The demarcation of law enforcement and defence forces 
became therefore even more blurred. 
 
The most controversial and less transparent state paramilitary force was the one 
under the MSS. When its predecessor, the National Security Ministry was 
reorganised into the MSS and the State Intelligence Department, the armed units 
of the MSS was planned to transfer to the MIA. Later on, President Saakashvili 
abolished the MSS. 
 
The Saakashvili government thus paid efforts to cluster its paramilitary forces 
along with the Western standards. The paramilitary reform process, however, was 
a controversial issue: the lack of clear demarcation between paramilitaries 
belongs to the defence and law enforcement bodies. As further elaborated in 
chapter 8, the issue of the blurred demarcation among different state 
paramilitaries had persisted since the Shevardnadze period, and remained 
unsolved.  
 
 
                                                          
113 The Unit underwent the anti-terrorist training by US between March and June in 2002. 
114 Under the Shevardnadze government, the SBDP had been an independent agency for eight years. The 
SDBD was combined law enforcement and military service, and obliged to obey different military acts, 
during the Shevardnadze period, however, they had not been dispatched to armed conflicts. Instead, they 
were in charge of protecting the state border through patrolling and border-control. 
115 Since 1998, various technical assistances had been provided to the SDBD by Germany, Russia, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the US. 
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Table 5 Major security agencies during the Saakashvili period, 2004 – 2008 
 
Non-state Quasi-state State 
(Mostly 
disbanded/dissolved) 
 Ajara paramilitary forces 
(abolished in 2004) 
 Border Police (transferred from 
MSS to MIA in 2004) 
 Internal Troops (transferred 
from MIA to MoD in 2004) 
 Ministry of Defence 
 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 Ministry of State Security 
(abolished in 2004) 
 National Guards (renamed the 
4th Infantry Brigade, MoD, in 
2004) 
 National Security Council 
 Special Service of State 
Protection 
 
Figure 2 State paramilitaries and their affiliation under the Saakashvili 
period, 2004 - 2008 
 
* The State Department of Border Defence was created in 1994 by being separated from the 
Ministry of Defence. Under the state department, the Boast Guard Service was created in 1998, 
followed by the creation of the Border Aviation Service in 1999. The state department was 
absorbed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2004 and became the Border Police in 2006.  
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6.4 Examining driving factors for security sector change between 2004 and 
2008 
 
As examined in the previous section, the security sector institutions and 
governance system experienced substantial changes between 2003 and 2008. 
The Saakashvili government implemented a number of reform efforts in the 
defence and law enforcement spheres, with an explicit intention to transform the 
defence and law enforcement institutions NATO- and/or the EU-compatible. On 
the other hand, despite the recommendations by external experts such as the 
ISAB members, a lack of clarity in the demarcation among defence and law 
enforcement paramilitaries remained. Furthermore, the actual civilian control over 
armed forces seemed to have become obscure. This section applies the same 
analytical framework applied in chapters 3 and 4 and provides a detailed analysis 
on what factors drove security sector change this way.  
 
6.4.1 Structural diagnosis 
 
6.4.1.1 Political dimension 
 
Since Saakashvili took power, Georgia’s pro-liberal, pro-democratic and pro-
reform political orientation became very much explicit, both in domestic politics 
and external relations.  
 
Prior to the so-called ‘Rose Revolution’, Saakashvili and his political allies had 
garnered popular support through their anti-corruption stance and discourses. 
Their stance towards corruption and allegedly corruption officials became even 
more aggressive when Saakashvili was elected the President. The issue of 
corruption was a political issue, rather than a mere issue of transparency and 
accountability of state institutions, as it implied the purge of officials associated 
with corruption who were mostly pro-Russia, former Soviet nomenklaturas. The 
Saakashvili government pledged a number of reforms to eradicate corruption. 
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The reform efforts in the law enforcement institutions such as the abolishment of 
the Traffic Police and the MSS, took place in this context.116 
 
External relations under the Saakashvili period, Georgia’s orientation towards its 
foreign policy also made a sharp contrast with the Shevardnadze government. 
Saakashvili’s predecessor, Shevardnadze, had declared Georgia’s intention to 
join the Euro-Atlantic partnership, however, his government maintained a 
balanced diplomacy between Russia and the Western allies. When Saakashvili 
replaced Shevardnadze, the Georgian government expressed its intention to join 
NATO and the EU more explicitly, adopted a pro-US foreign policy orientation. 
Consequently, the relations with Russia had become sore, and finally reached to 
the point of engaging in a war, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
On the other hand, the relations with the USA became much closer than in the 
Shevardnadze period. Since the independence of Georgia, the USA had provided 
Georgia with large-scale assistance in the areas of defence, economy, 
humanitarian and governance. Since the 9.11 attacks on the USA in 2001, the 
strategic importance of Georgia for the USA increased further. The USA 
demonstrated it through the visit of the President George W. Bush in May 2005, 
which was received vehemently by Georgian crowds (RFL/RL, 2005). This was 
the first visit by the US President to Georgia, which Saakashvili referred to as a 
“great political victory” (EurasiaNet, 2005). The close Georgia-US relations were 
reflected in the increase of the defence assistance provided by the USA through 
GTEP and GSSOP, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
6.4.1.2 Socio-economic dimension 
 
Organised crimes and corruption 
 
A sharp contrast can be found between the political stances towards corruption 
and organised crimes between Saakashvili and his predecessor, Shevardnadze. 
The state’s dependency on prominent thieves-in-law such as Tariel Oniani 
                                                          
116 Yet, the slow pace in the implementation gradually accumulated popular frustration. The Saakashvili’s 
reformist government itself became criticized by his former political ally and now rival, Irakri 
Okruashvili, for corruption. 
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peaked in around 2003. By the end of the Shevardnadze regime, “professional 
criminality had matured as an alternative power centre and represented a 
substantial challenge to the political elites” (Kupatadze, p.127). While 
Shevardnadze generated his political influence by overlooking corruption in the 
state system and mutual beneficiary relations with thieves-in-law, Saakashvili 
regarded the eradication of corruption and organised crimes as a major goal 
under his administration. The issue of corruption and organised crimes thus 
significantly influenced the Georgian politics and the agenda-setting of the reform 
of security sector institutions, particularly the police and the MSS. From the onset 
of his presidency, Saakashvili expressed his government’s commitment to an 
anti-corruption and anti-mafia campaign. At his inauguration speech, Saakashvili 
stated: “We have to eradicate corruption. At the current stage each corrupted 
official is a traitor to state interests in my opinion. We will root out the corruption 
and change the system that gave birth to the malignant circle of corruption” (Civil 
Georgia, 2004a). 
 
The Saakashvili administration introduced an anti-mafia legislation and curtailed 
the influence of thieves-in-law and organised crimes in Georgia significantly. A 
new legislation adopted in 2005 made “being a thieves-in-law a criminal act” 
(Kupatadze, pp.126-127). During the year 2015 alone, the police in Tbilisi 
detained nine thieves-in-law and 37 criminal authorities (ibid., p.127). 
 
The informal economic activities and corruption remained a major part of 
Georgia’s actual economy, despite the Saakashvili government’s political 
statement to eradicate corruption. In the regions bordering with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey, illegal economic activities such as smuggling 
were highly noticeable, so were the involvement of some local authorities and 
security sector actors. As illustrated in one report, smuggling was rampant over 
the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan (Koyama, 2005, p. 23). At a focus group 
interview meeting, a local community member in Marneuli in Kvemo Kartli, 
expresses the actual scale of smuggling across the borders with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan by saying: “Frankly speaking, the real frontier we have is only with 
Turkey.”117 Other local participants in Marneuli pointed to an increase in the price 
                                                          
117 Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. 
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of the bribes which need to be paid by smugglers. According to a female Azeri 
participant, the bribe increased approximately from 30 GEL to 100 GEL between 
2004 and 2005. 
 
Corruption and organised crimes were not only of an economic but also a political 
issue. The Saakashvili government used the issue of corruption as the main 
justification for the drastic reform of the police and the MSS. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, the MIA was significantly downsized after the dismissal of so-
called corrupt officials. The aim of the reform was the eradication of corruption, 
but more importantly the removal of the former Soviet nomenklaruta and so-called 
‘thieves-in-law’ and their political influence from the security sector institutions.  
 
The issue of corruption became further politicised, as the rivalry among political 
elites including Saakashvili and Okruashvili became intensified. By 2007, some 
of the alleged corruption cases involved cabinet members, 118  including 
Saakashvili and Okruashvili. Okruashvili, for instance, accused the President of 
“liquidation” of certain individuals, without providing any details. As discussed in 
this chapter earlier, the accusation led to a series of mass demonstrations against 
Saakashvili, then the declaration of a state of emergency later the year.   
 
Georgian-centric nationalism 
 
Georgian-centric policy discourses and implementation were observed under the 
Saakashvili government, unlike during the times under Shevardnadze. 
Shevardnadze’s government introduced a number of policies embracing the 
multi-ethnic nature of Georgia. For instance, the law on citizenship had no 
requirements such as a citizen’s ethnicity and the knowledge of the Georgian 
language (Jones, 2015, p. 224).  
 
On the other hand, Saakashvili reintroduced an ethnic Georgian centric stance in 
his political speeches and claimed for a need for “taking Georgian back” (Jones, 
2015, p. 225). As discussed earlier, the new National Security Concept adopted 
                                                          
118 One report mentioned that “the winner in every public procurement tender exceeding USD 50,000 is 
pre-determined from above (Kupatadze, 2010, p. 108). The report mentions a person receiving a call from 
a close relative of President Saakashvili recommending a certain company to win a public tender, too 
(Kupatadze, 2010, p. 108). 
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the word ‘people of Georgia’ instead of ‘Georgian people’, to place an emphasis 
on the multi-ethnic composition of the country. In parallel, however, the 
Saakashvili government adopted a policy allowing only Georgian to be an official 
state and working language in 2004.119  
 
This introduction of the official language policy brought negative consequences 
to non-Georgian ethnic minorities and their relationship with the state security 
institutions. According to one report (Koyama, 2005, p. 19), male ethnic-Azeri 
community members in Marneuli claimed that the Georgian language 
requirement for the state officials had reduced the number of Azeri police officers. 
According to them, although there was no official regulation to discharge non-
Georgian speaking personnel, Azeri officers felt pressure to leave their office if 
they did not have enough competencies in the Georgian language. Consequently, 
they felt the police reform had led to an under-representation of non-Georgians 
in the police force (Koyama, 2005, p. 27). The decreased number of ethnic Azeri 
in the state structure widened the distance between the Azeri community and the 
police. The increasing mistrust of the police drove ethnic Azeris to call for their 
own community network to settle conflicts and resolve problems, rather than 
reporting to the police. One ethnic-Azeri community member said: “A person who 
does not speak Georgian is actually unprotected” (Koyama, 2005, p. 20).  
 
The state language policy was not accompanied with the government’s support 
for non-Georgian speaking ethnic minorities to obtain the Georgian language 
skills. In Marneuli, an area dominantly inhabited by ethnic Azeris, schools were 
not equipped with Georgian speaking teachers and manuals in Georgian.120 
 
Public perception on the security sector actors 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Saakashvili government had an urgent 
need to reform the security sector, especially the police. Their notorious 
                                                          
119 The 1995 Constitution defined Georgian as the state language. The Chapter of Regional Language had 
not been adopted as of May 2005.  
120 One middle-aged Azeri man put his frustration against Tbilisi bitterly: “Azeris living in Kakheti, 
Tbilisi and Kapsi speak Georgian perfectly. The government must elaborate a special programme for us. 
Not that one for show, but a real one, which will give us an opportunity to learn the language. They say 
they will many times, but so far we see no results. All these seem like an empty promise. I think the 
government does not want us to speak Georgian.” Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli.  
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reputation for corruption, within the Traffic Police, had become a symbol figure of 
the Shevardnadze government, representing the image of corrupt Soviet legacy. 
For instance, people in Zugdidi regarded the police rather as a threat to their 
security. One male community member said: “People have to defend themselves 
against the police.”121  Reporting to the police was often regarded pointless, 
because the police are prone to corruption.122 The reform of the police could 
make an illustrative example demonstrating the Saakashvili government’s liberal 
political orientation and the departure from the existing Soviet style political 
culture, represented by the previous regime. 
 
However, despite the massive campaign to improve the image of the police by 
the Saakashvili Government, confidence in security sector institutions remained 
low, especially in regions far from Tbilisi where no apparent police reform 
activities could be seen. People did not believe that the police were able to 
investigate a case professionally.123 It also appears that the change in the state 
language policy mentioned above left a negative impact on the perception on the 
state agencies among the non-Georgian citizens. Both the minority groups in 
Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli expressed that the state agencies were for the benefits 
of ethnic Georgians and not for their own ethnic groups.124 
 
6.4.1.3 Institutional dimension 
 
The legislature was dominated by the ruling party, the United National Movement-
Democrats party led by Saakashvili. Furthermore, by the constitutional changes 
in February 2004, parliament lost the right to dismiss the prime minister in a no-
confidence vote (Civil Georgia, 2004b). According to one report, the degree of the 
independence of the legislature was quite weak (International Crisis Group, 
                                                          
121 Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
122 A local resident in Zugdidi told: “I was robbed in a café the other day. The shopkeeper saw everything. 
I asked him to help me to report to the police. But he said no. I asked him why not. He said, “Because it’s 
nonsense – the robber will pay the police and will be released anyway. As a result, you will just get an 
enemy.” Ibid.  
123 A middle-aged Georgian woman in Akhaltsikhe told: “Recently, there was a robbery. The police 
arrived late and the criminals had run away already. The police then suddenly arrested an innocent boy of 
18 years old, claiming that he was guilty. The whole community told them that he was not guilty and 
asked the police to discharge him. Even the victims of the robbery asked the police to release the boy, 
because they knew he was innocent. But the police ignored these claims and they still detained the boy.” 
Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe. 
124 Focus group interviews, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli. 
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2007a, p. 18). An independent parliamentarian reportedly said that the parliament 
acts primarily as Saakashvili’s “notary public” (International Crisis Group, 2007a, 
p. 18). The report also refers to a diplomat who pointed out that “the 
parliamentarians do not seem to feel mandated with a free voice, rather they act 
as civil servants of the ruling party” (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 18). Key 
parliament committees, including those relevant to the SSR, were dominated by 
the ruling party members. The defence committee, for instance, had both its chair 
and deputy from the United National Movement-Democrats.125  
 
As for the executive, with the overwhelming popular support, Saakashvili 
managed to consolidate and centralise power under the President, which his 
predecessor Shevardnadze did not achieve. Constitutional changes in February 
2004 gave the President power to dissolve parliament and call a new election 
(Civil Georgia, 2004b). With the legislature that was weak and under the strong 
influence of the President, the executive bodies had much more powerful 
positions in Georgia during the Saakashvili period. For instance, in 2004, a Prime 
Minister became the Head of the Government as well as the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Out of 14 ministries, the three “Power Ministries”, i.e., the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs, State Security and Defense became under primary supervision, whiles 
the other ministries were supervised by the Prime Minister. The National Security 
Council was largely inactive in an official sphere during the Shevardnadze period. 
However, since the death of Nugzar Sajaia in February 2002, the National 
Security Council had shifted to an institution with a stronger US tie. The 
transformation was well reflected in the appointment of Tedo Jafaridze, the former 
Ambassador to the USA, as the Secretary of the NSC.126 Concurrently, the USA 
offered assistance to the NSC to become “a more viable institution prior to the 
presidential election in 2005” (Chiaberashvili and Tevradze, 2005, p. 200). Since 
Saakashvili took power in 2003, the heads of the NSC have been pro-US figures 
(National Security Council of Georgia, n.d.). 
 
The justice reform during the Shevardnadze period brought a certain degree of 
independence of the justice system by separating it from the executive power. 
                                                          
125 Givi Targamadze as the chair, and Nika Rurua was the deputy (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 
19). 
126 Prior to the appointment, Jafaridze had been “closely involved in the discussions and planning of US 
military assistance to Georgia for counter-terrorism training” (EurasiaNet, 2002). 
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Saakashvili and his government were determined to remove corrupt judges. In 
2004, the president was given temporary constitutional power to dismiss and 
appoint judges (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 22).127  The president’s 
prerogative was removed when the government introduced another justice reform 
through constitutional amendments in 2007. By the 2007 reform, judges were no 
longer appointed or dismissed by the President (Simons, 2012, p. 279) 
(International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 22). The constitutional amendment made 
the justice system to be more independent of the President. The reason for the 
provision of the prerogative to the president between 2004 and 2007 was rather 
political. Despite the reform efforts, the degree of people’s confidence in the 
justice system remained low. One report points out that the prerogative made it 
“easy for the government to intimidate judges” (International Crisis Group, 2007a, 
p. 22). Similar to the parliament obedient to the President and his ruling party, the 
judiciary’s de facto independence of the executive was questionable.  
 
The security forces under the Saakashvili government, the security forces were 
seen politically royal to the government and/or its high ranking officials at some 
key political events. An illustrating example is the security forces’ violent reaction 
towards anti-Saakashvili demonstrators and the defence and internal forces 
accompanied Okruashvili in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The first example took 
place in 2007. On 7 November, the government violently supressed protestors 
and closed down a TV station, Imedi Television, in Tbilisi. 128  According to 
governmental officials, the security forces mobilised to disperse the 
demonstrators were said to be riot police and patrol police (Human Rights Watch, 
2007a, pp. 60–61). However, other informants stated the involvement of 
paramilitary forces, such as the Ministry of Justice’s special forces. (Human 
Rights Watch, 2007a, p. 61) The second example illustrates the personal royalty 
of some Georgian security forces to an individual politician rather than the 
principles of civilian control of the chain of command. In 2004, the then interior 
minister Okruashvili led an aggressive police operation against South Ossetia by 
himself (International Crisis Group, 2007a, p. 2). Okurashvili later became the 
                                                          
127 The government pressure against judges was profound. Out of the total 37 Supreme Court judges, 21 
designed (Human Rights Watch, 2007c). 
128 For detailed account of the police’s violent dispersal, see Human Rights watch (2007): Crossing the 
Line: Georgia’s Violent Dispersal of Protesters and Raid on Imedi Television, 19 December 2007 (Human 
Rights Watch, 2007a). 
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head of the defence ministry, and repeated a similar action by being accompanied 
by elite troops and entering into a territory under the control of the separatist 
region of Abkhazia in 2006 (Anjaparidze, 2005; Kommersant, 2005; The 
Associate Press, 2006).129 These two examples suggest the questionable degree 
of transparency and accountability in the chain of command and civilian control 
of the security forces under the Saakashvili government. 
 
6.4.2 Agency diagnosis 
 
6.4.2.1 Mikheil Saakashvili: The President 
 
Saakashvili appealed to anti-Soviet, pro-US and ethnic Georgian centric 
discourses, often by using fervent and militaristic expressions. Saakashvili used 
militant and chauvinistic discourse. Levan Lamishvili, the chairperson of the 
Liberty Institute who is close to Saakashvili’s circle explained his militaristic 
rhetoric. The militaristic discourses were used instead of extreme nationalism and 
religious fundamentalism. Lamishvili explained the reason for Saakashvili and his 
political allies using the militant discourse was that they were “criticised for their 
being extreme liberal, western-educated and not rooted in the Georgian 
tradition”.130  
 
Another reason why Saakashvili and his political allies needed the radical and 
nationalistic discourses was precisely because he lacked a strong political 
platform based on the traditional system such as the Soviet bureaucratic structure. 
Saakashvili needed to establish a strong political platform to rival Shevardnadze 
and his supporters. Unlike Shevardnadze, Saakashvili lacked strong institutional 
support system like Shevardnadze had from the former Soviet institutions and 
nomenklatura. As for Shevardnadze, his political leverage mainly stemmed from 
his background as a former Georgian Communist Party leader and a veteran 
Soviet nomenklatura. In particular, his close tie with the MIA served well in order 
to build and maintain the political economy structure based on client-patron 
relations with the power ministry officials, as described in chapter 4. On the other 
                                                          
129 The helicopter was the possession of the MIA (The Associate Press, 2006). 
130 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.  
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hand, Saakashvili, who was 22 years old when the Soviet Union collapsed, had 
little tie with the former Soviet bureaucratic system. Rather, his educational and 
professional experience in Europe and the USA made him very much inclined to 
the western, liberal-democratic political stance. Saakashvili did not inherit 
Shevardnadze’s political power base, although initially he was regarded as 
Shevardnadze’s protégé.  
 
As for external relations, Saakashvili’s explicit pro-western diplomatic stance 
made a sharp contrast with his predecessor, too. Shevardnadze was moderate 
in his foreign affairs stance, especially with Russia. Saakashvili tried to forge a 
close strategic tie with the USA, especially in the defence sphere. For instance, 
in 2005, the then US president Georgie W. Bush paid the first visit as the USA 
president to Tbilisi. Georgia became one of the largest troop contributing 
countries for the USA-led NATO operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo 
during the Saakashvili times. For the Saakashvili government, it was crucial to 
implement the SSR, especially of the defence forces, so that it can demonstrate 
that Georgia had political backing from the USA and NATO allies. 
 
6.4.2.2 Irakli Okruashvili: The Ministers of Internal Affairs (2004) and 
Defence (2004 - 2006) 
 
Okruashvili is one of the most prominent political figures in the Saakashvili 
government. He held the top positions of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and 
Defence. But the scope of his influence was not on the SSR process itself, but 
the Abkhazia and South Ossetia relations, as well as domestic politics, especially 
in relation with Saakashvili.  
 
Okruashvili, born in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, became a close ally of 
Saakashvili. 131  Under the Saakashvili government, Okruashvili held the top 
positions of the key security sector institutions: he was appointed the Minister of 
Internal Affairs in June 2004 then the Minister of Defence in December 2004. 
Okruashvili was a controversial political figure with a radical stance towards his 
                                                          
131 Okruashvili served the deputy Minister of Justice under the then justice minister, Saakashvili. When 
Saakashvili founded the United National Movement, Okruashvili joined the party.  
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opponents. When he was the Minister of Defence, Okruashvili introduced a large-
scale personnel change. He dismissed the Ministry’s most of all department 
heads and many General Staff officers those trained in the USA and Germany 
(Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 54).132 While the large-scale staff reshuffling took place, 
there were no clear criteria for dismissing and placing defence personnel. One 
critique claims that Okruashvili appointed his friends and acquaintances in the 
defence ministry “as new cadres” (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 54).  
 
Okruashvili had a fervent stance towards the separatist regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, and often appealed to provocative, militaristic actions. For 
instance, in September 2005, Okruashvili attended a forum attended by young 
Georgian “Young Patriots” and mentioned that he went to the contested territory 
of Abkhazia with several dozens of Georgian elite soldiers and spent several days 
in Galsky region of Abkhazia which was under the control of Abkhazian militia and 
Russian peacekeeping forces (Anjaparidze, 2005; Kommersant, 2005). Another 
example took place in September 2006, when he was the Minister of Defence. 
Okruashvili entered the airspace over the separatist region of South Ossetia in a 
helicopter (The Associate Press, 2006). The helicopter was shot by South 
Ossetian forces although Okruashvili and his co-passengers including the chief 
of staff of Georgia’s armed forces were safe.133 
 
Those patriotic political gesture gained popular support. By 2006, Okruashvili 
became a political rival of Saakashvili. In 2006, Saakashvili dismissed Okruashvili 
in 2006. Okruashvili criticised Saakashvili and his government for corruption and 
accused Saakashvili of ordering murders and establishing an authoritarian rule. 
By 2007, Okruashvili had become a leading opposition politician. In September, 
he established a new political party, the Movement for United Georgia, then within 
a week, he was detained for charges of extortion, money laundering, and abuse 
of office during the time at the defence ministry (RFE/RL, 2007b). Having been 
released, he later fled to France to take an exile.134  
 
                                                          
132 Okruashvili also disbanded a battalion, the Monadire (Hunter) Battalion. 
133 As mentioned earlier, while he was the head of the interior ministry, Okruashvili also led an aggressive 
police operation against South Ossetia in summer 2004. 
134 Okruashvili returned to Georgia and apologized Saakashvili for his act, after the 2008 war with Russia. 
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6.4.2.3 The ‘power ministries’: the MIA and the MSS 
 
The two ministries became a primal target for the Saakashvili’s reform efforts. 
This is a sharp contrast with the Shevardnadze times. Their influence was 
severely curtailed as the reform of eradication corruption started to take place. 
The MIA underwent a significant staff reduce by half: over 16,000 police officers 
were laid off (Jones, 2015, p. 166). In 2005, the MSS was abolished (Krunic and 
Siradze, 2005). Saakashvili appointed his close political allies to these ministries. 
For instance, as seen above, Okruiashvili was appointed as the Minister of 
Internal Affairs in 2004. According to one observer, Saakashvili regarded the MSS 
as a Soviet system and trustable. Subsequently, the same observer says, 
Saakashvili appointed people younger than 35 years as he believed that they 
would not be influenced by the Soviet legacy.135 
 
6.4.2.4 Civil society 
 
Georgia’s civil society organisations were involved in monitoring and assessing 
the SSR efforts and the security sector institutions’ governance since the times 
of Shevardnadze. However, they were rather independent and critical of the 
government, and were not so much involved in the government’s policy making 
process during the Shevardnadze times. Since Saakashvili took power in the 
government, the relation between the civil society organisations and the 
government changed drastically (Hiscock, 2005). 
 
When he formed his own government after the Rose Revolution, members of 
some of NGOs joined the Saakashvili’s government and took the ministerial 
positions by replacing the former Soviet nomenklaturas.136 After the so-called 
‘Rose Revolution’, Georgia’s civil society separated into two factions. One 
consisted of the affiliates and/or former members of the Liberty Institute or other 
NGOs with a close relation to it. Many of them joined the Saakashvili government 
                                                          
135 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
136 The most notable examples of a former civil society person turning to a politician is Giga Bokeria. 
Bokeria had been a close ally to Saakashvili. Even prior to the Rose Revolution, in autumn 2000, Bokeria 
was seemingly confident that Saakashvili would become the next president. Author’s communication, 
October 2000, Tbilisi.  
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and provided policy advice directly to the President. The MIA organised a ‘reform 
group’ consisting of NGO members, academics and lawyers. (Hiscock, 2005, p. 
181) The group discussed and recommended the way that the ministry need to 
take in the course of reform. Civil society was involved in carrying out reform 
efforts. For instance, the Liberty Institute provided assistance to the Saakashvili 
government to strengthen the Ombudsman for the police, by following the 
example of the police in Northern Ireland.137 They mostly belong to the young 
generation of under the age of 35 and relatively fluent in English. Another group 
of civil society members was those who remained out of power. Most of them 
were of a much older generation and more fluent in Russian than in English. The 
two groups became distant from one another: the civil society close to Saakashvili 
was criticised for being “elite-centric” and “making decisions without consulting 
widely”.138 On the other hand, those close to the administration claims that “there 
is no use to consult old Soviet professors.” 139  The emergence of the anti-
Shevardnadze movements brought an ironic side-effect to civil society, i.e., 
divided civil society.  
 
6.4.2.5 External actors 
 
Georgia’s strategic importance for the USA increased drastically since the early 
2000’s, especially after the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the USA. Responding to the 
attacks, the USA and its NATO allies adopted the Military Concept for Defence 
against Terrorism” at the 2002 Prague Summit, aiming at enhancing counter-
terrorism capabilities in NATO member countries. The modernisation and 
strengthening of Georgia’s defence forces were addressed in this wider context 
of the USA’s global campaign against terrorism. The visit of the then US President, 
Georgia W. Bush, for the first time in Georgia in 2005, illuminated the strategic 
partnership between Georgia and the USA.  
 
Russia’s geopolitical interest in Georgia had been always present throughout the 
Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze periods. Since the arrival of pro-West 
Saakashvili, Moscow had become more explicit and direct in expressing its 
                                                          
137 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.  
138 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
139 Ibid. 
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intention to regain control over Georgia. In addition to the election of Saakashvili 
as the president, the opening of the BTC pipeline was another significant incident 
that increased Russia’s frustration with Georgia. The oil pipeline, opened in May 
2005, runs between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, bypassing Armenia that is 
close to Russia and Russia itself.  This decreased the geopolitical leverage of 
Russia in the context of energy politics. Consequently, between 2004 and 2008, 
Russia expressed the intention through various economic and political actions 
including sanctions of Georgian import items, destruction of gas pipelines 
between and a total war over South Ossetia in summer 2008. The intention was 
grounded on Moscow’s political attitude towards the former Soviet Union 
republics. Moscow regarded that Georgia, among other former Soviet Union 
republics, was Russia’s ‘near abroad’ (ближнее зарубежье). 140  As the 
connotations of the Russian phrase suggests, Moscow had had difficulty in 
recognising that the newly independent former Soviet republic countries such as 
Georgia and Ukraine as sovereign states (German, 2006, p. 10). Russia viewed 
that Georgia, one of the “near abroad” states, belongs to their backyard, and 
intended to reinstall their influence in Georgia.  
 
The EU had shown its political orientation towards the eastward expansion since 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union and provided assistance in promoting market 
economy and democracy. Georgia, along with the five other former Soviet 
countries, i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, was a target 
country of the fifth wave of the European expansion towards the east. In 2007, 
TACIS was replaced with the ENP. The ENP provided a framework for further 
technical cooperation programmes in a wider range of issues, including energy 
and transportation (Gogolashvili, 2017, p. 8). Although the assistance was not 
part of the official preparatory procedure for the reintegration into the EU, the 
assistance was recognised as useful to prevent “general tendencies in the EU’s 
neighbourhood from hindering the process of each country’s functional EU 
integration” (Gogolashvili, 2017, p. 10). 
 
                                                          
140 Russians under Brezhnev used to use the phrase in ironic or wistful tone to suggest that “the Russian 
people had to sacrifice a higher standard of living to support their ‘socialist comrades’ elsewhere” (Safire, 
1994). 
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6.4.3 Dynamics 
 
Between 2004 and 2008, Georgia’s security sector institutions underwent a 
number of reform efforts and received external assistance, by aiming at 
enhancing NATO and the EU compatibilities. During the first half of this period, 
the reform efforts bared tangible outputs: the notoriously corrupt Traffic Police 
was replaced with the Patrol Police and the USA-trained Georgian troops were 
deployed for NATO operations overseas. The second half of the Saakashvili times 
witnessed the security sector actors involved in suppressing anti-Saakashvili 
demonstrators. How the structural factors and agencies interacted in the course 
of the security sector change process under the Saakashvili regime? Which 
factors affected the agenda-setting of security sector change? 
 
6.4.3.1 Power struggle between pro-West reformist leadership and 
former Soviet nomenklatura in the police sphere 
 
With a strong popular support, Saakashvili enabled to introduce a number of SSR 
efforts in the early period of his regime. Reform of internal affairs organs had been 
dictated by the power struggle between the two political groups, i.e., the young, 
pro-West ‘reformists’ and the older, former Soviet nomenklatura faction. The 
reform in the law enforcement sphere, i.e., the police, the judiciary and the MIA, 
along with the abolishment of the Ministry of State Ministry can be regarded as a 
means for establishing political dominance of Saakashvili and his reformist block 
over the Soviet nomenklatura faction.  
 
The Saakashvili government introduced a number of reform efforts in the security 
sector institutions, namely the Patrol Police, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and 
State Security. A number of departments and units were downsized: the State 
Security ministry was abolished and the Traffic Police were replaced by the Patrol 
Police. As a result, as seen above, a large number of personnel was purged. 
Some criticised Saakashvili’s appointing particular personnel due to their royalty 
to the President himself. In addition, the Ministerial positions of the key security 
sector institutions such as the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs were 
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frequently changed.141 The frequent ministerial shuffles hampered a structural 
reform in the security sector. Through the large-scale dismissals of security sector 
personnel, Saakashvili purged those suspected to be pro-KGB by accusing them 
of being corrupt or defiant against the state. 
 
The staff dismissal and the abolishment of the MSS appear to be motivated by 
Saakashvili’s political interest. Saakashvili was said to distrust the MSS and 
regarded it as an inheritance of the Soviet system.142  
 
Some ‘reformists’ politicians recognised the police reform as the central to “the 
modernisation process”.143 The “modernisation” by the reformist political elites 
meant the reform of the Soviet governance, which Shelley described that “[T]he 
centralized, hierarchical structure of the (Communist) Party shaped the 
organization of law enforcement in the USSR and left no room for decentralized 
policing or local autonomy” (Shelley, 1994, p. 60). According to Levan Ramishvili, 
the chairman of the Liberty Institute, the police reform consisted of an important 
part for this decentralisation reform, not only as the mere reform of law 
enforcement bodies. According to Ramishvili, an important aim of this reform was 
to reduce the central control over the police and local authority, which was the 
remnant of the Soviet governance style.144 
 
Another reason why the Saakashvili government focused on the reform in the 
internal affairs sphere was to sustain support from the general public. Having 
been brought to power by a revolution backed by mass demonstrations, 
Saakashvili and his government needed to show tangible outcomes of the ‘Rose 
Revolution’ in order to sustain the general public support. However, discussed in 
the earlier section, the public perception on the security sector actors remained 
low even after the regime change. Hence, the Saakashvili administration needed 
to demonstrate tangible results. The government’s primal target for reform 
became the Traffic Police, as the frustration against them among the general 
public had been quite strong. 
                                                          
141 Since the inauguration of the Saakashvili government, there have been two cabinet shuffles by May 
2005.  
142 Author’s interview, March 2005, Tbilisi.  
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid.  
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Furthermore, Saakashvili relied on a small circle of young, pro-western and liberal 
political elites many of whom joined the administration from civil society 
organisations. His government was often criticised for its elite-centric decision-
making style, without consulting a wide range of political blocks, in particular, the 
older generation and of the Soviet administrative background. Having been asked 
for the reason, one of the Saakashvili government’s key members replied: “I have 
the full respect to the old people. But there is no use to consult old Soviet 
professors for Soviet knowledge.” 145  Saakashvili seemed to share a similar 
attitude towards the older generation that were trained under the Soviet system. 
According to one source, it was Saakashvili’ deliberate decision to appoint 
personnel younger than 35 years in the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State 
Security.146 The generation gap between the young politicians represented by 
Saakashvili and their older counterparts corresponded with the political division.  
 
The reform of the police and the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, 
thus aimed to serve the Saakashvili government three political objectives: 
eradicating corruption, purging anti-reformist and Soviet nomenkratula faction 
and garnering popular support.  
 
6.4.3.2 Impacts of the relations with the USA and Russia on the reform 
in the defence sphere 
 
The external actors and their relations with Georgia led by Saakashvili also 
played an influential role in the SSR process. In particular, the relations with 
Russia and the USA had significant impacts on Georgia’s reform agenda-setting, 
especially in the defence sphere. 
 
Since the beginning, the Saakashvili government expressed explicitly the 
intention to become a NATO member. Following the 9.11 attacks in the USA and 
the opening of the BTC pipelines, the geopolitical importance of Georgia for the 
USA changed significantly in the early 2000’s. Georgia’s pro-NATO aspiration 
                                                          
145 Ibid.  
146 Ibid. 
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matched the USA’s war on terrorism, for which the USA needed more ally 
countries to provide troops to engage in combats in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
reform of the Georgian defence system, or, more precisely, the development of 
combat capabilities of Georgian troops, served the USA’s strategic interest. 
 
The defence reform during the Saakashvili period, however, did not witness a 
significant progress in the civilian oversight of the armed forces. On the centrally, 
the degree of the democratic control of armed forces decreased under the 
Saakashvili government. The reason for the lower degree of civilian oversight of 
the armed forces could be attributed the deteriorated diplomatic relation with 
Russia. There are two illustrative examples of the decreased civilian oversight.  
 
The first example lies with the concentration of power under the president. 
Combined with the massive popular support, the strong backing of the USA 
provided Saakashvili with a solid position in Georgian politics. Furthermore, the 
United National Movement-Democrat, a reformist party led by Saakashvili, had 
an overwhelming majority at the parliament, 147  resulting in weakening the 
legislature’s ability to check and balance the executive. Under those 
circumstances, Saakashvili changed the Constitution and enabled the President 
to deploy armed forces without seeking for a parliamentary approval in advance. 
This was a response to Russia’s increasing pressure in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Since the Saakashvili administration adopted its explicitly pro-Western 
strategic stance and employed antagonistic discourses against Russia, the latter 
increased its pressure over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Under the deteriorated diplomatic relation with Russia, the Saakashvili 
administration was required to change the Constitution to enable a rapid 
deployment of the armed forces. However, this decision was a set-back from the 
armed forces’ civilian control perspective.  
 
The second example concerns with the actual implementation of civilian oversight 
within the security sector. The actual implementation of civilian oversight was 
sometimes hampered. As discussed in the earlier section, the defence troops and 
internal affairs ministry’s helicopter were utilized by a civilian minister, Irakri 
                                                          
147 The United National Movement occupied 135 out of 150 parliamentary seats in 2004.  
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Okruashvili, when he entered the contested territories of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, in order to boost his popular support by demonstrating his patriotic and 
militant actions. Those incidents illuminate that civilian control principles could be 
overridden by a civilian minister due to his political motifs.  
 
6.4.3.3 Paramilitary reform interrupted by the re-escalating Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia issues 
 
The paramilitary reform still had a persisting challenge: the demarcation of 
paramilitary forces in the defence and law enforcement spheres, inherited from 
his predecessor’s regime that implemented no significant paramilitary reform. As 
discussed in chapter 4, the paramilitary forces under the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs and Defence had overlapping mandates. The Saakashvili government 
addressed the issue by transferring the Internal Troops from the MIA to the MoD. 
Saakashvili also managed to disband the paramilitaries in Adjara. With the 
disbandment of the paramilitaries in Adjara, the Saakashvili government 
succeeded to complete the lengthy process of integrating paramilitary forces into 
a single state structure.  
 
The unsettled violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not allow the 
paramilitary reform to advance further. During the second half of the Saakashvili 
times, the tension over Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased. As the relations 
with Russia over those territories raised, the security situation in areas bordering 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia escalated. The deteriorating situation in those 
two territories required the Saakashvili administration paramilitary units with 
military combat capacities. In 2006, the MIA obtained a new paramilitary body, 
the Border Police, whose mandate included a military function. The Border Police, 
therefore, was given a military function, despite their affiliation with the MIA. The 
demarcation between the Georgian paramilitary forces’ mandates thus remained 
blurred between the defence and law enforcement spheres. This change 
reversed the process of separating the defence forces from law enforcement 
forces. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The so-called 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ brought the pro-West, reform-minded 
leadership headed by Saakashvili. Georgia under the Saakashvili period saw a 
number of reform efforts in the security sector. Having developed a close relation 
with the USA, the Saakashvili government heavily invested into the upgrading of 
the military to align the NATO standards. The reform efforts in the justice sector 
continued since the time that Saakashvili was the justice minister under the 
Shevardnadze period. A contrasting difference with the Shevardnadze period can 
be found in the police sphere. Having centred its political agenda on the reform 
of the old regime under Shevardnadze and its power base, the ‘power ministries’, 
the new administration initiated a number of SSR initiatives. The SSR efforts led 
to the removal of anti-Saakashvili components within the ‘power ministries’: 
Saakashvili targeted the ‘power ministries’ in its campaign against corruption, 
abolished the MSS, and downsized the MIA. 
 
It is noteworthy that those reform efforts were implemented in the local context in 
which the administration centred the overall ‘reform’ as the main agenda. Based 
on the analysis, the chapter provides the following observations that explore the 
understanding of the relationship between socio-political factors and the agenda-
setting process for security sector change.  
 
First, as in the cases of the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze times, the nature 
of the security sector change process in Georgia appeared to remain politically 
driven. The Saakashvili government targeted the security sector institutions in 
order to curtail its opposition. For instance, the reform of the Police, Ministries of 
Internal Affairs and State Security mainly targeted the dismissal of anti-
Saakashvili block from the former ‘power ministries’. The Saakashvili government 
achieved its political objective to curtail the socio-political influence of the former 
Soviet nomenklatura. The introduction of the Patrol Police brought a positive 
public perception in Tbilisi. However, outside Tbilisi, the impact was limited, and 
people’s perception on the police and other security sector institutions remained 
low, especially among non-Georgian community members.  
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Second, the SSR agenda-setting process continued to be dominated by inter-
personal power struggles among the elite political figures including the President 
and relevant line ministries in the security sector. The analysis in this chapter 
attributes the reason to the concentration of executive power at the President, 
combined with the weak legislation, led to regressed democratic practice by the 
security sector institutions. Once elected with an overwhelming majority, 
Saakashvili and his ruling party had become coercive against the population. The 
accumulated power of the President and the legislation disproportionally 
dominated by the ruling party jeopardized the civilian control of armed forces, as 
well as an exceeding use of violence by law enforcement forces deployed at the 
anti-Saakashvili demonstrations in 2007. 
 
Third, the demarcation between the defence and law enforcement paramilitaries 
remained even under the reform-oriented Saakashvili administration. The 
paramilitary reform under the Saakashvili initially aimed at introducing the 
Western standard to separate the defence and law enforcement forces. However, 
the specific political and security challenges surrounding Georgia and the 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not allow drawing a clear 
demarcation between the two forces. As a result, Georgia remained with the 
paramilitaries affiliated with a number of security sector institutions, namely the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence, with overlapping mandates and 
unclarified functions.  
 
Thus, the analysis illustrates the interplay between the dynamics between 
political, socio-economic and institutional factors and the agenda-setting process 
for the SSR. Driven by these factors, the change in the security sector remained 
the mere change, rather than SSR informed of norms. The next chapter examines 
how the external SSR assistance interacted with those dynamics in the Georgian 
security sector change process between 2004 and 2008. 
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Chapter 7 Dynamics in the provision and reception of the SSR 
assistance in Georgia between 2004 and 2008 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The so-called ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003 brought a government headed by 
Saakashvili. Under the reform-oriented administration, a number of SSR 
initiatives took place. Externally, the Saakashvili government reiterated the 
strategic partnership with the Western allies. The relation with NATO and the EU 
grew into something more concrete and operational compared with the 
Shevardnadze period. In this environment, the security sector during the 
Saakashvili period between 2003 and 2008 increasingly received external 
assistance for SSR related activities. How did the external SSR assistance 
interplay with the actual security sector change in Georgia? What were the 
dynamics between the SSR assistance providers and the domestic actors 
receiving such assistance? 
 
This chapter examines how the international SSR assistance was received and 
perceived on the ground, by analysing the interplay between the domestic 
dynamics in security sector change and international SSR assistance efforts in 
key areas. The second part of this chapter examines the SSR assistance at the 
technical level and examines to which extent the SSR assistance provider’s 
objectives were met in the process of security sector change. The section also 
discusses how the Georgian counterparts responded to the SSR assistance. The 
last part of the chapter examines which security priorities were reflected in the 
course of security sector change during the period between 2004 and 2008. It 
then discusses what security issues remained to be attended consequently. 
 
7.2 External actors’ SSR assistance in Georgia between 2004 and 2008 
 
The norm- and interest-based assistance for the SSR approaches discussed in 
chapter 5 continued under the Saakashvili government. The major difference 
from the Shevardnadze period is, however, that the western assistance became 
more concrete, and the degree of their assistance became deeper in terms of 
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implementation. This was because of the political will on Georgia’s side: 
Saakashvili took a more explicit diplomatic orientation towards the Western allies 
which deepened the degree of SSR cooperation. The eastern expansion of the 
Western partnerships also provided SSR assistance platform for cooperation at 
operational level.  
 
Another factor is the further development of the SSR assistance framework on 
the side of the assistance providers. Following the endorsement of the 
OECD/Development Assistance Committee’s guidelines on “Security System 
Reform and Governance” in 2004 (OECD/DAC, 2005), the EU developed an EU 
concept on SSR by reflecting principles addressed in the OECD/DAC’s SSR 
guidelines. In 2005, the EU developed “EU Concept for ESDP support to Security 
Sector Reform (SSR)” (Council of the European Union, 2005). This Concept 
aimed at providing a concept for the ESDP support to SSR in a partner state, 
such as Georgia. The document provides a standard definition of the security 
sector, an overview of the breadth and cope of ESDP support to SSR, a proposal 
for integration of civilian and military SSR activities within ESDP and modalities 
on how to plan and conduct SSR activities within ESDP (Council of the European 
Union, 2005, p. 7). 
 
The other major SSR donor, the USA, on the other hand, was yet to develop a 
comprehensive SSR approach. It was only 2009, following the frustrated 
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan where its counterinsurgency met with 
community-level resistance that the USA came to recognise an integrated 
approach to SSR. In 2009, the US Department of State, Department of Defence, 
and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed 
a comprehensive approach to SSR and guidelines for SSR programmes. (USAID 
et al., 2009) During the Saakashvili period, the USA’ assistance for SSR 
continued being provided in specific issues such as the development of 
counterinsurgency capacities of Georgian troops and the justice sector reform. 
 
7.2.1 Objectives of the external SSR assistance 
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The new president Saakashvili clearly indicated that Georgia’s inclination towards 
Europe. His statement, “Georgians are Europeans”,148 makes a sharp contrast 
with the foreign policy inclination of his predecessor, Shevardnadze, who had 
avoided an explicit statement regarding Georgia’s stance in the relation with 
Europe.   
 
During the Saakashvili time, the West’s engagement in the Eastern Europe and 
the South Caucasus seemed more certain than during the Shevardnadze period. 
Both the EU and NATO expanded its membership eastward in 2004. Seven 
former Eastern Bloc countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, formally joined NATO in March 2004. Shortly after, the EU 
pushed its eastern border with the participation of seven countries from the former 
Eastern Bloc and three former Soviet countries in May 2004.149 The main SSR 
assistance provider, the USA, also had a closer relation with Georgia.  The 
George W. Bush administration demonstrated its eagerness to support the 
Saakashvili government. President Bush visited Tbilisi in May 2005, and this was 
the first visit by the US president. 
 
As in the Shevardnadze period, the Western allies provided SSR-related 
assistance based on liberal democratic norms. This “norm-based” approach 
(MacFarlane, 1999, pp. 9–10) can be found in the EU approached to SSR. ”EU 
Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” states that EU 
support to SSR is based on the following four principles:  
 
 “democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles 
and the rule of law, and the rule of law, and where applicable international 
humanitarian law; 
 respect for local ownership; and 
 coherence with other areas of EU external action” (Council of the 
European Union, 2005, p. 4). 
 
                                                          
148 For instance, in his address at Parliamentary Assembly session: 26 – 30 January 2004, the President 
Saakashvili, stated that “Georgians are Europeans – with a fundamental set of values, culture, behavior 
and system of governance that place them firmly within the European family” (Saakashvili, 2004). 
149 The countries which became the new EU member states in May 2004 are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
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Similarly, the EU/Georgia Action Plan was designed along with liberal democratic 
principles, with targeted actions including reform of the judicial system; civil 
service reform; and strengthening democratic institutions (European Union, 
2006). 
 
On the other side, the USA, another prominent SSR-related assistance provider, 
took an approach based on strategic interests. Following the 2001 9/11 attacks 
in the USA, the interest-based approach gained its weight as international 
strategic situations developed. The most prominent development was the ‘War 
on Terror’ by the USA and NATO. Given Georgia’s geopolitical location bordering 
on Chechnya, enhancing the border control capacities of Georgia continued to 
be a strategic priority for the West, in particular the USA. 
 
As NATO became engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, need for the NATO allies to provide troops with counter-insurgency 
capacities for its operations further increased. Raising the combat capacities of 
Georgian troops to meet the NATO standards thus continued to be a strategic 
interest for the USA and the other NATO members. Based on this strategic 
interest, foreign assistance was provided in the defence sphere, largely for 
enhancing combat capacities. 
 
7.2.2 Varying SSR strategies within the external assistance providers 
 
The Euro-Atlantic ally countries continued to be the main SSR assistance 
providers under the Saakashvili times. The term SSR was employed more often 
by the donors. For example, the USA and its departments and agency relevant 
to SSR, i.e., the Departments of Defence, States and USAID started using the 
term SSR since the middle 2000s, in an effort to provide assistance for security 
sector institutions in a coherent manner (USAID et al., 2009).  
 
Despite the term SSR having become a more familiar concept among the donors, 
when it comes to the actual division of labour of the SSR assistance, the external 
assistance providers remained to take a siloed approach. The major SSR 
assistance providers had their own focused areas: the NATO members and the 
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USA focusing on the defence sphere; the OSCE on the police sphere and policing 
issues; and the EU on the democratisation of security sector institutions, with an 
emphasis on the justice sphere. This demarcation of labour remained more or 
less the same as in the Shevardnadze times. The difference lay with the OSCE 
which shifted its focus from conflict prevention and resolution to the police reform 
for a variety of reasons discussed later. 
 
7.2.2.1 Defence-forces development 
 
The relations between NATO and Georgia had become closer during 
Shevardnadze’s time. The participation of the Georgian troops in the ISAF's 
election security force in Afghanistan in 2003 is a concrete example of the 
partnership. NATO-Georgia relations became even closer under the Saakashvili 
government whose foreign policy took a clear Euro-Atlantic approach. Echoing  
Georgia’s inclination to the Euro-Atlantic alliance, NATO decided to place a 
special representative and a liaison officer in the region at the Istanbul Summit in 
June 2004. In the same year, Georgia became the first country that agreed to an 
IPAP150 with NATO,151 and Georgia and NATO agreed to Intensified Dialogue in 
2007. It was in this context that various platforms and partnership frameworks for 
assistance in the SSR context were developed. Concrete and more action-
oriented initiatives started to take place. The Action Plan was approved by NATO 
member states and endorsed by members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council in June 2005. (Pataraia, 2008, p. 50) 
 
The difference between the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments is the 
degree of the commitment to the NATO partnership. The Saakashvili government 
became committed to more concrete partnership activities aiming at the NATO 
membership at operational level. In 2005, NATO and Georgia sign a transit 
agreement allowing the Alliance and other ISAF troop-contributing nations to 
send supplies for their forces in Afghanistan through Georgia. Following the 
                                                          
150 IPAPs, launched in the Prague Summit in 2002, are designed to provide focused country-specific 
advice on defence- and security-related reform and larger policy and institutional reform. IPAPs also set 
up action plans at strategic and operational level for defence institution building and armed forces 
development (NATO, n.d.). 
151 Georgia declared its intention to develop an IPAP at the 2002 Prague Summit and signed at the 
Istanbul Summit in 2004. 
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agreement, NATO offered an Intensified Dialogue to Georgia on its aspirations to 
join the Alliance in the following year. In addition to the contribution of its troops 
to NATO’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2007 Georgia hosted a NATO 
PfP air exercise, "Cooperative Archer 2007". Having had the array of partnership 
activities, at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 NATO members agreed that 
Georgia would become a member of NATO (“Budapest summit declaration,” 
1994).  
 
The USA continued providing assistance through its GSSOP. GSSOP followed 
its preceding assistance programme, GTEP, and continued providing Georgian 
troops with training and equipment to enhance their interoperability with US and 
NATO forces. 
 
In addition to the USA and the other NATO member states, new members of 
NATO from Eastern Europe began to provide SSR assistance. The wide range of 
NATO-related policy frameworks provided platforms for Romania, Bulgaria and 
the Baltic states to take an advisory role. Their advantage was their recent 
experience of transforming their own security sector institutions. Under the 
Saakashvili government, those countries had increasingly become prominent 
actors in the provision of support for reforming the defence institutions, especially 
at the operational level. The increased presence of the Baltic countries in an 
advisory position was also prominent in the composition of the ISAB board 
members. Upon the conception, the ISAB consisted of three senior advisers from 
the UK, USA and Germany. By 2005, advisers from the three Baltic countries 
joined the ISAB team (International Security Advisory Board, 2005, pp. 27–28). 
Those countries also provided police training and defence planning. After the 
extension of the OSCE’s Border Monitoring Operation was blocked by Russia in 
2004, experts from those countries provided support to the reform of the border 
control as well (Lynch, 2005, p. 55). 
 
7.2.2.2 Assistance for community policing 
 
OSCE was the main provider of foreign assistance in the police sphere. 
Compared with their involvement in the conflict resolution efforts during the 
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Shevardnadze period, OSCE shifted their engagement in assisting the police and 
played a vital role in community policing and community security.  
 
However, the deteriorated relations between Europe and Russia affected the 
OSCE assistance, especially on the border control on the Chechen border. The 
relation between the West and Russia became tense, especially after the eastern 
expansion of the EU and NATO in 2004 and Russia’s recognition of Kosovo as 
an independent state in 2005. The international political climate affected the 
western assistance to Georgia. One concrete example is that Russia vetoed the 
extension of the mandate of the Border Control and the OSCE mission’s border 
monitoring operation in the Chechen border in 2004. Russia vetoed an extension 
of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation in 2004. Since then, the OECD Mission 
conducted training programme for Georgian border troops and border police 
(Stöber, 2010). 
 
7.2.2.3 Justice reform assistance 
 
The EU engaged in various SSR-related assistance activities. The justice reform 
was one of the areas where their assistance was most prominent.  The relations 
between Georgia and the EU entered a new phase after the enlargement of the 
EU towards the east in 2004. Prior to 2004, Georgia had always expressed its 
intention to form a close tie with Europe since the Shevardnadze time. Having 
clearly expressed its intention to join the EU, the Saakashvili government took a 
further and more concrete step to be closer to Europe. Since 2004, the relation 
between Georgia and the EU grew closer. Saakashvili appointed Salome 
Zourabishvili, a French diplomat who had served for the French Foreign Ministry, 
the Foreign Minister. This sent a clear message that Georgia intends to have a 
close tie with Europe. 
 
Prior to the “Rose Revolution”, for instance, the ENP, adopted in March 2003, 
recognised Georgia among other countries neighbouring with the EU countries 
as close partners (The European Commission, 2003). The EU Council 
designated an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Georgia. In 2006, the 
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mandate of the EUSR was renewed. The five year Action laying out strategic 
objectives was adopted within the ENP context (European Union, 2006). 
 
Reflecting the previous engagement, the Action Plan placed an emphasis of their 
assistance on the areas of the justice reform, border management, conflict 
settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (European Union, 2006). The Action 
Plan laid out an array of actions that are to complete those specific priorities. 152  
Those actions include reform of the judicial system; civil service reform; and 
strengthening democratic institutions, which include the strengthening of the 
Georgian parliament especially in its oversight role in the security and defence 
sector. The 2006 EU/Georgia Action Plan thus provided a sense of prioritisation 
and a more coherent framework for actions for EU assistance in SSR.   
 
7.3 External SSR assistance programmes and projects between 2004 and 2008 
 
Reflecting the emerging threats of terrorism and the escalating tension with 
Russia, the Western allies’ strategic interests heavily influenced the direction and 
focus of foreign assistance for SSR efforts during the Saakashvili period. Their 
assistance efforts concentrated on developing Georgian troops’ counter-terrorism 
capacities, building their NATO compatibilities and border control capacities. 
Assistance in the rule of law was also provided to support the Saakashvili 
government’s efforts in reforming the police and judiciary.  
 
Unlike in Shevardnadze’s time, foreign assistance largely remained at technical 
level. This makes a contrast with the role and activities of the ISAB that provided 
an overarching assessment of the Georgia’s armed forces and civilian institutions 
concerning their oversight, along with an initial roadmap for reforming those 
armed forces and institutions since the middle 1990s. With the last report 
                                                          
152 Those priorities are:  
 “Strengthening rule of law especially through reform of the judicial system, including the penitentiary 
system, and through rebuilding state institutions. Strengthen democratic institutions and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with international commitments of Georgia 
(PCA, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN)” (priority area 1); 
 “Enhance cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security, including in the field of border 
management” (priority area 4); 
 “Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts” (priority 6); and 
 “Cooperation on foreign and security policy” (priority 7). 
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published in 2006, The ISAB’s advisory role in Georgia came to an end. The end 
of the ISAB’s advisory role coincided with the process in which the external 
assistance became more specific and operational. 
 
Table 6 SSR assistance initiatives in Georgia during the Saakashvili time: 
2004 - 2008 
 
Initiative Objective, Content, Activity Who When 
Defence 
NATO Individual 
Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP) 
An action plan aimed for Georgia’s integration to NATO, 
associated with yearly implementation assessment.  
NATO 2004 
Sustainment and 
Stability 
Operations 
Program (SSOP) 
60.5 million USD. Objectives: to train and equip more 
than 1,200 troops for US’s war on terror in Iraq. 
Designed to consolidate GTEP. Trained and equipped 
the 11th Brigade. 
In March 2005, Signed with US an agreement for SSOP. 
Allowing Georgia to continue supporting Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. In FY 2005, US allocated USD60.5 million for 
SSOP. 
USA 2005 -
2006 
NATO Planning 
Programming 
Budgeting 
System/Financial 
Management 
System 
(PPBS/FMS) 
Increasing the efficiency and transparency of its 
defence planning and budgeting procedures. 
PPBS/FMS is a fundamental organizational concept 
that will guide Georgia’s defence-related planning in the 
mid- and long-term future. 
NATO, 
Netherlands 
2006-  
NATO Intensified 
Dialogue on 
Membership 
Issues 
Through Intensified Dialogue, consultations between 
Georgia and the North Atlantic Council at a wide range 
of levels such as staff and high level takes place to 
discuss the full range of political, military, financial and 
security issues relating to possible NATO membership.  
NATO 2006 - 
NATO 
Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) 
Assisting institution-building and armed forces 
development for the NATO integration 
NATO 2008 
Police 
Short Term 
Assistance 
Programme 
(STAP) 
Supervised by the OSCE Mission to Georgia, the five-
month STAP provided basic police training and 
strengthening the personnel management system, as 
well as in equipping the Police Academy's new library. 
The STAP included the following activities: 
Institution and capacity building for community policing 
(workshops, study visit, provision of equipment and 
training) 
Aimed for improvements to the human resources 
management system of the Georgian police (The 
provision of workshops, materials and equipment and 
study trips), improvement of the training process at the 
OSCE, 
funded by 
Belgium 
and Norway 
2005 – 
2006 
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Police Academy and police-related assistance in the 
Georgian-South Ossetian zone of conflict 
OSCE Police 
Assistance 
Programme 
(PAP): “Basic 
Improvements to 
the human 
resources 
management 
system of the 
Georgian police 
Supporting Georgian Police in the transformation of its 
structure, professional culture and method towards a 
de-militarised, de-politicised and public service -
oriented agency. The project focused on improving 
human resources management process in the aim of 
achieving the following objectives:  
 introduce modern tools and effective procedures 
for entry-level recruitment and create sustainable 
capacity for their use; and 
 initiate transition to computerized administration of 
personnel records. 
 
OSCE 2007 
OSCE Police 
Assistance 
Programme 
(PAP): “Institution- 
and Capacity 
Building of 
Community 
Policing in 
Georgia” 
Supporting of institution building in the field of 
community policing, supporting of community policing 
related capacity building of police officers, starting with 
pilot implementation of community policing in selected 
area, and strengthening police-public partnership.  
Activities included public event and training.  
OSCE 2007 
Justice 
EUJUST THEMIS 
‘rule of law’ 
mission 
Assisting in developing a strategy for criminal legislation 
reform through the following activities: 
 assisting the development of a horizontal 
governmental strategy guiding the reform process 
for all relevant stakeholders within the criminal 
justice sector in full coordination with, and in 
complementarity to, EU programmes, as well as 
other donors’ programmes; 
 providing guidance for the new criminal justice 
reform strategy and support the planning for new 
legislation; and 
 helping develop an overall policy and improve top-
level planning and performance capabilities in the 
areas identified as requiring assistance. 
EU 2004 - 
2005 
Border Control 
The Cooperative 
Threat Reduction 
Program 
For developing export control regimes to prevent 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile material, 
support the Georgian State Department of the State 
Border Guards 
USA 
 
Exact 
date not 
availabl
e 
Other 
European 
Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), 
Action Plan for 
Georgia (ENP/AP) 
The action plan obliges Georgia to take measures to 
promote dialogue on regional and international issues, 
including implementation of European security strategy, 
in the framework of the CoE, the OSCE and the UN; to 
cooperate in developing effective systems of national 
export control, and controlling exports and transits of 
WMD-related materials; to cooperate in implementing 
the provisions of the OSCE document on arms control 
issues, to bring national legislation in line with the EU 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.  
EU 2006   
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7.3.1 Defence sphere: enhancing NATO compatibilities in counter-terrorism 
operations and NATO integration 
 
The Georgia-NATO cooperation began as early as in 1992 when Georgia joined 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Since Saakashvili took power, 
Georgia accelerated its effort to become a NATO member. In 2004, under the 
IPAP, Georgia began to receive a number of implementation assessments such 
as the assessment on maritime capacities and the assessment of the Georgian 
Navy Report (both conducted in 2004) and the US European Command Defence 
Assessment of Georgia (conducted in 2005). The defence reform efforts took 
place under the overall framework of the NATO-Georgia partnership. A wider 
range of assistance activities were provided through bilateral arrangements by 
the USA, the major assistance provider, as well as other NATO member states 
including those recently joined NATO. The main focus of the defence reform 
during the Saakashvili was two-pronged enhancing counter-terrorism operational 
capacities and NATO compatibility.  
 
Both of them aimed at the integration into NATO. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest 
Summit, NATO agreed that Georgia would become a NATO member and laid out 
that the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as the next step for Georgia on their 
“direct way to membership” (NATO, 2008). Foreign assistance therefore 
continuously dominated in the area of combat capacity development, to enhance 
NATO interoperability of the Georgian defence forces. In comparison with the 
Shevardnadze times, external assistance in the defence sphere had more 
concrete and practical components not only in the field of combat training but also 
administrative management. For instance, in 2006, Romania provided expert 
advice on budgeting system and cosy analyses and the Netherlands carried out 
training on budgeting and cost analysis, while Germany trained Georgian 
battalions to prepare them for the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. In addition, 
personnel management training was provided by Germany, Turkey and the UK. 
 
The most significant foreign assistance in this area is the Georgian Sustainment 
and Stability Operations (GSSOP) provided by the USA. Launched in January 
2005, the GSSOP succeeded the GTEP of 2002 – 2004 and continued assisting 
the Georgian defence forces in enhancing their combat capacities. The first 
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phase of the GSSOP (GSSOP-I) ran for 18 months, with the budget of 
approximately $60 million. It was succeeded by the second phase component, 
GSSOP-II, which ended in June 2007. GSSOP-I provided training to three light 
infantry battalions, a maintenance battalion of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, 
a reconnaissance company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and an independence 
company of military police. GSSOP-II trained two light infantry battalions, a 
maintenance battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, its reconnaissance and 
engineering companies, a communications company and an engineer company 
and a communications company of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.  
 
Another significant assistance package arrived from Turkey. Since the sign-off of 
the bilateral agreement on military cooperation on 1997, Turkey had provided 
Georgia with military equipment and training for officers and troops along with 
support for the reform of the National Defence Academy and the upgrading of an 
airbase. Between 1998 and 2005, Turkey had provided the total amount of 37 
million USD in the support of the modernisation of Georgia’s military (Lynch, 2006, 
p. 56). 
 
The area of the parliamentary oversight and democratic control of defence forces 
had also been on agenda among the international donors since the 
Shevardnadze period, without seeing much substantial progress. The tendency 
remained the same under the new government led by Saakashvili. It was only 
after the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia that a bilateral assistance was 
launched in this area.153 
 
7.3.2 Police sphere: advanced yet challenged assistance efforts 
 
The international community’s engagement in the police sphere during the 
Saakashvili period is twofold: assistance for the domestic police reform and 
support for policing issues in the conflict-affected regions bordering Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.  
                                                          
153 Between December 2008 and November 2011, the Netherlands financed a series of workshops which 
targeted Georgian parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, civil servants, NGO staff and journalists, and 
provided training on budgetary oversight, defence policy formation and planning (Centre for European 
Security Studies, n.d.). 
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Unlike during the Shevardnadze times, concrete assistance programmes and 
activities related to the institutional restriction of the MIA. The assistance to the 
reform of the police and the Ministry took was more practical and concrete, unlike 
the Shevardnadze period. Their assistance, however, were the provision of 
financial and technical support, and did not yield normative reform efforts. In 
comparison with the defence sphere, the police reform did not entail much 
concrete operational implications such as NATO compatibilities. The police 
reform was regarded as “’a marker of Georgia’s commitment to move beyond the 
past’ that has given Western governments confidence in pursuing closer relations 
with Georgia since 2003” (Light, 2014, p. 331).  
 
The foreign assistance to the police reform was provided through the provision of 
short-term projects which lasted for one year. The time frame was unrealistic for 
delivering normative changes the police sphere although those assistance 
activities did send a signal that the west supports the police reform. The OSCE 
was the major actor in policing-related matters initially. However, their 
involvement decreased and finally ceased in 2005 to exist as the relation with 
Russia deteriorated.  
 
7.3.2.1 Supporting domestic police reform 
 
Saakashvili government’s top priority was the reform of the police. Echoing to the 
political will of the Georgian government to change the police, assistance was 
provided to support the police reform by the Western countries through bilateral 
and multilateral aid (Boda and Kakachia, 2005). The major assistance providers 
in the police sphere were the OSCE,154 the USA155 and the EU.156  
 
The Georgian government under Saakashvili brought a drastic change to the 
police by abolishing the Traffic Police, one of the most notoriously corrupt state 
institutions, and establishing the Patrol Police. While the Georgian government 
                                                          
154 The OSCE Police Assistance Programme for the Georgian Police 
155 ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) 
156 The Council of Europe assisted the police reform efforts through the Police and Human Rights 
Programme of the Council of Europe, while the EU deployed the THEMIS Rule of Law mission in 
Tbilisi.  
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invested in bringing a normative change to the police, foreign assistance activities 
were mostly centred on the area of training of police personnel, training of staff 
and improving the curriculum of the Police Academy.   
 
Through the OSCE Police Assistance Programme for the Georgian Police, the 
OSCE assistance programme planned to “implement parts of the OSCE Kosovo 
Police Training School curriculum”,  (Boda and Kakachia, 2005) as well as provide 
opportunities for Georgian officers to participate in relevant courses abroad (Boda 
and Kakachia, 2005). The Police Assistance Programme in Georgia was 
launched in 2007, with a focus on institution and capacity building for community 
policing, improving the human resource management system of the Georgian 
police and improving the training of the Policy Academy (OSCE, n.d.). The 
programme carried out a few workshops and seminars on the theme of 
community policing. 
 
The impact of the assistance programme seems quite limited and remained at 
the level of organising ad hoc workshops and seminars, without leaving concrete, 
substantial results in the police structure. The Final Report of “Institution and 
Capacity Building of Community Policing in Georgia” reports, for instance, that a 
“Community Policing Development Unit” in the MIA was not established, contrary 
to what the final project report of the programme had stated (OSCE, 2007a, p. 3). 
The Final Report points out that “respective training was held, but had no impact 
on any implementation of community policing in Georgia” (OSCE, 2007a, p. 3). 
 
The other OSCE project under the Policy Assistance Programme, “Basic 
Improvements to Human Resources Management System of Georgian Police”, 
similarly met with a frustrated result. The project aimed at assisting the Georgian 
police in developing introducing “modern tools and effective procedures for entry-
level recruitment and create sustainable capacity for their use” (OSCE, 2007b, p. 
3) and “initiate transition to computerized administration of personnel records” 
(OSCE, 2007b, p. 3). Institution and capacity development for community policing 
was carried out in 2008 for three months.157 
 
                                                          
157 Final project narrative report: enhanced capacity-building of the Georgian police through training on 
community policing and elaboration of an advanced training curriculum (OSCE, n.d). 
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The USA also provided assistance in the police sphere through its International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).158 ICITAP is the 
USA’s assistance scheme supporting the reform and capacity development of 
law enforcement bodies in countries all over the world since the late 1980s. 
ICITAP provides support for foreign law enforcement bodies in order to ensure 
the US national security police.159 In 1997 ICITAP began providing assistance to 
several former Soviet Union countries,160 but not Georgia. Following the regime 
change in Georgia in 2003, ICITAP assistance in Georgia began and provided 
support for the Police Academy, such as “management training, the development 
of standard operating procedures and curriculum, and the donation of equipment 
and uniforms” (US Department of Justice, 2016). 
 
The Council of Europe was another foreign assistance provider for the police 
reform efforts. As part of the “Police and Human Rights” Programme, Council of 
Europe experts also provided assistance with the reform of the police in Georgia, 
particularly regarding the inclusion of human rights components in police curricula. 
 
7.3.2.2 Policing in the conflict-affected regions 
 
Under the Saakashvili government, the UN’s UNOMIG continued playing a 
crucial role in providing policing function in the conflict-affected regions. 
UNOMIG’s initial mandates were to monitor compliance with the ceasefire 
between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz authorities. Those mandates 
were revised and included evaluation of the local police forces in the regions 
bordering Abkhazia. The UNOMIG police forces developed training and reform 
projects in the areas of personnel and of police equipment (Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).   
 
                                                          
158 ICITAP is administrated by the US Department of Justice. ICITAP was established in 1986. Its first set 
of activities was building criminal investigative capacities of police forces in Latin America in the late 
1980s. Its assistance activities have reflected the US foreign policy priorities (US Department of Justice, 
2016). 
159 ICITAP supports to “develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement capacity that 
protects human rights, combats corruption, and reduces the threat of transnational crime and terrorism, in 
support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.” (US Department of Justice, n.d.) 
160 ICITAP provided assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 
1997, and to Moldova and Ukraine in 1998 (US Department of Justice, 2016).  
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The OSCE mission also supported law enforcement and police-related activities 
in the conflict-affected Georgian-South Ossetian communities, through facilitating 
information exchange, regular meetings and a communication centre in the 
conflict-affected area. 
 
The support for policing in the conflict-affected regions by both the UN and OSCE 
were heavily influenced by the political tension between Georgia and Russia, as 
well as between the western allies and Russia. After the 2008 war between 
Georgia and Russia, UNOMIG’s presence came to an end in June 2009 when 
the UN Security Council did not extend the mandate.161 OSCE’s mission was also 
affected negatively, as Russia blocked the extension of the Border Monitor in 
2005. 
 
7.3.3 Justice sphere: ambitious goals and unmatched implementation 
arrangement  
 
Along with the reform of the police, the justice reform as Saakashvili’s political 
agenda, even when he was the Minister of Justice. Assistance for justice reform 
efforts were provided by the Western actors, namely the EU and the USA, which 
were the two major assistance providers in the justice sphere.  
 
For the EU, Georgia was an experimental case of its assistance provided in the 
regional defence and security cooperation. Since 2003, the EU increased its 
efforts to establish its political presence in the South Caucasus region and 
expressed its will to appointment of the EU Special Representative (EUSG) to the 
South Caucasus (European Union, 2003). It was in this context that EU THEMIS 
was provided. EUJUST THEMIS was the first rule-of-law mission under the ESDP 
set up in June 2004 (European Union, 2004) and implemented between July 2004 
and July 2005. EUJUST THEMIS had ambitious objectives to achieve within the 
provided timeframe of one year. Those objectives were to “Provide urgent 
guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy”, “Support the overall 
coordinating role of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of judicial reform 
and anti-corruption”, “Support the planning for new legislation as necessary, e.g. 
                                                          
161 Russia vetoed the extension of the mission at the Security Council on 15 June 2009 (Lynch, 2009). 
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Criminal Procedure Code” and “Support the development of international as well 
as regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice” (European Union, 2004).  
 
THEMIS was an ESDP operation which aimed to have a quick impact and to 
demonstrate apolitical profile (Kurowska, 2009, p. 204). EU THEMIS was 
experimental in terms of implementing actors. It was not the oldest members of 
the EU but Lithuania and Estonia which joined the USA in 2004 that introduced 
and supported EU THEMIS in Georgia (Kurowska, 2009, p. 203). It was an 
emerging trend of the new EU member countries to provide assistance to a 
country that aspires to become an EU member. This cooperation had technical 
advantage due to similar socio-political background shared between the former 
Soviet Union countries. According to Kurowska, “Lithuania promoted a reform 
strategy for George that was inspired by its own experience of the mid-1990s 
when Vilinus designed and successfully implemented a comprehensive reform of 
the justice sector” (Kurowska, 2009, p. 203).  
 
EU THEMIS met with a few challenges upon the implementation. The first 
challenge lies with the level of actual engagement of the Georgian side. The 
Georgian side did not manage to indicate a consensus in the direction of the 
judicial reform strategy. After having issued a presidential decree on the judicial 
reform, the President Saakashvili and his administration did not show strong 
commitment to developing a justice reform strategy. Kurowska points out the 
weak recognition that EU THEMIS received from the Georgian authority, partly 
due to the lower profile of the mission than initially expected.162 During the course 
of the project was supposed to have a high-level working group draft a judicial 
reform strategy. The working group hardly met, and the Georgian authority did 
not contribute to finalising a judicial reform strategy (Kurowska, 2009, p. 206). EU 
THEMIS also struggled with a delay with logistic issues. This was due to complex 
financial and procurement procedures within the European Community 
(Kurowska, 2009, p. 205). The coordination between the THEMIS and 
Community was further hampered by “inter-institutional and individual tensions 
between THEMIS’s Head of Mission and the Commission’s delegation” (Helly, 
2009, p. 94).  
                                                          
162 According to Kurowska, the Georgian authorities were disappointed by the low political profile of EU 
THEMIS as a rule-of-law project. (Kurowska, 2009, p. 205) 
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Referring to the reform status in 2005, Helly points out remaining 
misunderstandings over crucial issues between Georgians and Europeans about 
the rationale of the reform (Helly, 2009, p. 97). For instance, the 
misunderstanding over what constitutes an independent judiciary surfaced when 
the executive power dismissed all the judges and put one third of them on a 
reverse list no independent Georgian organization existed to protect the judges 
(Helly, 2009, p. 97). 
 
The absence of the political commitment and absence of consensus in the 
direction of the justice reform created a space for divergent approaches to the 
justice reform between European and American donors. EU THEMIS experts 
objected to proposals such as plea bargaining, jury trials and the creation of an 
ombudsman with prosecutor-like-prerogatives as they regarded them as 
“reflecting the position of the American Bar Association in Georgia and some local 
NGOs” (Kurowska, 2009, p. 206) and thought that those proposals were to 
advocate the American model. The divergence between the European and 
American legal philosophies were reflected in the competition between two 
groups of Georgian NGOs. The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), a 
leading NGO in the field of legal and human rights issues, were more inclined to 
the European law, while the Liberty Institute, an NGO which played a crucial role 
in the anti-Shevardnadze movements and closely associated with Saakashvili 
and other influential politicians such as Giga Bokeria, was influenced by Anglo-
American law (Helly, 2009, p. 96). 
 
EU THEMIS exposed the challenges in the logistics and political recognition, as 
well as the internal rivalries both in the Georgian and Commission sides. The 
example of EU THEMIS illustrated the ambitious objectives of EU THEMIS to be 
achieved within the one-year project duration and that the implementation 
arrangement did not match to meet the ambitious objectives. 
 
7.3.4 Border control: expanded assistance and limited impacts 
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As discussed in chapter 5, the USA had provided Georgia with training on the 
border management since the Shevardnadze period. Besides Georgia’s border 
control activities being supported by the US assistance, the border control 
activities in the Georgian-Chechen border were conducted by the OSCE Border 
Monitoring Operation. The border control assistance had a major shift in 2005 
when the relations between Europe and Russia deteriorated over the status of 
Kosovo and resulted in the suspension of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation 
on the Georgian-Chechen border. Following the suspension of the OSCE 
operation, Georgia requested the EU to play a larger role in the border control 
issues (Helly, 2009, p. 95).  
 
Responding to the request from Georgia, the EU Member States increased its 
engagement in the border control on the Georgian-Chechen border by expanding 
the EUSR support team with the presence of border security experts.163 The 
EUSR’s mandate was amended in July 2005. According to the amended mandate, 
the EUSR’s mandate included: 
 
 providing “the European Union with reporting and a continued 
assessment of the border situation and facilitating confidence-building 
between Georgia and the Russian Federation, thereby ensuring efficient 
cooperation and liaison with all relevant actors;” 
 “assisting “the Georgian Border Guard and other relevant government 
institutions in Tbilisi in preparing a comprehensive reform strategy;” and 
 “working “with the Georgian authorities to increase communication 
between Tbilisi and the border, including mentoring. This will be done by 
working closely with Regional Border Guard Centres between Tbilisi and 
the border (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia)” (European Union, 
2005).  
 
The amendment also had a EUSR support team to “oversee the implementation 
of the strategy for the reform of the criminal justice system by the Georgian 
authorities and other actors, in particular through providing support to the 
Steering Group set up by the Georgian government” (European Union, 2005). 
                                                          
163 The Commission had an advisory project in the MIA, including a Border Guards component (Helly, 
2009, p. 95). 
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The foreign assistance and the government’s efforts in improving capacities of 
the customs and border control were yet to be seen, as revealed by field research 
conducted in 2005 (Koyama, 2005). Despite the reform efforts, capacity of the 
customs officials declined according to local respondents. Smuggling was still 
rampant over the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Soviet 
Union dissolved, the actual border seems the same as the Soviet era. An old 
Georgian male participant in Marneuli expresses that the actual scale of 
smuggling across the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan by saying: “Frankly 
speaking, the real frontier we have is only with Turkey.”164 In Marneuli, people 
noticed the slight decrease of smuggling since the middle 1990. They believed 
that improving the economic situation was the only effective way to reduce 
incidence of smuggling rather than increased capacities of custom offices. 
Similarly, in Zugdidi, people reported weak capacities of the border guards. One 
interviewee told:  
 
“Nobody is satisfied with the frontier military work. Kidnapping of 
neighbours in the bordering area by Abkhaz criminals is very common. The 
neighbours are constantly under fear. People are unprotected because the 
frontier military works badly.”165 
 
The improved regulations over custom officials and border guards remained 
largely unappreciated to the people. People cited the increasing price of bribe. 
According to a female Azeri participant, the cost of bribery increased 
approximately from 30 GEL to 100 GEL between 2004 and 2005. People in 
Zugdidi also pointed out the illegal trade as being problematic. 
 
7.4 Security consequences in the SSR efforts between 2004 and 2008 
 
Saakashvili’s political stance was very much inclined to liberal democratic values, 
such as the respect for human rights. As the previous chapter discusses, the 
reform efforts led to a number of changes in the Georgian security sector. The 
                                                          
164 Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. 
165 Author’s interview, March 2005, Zugdidi.  
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modernisation of the military, the separation of the justice from the executive, the 
abolishment of the MSS and the replacement of the Traffic Police with the Patrol 
Police were among security sector change that the Saakashvili government 
realised. External assistance from the Western allies was provided in supporting 
his reform efforts as well as the Saakashvili government’s aspiration for the 
reintegration into the EU and NATO.  
 
The actual implementation of the SSR and its assistance efforts appears to have 
mixed results. As chapter 5 discusses, the Georgian side showed a lack of the 
genuine commitment to establishing liberal democratic principles such as the 
parliamentary oversight of the security sector. As for the external assistance 
providers, it turned out that in some areas their assistance was limited in terms 
of the depth of normative changes and implemented in an ad hoc manner within 
a short period of time. 
 
The following part of this chapter analyses security consequences from state 
security, regime security and human security perspectives. The section examines 
what security issues remained unattended in the SSR process during the period.  
 
7.4.1 Regime security: reinforced by liberal democratic reform efforts 
 
The violent suppression of anti-government demonstration was carried out by the 
Saakashvili government that claimed to be liberal democrat, and not by the 
Shevardnadze government. 
 
As in the Shevardnadze period, SSR efforts in the police sphere were particularly 
driven by Georgian domestic political dynamics. Under the Saakashvili 
government, the power dynamics were played out between the young, liberal 
democratic political elites led by Saakashvili and the former Soviet nomenklatura 
represented by the power ministries, especially the MIA. The police sphere saw 
the most illustrative example of how the political dynamics influenced the direction 
of reform efforts. The reform efforts including the abolishment of the MSS, the 
replacement of the Traffic Police with the Patrol Police and the large scale lay-off 
and staff reshuffle in the security sector institutions contributed to concentrating 
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power on Saakashvili. The reform efforts also helped the Shevardnadze build 
dominant political influence, to an extent that oppositions and some international 
critiques expressed concerns that his government had become an authoritarian 
regime.166 
 
When the anti-Saakashvili demonstrations peaked in November 2007, the 
authoritarian feature of the government became highlighted by its usage of the 
police. As mentioned in the previous chapter, police dispersed the 
demonstrations in a harsh manner. The government’s reaction to the 
demonstrations and the use of the police tarnished the liberal democratic 
reputation of the Saakashvili regime. The November 2007 event had the 
president declare a 10-day long state of emergency and prompted strong criticism 
by the international community (Human Rights Watch, 2007d, 2007a).  
 
7.4.2 State security: defeated in the 2008 Georgia-Russia War 
 
As in the Shevardnadze time, the issue of the two separatist regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia remained the biggest threat to state security of Georgia under 
Saakashvili. The difference between the two governments lay in their diplomatic 
stance to relations with Russia. The Saakashvili government’s militant approach 
invited a direct armed confrontation with Russia over South Ossetia in August 
2008. Since April 2008, Georgian troops entered into the South Ossetian territory 
repeatedly. The August War began by illegal attacks by the Georgian troops 
(European Union, 2009). Within five days, the fighting ended, with Russia’s de 
facto victory. Consequently, Georgia lost the two separatist territories of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia to Russia which declared the recognition of the independence 
of the two territories (Levy, 2008).  
 
The 2008 War shows a negative consequence of Georgia’s engagement with 
NATO in terms of state security. During the Saakashvili period, Georgia 
strengthened the relations with NATO through the compact capacity training and 
Georgia’s participation in ISAF operations in Iraq since 2003 and Afghanistan 
since 2004. In April 2008, NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed that 
                                                          
166 Author’s interviews, March 2005, Tbilisi. 
201 
 
Georgia will become a member of NATO (“Budapest summit declaration,” 1994). 
The acceptance to NATO did not guarantee Georgia its state security 
automatically. The combat capacity training paid off for NATO. As a result of the 
long-term training of its troops in counter-insurgency, Georgia became the biggest 
troop contributor to ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The capacity development 
efforts in the defence sphere in Georgia contributed hugely by increasing the 
NATO troops engaged in counter-terrorism campaigns, and to the strategic 
interest of the NATO allies, especially the USA. The military assistance and 
cooperation in the field of counter-insurgency thus brought Georgia a remarkable 
progress in forging close strategic relations with NATO.  
 
From the perspective of Georgian state security, on the other hand, the outcome 
of the partnership with NATO does not appear to be a positive one. The 2008 War 
with Russia revealed a number of shortcomings in the Georgian army. When the 
war broke out in August 2008, 2,000 Georgian troops trained under the GSSOP 
were in not Georgia but in Iraq.167 Even those troops that received the USA-
sponsored programme were not equipped prepared for the warfare with Russia, 
according to some observers. For instance, Cheterian, citing a retired US Army 
General who was in charge of the Georgia Defence Reform Programme, points 
out that Georgia did not have a cohesive combat force necessary for the type of 
operation launched in August 2008 (Cheterian, 2009, p. 163). In spite of the heavy 
investment in the Georgian troops through the GSSOP and its predecessor, 
GTEP, according to the US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Eric S. 
Edelman, “the Georgian armed forces were never trained or equipped by the U.S. 
to fight the Russians” (Georgia-Russia crisis, implications and US response, 
testimony of Eric S. Edelman, 2008). A classified assessment by the US defence 
department reports that the Georgian armed forces were “prone to impulsive 
rather than deliberate decision making, undermined by unclear lines of command 
and led by senior officials who were selected for personal relationships rather 
than professional qualifications” (Chivers and Shanker, 2008). 
 
Both the Saakashvili government and its Western allies had an ambitious goal of 
integrating Georgia into NATO as a full member, and a heavy investment followed 
                                                          
167 The Georgian government recalled the 2,000 troops from Iraq to engage with the fights with Russia 
(Civil Georgia, 2008). 
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in order to achieve the goal. The result of the 2008 war with Russia and how the 
Georgian army fought in the war showed that the goal remained afar despite the 
efforts. 
 
7.4.3 Human security: persistent security challenges at community level 
 
As the previous section discusses, OSCE provided its assistance with a focus on 
security in communities. However, their intervention was limited in terms of the 
thematic scope, financial availability and project period. Within the circumstances, 
the external assistance could leave few tangible impacts on human security. In 
post-2003 Georgia, there were still a number of human security issues 
insufficiently addressed.  
 
7.4.3.1 Persistent mistrust in the police 
 
The Human Rights Report by Human Rights Watch published in April 2005 
reports that the Saakashvili government took steps to address abusive practices 
by the police, but these efforts have been inadequate to eradicate them (Human 
Rights Watch, 2005a, p. 2). The youth population, young men particularly, were 
targeted by the police’s coercive behaviour. The abusive behaviour of the police 
generated further distrust, as experienced by a young Georgian man in Zugdidi:  
   
“One day I was taken up by the police. They told me I had served in the 
army, although I haven’t. They brought me to the police station and began 
checking me up. How can I trust the police that lie?”168 
 
The Saakashvili government encouraged active media campaign to increase 
popular support for the newly created Patrol Police. A new TV programme called 
Patrol Police was aired to demonstrate good performances and portray a positive 
image of the police. The Patrol Police was appreciated in Tbilisi and other urban 
settings where they were most active, respondents in Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and 
Zugdidi noted that the police in general had few positive impacts on their daily 
                                                          
168 Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
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lives. They also reported misconduct by the police including torture; not coming 
when called or come only when bribed; bribes for creating documentation, 
especially driving licenses; theft, including stealing from confiscated materials 
and during crime investigations; false arrest, accusation, and imprisonment; 
harassing youth; and arms and drugs trafficking.169 
 
7.4.3.2 Marginalised ethnic minorities 
 
The police reform by the Saakashvili government focused on the public safety in 
larger cities such as Tbilisi, where various ethnic groups co-existed with little 
friction. Compared with the Gamsakhurdia period, Georgia had a lesser degree 
of violence related to ethnicities. Yet, according to the field study conducted in 
post-2003 Georgia, few participants believed that grievance between different 
ethnic groups disappeared (Koyama, 2005). In the study, Georgian participants 
in Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli conveyed their feeling that their Armenian and Azeri 
neighbours keep their resentment against Georgians. One female participant 
from Akhaltsikhe told, for example, that she felt awkward to introduce herself as 
a head of the ‘national’ theatre to her Armenian audience.170 In Marneuli, male 
Georgian participants recalled a recent dispute between Georgian and Azeri 
communities. According to them, one day during a ritual at a Georgian Church, 
some Azeris had come to hang a dead dog from the entrance of the church upon 
an order by an akhsakhkal.171 In post-2003 Georgia, there were far fewer armed 
disputes between ethnic groups than in the 1990. Yet, underpinning mistrust 
between them seemed unsolved.  
 
Ethnic minorities pointed out that the Georgian language was a key for their social 
and economic security. Rather, ethnicity had become a contested issue among 
the residents mainly because of the pro-Georgian language policy recently 
adopted by the Saakashvili government. The constitution of Georgia defines 
Georgian as the state language in 1995. The new Saakashvili government 
                                                          
169 Focus group interviews, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi.  
170 Focus group interview, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe. 
171 Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. 
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adopted a policy allowing only Georgian to be an official state and working 
language in 2004.172  
 
Whilst promoting the Georgian nationalist and the Georgian language in society, 
the government did not provide adequate support for then population of ethnic 
minorities. In areas where the majority of its inhabitants were ethnic minorities, 
schools were not equipped with capable Georgian teachers and manuals, either. 
They felt the government did not support them at all. One middle age Azeri man 
in Marneuli put his frustration against Tbilisi bitterly: 
 
“Azeris living in Kakheti, Tbilisi and Kapsi speak Georgian perfectly. The 
government must elaborate a special programme for us. Not that one for 
show, but a real one, which will give us an opportunity to learn the 
language. They say they will many times, but so far we see no results. All 
these seem like an empty promise. I think the government does not want 
us to speak Georgian” (Koyama, 2005). 
 
Saakashvili appealed to ethnic minorities through political gestures by addressing 
in minority languages and announcing a programme to train young 
representatives from minority groups in Georgian university for future government 
positions (Nodia, 2005). 
 
In the SSR efforts, either by the domestic and foreign assistance efforts, there 
were no particular effort paid to curtail the ethnic tension. This was particularly 
demonstrated in the community security sphere, in the police reform context. The 
number of police officers in regions decreased because of the recent lay-off of 
police officers as part of the police reform. New replacements arrived; however, 
most of the newly recruited officers were ethnic Georgians. This was because of 
the new language policy: the governmental officials are obliged to possess 
enough Georgian skills in speaking and drafting. This language requirement 
prevented ethnic Armenian and Azeris from the minority dominated regions such 
as Kvemo Kartli and Samktskhe-Javakneti from being recruited.   
 
                                                          
172 The Chapter of Regional Language has not been adopted as of May 2005.  
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In Kvemo Kartli, different social groups expressed different degrees of mistrust 
against the police. In Marneuli, male Georgian participants reported troublesome 
relations between the Azeri community and the police in the Kvemo-Kartli 
region.173 Emphasising that the tension between ethnic Azeris and the police was 
much less in Marneuli, the Georgian participants claimed that the Azeri population 
were afraid of the police and collectively resist the police when an Azeri citizen 
were arrested, especially in the rural areas.174 The Azeri participants expressed 
mistrust against and tension with the police. Some male Azeri participants 
believed that the police treat Azeris unfairly.175 
 
The reason for the current frustrations among the Azeri population was, however, 
not only due to ethnicities, but also due to the state language problem. The male 
Azeri participants claimed that the Georgian language requirement for state 
officials reduced the number of Azeri police officers. 176  According to them, 
although there were no official regulations to discharge non-Georgian speaking 
personnel, Azeri officers felt pressured to leave their office if they were not 
competent in Georgian.177 Consequently, the decreased number of ethnic Azeris 
in the state structure deepened the distance between the Azeri community and 
the police. The increasing sense of mistrust with the police drove ethnic Azeris to 
call for their own community network to settle conflicts and resolve problems.  
 
7.4.3.3 Domestic violence 
 
Women were constantly afraid of being robbed on the street. Compared to the 
Soviet times, women report that street safety had deteriorated significantly in the 
last 15 years. In Marneuli, women felt less secure on street as a result of the 
abolishment of the Traffic Police by the Saakashvili government.178 While the 
general public supports the abolishment, female participants in Marneuli claimed 
that the less visibility of police officers contributed to the increase in street crimes, 
and confine themselves to their houses, because: “We are afraid of walking down 
                                                          
173 Focus group interview, March 2005, Marneuli. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
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the street, because we are afraid of being robbed.”179  Ironically, they stated that 
they felt more insecure after the police reform.  
 
Some of the causes of crimes were attributed to the collapse of the Soviet system, 
difficulties in finding jobs and incompetence of the law enforcement bodies, 
Unemployment among men were considered particularly problematic. In Marneuli, 
an old male participant expressed that one needed to earn money illegally when 
unemployed without any social welfare.180 In Zugdidi, one female participant 
recounted that she frequently heard stories that wives of unemployed husbands 
urged them to do anything, even committing crimes, to bring home some 
money.181 Given the economic hardship, the workshop participants showed a 
mixed feeling of sympathy and resignation against criminals. 
 
Gender-based violence (GBV) remained an acute problem in Georgia, yet the 
issue was neither widely discussed nor recognized as a crime. As a result, the 
police hardly intervene to solve GBV. As far as what the interviewees in this 
research told, mostly women were the main victim of GBV.182 GBV in Georgia 
often took the form of husbands beating their wives when they were drunk. A 
female interviewee referred to the frequency of GBV in her community and told: 
“If you’ve got a sane husband, you are a very lucky person.”183 In the group 
discussions, there were clear differences in the attitudes towards GBV between 
male and female participants. Male participants talked little about violence 
against women. In one workshop, participants laughed and waved off the topic, 
failing to engage in a serious discussion. 184  In contrast, female participants 
sometimes brought up the issue spontaneously, and were willing to discuss it for 
long periods. A female participant in Zugdidi told: 
 
“My neighbour drinks a lot. When he is drunk, he beats his wife. They have 
a 9-year old boy. When the parents start to quarrel, the boy first asks his 
mother to keep quiet, and then his father not to beat her. Once the woman 
                                                          
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
182 Focus group interviews, March 2005, Akhaltsikhe, Marneuli and Zugdidi. 
183 Focus group interview, March 2005, Zugdidi. 
184 Ibid. 
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called the police. She told them that their house was robbed, because she 
was afraid that the police would not come if she told them the truth.”185 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Foreign assistance for the SSR efforts between 2003 and 2008 were strongly 
affected by the strategic interests of the major assistance providers i.e. the Euro-
Atlantic allies. The Georgian government under Saakashvili, on the other hand, 
selected and accepted foreign assistance in areas, such as the defence sphere, 
where their own political interest could also meet. However, the uncomprehensive 
SSR implementation and assistance based on political and strategic interests of 
the Georgian political elites and the assistance providers left Georgia and its 
people with costly security consequences: persisting community insecurity, 
tarnished regime reputation and jeopardised state security. The so-called Rose 
Revolution in 2003 brought young political leadership led by Saakashvili to power 
by replacing Shevardnadze. Saakashvili and his elite political allies were inclined 
to liberal democratic values. The post-Rose Revolution period largely coincides 
with the eastern expansion of the EU and NATO that started in 2004. Unlike this 
predecessor, Saakashvili made his Euro-Atlantic oriented diplomatic stance and 
domestic political stance that was anti-Soviet nomenclature from an outset.  
 
Despite the regime change and the subsequent shifts in domestic political 
dynamics and external relations, the interplay with the external SSR assistance 
and local dynamics remained the same as the one under the Shevardnadze 
government. It appears that the provision of the SSR assistance between 2004 
and 2008 continues to be driven by the strategic interests among the assistance 
providers. Georgia actively invited external support in the areas where they found 
a mutual interest in having reform efforts.  
 
The defence sphere is the prime example. SSR efforts in the defence sphere saw 
mutual interests of Georgia and NATO, and of the USA to be more precise, met 
most. As in the times of Shevardnadze, the SSR assistance initiatives provided 
by the Euro-Atlantic allies mainly focused on the development of border control 
                                                          
185 Ibid. 
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and combat capacities. The main objective was to enhance Georgia’s capacities 
to participate as part of the USA and its allies’ international operations against 
terrorism. The assistance was provided to enhance Georgian troops’ counter-
terrorism combat capacities and NATO compatibility. The GSSOP was provided 
in this context and succeeded in training Georgian troops that could be deployed 
in international operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The GSSOP-trained Georgian 
troops thus contributed to increasing the manpower to the international 
operations and benefitted to NATO and its allies. In particular, the strengthened 
partnership between Georgia and NATO, and the USA was a positive 
achievement for the Saakashvili government whose relations with Russia had 
increasingly deteriorated and become hostile. 
 
The police and justice spheres were the other areas on which the Saakashvili 
government focused its reform efforts. Reflecting the strategic interest in ensuring 
a secure border control, the international community’s role in the police sphere 
was mainly on the border control issues. For instance, the USA had a primal 
interest in securing the border facing Chechnya; OSCE provided the Border 
Monitor operations alongside Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and later training of 
the police. The EU had expanded its engagement to the rule of law and border 
control issues. On the other hand, most of the foreign assistance in the domestic 
policing issue was limited, despite the police reform being the priority of the 
Saakashvili administration. The external assistance providers’ approach to the 
provision of assistance in the police and judiciary was different from the one in 
the defence sphere. Unlike in the defence sphere, external assistance in the 
police and justice spheres were provided in an ad hoc manner. Most of the 
assistance took the form of the provision of training, workshops and the provision 
of equipment. 
 
The analysis in this chapter provides the following observations on the 
consequences of the external actors’ interest-based SSR assistance. First, the 
SSR efforts focused on external security issues left internal security issues within 
Georgia little attended. As in the Shevardnadze period, community insecurity 
persisted. Furthermore, Georgia’s state security was jeopardized when the 2008 
Georgia-Russia war broke out. The best trained Georgian troops by the GSSOP 
had been deployed in international operations outside Georgia, leaving Georgia 
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without its best trained troops when Georgia became engaged in a war with 
Russia in 2008, and cost Georgia the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. 
 
Second, since the SSR assistance was driven by the strategic interests of the 
assistance providers, the direction and content of the engagement of the Euro-
Atlantic allies were heavily influenced by their relations with Russia, resulting in 
compromised SSR support. Saakashvili’s Georgia managed to forge a closer 
relation with the Euro-Atlantic allies and enticed their expanded engagement in 
SSR efforts. However, as the relation with the Euro-Atlantic bloc and Russia 
deteriorated, their assistance became significantly affected. The suspension of 
the OSCE Border Monitor operation is its primal example. This shows that the 
SSR assistance in Georgia was not only affected by the domestic and external 
dynamics surrounding Georgia but also the political dynamics within and around 
the SSR assistance providers.  
 
Third, little effort in civilian control of security forces, particularly paramilitaries, 
led to jeopardise both regime security and state security. The Saakashvili 
government received ample reform assistance in the defence and rule of law 
spheres, based on democratic principles of human rights and democratic control 
of armed forces. However, most of the assistance remained at a technical level 
and were provided in an ad hoc manner in a short-period of time and did not lead 
to substantive normative changes in security sector governance. In the defence 
sphere, for instance, the Euro-Atlantic allies focused on developing the combat 
capacities of Georgian troops and left Georgia to tackle with the issue of 
democratic control of its security forces. The two incidents of Okruashvili, the then 
Ministers of Defence and Internal Affairs, entering into the Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia territories, are the illuminating example of inappropriate control of the 
security forces, in particular, those of the paramilitary nature. The Saakashvili 
government’s violent repression of anti-government demonstrators in November 
2007 is another example of the persisting repressive nature of the paramilitary 
forces.  
 
As in the case of the SSR assistance efforts under the Shevardnadze government, 
external assistance remained supplementary and did not result in the introduction 
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of normatively driven reform efforts in the security sector. Rather, the overall 
security sector change is largely superficial change rather than SSR. What is 
noteworthy is that even during the Saakashvili period with the ample SSR 
assistance, no substantial SSR efforts and foreign assistance were provided for 
paramilitary forces. The paramilitary forces were left to be mobilised by individual 
political elites and/or the government without following a legal procedure. While 
the other security sector actors underwent varying degrees of reform initiatives, 
the paramilitaries were yet again left unattended in the SSR process. The next 
chapter focuses on the paramilitaries and examines why they escaped from 
substantial SSR efforts throughout the entire period between 1985 and 2008. 
While its main focus is on Georgia, the next chapter expands its scope beyond 
Georgia and looks at other countries. 
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Chapter 8 Paramilitary change in transitional societies 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Following the five core chapters on Georgia, Part III of this thesis consisting of 
this chapter examines how the domestic agenda-setting process for security 
sector change is driven by certain dynamics and factors, with a focus on 
paramilitaries. By examining paramilitaries in Georgia and beyond, the chapter 
explores how closely the overall political process interlinked with the process of 
paramilitary change, which takes various trajectories largely independent of 
external SSR assistance.  
 
In doing so, the chapter first builds its analysis on the literature review in chapter 
2. The Georgia case study in the preceding chapters of Part II demonstrates and 
examines the significant roles played by paramilitaries in conflict-affected 
transitional society in Georgia. Building on the Georgia case study, the 
subsequent section expands its scope beyond Georgia and fills in the gap in the 
literature on the security sector actors and political developments by providing an 
in-depth analysis on paramilitaries in transitional societies. More specifically, the 
section analyses varying types of paramilitaries and their functions and roles, as 
well as how paramilitaries in post-conflict interplay with political dynamics in 
societies.  
 
The next section builds on the liberal peace critiques discussed in chapter 2, in 
particular, the critical liberal peacebuilding literature from the perspectives of local 
ownership, actors and dynamics. This section scrutinises these local dynamics in 
the security sector change process in Georgia and analyses how the 
paramilitaries escaped from external reform assistance and how local political 
dynamics drove the course of paramilitary change.  
 
The chapter ends by demonstrating the need for more close examination of 
paramilitaries and political dynamics surrounding their reform, as a sub-section 
in the SSR studies. While the chapter develops its argument by being based on 
the Georgia case study, it also refers to other countries’ examples. 
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8.2 Typology of paramilitaries: state, quasi-state and non-state paramilitaries 
 
The definition of paramilitary is ambiguous, as discussed in chapter 2, reflecting 
the blurred status of paramilitaries in the spectrum, i.e., between police and 
military as well as state and non-state actors, in which they are discussed. Their 
logistical, legal and functional characteristics differ from case to case. However, 
there are some criteria that help us to classify them into a few clusters. For 
instance, the IISS Military Balance offers one of the examples of selecting armed 
forces in a paramilitary category based on the armed forces’ military nature in 
their equipment, function and training.186 
 
A common feature of paramilitaries is that their weaponry is typically light infantry, 
despite of their varying affiliations. Difference in degree and nature of legitimacy 
of paramilitaries, or their relation to state, can classify them into three types: state, 
non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries. Depending on whether they are 
recognized as a full-fledged state organ or not, their types vary over further 
criteria, i.e., function and, in case of state paramilitaries, mandate and ministerial 
affiliation. 
 
8.2.1 State paramilitaries 
 
The first type, state paramilitary, include state security sector actors such as 
military, police, presidential guards and coastal guards. Those paramilitary 
groups can be further classified based on their governmental affiliation, as 
discussed in the following sub-section. State paramilitaries are often found in 
continental European countries and former Soviet Union countries. Prominent 
examples of state paramilitaries include Italy’s Carabinieri and France’s 
                                                          
186 The Military Balance does not include paramilitary forces as part of regular military forces, yet they 
refers paramilitary forces “whose training, organisation, equipment and control suggest they may be 
usable in support, or in lieu, of regular military forces.” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1994, p. 5) Their definition of the term, armed forces, reflects the inclination of the authors of the Military 
Balance to categorise non-military actors as armed forces should the armed forces have equipment, 
function and training of a military nature. The term armed forces “includes paramilitary forces such as the 
gendarmerie, customs service and border guard if these are trained in military tactics, equipped as a 
military force and operate under military authority in the event of war.” (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 10) 
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Gendarmaries.  
 
Either being affiliated to the military or law enforcement bodies, paramilitaries are 
usually equipped with military weaponry, often with small arms and light weapons, 
but not with heavy weaponry. They are equipped and trained for operations which 
require guerrilla fighting and urban combating. Typically, paramilitary forces have 
relatively small, mobile, light infantry as compared to those of the military. Some 
law enforcement bodies with paramilitary forces including internal security forces 
and border control have training, equipment and composition similar to those of 
the military. Internal Troops of the Russian MIA (MVD) and India’s Border Security 
Force are among the examples. Both non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries are 
equipped and composed as state paramilitaries.  
 
When it comes to function and mandate, paramilitaries vary its characteristics 
drastically. As Hills focuses on actual function of policing function of internal 
forces and rightly points out that paramilitaries have played significant roles in 
societies. (Hills, 2000) Ministerial affiliation does not necessarily correspond to a 
type of function that they engage. In some countries, they are engaged in law 
enforcement functioning, whilst in other countries, they may participate in military 
operations. In the case of France’s Gendarmaries, they are engaged in a wide 
range of activities including crowd control, counter-terrorism operations, coast 
guard, control at airports, and so forth. It is not rare that roles and responsibilities 
of paramilitary forces duplicate or overlap with those of the military and police. In 
some other countries, function and mandate of paramilitary forces are not clearly 
specified. This is often the case with special forces such as presidential guards. 
 
State paramilitaries’ mandates and functions vary, depending on governance 
style. In democratically stable countries, paramilitary groups are legitimate and 
have clear mandates complimentary to those of the military and police. In Britain, 
policing has been carried out by civilians whilst the military was kept away from 
intervening in policing. 187  In contrast, in continental European countries, 
paramilitaries have traditionally engaged in policing functioning. The prime 
                                                          
187 However, this trend has been changing in the recent years. In the US, some law enforcement 
functioning has been militaries, especially in the area of boarder control along with the border with 
Mexico. In UK, urban policing has become militaries since the 9/11 attacks in the US. 
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example is Gendermarie Nationale of France. Gendermarie is a national police 
force with military status. It takes charge of law enforcement in rural areas and 
military installations. Several other continental European countries follow the 
French model, with paramilitaries responsible mainly for rural area security. 
Caribinieri of Italy, Bundesgrenzschutz of Germany, Guardia Civil of Spain are 
such examples. Another type of paramilitary function in democratic countries is 
intelligence. There are examples where paramilitaries belong to intelligence 
services such as paramilitary units of the USA’s CIA and Israel’s Mossad. Those 
groups are highly trained in commando operations rather than in law enforcement. 
 
The Soviet Union had a distinct policing style from those in the Western European 
states (Stepanova, 2005). Instead of focusing mainly on crime control as, say, 
British policing, the focus of the Soviet militia was not on crime control and 
prevention. Rather, the policing focused on protecting state property and 
maintaining social and political control (Shelley, 1994, p. 57). In particular, policing 
in its non-Russian states became political. As Turk observed in other cases, the 
Soviet policing was also politicised (Turk, 1982). In particular, “As all threats to 
the political order were perceived as impinging the power of the imperial state, 
law enforcement in these areas (non-Russian areas) became highly politicized” 
(Shelley, 1994, p. 57). Therefore, the major aim of paramilitaries was to control 
the populace of the territory within the Soviet Union, and in order to achieve this 
goal, a strong centralised policing institution was necessary.  
 
Under the policing style, the Internal Troops’ role was to control the population. 
Among the internal security apparatus, paramilitary troops had a significant role 
in the control of the populace in the Soviet territory. The internal security organs, 
the NKVD and subsequently the KGB, had three troops under its control for the 
purpose of ensuring internal security (Shelley, 1994, p. 57). Those three 
paramilitary bodies are the Internal Troops, the Security Troops and the Border 
Troops. The Internal Troops (vnutrennie voiska) were first established in 1919 
under the NKVD then shifted to the MVD in 1954 when the KGB was established. 
Until then, the Internal Troops were under the authority of the secret police. The 
most of their paramilitaries were conscripts. One of their most important functions 
was that of preventing internal disorder that might threaten the regime’s political 
stability. Other duties of the Internal Troops included controlling crowds in large 
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cities by supplementing the militsiia, and guarding large-scale industrial 
enterprises, railroad stations, certain large stockpiles of food and material, and 
certain communication centres.  
 
The Security Troops were affiliated to the KGB, and their duties were not clearly 
specified by the Soviet sources. Their duties probably included guarding key 
government and party buildings and officials, as well as counterterrorist and 
counterinsurgency operations. The Security Troops were also reportedly 
employed along with the MVD’s Internal Troops, to suppress public protests and 
disperse demonstration. The KGB had another paramilitary body, the Border 
Troops (пограничные войска). Although the KGB was an internal security organ, 
the Border Guards were conscripted as part of the biannual call-up of the MoD. 
Their duties included repulsing armed incursions into Soviet territory; preventing 
illegal crossing of the border or the transport of weapons, explosives, contraband, 
or subversive literature across the border; monitoring the observance of 
established procedures at border crossing points; monitoring the observance by 
Soviet and foreign ships of navigation procedures in Soviet territorial waters; and 
assisting state agencies in the preservation of natural resources and the 
protection of the environment from pollution. At the republic level, the KGB did 
not supervise units of the Border Troops. 
 
In case of the state paramilitary forces, they can be further classified depending 
on their ministerial affiliation. Some are affiliated to the military structure or the 
police, or to both the military and the police. Some paramilitary forces including 
gendarmeries with policing function belong to the MoD. Italy’s Carabinieri is an 
example. Other forces belong to the MIA (as in the case in Argentina). France’s 
Gendarmaries belong to both the ministries of defence and internal affairs. There 
are a few cases of paramilitaries belonging to intelligence services and political 
entities. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for instance, has the Special 
Activities Division. 
 
8.2.2 Quasi-state and non-state paramilitaries 
 
There are a number of non-state paramilitary groups that are not recognized by 
216 
 
a state, especially in conflict-affected countries. These paramilitaries are often 
called guerrillas and insurgents (e.g., Colombia’s FARC and ELN) by 
governments that they are fighting against. While some of such non-state 
paramilitaries are fighting against a regime in the country, other non-state 
paramilitaries have a political wing to represent their political position (e.g., 
Hamas in Palestine and Huzbollah in Lebanon). As Alyev, Carey and Mazzei point 
out, non-state paramilitaries do not necessarily mean anti-government (Aliyev, 
2016; Carey et al., 2013; Mazzei, 2009). As the recent paramilitary literature 
shows, a number of non-state paramilitary forces are pro-government (Aliyev, 
2016; Carey et al., 2013; Mazzei, 2009) Although those paramilitaries are not 
formerly associated with a state, they play a significant role in executing what the 
state that they are closely linked to (Aliyev, 2016; Carey et al., 2013; Malyarenko 
and Galbreath, 2016; Mazzei, 2009). In addition, there are private security 
companies and groups of individuals such as mercenaries that belong to the 
category of non-state paramilitaries. Paramilitaries under this sub-category 
usually do not limit their royalty to any particular actors and often shift their 
reporting line from one party to another, depending on contract. 
 
Some paramilitaries can be termed as quasi-state paramilitaries: they function as 
a de facto state organ although they are not necessarily recognized as state 
organs in legal terms. This is often the case in societies affected by and/or 
emerging from armed conflict where the legitimacy over state organs is contested. 
Such quasi-state paramilitary groups might have certain degree and nature of 
legitimacy and support from communities, political groups and/or political parties, 
to which they are associated with.  
 
The first prominent characteristic of contemporary paramilitaries in a fragile state, 
either affected by a violent conflict or by a radical regime change, is that members 
often follow individual commanders for personal loyalty rather than because of 
official affiliation. Those leaders are usually self-made strongmen, often with 
criminal backgrounds and little professional military experience. In the former 
Yugoslavia, there were 83 paramilitary groups operating during the conflict 
(Kaldor, 1999). On the Serbian side, the most notorious groups are ‘Tiger’ led by 
Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as Arkan, and ‘White Eagle’ led by Vojislav Seselji. 
Arkan was known as a hit man for the communist regime, as well as a criminal 
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accused of bank robberies and murder. Those strongmen figures mobilise their 
paramilitaries to achieve their individual political and economic goals. For 
example, the anti-government armed forces in eastern DRC are under the 
personal control of individual commanders. Although they are officially, and 
supposedly, part of the Congolese national army, their actual activities include 
looting, fighting against other armed factions, often collaborating with other 
national armed forces, such as Ugandans. 
 
Secondly, the weak or no de jure nor de facto legitimacy, paramilitary forces in 
fragile states tend to attract young males to join the force for various reasons. On 
the war in the former Yugoslavia, Woodward observes that “The war became an 
opportunity for a revolt of the disadvantaged, for individual enrichment, for 
political aspirations, and for revenge against the communist regime” (Woodward, 
1995, p. 271). Brett and Specht observe that a number of young soldiers join 
armed forces because of an individual opportunity in a context of war.188 For 
young people, especially boys and male adolescents, joining armed forces often 
means that they become an important member of family and community by 
protecting family and community members with arms.  
 
The third major characteristic of paramilitaries in fragile states is the lack of formal 
institutionalisation (or recruiting process) like the conventional military. The 
armies were not composed of professionals but of fathers, sons, and brothers 
from the region. The purpose of the warfare was defence of village and land. 
Except for small elite units, army units were not mobile, were locally recruited 
among farmers and villages of all ages, tended to be led by commanders from 
the areas, and were known to be loyal to that local commander, even if doing so 
meant that they disobeyed orders given higher up the normal chain of command. 
Localised fighting for the territory and soul of a village drew in villagers who had 
tried to stay out of politics but found they had to fight or be killed or expelled (Brett 
and Specht, 2004, pp. 31–32). 
 
Yet, there are several kinds of combatant. There are those who took arms to 
defend their lands, the unemployed youth, the right-wing teenagers, militant 
                                                          
188 Brett and Specht, pp.31-32. 
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extremist volunteer, and criminals released from jails (Woodward, 1995, pp. 249–
250). When the state collapsed, the recruitment of soldiers reinforced the class 
division, because the unemployed, poorer village youth, and industrial workers, 
unpaid for months were more vulnerable to the draft and promises of pay and 
veterans’ benefits. In the former Yugoslavia, paramilitary forces were full of 
teenagers faced with the choice either to leave the country or to join in a military 
organisation, but under little organised command or adult standard of behaviour 
(Woodward, 1995, p. 249). Many of Arkan’s paramilitaries were recruited from a 
fan club of Belgrade’s football team owned by Arkan. Following unprofessional 
commanders driven by personal interests, many of the soldiers did not 
understand what they were fighting for, nor approved a war in which the two 
formerly living closely were fighting and killing one another. 
 
The difference between state paramilitaries and non-state/quasi-state 
paramilitaries is that the paramilitaries in fragile states take a wider function than 
those of stable societies. Paramilitaries in fragile states often have political and 
social roles in addition to usual roles as security forces, as seen in the case of 
Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Some paramilitaries such as IRA and 
Hamas have a political wing to represent their supporters. As non-state 
paramilitaries operate outside of the state structure, they are not mandated to 
function neither as the military and/or law enforcement bodies. On other hand, in 
some cases, it is observed that some of non-state paramilitaries do provide a 
certain degree of law enforcement, whether they are fully endorsed by local 
populations or not. Some non-state paramilitaries such as Hamas and Huzbollah 
also provide a much wider range of services other than security, including 
socioeconomic services in communities. Others play a role as a cultural symbol 
for youth groups, as in the case of Arkan’s Tigers in the Balkans. 
 
In addition to these political and security perspectives, paramilitaries in unstable 
societies such as ones in fragile states have strong socio-economic 
characteristics. In some cases, paramilitaries fill in a governance gap left by 
malfunctioning government. In the Middle East, Hamas and other paramilitaries 
cover socio-economic roles by providing community services such as health and 
education. Some paramilitaries such as FARC in Colombia provide job 
opportunities for poor communities, particularly in rural areas, by recruiting their 
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members as porters and soldiers. Also, as seen in the case of Serbia, 
paramilitaries headed by Arkan offered some sort of social roles for unemployed 
young male. 
 
8.2.3 Paramilitaries in political transition 
 
Unlike the other security sector apparatus such as the military, police and judiciary, 
the role and function of paramilitaries are less clearly defined. Paramilitaries’ 
function and role are often revisited, redefined and sometimes blurred during a 
political transition. There are two major paths of political transition in which 
paramilitaries face substantive transformation, i.e., a) transition from war-torn, 
fragile state to a stable state (reconstruction) and b) transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy (democratisation). 
 
Reconstruction takes place after violent conflict. In a reconstruction process, 
efforts are often made to transform a war-torn, fragile state to a more stable state. 
Reconstruction efforts often aim at building a liberal democratic state, especially 
in post-conflict societies for which the international community, namely of the 
Euro Atlantic countries, provides reconstruction assistance. This is because their 
assistance tends to aim at transforming into a liberal democracy, as the 
international assistance is often provided in accordance with liberal democratic 
values such as the rule of law, independent judiciary and protection of human 
rights. 
 
The second type of transition is democratisation. Post-authoritarian 
democratisation takes in various contexts. In the 1990, for instance, South Africa 
underwent a democratisation process in which their transformed from an 
authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy by ending apartheid. The paramilitary 
forces, along with the police, experienced substantive reform and transformed 
from a state apparatus serving the regime to an institution serving for the people. 
Efforts for democratisation took place in Latin America (since the 1980s) and 
post-Communist Europe (since the 1990), too.189 Unlike South Africa, however, 
                                                          
189 According to Linz and Stepa, South American countries have reached a certain level of consolidated 
democracy (p.221), many of the post-Communist countries remained non-democratic (p.436) (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996).  
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to what extent their paramilitaries have become aligned with liberal democratic 
standards is yet to be examined.  
 
As the previous sections in this chapter show, both in conflict-affected and 
authoritarian societies, paramilitaries are often mobilised to engage in function, 
such as serving specific political and/or ethnic groups and/or political elites (e,g, 
the Chilean Anti-Communist Action (AChA) in Chile in the 1940s, Tiger in the 
Balkans, oppressing dissident populations (e.g. Internal Troops in the former 
Soviet Union). Both in the transitional phases from authoritarianism to democracy 
(democratisation) or from war to peace (reconstruction) paramilitaries face the 
need to transform themselves. 
 
Needless to say, the two transition paths, reconstruction and democratisation, 
may happen at the same time as in the cases of Cambodia (post-Khmer Rouge), 
the DRC (post-Mobutu), Georgia (post-independence) and former Yugoslavia 
(post-conflict). However, this does not mean that reconstruction automatically 
leads to democratisation. Unless normative democratisation efforts are 
substantial, reconstruction efforts can merely mean stabilisation of post-conflict 
societies. Reconstruction may lead to (re-)building an authoritarian regime rather 
than a liberal democracy. 
 
As this section shows, paramilitaries vary among themselves in terms of their 
statutory status, equipment and composition, as well as function and role. In a 
transitional society, either in the process of reconstruction or democratisation or 
both, understanding specific characteristics of paramilitaries is crucial to examine 
whether and how the transition leads to a liberal democracy or re-emergence of 
an authoritarian state or not. In other words, paramilitary change is closely 
interlinked with political processes in a transitional society. In order to examine 
the inter-link between the political processes and paramilitary change, the next 
section takes a close look at post-independence Georgia which underwent both 
reconstruction and democratisation processes. 
 
8.2.4 Patterns of paramilitary change in transitional societies 
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When a SSR process begins in transitional societies undergoing either 
reconstruction and/or democratisation, paramilitaries take varying courses of 
change. There are four main patterns of paramilitary changes. 
 
Disbandment: one scenario is that paramilitaries are disarmed and demobilised. 
This scenario takes place in both post-conflict and non-conflict-affected 
environments. Since the beginning of the 1990s so-called disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes have been implemented and 
dismantled armed forces in post-conflict societies such as Angola, El Salvador, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Nicaragua. The Soviet Internal Troops is another type 
of dismantlement in a non-post-conflict setting, where the political change (the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union) led to the dismantling of the paramilitary forces, 
rather than assisted by the international community as in the case of the South 
African and Latin American countries. 
 
Reintegration into (new) security forces: in other cases, paramilitaries are 
sometimes integrated into (new) national armed forces, usually, the police and 
the military. Paramilitaries restore their political influence, by obtaining a political 
status. Whether the paramilitary leadership share power in a public office is one 
of the most crucial issues in peace-building negotiation. 
 
Transformation into a political party: when paramilitaries are re-inserted into the 
new armed forces and the demilitarised paramilitary force gains a political party 
status, the leadership of the paramilitary force often become politicians or high 
ranked governmental officers. In Serbia, a former commander of the powerful 
paramilitary unit ‘White Eagle’, Seselj, ran for a presidential election in 2002, 
andreceived 36.6 per cent of the votes. In Iraq, the paramilitary head in Meysan 
now holds a seat in the governmental council and his militia have become local 
police officers (Kaldor, 1999, p. 3). 
 
Transformation into democratically controlled armed forces: in societies emerging 
from violent conflict or authoritarian regimes, paramilitaries may take further 
reform efforts to establish civilian control and to demilitarise non-military security 
apparatus (including the police and the intelligence). This path of transformation 
requires the most significant normative change. 
222 
 
 
8.3 Paramilitary change in Georgia between 1985 and 2008 
 
Having emerged from a violent conflict and an authoritarian regime of the Soviet 
Union, Georgia between 1992 and 2008 has characteristic features of a fragile 
state and a post-authoritarian state. Paramilitary change in Georgia during this 
period thus took place in the reconstruction and democratisation processes. It 
was in this context that SSR in Georgia took place. As discussed in the previous 
chapters in Part II (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7), SSR assistance in Georgia 
concentrated on a selective list of security sector spheres such as the defence 
and judiciary. As examined in chapters 5 and 7, the Euro-Atlantic allies as the 
major assistance providers provided their assistance either along with their 
geopolitical strategy (the USA) or in accordance with their liberal democratic 
values (the EU). As for thematic areas, the majority of the assistance was thus 
provided in the areas of border control and rule of law. This section focuses on 
the area of SSR what had received least external SSR assistance, i.e., 
paramilitaries, by closely examining the various types of paramilitaries and a 
number of change paths that those paramilitaries take in post-conflict Georgia 
between 1992 and 2008.  
 
8.3.1 Types of paramilitaries 
 
Between its independence in 1991 and the return of Shevardnadze, the former 
Soviet Foreign Minister, as the head of the new state in 1992, Georgia 
experienced a complex of violent conflicts, as discussed in chapter 3. In post-
conflict Georgia, a number of varying types of paramilitary forces existed in each 
of the three paramilitary types: non-state, state-, quasi-state and state 
paramilitaries. 
 
While the paramilitary forces varied in their legal status: they had a number of 
common features. First, their weaponry consisted of light infantry equipped with 
small arms and light weapons, as other countries’ paramilitaries. (Feinberg, 1999) 
Second, except in the case of a few state paramilitary forces, few paramilitary 
forces and their leaders had received professional training. Most of the troops 
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were non-professional personnel and they were often volunteer civilians and/or 
conscripts (Darchiashvili, 1997c). This tendency was particularly prominent 
among the paramilitary forces in the early days in post-independence Georgia. 
The third common features of the Georgian paramilitaries lies in their mobilisation 
style which is based on personal royalty towards paramilitary leaders. In the early 
post-independence period, paramilitary forces such as the Zviadists and the 
Mkhedrioni gathered under prominent political and social figures. Those features 
of paramilitaries in post-conflict Georgia, except its weaponry, make a contrast to 
the paramilitaries in most of Western states. In other word, there was no or weak 
civilian control governing those paramilitary forces established. Another specific 
characteristic of the paramilitaries in post-conflict Georgia as compared to those 
in Western states is that some of the state paramilitaries remained the Soviet 
style. This was particularly the case with the Internal Troops and the MSS troops. 
In addition, they had a paramilitary force, the Rescue Corps, consists of former 
Mkhedrioni members, which was Georgia-specific with no equivalent in Western 
states. It was in this context that Georgian began its SSR process and receiving 
external assistance to SSR. 
 
8.3.1.1 Non-state paramilitaries: The White Legion and the Forest 
Brothers 
 
There were a handful of non-state paramilitaries in Georgia in 1992. The major 
Georgian paramilitary groups under this category include the White Legion and 
the Forest Brothers. Both the White Legion and the Forest Brothers consisted of 
volunteers from the Georgian IDP population from the Mingrelia region. Many of 
the volunteers were the Zviadists, supporters of the former President 
Gamsahurdia. The commander of the Forest Brothers was previously a member 
of the Mkhedrioni (Feinberg, 1999). According to Abkhaz Security Ministry, the 
White Legion also absorbed former employees of the Sukhumi, Gali, and Gulripsh 
District Militias.  
 
There is no official number for the size of the manpower of those paramilitary 
forces. The White Legion was said to have a contingent of some 3,000 ethnic 
Georgian former members of the Abkhaz police forces and Abkhaz militia forces. 
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The then Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze claimed that the 
Georgian armed forces numbered 49,000 (Fuller, 1997) but independent 
observers considered the figure inflated (Fuller, 1997a). Their level of training and 
combat capacities seemingly exceeded the level of mere amateur. It is reported 
that the White Legion was a “well-organized and highly trained group of several 
hundred Georgian militants committed to restoring Abkhazia to Georgian control” 
(Fuller, 1997b). 
 
The White Legion and the Forest Brothers could be termed as ‘state-parallel’ 
paramilitary forces, according to the definition by Aliyev. Both the White Legion 
and the Forest Brothers had alleged ties with Tbilisi and ethnic Georgian Abkhaz 
parliament-in-exile.190 According to one report, the White Legion and the Forest 
Brothers did “subordinate to the so-called Abkhaz parliament in exile – the ethnic 
Georgian deputies to the Abkhaz parliament” (Fuller, 1997b) and both the groups 
did “advocate a new Georgia’s hegemony over Abkhazia by force” (Fuller, 1997b). 
Babenkov claimed that the While Legion had links to unspecified Georgian 
“power structure” (Fuller, 1997b). Abkhaz spokesmen, too, repeatedly claimed 
that the White Legion was subordinated either to Georgian intelligence, or, 
according to Interior Minister Alika Kchach, to Nadareishvili, who has voiced is 
approval of the terrorist activities of Georgian militants in Abkhazia” (Fuller, 
1997b). 
 
Both the White Legion and the Forest Brothers were active in hostilities against 
Abkhaz armed forces. In July 1992, the Georgian paramilitary forces “moved into 
Abkhazia and stormed the capital city of Sukhumi, forcing the local Abkhazian 
government to flee to the neighbouring town of Gudauta. Fighting broke out in 
earnest between Georgian and Abkhazian units in August 1992” (Finch, 1996).  
 
                                                          
190 It was not only ethnic Georgian paramilitaries but a number of armed groups and individuals with 
various backgrounds fought on the side of Abkhazia. Finch reports that “a host of various representatives 
from Russia aided the Abkhazians in their fights against Georgian nationalists. There were units of the 
Russian Army, quartered in Abkhazia, providing equipment and expertise to the Abkhazians. It is not 
clear whether they were acting independently or following orders from Moscow. Russian veterans living 
in Abkhazia also provided their services. Members of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus (CMPC), which is a recently formed organization representing a member of different ethnic 
groups living in the Caucasus area, volunteered their fighting expertise. Russian Cossacks and 
mercenaries also aided the Abkhazians” (Finch, 1996). 
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8.3.1.2 Quasi-state paramilitaries: The National Guard, the Mkhedrioni 
and the Adjara paramilitary forces 
 
Georgia had a number of quasi-state paramilitaries during the transitional period 
between the late 1980s and 2008. During the period, a full-fledged functional 
state apparatus was yet to emerge. Quasi-state actors prevailed and filled in 
power and organisational vacuum. In the early 1990, Georgia went through a 
transition from a Soviet republic to an independent state as discussed in chapter 
3. This political transition provided Georgia a vacuum in power and governance 
structure, including in the security sector. In the absence of national security 
institutions of its own, a few armed forces emerged as influential armed forces 
and groups under influential social and political figures. The National Guard led 
by Kitovani, and Ioseliani’s Mkhedrioni, and Abashidze and his paramilitaries in 
Adjara are the prominent examples of the quasi-state paramilitary forces.  
 
Those are a mixed group of quasi-state paramilitaries with different degrees of 
legality. Among the three quasi-state paramilitaries, the National Guard achieved 
the highest degree of legality as they were first established through a legal 
procedure. The National Guard was established on 20 December 1990 by the 
Georgian Supreme Soviet as Internal Troops of Georgia. (“Reserve 
Force/National Guard,” 2017) Apart from the legal procedure, the National Guard 
was far from being a professional army. The size of the National Guard was as 
large as 15,000 at its peak according to one of the founders of the National Guard 
(Feinberg, 1999). They were mostly volunteers loyal to Kitovani.191 Neither the 
commander nor most of the paramilitary forces had little professional military 
training.  
 
Even after they became affiliated to the MoD, the National Guards remained 
under the control of its commander, Kitovani. The National Guard’s members 
remained under the control of Kitovani. In early 1991, OMON192 was created by 
the then President Gamsakhurdia for cutting the influence of Kitovani over the 
armed forces. The National Guard was ordered to become a subunit of OMON, 
                                                          
191 Kitovani’s followers referred Kitovani as ‘batia’ or ‘little father’ (Jones, 2015, p. 68). 
192 Or, the Special Service Militia Detachment, according to Stephen Jones’ translation (Jones, 2015, p. 
68). 
226 
 
but Kitovani refused to follow the order.  
 
Another prominent quasi-state paramilitary, the Mkhedrioni, has an even more 
controversial background. Gaining influence in the political scene and criminal 
activities, the Mkhedrioni became one of the two only effective armed groups, 
along with the National Guard in the early 1990. The Mkhedrioni emerged as an 
armed group of members with criminal backgrounds, with approximately 5,000 
members. As the political turmoil escalated in December 1991, many of the 
Mkhedrioni members were released from prisons and mobilised to fight in the civil 
war in Georgia against the Gamsakhurdia side, as well as in Abkhazia. On the 
ground, the Mkhedrioni members demanded `tax` from the local population for 
the war effort. They also financed themselves through the control over the 
distribution of lucrative commodities. In local administrations, the Mkhedrioni 
penetrated into the police force, and many members of the group reportedly 
became police officers afterwards.  
 
Despite the controversial background and activities by associated members, the 
heads of the Mkhedrioni, Ioseliani, led the Military Council along with  Kitovani, 
another head of the paramilitary forces, the National Guards. Gamsakhurdia 
ordered the Mkhedrioni was ordered to transform to the Rescue Corps, state 
paramilitary forces which had no institutional precedent in the Soviet Union or the 
West (Belkin and Schofer, 2005). Ioseliani and his followers did not follow the 
order and they remained outside state control. 
 
All three quasi-state paramilitaries remained outside the state control. For 
instance, the National Guard, along with the Mkhedrioni, engaged in the fight 
against Gamsakhurdia and his armed supporters, Zviadists, in Tbilisi, the capital 
city, and ousted the first President. The National Guard and the Mkhedrioni also 
engaged in the violent clashes in Sukhumi in 1992, although they had not 
received such orders from Tbilisi (Coppieters et al., 2000, p. 24). 
 
Shevardnadze’s stance towards the territorial dispute in Abkhazia was moderate, 
while Kitovani and other political oppositions had a stronger orientation towards 
the restoration of Georgian hegemony. The National Guard marched into 
Abkhazia in August 1992. On 14 August 1992, Georgian troops under the 
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command of the then Defence Minister Kitovani marched into the Akbhazia 
capital, Sukhumi, and opened fire on the parliament building. That action 
triggered a 13-month war between the central Georgian government and the 
secessionist Abkhaz leadership, which culminated in Tbilisi’s loss of jurisdiction 
over Abkhazia and the exodus of some 250,000 ethnic Georgians who lived there.” 
This militant approach of Kitovani to the territorial disputes in Abkhazia hampered 
Shevardnadze’s more modest approach, and contributed to further deteriorating 
the political relationship between Kitovani and Shevardnadze. Similarly, 
Abashidze’s paramilitary group remained royal to Abashidze himself rather than 
Tbilisi until they were ordered to dissolve by the President Saakashvili after the 
2003 Rose Revolution.  
 
8.3.1.3 State paramilitaries: armed forces under the ‘power ministries’ 
 
Besides the quasi-state and non-state paramilitaries, Georgia quickly developed 
several paramilitaries that belonged to the state. Those state paramilitaries 
affiliate to a number of state organs. In particular, all the three so-called ‘power 
ministries’, i.e., the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defence and State Security, had 
their own paramilitary forces.  
 
Like the continental European countries such as France and Italy, some 
paramilitary forces were affiliated to the MIA. The Internal Troops were formed on 
12 September 1991, i.e., five months after Georgia declared its independence 
from the Soviet Union. Affiliated to the MIA, Internal Troops were mandated to 
assist local police and security services in maintaining law and order, fighting 
terrorism, and organized crimes, defending the most important state objects and 
protecting special cargo transportation, and supporting the military in wartime 
(Feinberg, 1999). According to one report, “Internal Troops were staffed through 
conscription but were also partially contract-based” (Belkin, 2005), as similar to 
the Soviet practice. In September 2004, the Internal Troops was then transformed 
into the 4th Infantry Brigade of the MoD (“Internal Troops abolished, units merged 
with the Defense Ministry,” 2004). 
 
The Ministry of National Security, later reorganised into the MSS and the State 
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Intelligence Department, also possessed its own paramilitary forces. This feature 
was also found in the other former Socialist and Soviet republic countries such 
as Ukraine. The armed unit of the Ministry of National Security was mandated for 
counter-surveillance and anti-terrorism. Apart from the mission, information about 
the armed unit under the Ministry of National Security is not available. Similarly, 
it is unknown whether the State Intelligence Department had its own armed 
forces.193 
 
In addition to the paramilitaries under the so-called power ministries, i.e., the 
Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and State Security, there had been a 
number of state paramilitaries in Georgia. The Office of the President also had its 
own paramilitary unit: Special Service of State Protection. Its mandate includes 
pprotecting all strategic state objects such as President’s office, parliament and 
the oil industry’s infrastructure. There are approximately 6,000 personnel in the 
Service. 
 
The State Department of State Border Defence (SDBD) is another state organ 
with paramilitary forces, although details as to the size of manpower are not 
available. Its mandates include apprehending smugglers, drug traffickers, 
poaches, and illegal immigrants. 
 
Table 7 List of paramilitaries in Georgia between 1985 and 2008 
 
 Professional 
personnel 
Influential 
leadership 
figure 
Political 
wing 
Ministerial affiliation Function 
Defence Internal 
Affairs 
Other Military Police Other 
Non-state paramilitary 
The White 
Legion 
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
The Forest 
Brothers 
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
The Zviadists 
 
__ X __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
Quasi-state paramilitary 
The National 
Guard 
__ X __ __ __ __ __ __ X 
The 
Mkhedrioni 
 
__ X X __ __ __ __ __ X 
The Adjara __ X __ __ __ __ X X X 
                                                          
193 The Department was mandated for intelligence collection outside of Georgia. 
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paramilitary 
forces 
State paramilitary 
The Internal 
Troops 
(renamed the 
4th Infantry 
Brigade) 
 
X __ __ X  
(since 
2004) 
X (1991-
2004) 
__ __ X X 
The special 
purpose unit 
(a.k.a. ‘Gulua’) 
 
X __ __ __ X 
(since 
2004) 
X 
(MSS 
until 
2004) 
__ __ X 
The Special 
Service of 
State 
Protection 
 
X __ __ __ __ X __ __ X 
The State 
Department of 
State Border 
Defence 
(SDBD, 
renamed the 
Border Police 
in 2006) 
 
X __ __ __ X X X X X 
 
8.3.2 Paramilitary change, not paramilitary reform 
 
External assistance to SSR in Georgia mainly focused on the military, police and 
justice institutions. In the vacuum of external assistance, the trajectory of the non-
state and quasi-state paramilitary change charted different paths, including 
dissolution/disbandment, integration into state institutions, and transformation 
into a civilian political actor. If they became state institutions, some of the 
paramilitaries experienced changes in ministerial affiliations. 
 
8.3.2.1 Non-state paramilitaries 
 
Non-state paramilitaries such as the Zviadists, the White Legion and the Forest 
Brothers were either ordered to disband or remained outside any reform efforts. 
There was no official DDR with a systematic assistance programme or timeframe 
took place in Georgia. Since the ousting of Gamsakhurdia and the defeat in 
Abkhazia, those armed men (and women) went back to the civilian life voluntarily, 
mostly thought their own informal network, such as community and family network 
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and so forth.194 Georgia’s defeat in Sukhumi in 1993 further accelerated the 
voluntary disbandment of individual combatants.  
 
8.3.2.2 Quasi-state paramilitaries 
 
The quasi-state paramilitaries were once the most influential actors in early post-
independence Georgia, not only as security sector actors but also political actors. 
They eventually ceased to be influential or functional after following a series of 
organisational reshuffles under the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili governments. 
 
The transformation of the quasi-state paramilitary forces such as the National 
Guard and the Mkhedrioni reflects the socio-political dynamics as well as the 
power struggle among Georgian political elites in the early 1990. As chapters 3 
and 4 reveals, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni filled in the vacuum left by 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its state apparatus. While being as the 
most influential security sector actors, those two paramilitary groups, along their 
leaders, existed as de facto state institutions.  
 
However, neither of them underwent a legitimate process of formalizing their 
status as a state apparatus. The National Guard was originally a group of 
volunteers loyal to Kitovani. The National Guard had gradually grown to be a 
quasi-state actor as Georgia underwent the transition from the Soviet republic to 
an independent state. Their influence peaked when Kitovani and Ioseliani, the 
Mkhedrioni leader, brought Shevardnadze back from Moscow to Tbilisi and 
ousted the President Gamsakhurdia.  
 
Back in the early 1990, the National Guard was initially established with an aim 
to become a national army. However, the National Guard had never become full-
fledged national military forces. Since the arrival of Shevardnadze as the head of 
the state, the National Guard and its leader, Kitovani, had become side-lined. The 
influence of Kitovani was curtailed by a number of the organisational transfer of 
                                                          
194 According to an International Centre of Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN) programme officer, most of 
the combatants volunteered to the fight. The demography of them is namely the middle-aged men. The 
gap between demand and supply on the trauma of the violent conflicts was clearly expressed in an 
international conference for war veterans in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 2000, too. Author’s interviews, 
November 2000, Tbilisi.  
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the National Guard from the MoD, to the MIA then back to the MoD again, this 
time with a much-limited mandates. As the next section shows, the reform of the 
National Guard was not straightforward. By the end of the 1990, the National 
Guard had become an insignificant security sector figure in Georgia. 
 
Another quasi-state paramilitary force, the Mkhedrioni, took a different change 
trajectory. As in the case of the National Guard, the Mkhedrioni started as a non-
state paramilitary group consisting of individuals loyal to its leader, Ioseliani, and 
eventually became a government organ although for a brief period of time. Like 
the National Guard’ leader, Kitovani, its leader, Ioseliani was also an influential 
political figure in the new regime after the outcast of the former President 
Gamsakhurdia. Upon the peak of their political influence, the Mkhedrioni obtained 
the governmental status as Rescue Corps in 1993. In 1994, the Mkhedrioni 
declared a voluntary disarmament, but in reality the process is not clear and they 
allegedly restored armaments. Ioseliani established a political organisation based 
on the Mkhedrioni. But after the attempted assassination of the President 
Shevardnadze in 1995, several members of the Mkhedrioni including Ioseliani 
were arrested. The armed group was disbanded by the government. Ioseliani was, 
however, later given amnesty. 
 
Another important quasi-state paramilitary group is the paramilitary forces in 
Adjara. Like the previous two paramilitary groups, the Adjara paramilitary forces 
consisted of individuals loyal to Abashidze. The Adjara remained immune to any 
reform efforts by Tbilisi under the Shevardnadze period. They remained a 
personal protection force for Abashidze until a newly elected president 
Saakashvili ordered to disband. This is thus another example of a paramilitary 
force which started as a non-state actor, grew to become a quasi-state actor led 
by prominent political elite, then disbanded due to a political rivalry between its 
leader and the head of the state. 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, quasi-state paramilitary change was largely driven by 
a domestic power struggle. The rivalry among the quasi-state paramilitary leaders 
sometimes took the form of an armed clash by involving their paramilitary forces. 
The power dynamics among the paramilitary leaders led to the creation of a 
paramilitary, OMON, which was created by Gamsakhurdia to counter the National 
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Guard and the Mkhedrioni. The quasi-state paramilitaries dominated Georgian 
politics and played a central role in replacing Gamsakhurdia with Shevardnadze 
who returned from Moscow to Tbilisi in March 1992. In the early times of the 
Shevardnadze regime, the paramilitary leaders held key governmental positions. 
For instance, from April 1992 until May 1993, Kitovani headed the MoD.  
 
As Shevardnadze consolidated power, the quasi-paramilitaries and their leaders 
became targeted for disbandment and/or institutional transfer. During 1993 the 
co-operation between Shevardnadze and Kitovabi dissolved, and the latter was 
dismissed as the Minister of Defence. As chapter 4 shows, Shevardnadze 
commenced a military building process to professionalise the armed forces and 
reduce the individual influence of the leaders. The National Guard, which was 
renamed as the Rapid Reaction Forces at the time, was abolished as a separate 
unit. However, the disbandment of unaffiliated armed forces was not a smooth 
process. In January 1995, Kitovani departed with his 1,000-armed supporters and 
invaded Abkhazia. After clashes with forces of the Georgian MSS, he was 
arrested, and his men were disarmed, which put an end to the power struggle 
between the quasi-paramilitary faction and Shevardnadze. 
 
8.3.2.3 State paramilitaries 
 
In addition to the National Guards, quasi-state-turned-state paramilitary, Georgia 
had had a number of state paramilitary forces. Reflecting its legacy as a former 
Soviet Union republic, the paramilitary forces affiliated to the former Soviet power 
ministries, i.e., Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and State Security. 
Furthermore, a handful of other state paramilitary forces such as State 
Department of Border Defence, Border Guard and Presidential Guards, were 
created and/or reformed under the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili 
administrations in the SSR process. 
 
Issues that need to be tacked with in the SSR in Georgia were rather straight 
forward. As the ISAB members pointed out at the early stage of the SSR planning, 
the requirement for the security sector in Georgia was the adjustment actual 
security needs and the demilitarisation of non-defence actors, namely, the 
233 
 
paramilitary forces. As early as 2002, the ISAB set out and shared with the 
Georgian National Security Council a list of issues that need to be tacked by SSR 
efforts, including on the issue of the demarcation among various paramilitary 
forces, clearly. 195  The outcomes of the change of the state paramilitaries, 
however, were far from what the international advisory group envisaged. 
 
Table 8 Change trajectories of paramilitaries in Georgia between 1992 and 
2008 
 
Statutory type 
of paramilitary 
 
Paramilitary forces Type of change 
Non-state White Legion 
 
Forest Brothers 
 
Zviadists 
 
Disbandment (voluntary) 
 
Disbandment (voluntary) 
 
Disbandment (voluntary) 
Quasi-state Adjara paramilitaries 
 
Mkhedrioni 
 
 
National Guards 
 
Disbandment (ordered) 
 
Disbandment (ordered)/transformed to a 
political party 
 
Transformed to a state organ 
State National Guards 
 
 
Internal Troops 
 
 
Special Purpose Unit (‘Gulua’) 
 
 
The State Department of 
Border Defence force 
Ministerial affiliation change 
(MoDMIAMoD)  
 
Ministerial affiliation change (MIAMoD) 
 
 
Ministerial affiliation change (MSS MIA) 
 
Ministerial affiliation change (MSSMIA: 
renamed ‘The Border Police’ in 2004, 
mandated to function as a military force in 
2006) 
 
 
                                                          
195 Johnson (2005). “The requirements for the various sectors are fairly clear. In the military it requires a 
move from quantity to quality, a reduction of numbers and an enhancement of capability to provide a 
more flexible military which is interoperable with NATO and other western forces. In the Interior 
Ministry it means moving from Interior Troops in the military model to a gendarmerie force which is 
essentially an enhanced police component. In order security it means changing the military Border Guards 
to a largely civilianised security agency for border security and control. In the Security Ministry it means 
moving to a plain-cloth agency basis, with no place in the prosecuting procedures. The thread which runs 
through all these requirements is that of demilitarisation, for security is not just about tanks in the modern 
era. It also means an acceptance of some form of democratic oversight and an understanding of how to 
apply that without it turning into an unreasonable and potentially dangerous form of political control” 
(Johnson, 2005, pp. 53–54). 
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8.3.3 Driving factors for the paramilitary change 
 
As discussed above, despite the international advisory group’s clear 
recommendations, i.e., setting up security concepts, demilitarisation, establishing 
civilian oversight, the SSR efforts in Georgia did not follow the recommendations. 
Rather, in post-independent Georgia, the trajectories of the paramilitary change 
were shaped by a range of political factors rather than SSR priorities. 
 
8.3.3.1 Political dynamics among key actors: power struggle between 
security sector actors 
 
The personalised and politicised nature of the paramilitary forces was the most 
significant driving factor for the change of those forces. As early as in the times 
of President Gamsakhurdia, Georgia saw the creation of OMON by 
Gamsakhurdia in trying to rival the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni. OMON 
soon faded away along with Gamsakhurdia himself in the subsequent political 
chaos. However, the change of Georgia’s paramilitary forces, especially of quasi-
state nature, remained subject to political dynamics.  
 
The prime example is the disbandment of the Mkhedrioni. As seen above, the 
Mkhedrioni was one of the two most prominent paramilitary forces in the early 
1990 in Georgia. Its leader, Ioseliani brought Shevardnadadze back to Georgia 
and supported replacing Gamsakhurdia. Furthermore, the Mkhedrioni also 
rivalled against other powerful figures in society, especially those associated with 
the so-called ‘power ministries’. In the power struggle, some of his Mkhedrioni 
members allegedly got involved in politically motivated assassinations targeting 
high-ranking officials of the ‘power ministries’ along with other political figures 
including President Shevardnadze, while they were also often targeted by their 
political rivals.196 In addition to Mkhedrioni members, the involvement of the MSS 
                                                          
196 Gocha Tediashvili, a member of the Mkhedrioni, told the Georgian Supreme Court in 1997 that he was 
involved in the murders of three prominent Georgian political figures. Tediashvili confessed to having 
taken part in the 1994 killings of Deputy Interior Minister Giorgi Gulua, Shevardnadze Fund President 
Soliko Khabeishvili, and Georgian National Democratic Party leader Gia Chanturia (“Mkhedrioni 
member confesses to involvement in political assassinations,” 1997).. 
235 
 
was also suspected in the assassination attempts against Shevardnadze.197 
 
Security institution officials were often targeted by violence in the mid-1990s. For 
instance, a Deputy Interior Minister Giorgi Gulua was murdered along with his 
driver and another Interior Ministry official by machinegun fire in Tbilisi. This was 
among several assassinations attempts against the ‘power ministries’ officials 
around this period of time (Fuller, 1994a). Another high-ranking ‘power ministries’ 
official assassinated around this period is the deputy defense minister Nikolai 
Kekelidze who was killed when a bomb exploded in his apartment (Fuller, 1994b). 
 
It was not only the Mkhedrioni members but also some ‘power ministries’ officials 
who became involved in murder during this period. The then State Security 
Minister Shota Kviraya allegedly killed Mkhedrionis and link to Russia (“Georgian 
prosecutor-general to access charges against security minister,” 1997). Those 
assassinations of the ‘power-ministries’ officials and the Mkhedrioni members 
show how heavily the security sector officials and the paramilitary group were 
involved in violent grievance. 
 
8.3.3.2 Territorial disputes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara 
 
The low-intensity, violent conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia had played a 
significant role in the transformation of the Georgian paramilitaries, in particular, 
the quasi-state paramilitary forces such as the National Guard.  
 
The unsettled political status of Abkhazia prevented an official DDR process from 
taking place. A cease-fire was signed on 27 July 1993. The cease-fire agreement 
provided for “disarmament by both sides, to be accompanied by a prompt 
withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia and the return of the legitimate 
government of the capital city of Sukhumi” (Finch, 1996). A tripartite commission 
consisting of Russia, Georgia and the Abkhazian authority to monitor a ceasefire 
and the removal of military armaments was established in July 1993. 
                                                          
197 Prosecutor Dzhamlet Babilashvili told journalists in Tbilisi that the assassination attempt in August 
1995 was “planned by former Georgian security service chief Igor Giorgadze and Mkhedrioni leader 
Dzhaba Ioseliani, who had worked with Russian intelligence agents to eiminate Shevardnadze and install 
Giorgadze as Georgia’s leader” (“Georgian prosecutor-general to access charges against security 
minister,” 1997). 
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Shevardnadze was said to lose support among the Georgian army (paramilitary) 
significantly due to the agreement as it was regarded as “humiliating and 
detrimental” to Georgian national interests (Finch, 1996). 
 
The National Guard and its leader, Kitovani enjoyed an autonomy to an extent to 
draft a military doctrine. Citing “well-informed sources in Tbilisi”, Interfax reported 
on 4 October that the Georgian leadership intended to integrated the semi-
autonomous National Guard into the country’s armed forces, apparently in 
response to the creation by opposition political figures, including former Defence 
Minister and National Guard leader Kitovani of the National Union for the 
Liberation of Abkhazia, which aims to restore Georgian hegemony over the 
breakaway region by military means. Kitovani was said to have circulated his draft 
of an “exclusively defensive” military doctrine for Georgia, which provides for the 
expansion of the army from 15,000 to 20,000 men. This draft and alternatives will 
be debated by the Georgian parliament” (Fuller, 1994c). 
 
Thus, the quasi-state paramilitaries grew in response to popular and political 
support for them in the conflict in Abkhazia. Their political status started to decline 
when Georgia was defeated in Abkhazia in September 1993. The Abkhaz side 
forced out the Georgian armed forces along with the Georgian population out of 
Abkhazia. Since the defeat in Sukhumi, the National Guards and other quasi-
state paramilitaries lost popular support as well as their combatants who returned 
to civilian life voluntarily (Darchiashvili, 1997c). 
 
8.3.3.3 The ‘power ministries’ as a regime symbol under Shevardnadze 
 
After Shevardnadze succeeded in curtailing political influence of the National 
Guard and the Mkhedrioni, the SSR process came to a halt, despite the NATO 
allies offered a set of assistance, including the group of SSR advisers, the ISAB. 
The ISAB recommendations were straight forward. The recommendations 
included defining the security concept; defining the responding architecture of the 
SSR such as defence, paramilitary, police and border control. The Shevardnadze 
government did not follow the ISAB recommendations (Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 17). 
As chapter 5 shows, during the Shevardnadze times between 1992 and 2003, 
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few reform efforts took place apart from receiving the military assistance from 
NATO allies to the military. Consequently, the paramilitary forces were left without 
any reform efforts. 
 
The reason behind the absent reform efforts can be attributed to the power 
relation between Shevardnadze and the ‘power ministries’ as well as the different 
ministries among the ‘power ministries’. Having served as the head of the MIA in 
Soviet Georgia, Shevardnadze had had his power base in the MIA. 
Shevardnadze also had been influential over the over security sector organs, 
including the other ‘power ministries’ and the National Security Council (NSC). 
For instance, during the Shevardnadze period, the NSC was an incubator of 
senior management officials of the security sector institutions. Under its secretary, 
Nugzar Sajaia, the NSC produced a number of senior officials affiliated or close 
to the power ministries.198 Having been one of the closest allies of Shevardnadze, 
Sajaia held the position between 1996 and 2002, until his death.199 It is said that 
Sajaia himself exercised strong influence over the MIA, Kakha Targamadze, not 
to engage in open conflict with anti-government factions, including the anti-
Shervardnadze block, so-called “reformists” led by Zhvania, the then Speaker of 
Parliament, and Saakashvili, the then Minister of Justice (Chiaberashvili and 
Tevradze, 2005, pp. 200–201). After the death of Sajaia, Shevardnadze 
appointed Sajaia’s protégés to heads of the key “power ministries”, i.e., the 
Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs.200 
 
8.3.3.4 Reform of the ‘power ministries’ as a political demonstration 
under Saakashvili 
 
In contrast, the Saakashvili government placed its priority in reforming the ‘power 
ministries’. As chapter 6 details, Saakashvili and his political block, the ‘reformists’, 
emerged as a counter movement against the old regime of Shevardnadze. While 
Shevardnadze remained the most prominent political figure, a new leadership 
                                                          
198 For instance, the Ministers of State Security and Internal Affairs and the Head of the Service of 
Government Protection.   
199 Sajaia died in February 2002. The cause of the death was reported to be a suicide (“Death of the 
Georgian National Security Council secretary still a mystery,” 2002). 
200 Valerie Khaburdzania as the Minister of State Security and Koba Narchemashvili as the Minister of 
Internal Affairs (“Death of the Georgian National Security Council secretary still a mystery,” 2002). 
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emerged from the reform-minded wing of the CUG, including  Zhvania and 
Saakashvili.201 However, as the political situation in Georgia stagnated, they 
formed their own political factions. Among them, Saakashvili took a more radical 
stance against the President than Zhvania, accusing the Shevardnadze 
government of corruption and “power ministries” of being the stronghold of 
corruption.  
 
When Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze as the President, his priority was to 
combat corruption in the security apparatus, namely the ‘power ministries’. The 
subsequent reform efforts, detailed in chapter 6, were driven by the political 
motivation. Even then, external SSR advisers had stressed the need for the 
reform of the security sector based on a clearly defined political and security 
framework. Sir Garry Johnson, one of the ISAB advisers, for instance, pointed 
out that the importance of “clarifying at the onset the political and security 
framework within which reform is to take place” (Johnson, 2005, p. 55). This was 
based on lessons learnt from the SSR experience in Georgia between 1993 and 
2003, during the Shevardnadze period. The very task of clarifying the political and 
security framework itself was, however, the biggest challenge and dilemma for 
the SSR in Georgia under Saakashvili, too. The political symbol of the reform of 
the ‘power ministries’ had a more priority than reforming them based on a security 
framework.  
 
As discussed above, the case of Georgia illustrates some characteristics and 
challenges that a country in the reconstruction and democratisation processes 
may face in the course of paramilitary change. The lack of systematic DDR efforts 
left negative consequences such as the insertion of former adversaries to the 
state security institutions and the persisting proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons. The lack of substantive normative reform efforts in the state 
paramilitaries left controversial ambiguities over their mandates, demarcation of 
roles and definition of key conditions for paramilitary deployment such as ‘public 
orders’ and ‘emergency’. In other words, the reform of paramilitaries in Georgia 
did not take place in accordance with liberal democratic standards as proposed 
                                                          
201 Both Zhvania and Saakashvili had been members of the CUG, the political party led by Shevardnadze. 
Both of them were regarded as future leadership of the Georgian politics to replace Shevardnadze in the 
future. 
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by external advisers such as the ISAB. The Saakashvili government’s response 
to the anti-government demonstrations in 2007 illustrates this point. The 
paramilitaries were dispatched to violently supressed peaceful anti-government 
demonstrators, which had never been done under the Shevardnadze rimes. For 
this action, the Saakashvili government was criticised to be of authoritarian by 
international and domestic critiques. The incident of the 2007 anti-government 
demonstration shows that the paramilitary change under Saakashvili could 
reverse the democratisation process. 
 
8.3.4 Characteristics of the politically-driven paramilitary change 
 
As discussed in the previous section, in the absence of substantial international 
assistance and domestic political dynamics as main driving factors for change, 
the paramilitary sphere did not experience reform but change. The Georgian 
paramilitaries did not undergo substantial SSR efforts. Instead, they experienced 
institutional change, i.e., disbandment, transformation to a political party, or 
ministerial affiliation change. More specifically, internationally-supported 
establishment of civil control and the demilitarization of non-military paramilitary 
forces, did not take place in Georgia. Moreover, the area of paramilitaries fell into 
a policy gap among external SSR assistance providers. Those characteristics of 
paramilitary change in Georgia left unsolved security and political issues in its 
society. 
 
8.3.4.1 The absence of internationally-supported official DDR initiative 
 
What is noteworthy is that no systematic DDR efforts took place in post-conflict 
Georgia. Post-conflict societies which receive international assistance often 
undergo an official DDR process. However, in case of Georgia, no formal, 
organised DDR efforts besides the disbandment orders were implemented 
neither by the government or the international community despite of a large 
number of individuals who participated in the violent conflicts in the early 1990.  
 
Individual combatants of the non-paramilitary forces, the Zviadists, the White 
Legion and the Forest Brothers, left the armed forces on their own. The number 
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of such former combatants, however, remains unknown. For instance, the non-
state paramilitary group, the White Legion, consisted of volunteers. Its members 
were mostly former Soviet army officials. Even after their influence in society 
significantly weakened after the defeat in Sukhumi, they continued engaging in 
violent hostilities against Abkhazian counterparts. The While Legion engaged in 
armed attacks in Abkhazia during 1996. The White Legion was allegedly 
responsible for numerous attacks against Abkhaz police forces and the Russian 
Peacekeepers, too. The Forest Brothers played a major part of the May 1998 
violent clashes between Abkhaz police forces in the Gali region. Despite the 
influential and significant impacts of those non-state paramilitary forces, there 
was no attempt of systematically disarm, demobilize and reintegrate those 
paramilitary group members, either by the Georgian government nor international 
community. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, most of those former volunteered 
combatants affiliated to non-state paramilitaries went back to the civilian life. 
Some of them who fought under troops submissive to the MoD received 
governmental supply as war veterans received limited financial support from the 
government via the Ministry of Finance.202 Psychosocial support was a strong yet 
unmet need among the ex-combatants. While the families of ex-combatants often 
claimed for financial support from the government and the international 
organisations, the ex-combatants themselves demanded rather mental support 
(which they termed ‘spiritual support’) from the society, having pointed out the 
alienated position of them from the rest of the populations.203 Responding to 
those needs, some of the former members of the White Legion and the Forest 
Brothers organised veteran associations204 and received support from local and 
international NGOs.205 However, the majority of ex-combatants received little 
support in financial and/or psychological rehabilitation either from the government 
or the international community. 
                                                          
202 Author’s interviews, November 2000, Tbilisi. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Author’s interviews, March 2005, Zugdidi. Women ex-combatants were not seen in those gathering, 
and one interviewer told that they were afraid of being discriminated in society. 
205 In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, International Alert, for instance, carried out a project to support 
ex-combatants of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Project activities included confidence building 
workshops with former combatants from the three countries. Women ex-combatants were not seen in 
those gathering, and one interviewer told that they were afraid of being discriminated in society. 
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As examined in the previous chapters, the overall SSR process was affected by 
domestic political factors. The absence of internationally-supported DDR efforts 
means that there were no international actors to monitor the movement of 
demobilised former paramilitary members. The 1995 Constitution restricting the 
quasi-state paramilitaries having become in effect, the official process of 
disbanding the National Guards and the Mkhedrioni became complete. However, 
some of the former members of the National Guards and the Mkhedrioni 
reportedly joined the newly established police and the military.206 For instance, 
according to an interviewee, a large number of former Mkhedrioni members 
joined the police without any background check.207 The informal nature of the 
demobilisation and reintegration process, in particular, the insertion of the former 
Mkhedrioni members, jeopardized the confidence in the security sector 
institutions. Moreover, the disbandment of some of the non-state and quasi-state 
paramilitaries were carried out in a way a political purge of anti-Shevardnadze 
groups rather than institutional reform. As for the armed groups such as the 
Zviadists208 and the Mkhedrioni,209 many of the members were arrested due to 
alleged criminal acts. Human rights NGOs claimed that they did not received fair 
investigations or trials, therefore that they were political prisoners. Other 
Mkhedrioni members who escaped the arrests declared voluntary disbandment 
in 1993, although it is believed that they restored arms (Feinberg, 1999). 
 
Another negative remnant of the absence of formal DDR is the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons in society. In Georgia in the early 2000s, there was 
still guns remaining in circulation and caused serious security threats to local 
populations, especially in conflict-affected communities in and around Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. In the 1990, the government, with the help of the international 
community, carried out weapons collection initiatives. Disarmament had been 
                                                          
206 Author’s interview, November 2000, Tbilisi. 
207 Author’s interview, November 2000, Tbilisi. 
208 The supporters of the former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia who died in disputable circumstances in 
the end of 1993. 
209 According to Darchiashvili, during the political turmoil, armed men were acting according to their own 
desire or at the order of certain charismatic military leaders, and there was little organised framework in 
those armed forces. In some cases, individual soldiers or officers acted voluntarily and they could join 
and leave the unit whenever they wanted and join in the other. As for the National Guard, Darchiashvili 
points out that having low level of discipline the armed force was actually a militia although it was never 
regarded as such (Darchiashvili, 1997c). 
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carried out by the MIA throughout the country, except in the regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Between late 1995 and early 1996, 9,717 small arms and 
light weapons were collected (Demetriou, 2002). 60 per cent of them were 
collected from former Mkhedrioni members, 28 per cent were collected from 
National Guards members, and 12 per cent were voluntarily turned in by civilians 
(Demetriou, S., 2002). It was only 2005 when the Georgian government 
recognised the small arms issue as a problem and an internationally-supported 
program on the small arms control began.210 
 
8.3.4.2 The absence of normative changes within paramilitary forces 
 
The lack of substantive reform efforts are reflected in some controversial issues: 
a) the duplication of mandates among state paramilitaries; b) blurred demarcation 
between law enforcement and military domains; and c) ambiguous definition of 
‘public order’ and ‘emergency’. 
 
Duplication of mandates among state paramilitaries 
 
The lack of substantial reform efforts in state paramilitaries left mandates among 
state paramilitary forces, namely, the National Guards, Internal Troops and State 
Safeguard Service, duplicated and sometimes conflicting. For instance, the 
National Guard was subordinated to the MoD in 1994 as a mere department, not 
as a main armed force. Taking a model from the American national guards, new 
roles of the National Guards were examined. According to the National Guards 
Department of the MoD, the Guard’s missions and functions in peacetime 
included: reserve training; training of “additional special forces” for the army; 
ceremonial functions; training and material and technical maintenance of 
peacekeeping troops; and participation in disaster relief operations. In wartime, 
the National Guard Department is responsible for local defensive operations and 
defence of vital state objects. Some of the mandates of the National Guards 
                                                          
210 A London-based NGO, Saferworld, began a SALW-related project in 2005. Furthermore, in 2005, 
local community members reported that they replied on themselves for protection and security rather than 
on the police. Due to the lawlessness in the society in the beginning of the 1990s, small arms proliferation 
among civilians increased rapidly. Studies conducted by CIPDD in Kvemo Kartli in 2004 shows that 
people still retained interest in acquiring arms. In the CIPDD study, inhabitants of the region explained 
that the failure of local authorities to guarantee their security and the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of 
law enforcement bodies drove them to arm themselves. 
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overlapped with the other existing armed forces. For examples, disaster relief 
operations were mandated to Internal Troops, and the protection of vital state 
objects to State Safeguard Service. During the Shevardnadze period, no reform 
to address the duplicating mandates among various state paramilitaries took 
place. 
 
By contrast with the Shevardnadze government, the Saakashvili government 
advanced to reform quasi-state and state paramilitaries. As discussed in chapter 
6, the Saakashvili government disbanded the Adjara’s paramilitary forces, 
transferred the Internal Troops to the MoD, and removed the paramilitary forces 
from the MSS and transferred to the MIA. By abolishing the MSS and transferring 
the more militant paramilitary forces to the MoD, the Saakashvili government 
managed to bring its paramilitary forces along with the Western standards. 
However, this controversial issue of the lack of clear demarcation in mandates 
between paramilitaries under the defence and law enforcement bodies persisted 
under the Saakashvili government. 
 
The lack of a clear demarcation of mandates between the MIA and the MoD 
troops remained under the Saakashvili government. In a way, this issue of 
duplication of mandates among the state paramilitaries illustrates the specific 
security challenge that Georgia faced in the post-conflict and post-independence 
context, i.e., the definition of its security threats. In the early 2000s, Georgia’s 
territorial integrity was challenged by the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
As the 2005 National Security Concept highlighted, border security was one of 
the top security priorities for Georgia. Emerging security challenges in the 
bordering regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia required military operations. 
Yet, for Georgia, those separatist regions were ‘internal territories’ and not 
external adversaries. Thus, the security challenges there needed to be tacked by 
law enforcement bodies. 
 
Instead of having the defence forces take an overall control over the military 
operations, both the MIA paramilitaries were requested to take a leading role. The 
Strategic Defence Review assumed that the MIA to take a leading role in dealing 
with domestic threats such as terrorism, whilst the MoD leads defence planning. 
The Strategic Defence Review highlighted the need for inter-agency cooperation 
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between the MoD and the MIA, and their paramilitaries, rather than 
recommending to uniting paramilitary affiliations. In case of domestic threats, 
according to the Strategic Defence Review, the MoD would assist the MIA. The 
assumption for the inter-agency cooperation was that it is “impossible to separate 
defence and law enforcement in the contemporary security environment”. 
(Darchiashvili, 2008, pp. 20–21) Defence Review, however, both Interior Troops, 
then affiliated to the MIA, and the MoD’s troops were criticised for their 
uncoordinated actions during the armed clashes with the South Ossetian militia 
groups in summer 2004 (“Internal Troops abolished, units merged with the 
Defense Ministry,” 2004). 
 
Blurred law enforcement and military domains 
 
The second controversial issue left behind the non-substantial paramilitary reform 
is the lack of clear demarcation between state paramilitaries in law enforcement 
and military domains. This was particularly the case for border control. The State 
Border Protection Department, created in 1996, was tasked to carry out both law 
enforcement and military services (Krunic and Siradze, 2005, p. 32). 
 
The blurred demarcation between the two security domains also reflects the 
legacy of the Soviet Union in which Soviet Internal Troops were subordinated to 
MVD (Ministrestvo vnutrennykh del: Ministry of Internal Affairs), not to the defence 
ministry. 211  During the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili periods, the power-
ministry paramilitaries including Internal Troops changed their ministerial 
affiliations frequently, especially between the Ministries of Defence and Internal 
Affairs. The National Guard was, for instance, initially a quasi-state paramilitary. 
It then received an official status and became subordinated to the MoD. Later it 
was transferred to the MIA. Again, the National Guard became affiliated to the 
                                                          
211 The MVD was responsible for uncovering and investigating certain categories of crimes. The 
mandates of the MVD had a wide range of activities, including apprehending criminals, supervising the 
internal passport system, maintaining public order, combating public intoxication, supervising parolees, 
managing prisons and labour camps, providing fire protection, and controlling traffic. Until 1968, the 
MVD was also in charge of special psychiatric hospitals. This means that the MVD was not only in 
charge of controlling ordinary crimes, but also policing political dissidents in society. In order to ensure 
the Kremlin’s control over the anti-Soviet and anti-Moscow dissenters, the MVD was subject to dual 
subordination. Local internal affairs offices reported both to their local soviet and to their superior offices 
in the MVD hierarchy in Moscow (Finch, 1996). 
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MoD. The change of Internal Troops is another example illustrating the issue of 
blurred demarcation between law enforcement and military domains. Internal 
Troops changed its ministerial affiliation. Initially, it subordinated to the MIA, as 
the Internal Troops in the other Soviet republics like Russia. Initially, Internal 
Troops were to be reformed to become like the Turkish Jandarmes. (“Internal 
Troops abolished, units merged with the Defense Ministry,” 2004) However, 
Georgian Internal Troops became increasingly engaged in low-intensity combats 
in the separatist regions under the Saakashvili administration. The MIA and its 
Internal Troops were actively engaging in the low intensity military operations 
under the then Minister of Internal Affairs and militant nationalist political figure, 
Okruashvili. Despite the recommendation for the inter-agency coordination by the 
Strategic It was at this time that Internal Troops was transferred to the MoD in 
September 2004 (“Internal Troops abolished, units merged with the Defense 
Ministry,” 2004). 
 
Ambiguous definition of ‘public order’ and ‘emergency’ 
 
Another characteristic of the change of state paramilitaries in post-independent 
and post-conflict Georgia is the lack of clarity in the definition of key terms such 
as ‘public order’ and ‘emergency’. In the late 1990 and the early 2000s, the reform 
of the paramilitaries was carried out with a focus on ‘public order’. However, a 
lack of clear definition of key terms added further confusion to the formation of 
the paramilitaries. For example, the security forces under MoD, including the 
National Guards, were not only responsible for defending territorial integrity but 
also to ensure ‘civil order’ by defeating any types of armed forces that might seek 
to divide Georgia or to change, by force of arms, its political systems or form of 
government. In extreme situations, the paramilitaries under the MoD might be 
called on to assist civil authorities in maintaining order and perform police 
functions. Therefore, both the defence and law enforcement paramilitaries were 
mandated to restore ‘public order’ during a state of emergency was of both 
security and law enforcement forces. 
 
The definition of public order was key to determine which state paramilitaries 
would be deployed. However, there was little consensus or discussion over what 
consists of ‘public order’ and how to demarcate labours among the Ministries of 
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Internal Affairs, State Security and Defence, which the majority of the 
paramilitaries belonged to. A working definition of emergency and roles of the 
paramilitaries in such a situation would depend upon whether the situation is 
interpreted as ‘disorder’ (for which the police will be dispatched) or ‘violent 
conflicts’ (which is the responsibility of the military), rather than by an objective 
security assessment. The definition of the term ‘public order’ remained rather 
ambiguous, except that the emphasis was put on the protection of the President 
and state property and left free for interpretation. More concrete definition had not 
yet been made public. In addition to the regular armed forces, Georgia had 
reservists. The Law On Reserve Military Service states that reserve forces can 
be used both during a state of war or a state of emergency, as well as in other 
special situations.212 The Law, however, did not specify criteria for determining 
‘special situations’, nor roles of the reserve under such situations (Darchiashvili, 
2008, p. 61). This devoid of clear and objective definitions had a risk to create 
confusion within the security sector among the ‘power ministries’, i.e., the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, which had the power to mobilise 
Internal Troops in an emergency. The lack of clear definition blurred the distinction 
among the internal security forces of the military and law enforce, especially in 
the case of internal disorder. 
 
The duplication of mandates between the paramilitaries of the Ministries of 
Internal Affairs and Defence, as well as the ambiguous definitions of terms ‘public 
order’ remained unsolved throughout the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili times. 
Similarly, the lack of clear definition key terms including ‘public order’, ‘disorder’, 
‘violent conflict’ and ‘special situations’ remained ambiguous, leaving room for 
various interpretations that would allow a dispatch of a number of state 
paramilitary forces (and reserves) simultaneously. This situation suggests that 
the paramilitary change process under the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili 
governments produced an outcome opposite to what the international military 
advisers recommended: the separation of the defence forces from non-defence 
forces. 
 
                                                          
212 The Law On Reserve Military Service, Article 2, Paragraph 1, cited in Darchiashvili (2008), p.61 
(Darchiashvili, 2008, p. 61). 
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8.3.4.3 Uncoordinated external assistance to ‘non-military‘ security 
sector issues 
 
Since the late 1990, Georgia had received ample external support for its SSR. As 
the chapters in Part II discuss, the majority of the external assistance came from 
the Euro-Atlantic allies and spent on the fields of defence. Paramilitaries were not 
the main target of the external assistance, except some cases of the border 
control paramilitaries that received US assistance in combat capacity 
development. This lack of external assistance efforts for paramilitaries contradicts 
with what a group of international advisers have recommended for.  
 
In March 2005, the ISAB published a report on the progress in Georgia’s SSR.213 
The ISAB 2005 Report reviews the reform process in the security sector since 
1999, when the ISAB submitted its initial report. This ISAB report claims that 
unlike in 1999, the government of Georgia has a clear strategic goal for the SSR, 
i.e. the full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and its institutions. While 
the 2005 ISAB report acknowledges irreversible progress in the modernisation of 
the security sector, in particular, the MoD and its armed forces, the report points 
out that the field of police and public order requires further reform. In particular, 
the ISAB report urged the MIA to clarify plans for conducting the public order 
function, which lacked clarity, as discussed in the section above. 
 
As the 2005 ISAB report pointed out, Georgia had a need for reform in the area 
of non-military security sector, especially in public order issues. However, this 
was the area that fell in a vacuum of external assistance. NATO and the EU were 
the major assistance providers, but neither of them had programs focused on 
paramilitaries and public order issues. Johnson who headed the ISAB team at 
that time describes the chasm of the SSR assistance over the non-military part 
of the security sector, by pointing out an inactive role of the EU in this area: 
 
“On the military side NATO provides some of the cohesion required 
through the PfP and other programmes, but NATO only deals with the 
                                                          
213 ISAB was established in 1998 at the request of the Georgian government. The Board consists of 
experts from UK, US, Germany and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
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defence component. The EU, although it puts a great deal of financial and 
technical assistance into Georgia, is less good at coordinating its efforts 
and curiously reluctant to mirror NATO's lead role in the non-military parts 
of the security sector. In the absence of effective official international 
coordination mechanisms much reliance is placed on the efforts of 
embassy staff in country and on quasi-international organisations such 
as ISAB. There are improvements in sight in this area” (Johnson, 2005, 
p. 54). 
 
The EU had its own policy framework for assisting Georgia. In 1996 the EU and 
Georgia agreed on a PCA214 which served as the basis for the 2006 EU-Georgia 
European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP), which was in force for a 
period of five years (Simons, 2012, p. 280). The primary objectives of the PCA 
included to: 
 
 ensure enhancement of political dialogue between the parties through 
establishment of relevant structural framework; 
 support Georgia’s effort to strengthen democracy, economic 
development and adaptation of market economy; 
 promote harmonised economic relations, trade and investments between 
the parities and stable economic economy; and  
 provide legal, economic, social, financial, civil, scientific, technologic and 
cultural basis for cooperation.  
 
The PCA required the harmonisation of the Georgian legislation with the EU law, 
the EU’s acquis communautaire, the set of rules and regulations for all member 
states. Those rules and regulations include including in rules on public 
procurement, indirect taxation and nuclear regulations and transport. In other 
words, the PCA did not include components directly related to SSR apart from 
the judiciary, which was conducted within the context of the adaptation of the 
National Program of Harmonisation of Georgian Legislation with EU law.215 
 
                                                          
214 The PCA entered into force in 1999. 
215 The preparation process for the adaptation of the National Program of Harmonisation of Georgian 
Legislation with EU law started in 2001-2003.  
249 
 
The policy gap over the non-military issues thus appeared. OSCE was the 
organisation that could potentially fill in the policy gap. OSCE was launched in 
December 1992 on a request from Georgia. The OSCE mission was political, 
aiming at reaching a peaceful political settlement for the South Ossetia conflict. 
The mission became further tasked with supporting to resolve the conflict in 
Abkhazia, which was a responsibility of UNOMIG primarily. The mandates of the 
OSCE mission included SSR-related issues, such as helping Georgia to become 
a democratic state under the rule of law, promoting human rights and coordinating 
its work with the UN, the EU, and the Council of Europe (Stöber, 2010). The 
OSCE Mission shifted its mandates to SSR-related issues, in particular, non-
military areas such as community policing and police reform. However, the OSCE 
Mission’s activities were hampered and came to an end, due to the political strife 
between Russia and other OSCE members over Kosovo’s status as mentioned 
in chapter 7.  
 
The area of non-military security sector and, the controversial issue of ‘public 
order’ in particular, thus fell into a policy gap among SSR assistance providers 
and remained unattended.  
 
8.4 Paramilitary change in transitional societies 
 
Those characteristics of paramilitary change are not unique to Georgia but also 
found in other transitional societies. Most of paramilitary forces do not undergo 
substantial reform efforts. This section first turns to other transitional societies 
where those characteristics of paramilitary change are present and discusses 
emerging issues that require further research. The section then discusses the 
need for better understanding of paramilitaries by exploring recent paramilitary 
research and potential research agenda in this field. 
 
8.4.1 Issues in paramilitary change in transitional societies 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters on Georgia, the regime in power does not 
show a strong political will to reform paramilitaries unless it is necessary for 
regime security. If paramilitaries are targeted for reform, they hardly undergo 
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substantial reform but mere change. This was the case of the Georgian state 
paramilitaries, as presented in the earlier sections in this chapter. Similarly, in 
many other post-conflict societies, paramilitary forces often bypass reform and 
continue exercising its political and social influence. They often remain immune 
to substantial reform efforts in the absence of normative changes and solid 
external assistance to paramilitary reform. The consequence of the lack of 
paramilitary reform is often a negative one. Paramilitaries, i.e., either non-state, 
quasi-state, or state paramilitaries, continue committing atrocities. 
 
8.4.1.1 The absence of normative changes within paramilitary forces: 
Colombia and Serbia 
 
Whilst disarmament and demobilisation efforts have been paid, in many post-
conflict countries, non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries remain armed and 
often continue committing atrocities. In Colombia, for instance, a human rights 
organisation Human Rights Watch reports that demobilised paramilitaries 
continued to have a regional city under their control and even increases their 
involvement in local politics (Human Rights Watch, 2005b, p. 5). The report claims 
that Bogota concentrates merely on disarming and giving benefits to the 
paramilitary groups and that it does not make an effort to dismantle an underlying 
structure and financial power of these groups, which penetrate into the whole 
Colombian society (Human Rights Watch, 2005b, p. 3). 
 
A similar observation is made on the case of Serbia where paramilitary forces 
played significant role in wartime atrocities. 216  According to a report by 
International Crisis group, despite a cut of a formal tie between the governmental 
security sector and paramilitaries, the wartime time between them persisted in 
society (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 14). Despite the official peace process 
and its arrangements, fundamental power structures of paramilitary groups were 
hardly dismantled. Some scholars claim that this was a deliberate outlook,217 as 
the governments in those conflict-affected societies needed the paramilitaries 
                                                          
216 As in the case of Georgia, those paramilitary soldiers were mostly amateur without professional 
training. According to Woodward, “Paramilitary forces were full of teenagers faced with the choice either 
to leave the country or to join in a military organisation, but under little organised command or adult 
standard of behaviour” (Woodward, 1995, p. 249). 
217 “PMGs need the state to overlook then, or provide impunity” (Mazzei, 2009, p. 12). 
251 
 
closely associated with, yet unofficially, with themselves to continue engaging in 
violence against dissidents. 
 
8.4.1.2 SSR without solid paramilitary reform: Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
In Afghanistan, the international community divided the tasks among bilateral 
donors, each of which took a lead to implement each reform at the Bonn 
Conference in 2002. The USA became a leading donor for military reform, 
Germany for police reform, Italy for judicial reform, and Japan for DDR. The issue 
of paramilitaries fell into the chasm of the silo approach. Insecurity persists in the 
country because of insurgence by various paramilitary forces (i.e. Taliban, Al 
Quaeda and Hizb-I Islami). Other irregular armed figures including local militias 
and warlords prevent rule of law from being implemented in communities. 
 
Paramilitary reform is a challenging task even if a coordination mechanism for 
external assistance is in place. The example of the DRC shows that the 
assistance recipient country’s resistance against paramilitary reform efforts. As in 
the case of post-conflict Georgia, there are various paramilitary forces in the DRC. 
The SSR in the DRC therefore requires modernising and professionalizing those 
paramilitaries to function as modern military forces. However, there is no 
mentioning of reforming paramilitaries, those most highly trained and best 
equipped such as the presidential guards in the SSR policies. The paramilitaries 
fought in the civil war remain affiliated to their political leaders. The DRC received 
amble external assistance for SSR. Their SSR efforts were coordinated by the 
United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC), then the UN peacekeeping mission in the country.218 Unlike the case 
of Afghanistan, the UN played a pivotal role: MONUC coordinated the 
international donors and encouraged the Transitional Government to enhance the 
speed and commitment to SSR through the Joint Commission for Security Sector 
Reform.  
                                                          
218 The Security Council mandated MONUC to assist the then Transitional Government by providing 
advice and assistance on SSR: “including the reintegration of national defence and internal security sector 
forces together with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and, in particular, the training and 
monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” (United Nations, 2004). 
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Despite the coordination mechanism in place, however, SSR was done in a silo 
manner. The police reform was dealt with separately from the military reform.219 
Paramilitary forces were not included in the reform plan of neither the military nor 
police. The question of the status and role of paramilitaries was unquestioned in 
the SSR plan. As in the case of Georgia, paramilitaries fell out of the SSR 
assistance framework. In addition, the Transitional Government was reluctant to 
address paramilitary issues in the SSR process. As his power base, the President 
Josephe Kabila had to rely on his own elite unit.220 It appears that Kabila was not 
interested in advancing the SSR process since Kabila had tried to absorb the 
other forces into his own armed forces, “rather than allowing a genuine integration 
of command and control” (International Crisis Group, 2005). 
 
The lack of paramilitary components in the SSR in the DRC has resulted in a 
large scale of violence against people in the country. Irregular forces have 
continued causing atrocities against civilian populations, especially in Katanga 
province and the eastern region. The heavy military clash between the 
paramilitaries of the President and the former vice president Bemba in March 
2007 in Kinshasa (“EU says up to 600 killed in Congo fighting,” 2007) is another 
illustrative example of a violent consequence of the absence of paramilitary 
reform. 
 
Those cases from the post-conflict societies present an illustrative example of 
paramilitaries playing crucial role in domestic politics and being separately dealt 
with from the military and police issues and, consequently, with little reform efforts 
about paramilitaries. In such societies where the role of paramilitaries is 
significant, those paramilitary forces remain outside substantive normative 
changes. Despite the controversial issues and challenges found in the 
paramilitary domain, the international community has started adopting a new 
                                                          
219 As for the police, France and the European Union provided technical and financial assistance to reform 
and strengthen the Congolese National Police, whilst MONUC provided training for the National Police, 
including human rights training for police officers. As for the military, EUSEC proposed the Transitional 
Government their assistance to modernise various managerial functions within the army, in particular, the 
creation of an effective salary management. 
220 Groupe spécial de sécurite présidentielle (GSSP), consisting of 10,000 to 15,000 strong presidential 
guards. When Josephe Kabila became the president after his father’s assassination in 2001, the GSSP was 
reinforced with his father’s tribe, creating his own military office, Maison militaire and controlling many 
military resources. 
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approach to paramilitaries: training local police and militias to have paramilitary 
capacities, rather than reforming paramilitaries. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a close examination of paramilitaries in Georgia and other 
transitional societies and their change process and provided a detailed account 
on them. 
 
The close examination of the paramilitary typology shows both similarity and 
differences among themselves. On one hand, paramilitaries share common 
features in equipment and composition: most of they are equipped with light 
military weaponry. On the other hand, paramilitaries differ significantly in the 
statutory status. Paramilitaries can be either state quasi-state or non-state actors, 
depending on their degree and relations with a state. Furthermore, different 
function and role can be found even in the category of state paramilitaries. The 
deference does not stem from ministerial affiliation. Rather, as Hills points out, 
(Hills, 2000) paramilitary’s function and role are defined by how the state’s 
approach to internal security the regime security. The detailed examination of the 
example of the Georgian paramilitaries in this chapter confirms the point. To be 
more specific, having examined their socioeconomic, political and security roles, 
the chapter examined the trajectories of institutional change and change of those 
paramilitaries in Georgia. 
 
The analysis on the paramilitary change in Georgia further examines the change 
process and shows that paramilitaries’ change trajectory saw varying patterns 
such as emergence, evolution and dissolution. The analysis demonstrates that 
the paramilitary change process was driven by a number of political factors, i.e., 
a) domestic political dynamics among political elites and institutions and b) the 
regional violent conflicts. These factors affected different types of paramilitaries 
and their change trajectory differently. 
 
For example, the non-state paramilitaries were mostly disbanded in a voluntary 
manner after having lost popular support due to the loss in the armed conflict over 
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Abkhazia. The non-state paramilitaries had no formal legitimacy as a state actor 
and heavily relied on the popular support. Once they lost the support from the 
general public, disbandment of these forces did not meet strong resistance. The 
regional conflict developments, in particular, the 1993 defeat of Georgian 
paramilitaries in Sukhumi was the significant factor to reduce the popular support 
as well as the number of volunteer fighters for the non-state paramilitary forces. 
 
The quasi-state paramilitaries had two change courses: disbandment and 
transformation into a state organ. As for the quasi-state paramilitaries that 
underwent the disbandment, the deciding factor was the political dynamics 
among a handful of political elites determined the course of their change. This 
was since these quasi-state paramilitaries were led by influential political figures 
such as Kitovani and Ioseliani who become political rivals of the other political 
actors, i.e., the President: first Gamsakhurdia, then Shevardnadze. In the power 
struggle context, both the Presidents ordered the quasi-paramilitary forces to 
disband in order to curtail their influence. This makes a contrast with the non-
state paramilitaries that underwent a voluntary disbandment. During the 
Shevardnadze period, the National Guards avoided the forced disbandment and 
went under the control of the MoD. This transfer brought the National Guards and 
its commander, Kitovani, under the control of the state executive body and the 
President Shevardnadze. In other words, the transfer to the defence ministry was 
not an upgrading but subjugating the paramilitary force and its commander under 
his political rival, Shevardnadze. 
 
Unlike the non-state and quasi-state paramilitaries, most of the state 
paramilitaries survived without undergoing disbandment. However, some of them 
experienced a number of ministerial affiliation changes as a result of an 
abolishment of their affiliating ministry (the MSS) as it was involved in the political 
struggle with the then President. In other words, the paramilitary change in 
Georgia was largely driven by those domestic and regional political factors, rather 
than SSR principles and a security policy framework. 
 
The political nature of paramilitary change made it challenging for external SSR 
assistance providers to engage in paramilitary reform. The earlier chapters in Part 
II examined the process of security sector change and SSR efforts. In the case 
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of Georgia, both the domestic and external assistance providers hardly 
implemented paramilitary reform efforts. The reform of paramilitaries remained 
outside the scope of external SSR assistance, except the ISAB recommendation 
for the separation of the military and law enforcement forces. 
 
The political dynamics among the external actors can be attributed to the lack of 
paramilitary reform. Among the international actors, Russia’s diplomatic stance 
towards Georgia played a determining role. Russia utilised its veto power both at 
the UN and OSCE, managed to keep the international organisations’ role in SSR 
support minimum, except small-scale weapons collection programmes and 
humanitarian assistance. The lack of systematic, internationally supported DDR 
programme is another example of the weak engagement of the UN and its 
agencies concerning the SSR-related issues. Apart from the UNOMIG presence, 
the UN kept a low profile in Georgia in the post-independent period.  
 
The other actors in the international community did not counter Russia’s pressure 
robustly. Their priority seemed placed in establishing and maintaining stable 
Georgia. The paramilitary change process in Georgia was far from being a reform 
process guided by SSR principles. Nonetheless, the process led to the removal 
of the potential destabilisers and quasi-paramilitary leaders, i.e., Ioseliani and 
Kitovani for Shevardnadze; and Abashidze for Saakashvili, which did not meet 
any critiques from the international community. 
 
The absence of the paramilitary reform efforts is not a unique phenomenon. This 
chapter also examined the cases of other conflict-affected countries (Afghanistan, 
Colombia, the DRC and Serbia) where the vacuum in reform and assistance 
efforts targeting paramilitaries could be found. The understanding of varying 
types of paramilitaries, different change patterns and driving factors that 
determines the change charts would be useful to better equip the SSR research 
and practice, with paramilitary as a subject for analysis. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The thesis set out to develop a better understanding of factors driving and 
shaping security sector change in transitional societies, by focusing on Georgia 
as its case study. The thesis examined how the security sector actors interacted 
with socio-political dynamics between 1985 and 2008.  
 
More specifically, the thesis examined the processes and drivers of security 
sector change in Georgia during the transitional period, and their inter-relations 
with SSR agendas and donor supported programmes. By analysing security 
sector change from political economy perspectives, it explored varying 
socioeconomic and political dynamics that influenced the change process of 
security sector actors. The thesis particularly examined processes and drivers of 
change of policing institutions, namely, paramilitaries. 
 
The subsequent section presents findings in relation to the overall inquiry. The 
second section discusses the findings’ implications for the literature on the 
relation between security sector and political developments. The last section 
concludes the chapter and thesis by discussing future research considerations. 
 
9.2 Research findings 
 
This thesis provides rare research extensively examining the chronological 
security sector change in the post-Soviet space. The close examination of the 
case study on Georgia in this research produced a series of findings in relation 
to the main research questions concerning a) the determining factors in agenda-
setting for security sector change, b) the interrelation between security sector 
change and SSR activities, and c) objective and dynamics in the paramilitary 
change process. The research revealed that the security sector actors were 
politically active actors in the Georgian politics and society throughout the 
transitional period between 1985 and 2008. Similarly, agenda setting for security 
sector change of these actors was a highly political process. Among the security 
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sector actors in Georgia, those with policing functions, especially paramilitaries, 
were the most influential actors and escaped from substantial reform efforts. 
What took place in the Georgian security sector sphere during the transitional 
period is better described as security sector change rather than normatively 
informed SSR. 
 
The following sections present specific findings in relation to the aforementioned 
research questions. 
 
9.2.1 Factors determining agenda setting for security sector change 
 
The following section presents findings in relation to a set of key determining 
factors: power struggle among political elites and regime security as an 
incentivising factor for security sector change.  
 
9.2.1.1 Power struggle among political elites 
 
The analysis on the security sector change process highlighted actual driving 
factors that shaped the trajectory of the change of the security sector actors. In 
particular, power dynamics among a handful of political elites were key 
determining factors in the agenda-setting process of security sector change. The 
chronical investigation over the period of 1985 and 2008 revealed that this 
phenomenon has been consistent throughout the three different transitional 
periods studied in this research. 
 
Within the power dynamics, a handful of actors played influential roles in agenda-
setting of security sector change. The first group of actors is those who served as 
the President, i.e., Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili. In post-Soviet 
Georgia between 1985 and 2008, democratic governance and state institutions 
were yet to grow and mature. In the political context, power consolidation was a 
constant challenge for those in the executive position, and the President always 
played a central role in the power struggle. (See, chapters 3, 4 and 6) 
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The second group of key actors in the power dynamics was the security sector 
actors. In Georgia’s infantry and fragile democracy, the security sector actors, in 
particular, paramilitaries and the so-called ‘power ministries’: the MIA and the 
MSS as well as paramilitaries played a pivotal role in power struggle among 
political elites.  
 
As in the case of the overall security sector change, the change in paramilitary 
was heavily influenced by the political dynamics among a handful of political elites. 
The creation of state paramilitary forces, i.e., OMON and the disbandment of 
quasi-state paramilitaries in the early 1990 were direct results of the rivalry among 
political leaders. The first of such a rivalry took place between the President 
Gamsakhurdia and two paramilitary heads: Kitovani and Ioseliani, followed by the 
power struggle among Kitovani, Ioseliani and Shevardnadze. (See, chapters 3 
and 4).  
 
The MIA and MSS had been the most powerful state apparatus in the Soviet 
regime and called ‘power ministries’, too. (chapters 4 and 6) Having inherited the 
Soviet nomenklatura and closer tie to Moscow, and Soviet-style systems, the MIA 
and MSS became the strongest resistance towards the democratisation efforts in 
post-Soviet Georgia, as well as SSR efforts informed by democratic norms. 
 
In the context, how to handle these ‘power ministries’ was key in the power 
struggle process. The approaches took by Shevardnadze and Saakashvili makes 
a sharp contrast. Shevardnadze choose not to reform either of the ‘power 
ministries’: he had his power platform, the MIA, and its rival ministry, the MSS, 
hardly underwent any reform efforts. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 
Shevardnadze allowed the ‘power ministries’ to continue surviving on the informal 
economic activities so that he could secure regime stability, unchallenged by 
these ministries and subsequent political blocks. (See, chapter 4)  
 
On the other hand, Saakashvili took an opposite stance towards the MIA and 
MSS: his administration regarded the reform of the MIA and MSS as key political 
agenda, and carried out substantial reform efforts, including the abolishment of 
the MSS. The purpose of the reform efforts was the opposite of Shevardnadze: 
the removal of the Soviet nomenklatura. The reform efforts of the MIA and MSS 
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under the Saakashvili administration were more of a purge of the anti-Saakashvili 
block, namely the Soviet nomenklatura, and largely remained just as so. (See, 
chapter 6) 
 
9.2.1.2 Regime security 
 
Once these political elites consolidated a certain degree of power, the next 
challenge for them was to sustain its regime. The political elites’ regime security 
concerns became the other influential factor to shape the course of security 
sector change. The consolidation of public order and power-sharing among 
political elites drove the direction of the security sector change process. In spite 
of the changes in political ideologies (i.e. from communism to democracy) and 
diplomatic orientation, i.e., from the balancing diplomacy between Russia and the 
West to the diplomacy centred on the Georgia-US/Georgia-EU relations, the 
principle of preserving elites’ security was consistent throughout the period 
examined by the research. The regime security concerns prevailed over other 
security concerns such as state security and community security.  
 
Under the Shevardnadze regime, the absence of substantial reform in the power 
ministries was beneficial for the early stage of the Shevardnadze regime during 
the power consolidation phase. Therefore, a priority in security sector change 
was not to have any substantial change but rather maintain the status quo, 
especially within the MIA and MSS. Similarly, security sector change had a 
significant implication for the security of the Saakashvili regime. In the case of 
Saakashvili with the Soviet nomenklatura as political opponents, reform efforts in 
the MIA and MSS demonstrated tangible results of the regime change and 
garnered popular support for his government. 
 
In agenda setting for security sector change, the regime security needs were 
prioritised over community security and state security needs. Between 1985 and 
2008, Georgia had been challenged by a wide variety of security concerns. (See, 
chapters 5 and 7) Its border was threatened by the territorial disputes; community 
faced a multi-faceted human security threats; and state security was jeopardized 
by the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. Under the security environment, it was regime 
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security concerns that determined the course of security sector change rather 
than the human security and state security needs. The defeat of Georgia in the 
2008 Russo-Georgia War was a primal example in which Georgia did not success 
in securing its state security despite the heavily invested SSR efforts. SSR’s 
impacts on human security discussed in chapters 5 and 7 also support the 
observation.  
 
The politically motivated security sector change contributed to building and 
sustaining regime security only to a certain degree: it did not perpetuate regime 
security, as shown in the both cases of the Shevardnadze and Saakashvili 
governments. For the Shevardnadze regime, the balance of power act involving 
the MIA and MSS did not sustain regime stability. Resentment against the corrupt 
regime saturated and eventually led to the overturn of the Shevardnadze 
government. (See, chapter 4) For Saakashvili’s government, the reform effort 
remained as a political performance, without yielding any practical results in terms 
of state and community security, as discussed in chapter 7. 
 
9.2.2 The interplay between normatively informed SSR agendas and politically 
driven security sector change 
 
Having been heavily influenced by the political factors and regime security 
priorities, how did security sector change interact with the norm-based SSR 
interventions? The SSR assistance was based on liberal democratic norms and 
required Georgia to develop its security sector along with principles such as 
civilian control of armed forces, the separation of defence and law enforcement 
forces and the independence of the judiciary of the executive. The findings in the 
thesis suggest that these norms were adopted only partially. 
 
In Georgia, the efforts for SSR took place in parallel to the overall security sector 
change process. Domestic and external actors engaged in both the processes: 
the overall security sector change and SSR. On one hand, the security sector 
actors engaged in the overall security sector change. On the other hand, there 
were a group of actors including some international and Georgian experts, civil 
society leadership and so on who envisaged SSR as reform efforts informed by 
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liberal democratic principles such as accountability, transparency and right-based 
approach. A group of Georgian experts, civil society leaders and lawyers, for 
instance, drafted the 2005 National Security Concept with an emphasis on 
people-centred approach to security. (See, chapter 7)  
 
Their efforts did not yield tangible results either under the Shevardnadze or the 
Saakashvili periods. For the Shevardnadze administration, the implementation of 
any substantial reform efforts besides the defence modernisation took place. 
During the Saakashvili time, reform started to take place especially at the former 
‘power ministries’. But, as discussed in chapter 6, the civil society became divided 
along with the line of pro-Saakashvili and those not so close to the regime. 
Consequently, the Saakashvili administration reduced its widow for policy 
dialogues by distancing critical experts and civil society organisations. This way, 
the SSR efforts were sacrificed at the sake of the political rivalry among the 
Georgian elites. 
 
External actors also involved in promoting SSR, too. The ISAB is an example of 
such actors who recommended the de-politicization and professionalization of the 
security sector. Georgia received the group of external advisers, the ISAB, who 
provided an overall strategic advice and recommendations for the SSR-related 
issues as early as in the late 1990. The advisory group provided a number of 
strategic and concrete recommendations to transform the Georgian security 
sector actors, especially of the military and police, into a professional security 
sector controlled by democratic control. Their advice, however, was translated 
into practice only partially. The paramilitaries’ example discussed in chapter 8 
demonstrates that Georgia did not follow the advice on the separation of the 
military and police forces, for instance. Besides the ISAB’s advisory activities, 
external support for SSR was largely limited at technical level. NATO Planning 
Programming Budgeting System/Financial Management System (PPBS/FMS) is 
one of such support aimed at enhancing managerial accountability within the 
military. (See, chapter 7) 
 
Besides these few efforts addressing liberal democratic principles, the majority of 
domestic and external efforts in security sector change targeted either strategic 
interest of the external partners and/or Georgian counterpart. The defence sphere 
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is where both the assistance providers and receiver saw a mutual interest for 
external assistance, largely under the NATO partnership framework. As 
discussed in chapters 5 and 7, the Western countries, especially the USA, 
provided an ample of assistance arrived since the mid-1990s. However, external 
assistance programmes and activities that took place in the security sector were 
not necessarily informed of liberal democratic norms. The Georgian counterpart 
received assistance in various forms such as the provision of equipment and 
combat training. While the defence sphere saw a progress in developing combat 
capabilities that was brought up to the level of NATO inter-operability standards. 
The provision of assistance was limited in other areas of the defence spheres, 
however. (See, chapters 5 and 7)  
 
The SSR assistance provided by the Western ally countries appears to be 
influenced by their strategic interests rather than liberal democratic values or 
Georgia’s security. The research in the thesis suggests that the reason for the 
uneven reform efforts in the defence, police and justice spheres can be attributed 
to two political factors. First, during the 1990 when Georgia was a fragile state, 
the priority was placed in the stabilisation of the Shevardnadze regime. As 
discussed in detail in chapter 4, liberal democratic norms in the security sector, 
in particular, the police, were not encouraged due to the need for reserving the 
corrupt environment for the regime stability. The Western ally countries 
accommodated the absence of reform in the police sphere, by prioritising the 
stabilisation of Georgia that appeared to necessitate the regime security.  
 
The second factor relates to the strategic inter-dependency between Georgia and 
the NATO ally countries. For the USA and the other NATO ally countries, 
Georgia’s increased geopolitical importance in the post-9.11 period in which 
Georgia became a frontline for the USA and its allies’ anti-terrorist strategy. For 
Georgia, enhancing a strategic partnership with these Western countries became 
more crucial during the Saakashvili time in which the diplomatic relation between 
Georgia and Russia grew antagonistic and volatile. This way, Georgia and its 
external assistance providers found a common interest in advancing combat 
capacities immediately rather than norm-based reform efforts which may need 
substantive time and resources. 
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9.2.2.1 Compromised liberal democratic SSR norms 
 
The SSR policy discourse and its principles were not the drivers that shaped the 
change courses of the Georgian security sector actors. Rather, it was the 
domestic political dynamics that shaped the courses of the security sector actors. 
The research revealed that how the implementation of the liberal-democratic 
principles to the security sector governance was compromised. This was 
particularly prominent in the areas of civilian control and community security.  
 
Since the independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia had developed its own 
security sector institutions and the institutional framework for the civilian control 
was established. However, the actual implementation of civilian control was not 
effective. In Georgia, the fragility of civilian control was displayed by a number of 
military raids led by the civilian leader, Okurashvili, and the excessively violent 
suppression of anti-government demonstrations under the Saakashvili 
administration that was supposedly a liberal democratic government. (See, 
chapter 6) 
 
A few factors attribute to the phenomena. First, a balance of power between the 
executive and legislature was weak. The executive, especially the President was 
too powerful in terms of its governance authority. The dominance of the ruling 
party in the legislature did not counter the powerful executive body, which 
disabled an effective implementation of civilian control. In the environment, the 
effectiveness of the parliamentary oversight was limited. Another factor was the 
territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The so-called frozen 
conflicts provided some Georgian elites such as Okruashvili who garnered 
popular support by appealing to Georgian-centric nationalism with a justification 
for employing the militant political rhetoric and subsequent militant actions. The 
general public accommodated such a militant political leadership style for which 
the early 1990 when civilian paramilitary leaders led the armed forces and the 
country was not yet a distant memory. The third factor lies within the interplay 
between domestic political dynamics and external assistance providers. The 
domestic political factors affected the course of security sector change SSR 
guidelines and advices provided by the strategic partners such as NATO and the 
264 
 
EU. The SSR assistance providers such as the EU, NATO and the OECD were 
not prepared or positioned to interfere in the domestic power games. The SSR 
implementation was heavily affected by the domestic power struggle, and its 
outcomes became compromised by the domestic political factors. 
 
Another area where the liberal democratic norms were not realised was 
community security. As discussed earlier, the chronical examination of the 
agenda setting of security sector change revealed that it was regime security 
priorities that determined the course of security sector change. The persistent 
community security challenges also show that the SSR was not sufficiently 
carried out, especially in the sphere of the police and community policing. Despite 
the increase in domestic efforts and external assistance in the security sector 
since the mid-1990s, the security environment at community level, in particular, 
in rural areas and border regions, human rights abuses and corruption remained 
an issue. (See, chapters 5 and 7) Even under the Saakashvili period, SSR efforts 
informed by liberal democratic norms such as accountability, transparency and 
human rights did not achieve a wide outreach outside Tbilisi where the 
administration demonstrated police reform initiatives, such as the introduction of 
the Patrol Police. 
 
9.2.3 Objectives and dynamics of the paramilitary change process 
 
The research found that the paramilitary forces and their leaders played 
significant roles in the domestic politics during the timeframes examined in this 
thesis (see chapters 3, 4 and 6). The thesis then provided a detailed account on 
the paramilitaries and their roles in politics and society pre- and post-
independence Georgia (see chapter 8). It expanded the existing SSR literature 
that had not allocated sufficient scholarly attention to paramilitary forces. The 
case study on Georgia and the discussion in chapter 8 showed that paramilitaries 
are leading actors in transitional societies rather than being a sub-actor in the 
security sector. This way, the thesis expanded the scope of analytical units of 
most of the existing SSR literature and shed a light on the under-researched 
subject. The process tracing of the security sector change process over the 
extended period of timeline between 1985 and 2008 made it clear that 
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paramilitaries had been major security actors in the transitional period in Georgia. 
What factors determined and/or influenced the change in paramilitary groups? 
How did these changes in paramilitaries relate to SSR programmes?” 
 
The most influential factor to shape the course of the paramilitary change was 
the political elites’ regime security concerns, as in the case of the other security 
sector actors. The research on the Georgia’s case revealed that the phenomenon 
of domestic political dynamics affecting security sector actors’ change was best 
demonstrated in the case of the paramilitaries. (See, chapter 8) The investigation 
on the paramilitary change process found that the deciding factor for the 
disbandment of paramilitaries was an outcome of power struggle among political 
elites. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, paramilitary leaders played a significant role in the early transitional stage 
in Georgia. Security sector change was implemented in a way to remove them 
from power. During the early stabilisation phase under Shevardnadze, the 
establishing state security sector and civilian control meant for the Shevardnadze 
regime to remove the paramilitary heads from the state functions and politics. 
Paramilitary forces under the leadership of political opponents such as the 
Mkhedrioni and the National Guard became disbanded after their leaders lost 
against its political rivals in the power struggle. This patter continued even after 
Georgia had gained a certain degree of stability and the state paramilitary forces 
also followed the patterns. (See, chapter 8) 
 
The post-Soviet transition required Georgia to transform the Soviet Internal 
Troops and separate military and law enforcement bodies. However, efforts for 
paramilitary reform advanced to the extent to dismissing the paramilitary leaders. 
Once the dismissal was complete, few substantial paramilitary reform efforts 
along with the Western standards took place. However, given the politically 
motivated incentive for the paramilitary reform, the reform efforts did not yield 
more than the removal of the paramilitary heads and the disbandment of their 
supporters and paramilitary groups. Paramilitary reform did not contain more 
normative and substantial efforts such as the demarcation of military and law 
enforcement paramilitaries, and the clarification of mandates. The change of the 
security sector was therefore driven by regime security concerns. The 
observation was driven from the detailed account on the change of the security 
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sector in Georgia found that domestic political dynamics were the major driving 
factor to shape the courses of paramilitary change (see chapters 5 and 7). The 
research found that agenda setting for change in the security sector were highly 
political and involved power struggle among a handful of political elites. 
 
These domestic political factors affected the course of change more significantly 
than the liberal democratic principles and advices provided by the strategic 
partners such as NATO and the EU. The SSR assistance providers such as the 
EU, NATO and the OECD were not prepared or positioned to interfere in the 
domestic power games. The SSR implementation was heavily affected by the 
domestic power struggle, and its outcomes became compromised by the 
domestic political factors. The incentive of maintaining the Soviet-style 
paramilitaries was stronger than introducing the Western institutional set-up in 
which the military and police are separate. 
 
Table 9 Security sector change in Georgia under the Gamsakhurdia, 
Shevardnadze and Saakashvili regimes 
 
Regime Security sector change 
Gamsakhurdia 
(1991 – 1992) 
 Soviet security apparatus dissolved 
 Non-state paramilitary forces emerged 
 Georgian national security institutions began to develop 
 Very few external SSR assistance arrived 
Shevardnadze 
(1992 – 2003) 
 Most of non-state paramilitaries disbanded 
 Security sector institutions began to be professionalised 
 Legal framework for civilian control of armed forces placed 
 External SSR assistance provided mostly in defence and justice 
spheres 
 MIA, MSS and their paramilitaries left without substantial reform nor 
assistance 
Saakashvili 
(2004 – 2008)* 
 Remaining quasi-state paramilitaries disbanded 
 Substantial reform efforts including police reform and anti-corruption 
campaign took place 
 MIA and MSS influence substantially declined (MSS abolished) 
 External SSR assistance continued to focus on defence and justice  
 Civilian control of armed forces remained fragile 
* Saakashvili held the presidency between 2004 and 2013. This tables covers the timeline 
covered by the thesis.   
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9.3 Implications of the findings on key debates in the wider literature 
 
The findings in this study were derived from the single case study on Georgia and 
should not be considered as generalisations. Nevertheless, they provide 
considerations on how the analysis of the example of Georgia contributes to a 
better understanding of the characteristics, causation and challenges of security 
sector change in other transitional societies emerging from war and/or 
authoritarian regime. The following section introduces theoretical implications on 
the literature concerning the interplay between wider political transformation and 
security sector change process, as well as theoretical and practical implications 
on reform efforts for the overall security sector and paramilitaries. 
 
9.3.1 Theoretical implications 
 
This study contributes theory on the relation between security sector actors and 
political developments and asserts the following points. 
 
First, local actors are influential agents in the security sector change process in 
transitional societies rather than mere recipients of international assistance. The 
examination on Georgia’s security sector actors provides nuanced findings on 
local actors which have increasingly received scholarly attention in the context of 
liberal peacebuilding critiques (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2008; 
Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2010; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). The Georgia 
case suggests that political dynamics among political elites is a key factor for 
security sector change. Even where reform efforts informed by liberal democratic 
values take place, the political dynamics is a dominant factor to determine the 
course of security sector change. The study on Georgia shows that the driving 
factors for security sector change are embedded in a handful of political elites in 
power, and not based on policy strategy and security needs. The study also 
demonstrates that local security sector actors do not form a monolithic group; 
rather, it is a diverse group of actors with varying socioeconomic and political 
interests and roles, often with conflicting relations among themselves. The 
investigation on Georgia’s security sector change process extends critical 
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peacebuilding literature by providing detailed examination of local actors and their 
actual roles (Donais, 2008; Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mannitz, 2014). 
Furthermore, the study contributes to scholarship on security sector actors in 
authoritarian societies by providing some evidence that security sector actors, 
particularly paramilitaries, play multi-faceted roles in regime security 
maintenance (Cook, 2007; Davis and Pereira, 2003; Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 
1982; Nassif, 2013; Quinlivan, 1999). 
 
Second, liberal democratic values do not necessarily draw a distinct line between 
the international community and local actors and have the former impose these 
values on the local actors. One of main critiques on liberal peacebuilding debate 
lies in the ‘top-down’ approach of the international community. Acknowledging the 
roles of local institutions, they argue against intervening with liberal democratic 
values in a ‘top-down’ approach (Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009). The 
investigation on Georgia indicates that such an international-local dichotomy did 
not quite exist. Instead, the research showed complex and nuanced dynamics 
among local actors. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, liberal democratic 
values did not draw a distinct line between the international community and local 
actors. Rather, the Georgian political leaders such as Shevardnadze and 
Saakashvili chose to employ liberal democratic norms to advance certain policy 
agendas. Furthermore, it was not only the top-level Georgian leadership that held 
to the liberal democratic norms. Civil society in Georgia had a number of 
institutions advocating for human rights and other liberal democratic values and 
some of them took part in policy development concerning security sector change. 
 
Third, the international assistance provided in the security sector is not 
necessarily based on liberal democratic norms. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
international community’s so-called liberal peacebuilding interventions have 
gathered a wide range of critiques on its ‘norm-based’ approach (Chandler, 2017, 
2009; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2010; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). 
However, the close examination of various reform efforts in the security sector in 
Georgia reveals that most of the international assistance in Georgia was provided 
based on strategic interests of the assistance providers rather than on liberal 
democratic norms. The overall emphasis of the international assistance in the 
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field of combat training in the defence and border control spheres discussed in 
chapters 5 and 7 is an illustrative example. 
 
Fourth, paramilitaries play significant political roles in environments where 
democratic control of security sector actors remains incomplete, regardless of 
their statutory status. This research expands scholarship on paramilitaries by 
providing the case study from the former Soviet Union country that the existing 
paramilitary study has rarely covered. The focus on Georgia’s paramilitaries the 
research provided an extensive example of how irregular armed forces interacted 
with politics and state formation in societies other than Latin America and 
Northern Ireland on which the majority of the existing paramilitary studies have 
been conducted. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the earlier literature on paramilitaries have applied the 
state-focused understanding of paramilitaries based on the assumption that 
paramilitaries are assumed non-state entities which closely collaborate with a 
state (Aliyev, 2016; Carey et al., 2013; Mazzei, 2009). The investigation on 
paramilitaries in Georgia shows that the assumption does not always apply in 
transitional societies. In Georgia, paramilitaries operated in a state that 
experienced drastic socio-political transformation, including a near state-collapse 
in early 1990. The case study on Georgia revealed that paramilitaries could take 
many forms in terms of its relation to a state. chapter 8 illustrated that there were 
three types of paramilitaries, i.e., non-state, quasi-state and state paramilitaries 
in Georgia. Furthermore, the case study on Georgia shows that it was quasi-state 
paramilitaries that became the most influential political actors at some point, and 
that, for this reason, how to transform them became a crucial issue in the course 
of stabilising Georgia.  
 
The challenge of the quasi-paramilitary change leads to another analytical gap in 
the paramilitary studies relates to empirical issues that conflict-affected societies 
often face in post-conflict settings: what are the exact drivers for paramilitaries to 
transform, and how do they transform? In order for exploring those questions, this 
research carried out a more comprehensive overview of different types of 
paramilitaries including non-state, quasi-state and state paramilitaries in societies 
emerging from conflict. The research showed that their transformation trajectory 
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patterns differ depending on the key deciding factor i.e., the paramilitary leaders’ 
relation with the political regime. 
 
9.3.2 Policy implications 
 
The research advances the understanding of the security sector actors on the 
analytical focal points suggested by Schroeder and Chappuis: focus on local 
agency and domestic political systems; focus on interaction dynamics between 
external and domestic actors; and focus on non-traditional methodological 
approaches (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014). The research have two main policy 
implications for policy makers and practitioners engaged in reforming of the 
security sector in transitional societies. 
 
First, the case in Georgia suggests that SSR strategy development needs to be 
well aware of political implication/incentives for more effective implementation of 
SSR. This concurs to the critical SSR scholars such as Schroeder and Chappuis 
(Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014) on the point that the SSR study a need to adopt 
the dynamic approach to understanding the security sector actors, their dynamics 
and inter-relation with an overall political process, instead of regarding them as 
mere technical entities but political ones. To understand the actual dynamics of 
security sector and its reform requires placing the security sector actors and its 
reform process in a political context, rather than treating them as technical issues 
independent of the socio-political surroundings. 
 
Second, the SSR policy discourse and practice need to consider an additional 
unit for SSR implementation: paramilitaries. This research shows that paramilitary 
forces are the one of the main security sector actors in transitional societies. By 
contrast, the current reform efforts by the international community focus on the 
military and police and paramilitary forces remain hardly touched by reform, as 
some empirical research suggest. In order to avoid paramilitaries from restoring 
authoritarian and/or coercive security apparatus, SSR policy should address 
paramilitaries and political incentives that may resist or drive paramilitary reform.  
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9.4 Suggestions for future research 
 
While the pre-existing research on paramilitaries introduced above focuses on 
definitions of paramilitaries, especially from their association with states, the 
research in this thesis examined the process in which paramilitaries are 
transforming and what driving factors interact with and/or influence their change. 
Instead of describing the temporary and time-limited conditions and status of 
paramilitaries, this research took a longer timeframe for its analysis to look at 
certain paramilitary groups in Georgia and how they have evolved and 
transformed over an extended period of time and various political developments. 
The research on Georgia and other conflict-affected countries above suggest 
controversial characteristics of paramilitary change in transitional societies in 
which influential paramilitaries are often left without any substantial reform efforts 
to make paramilitaries accountable for the people not the regime in transitional 
societies.  
 
Despite this, as the examples from Georgia and the other transitional countries 
showed in this study, the current body of knowledge on the relation between the 
security sector actors and political developments has not sufficiently investigated 
the paramilitary sphere. To fill in the knowledge gap, the following research 
directions could contribute to better understanding of paramilitaries in transitional 
societies emerging from war and/or authoritarianism.  
 
The research in this thesis contributed to the literature on the relation between 
security sector actors and political developments by providing a detailed account 
on the chronical investigation of security sector change in Georgia, the former 
Soviet Union country, and how the change of security sector actors including 
paramilitaries interacted with the overall political development process. The 
former Soviet Union is one of the least researched geographical areas within the 
field of research exploring the relation between the security sector and political 
developments. Although this research on Georgia was a contribution to filling in 
the geographical gap in the literature that has rarely covers the former Soviet 
Union countries, it will be useful to conduct further research on the other Soviet 
Union countries. In doing so, the focus on paramilitary would be useful because 
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paramilitary is a security sector actor predominant in the former Soviet Union 
sphere in which the state paramilitary forces, Internal Troops, have played a 
significant role in maintaining public order and state stability. Such research on 
the former Soviet Union countries with a focus on paramilitary would be also 
helpful to understand security sector actors and their change process in other 
societies which share similar socio-political background with the former Soviet 
Union countries. 
 
This research also contributes to the paramilitary literature by providing detailed 
accounts on paramilitaries in Georgia. It is useful for future research to examine 
paramilitaries in varying geographical areas. The paramilitary literature has been 
limited in terms of the geography coverage. Most of the existing research has 
been conducted on specific paramilitary groups in a limited range of countries 
such as Colombia and Ireland. Research on the paramilitaries in Georgia in this 
thesis thus provided the paramilitary research with a new geographic perspective. 
Recently, paramilitaries have been actively engaging in violence in the eastern 
European countries such as Ukraine (Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016). Further 
research should be carried out to examine the former Soviet Union countries and 
the eastern European countries which have shown change patterns of the 
security sector actors, and especially paramilitaries, similar to those in Georgia. 
Studying paramilitaries in these countries would be useful to better understand 
their dynamics of change and implement more democratic change of security 
sector actors in transitional countries. 
  
273 
 
Appendix 1 Note on the field research methods 
 
The field research employed and triangulated various methods of data collection. 
Data collection was carried out through a) semi- and un-structured interviews and 
participatory observation and b) focus group interviews with community members. 
Field research activities conducted in 2002 received financial support from Akino 
Yutaka Eurasia Fund. Field research activities conducted in 2005 received 
financial support from the United Nations University’s Akino Memorial Research 
Fellowship. 
 
a) Interviews and participatory observation 
Semi- and un-structured interviews were conducted with Georgian 
parliamentarians, officials from the security sector agencies including the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, State Security and Defence. 
Relevant personnel from external agencies, local journalists and non-
governmental organisations were also interviewed. While the majority of the key 
informants chose to be anonymous, the following key informants agreed to be 
referred to: 
 
1. Mr Levan Berdzenishvili, Member of the Parliament, Republican Party 
2. Mr David Darchiashvili, Executive Director, Open Society Institute 
3. Ms Sabine Freizer, International Crisis Group, Caucasus Project Director 
4. Ms Tamara Pataraia, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and 
Development 
5. Mr Levan Ramishvili, Liberty Institute, Chairman 
6. Mr Nika Rurua, Member of the Parliament, Deputy Chairperson of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security 
7. Ms Dato Sikharulidze, Deputy Minister of Defence 
8. Mr Shota Utiashvili, Head of Analysis Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
9. Mr Paata Zakareishvili, Center for Development and Co-operation 
 
b) Focus group interviews 
Focus group interviews were conducted to collect and analyse data in a bottom-
up approach. Sample data were collected from three communities of Akhaltsikhe, 
Marneuli and Zugdidi, considering geographical and social variables as 
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discussed in chapter 1. In each of the communities, focus group interviews were 
conducted with a group of men and a group of women. The total number of the 
participants is 51 (26 men and 25 women). Workshops were held for each social 
group separately to avoid either of the gender groups dominate the other. 
 
The focus group interview methods were informed by participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA) techniques to generate raw data directly from the local community 
members. Entry points to the communities were established by the time of arrival 
to the communities through contacting and interviewing with relevant local 
organisations in the region.  
 
Upon the arrival, I trained three facilitators chosen by a local civil society 
organisation on PRA tools. The facilitators included one female collaborator who 
facilitated the female groups, and one male collaborator who facilitated the male 
groups. It was these Georgian facilitators who facilitated focus group interviews 
while I was present at the workshop venue and observing the participants and 
workshop proceedings. In addition to the training on PRA, the facilitators and I 
discussed the overall research questions and specific research questions of this 
research. I provided them a list of guiding questions to be asked at the focus 
group interviews. 
 
The language used in the focus group interviews were either Georgian or Russian. 
The participants in Zugdidi responded mostly in Georgian, while the participants 
in Akhaltsikhe and Marneuli used both Russian and Georgian. Transcripts of 
workshop discussions were translated to English later by the female facilitator. I 
followed up the data collection by data reduction, including write-ups of field notes, 
transcripts of workshop discussions and interviews. 
 
The focus group interview arrangement with the low facilitators has both 
advantages and disadvantages. The presence of the female and male facilitators 
enabled to explore sensitive issues including GBV in communities. Using 
Georgian (and Russian for those whose first language was not Georgian) was 
necessary to conduct interactive discussions, the presence of the two local 
facilitators was indispensable.  
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The arrangement of having the local facilitators facilitate focus group interviews 
has its disadvantage. If I had facilitated the interview workshops, I could have had 
more control in how to guide group discussions and may have been able to ask 
more specific questions. However, this was not possible with the two local 
collaborators being the main facilitators. The translated interview scripts may not 
have conveyed every detail and nuance expressed by the participants, either.  
 
Despite these disadvantages, applying PRA techniques in the research was 
found useful as it explored local security challenges and dynamics in communities 
as discussed in this research. 
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